rsl@ihlpl.ATT.COM (Richard S. Latimer ) (09/01/87)
In article <128@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: ***[paraphrasing] What we need is a definition of `knowledge'. **A proper definition needs to identify the `genus' or class to which **the concept belongs and the `differentia' or differences which **distinguish the concept from others in that class. **How about?: genus = a hierarchial structure of inter-related thoughts ** and differentia = derived from actual sensations/perceptions ** (i.e. from reality) integrated via logical ** (non-contradictory) methods (i.e. through reasoning). **Thus: definition = a hierarchial structure of inter-related thoughts, ** derived from actual sensations/perceptions ** integrated via logical methods. **Or a `short form': "a mental grasping of facts of reality". **How do you like that definition? If it is unsatisfactory, can you **identify a clearer or more precise genus and/or differentia? > I can't say I really understand what you mean. What's "a mental > grasping of facts of reality"? "Knowing things"? So (since you ignore the definition that I generated, I guess you did not want a definition of knowledge afterall (as you stated that you did in your original posting [?]). > If this is the case, then I think that's quite a different thing from > giving a definition. > Some definitions might contain genera and differentia (like the classical > "featherless biped"), but I don't think they *all* do. > I prefer a simpler definition of "definition": Actually I was defining `knowledge' and not `definition', but go ahead and switch contexts if you like (it would help if signaled before you turned!!). > Let's call an object that is intended to convey a concept (a word, > phrase, symbol, picture, gesture, etc.) a "token". Then: > Token A is a definition of token B iff Token A and token B refer > to the same concept. > Note that the relation "is a definition of" is commutative. So B > would also be a definition of A. This sounds like a clear case of redundant, or too many, tokens; and not purposeful or useful `defining'. > Latimer's notion of definition would not cover, for instance, ostensive > definitions. In the exchange: > Q: "What is 'Jane'?" A: "[Points to Jane].", This hardly seems like `defining' to me; I would refer to it as `pointing at' so as not to confuse or obscure what I in fact was doing. > It is hard to think of hierarchical structures of genera. No one ever said that clear pruposeful definitions were easy for those who have poorly organized concepts! Perhaps there is a message for those who like to play Ring Around The Tokens. ;-) > Note that even this ostensive definition is commutative: > Q: "[Points to Jane]?" A: "That is Jane." And it is also cirular and largely useless (as a definition of a concept). How did you get off on this tangent anyway; We were discussing the definition of knowledge; Right [?] -- Eudaemonia, Richard S. Latimer [(312)-416-7501, ihnp4!ihlpl!rsl]
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (09/02/87)
In an earlier posting, I suggested to rsl@ihlpl.ATT.COM (Richard Latimer) that we needed a definition of "knowledge". In response, In article <2615@ihlpl.ATT.COM>, Richard started out by writing: >A proper definition needs to identify the `genus' or class to which >the concept belongs and the `differentia' or differences which >distinguish the concept from others in that class. Sorry. You started out with this definition of definition, and I thought you were defining "definition" all along and didn't realize that you had gotten around to defining "knowledge". To continue: >How about?: genus = a hierarchial structure of inter-related thoughts > and differentia = derived from actual sensations/perceptions > (i.e. from reality) integrated via logical > (non-contradictory) methods (i.e. through reasoning). >Thus: definition = a hierarchial structure of inter-related thoughts, > derived from actual sensations/perceptions > integrated via logical methods. >Or a `short form': "a mental grasping of facts of reality". >How do you like that definition? If it is unsatisfactory, can you >identify a clearer or more precise genus and/or differentia? I think this isn't too bad a definition of "the mind", or a part of it. It's not a bad definition of a data base, anyway. But I don't think it will serve as a definition of knowledge, because there is nothing in the definition that says anything about the truth or falsity (unacceptability or acceptability) of the data in the database. It could be derived logically from perceptions and sensations and still be quite incorrect. And I don't see how this definition equates to "a mental grasping of facts of reality", whatever that might mean. What I was after in my request was to arrive at a definition of what the act of knowing consists of. "Mental grasping of facts of reality" might be what I'm looking for, if I could understand what you mean by that. Concerning the definition of definition, I still don't think one has to give genus and differentia (species?). As I said: >> I prefer a simpler definition of "definition": >> Let's call an object that is intended to convey a concept (a word, >> phrase, symbol, picture, gesture, etc.) a "token". Then: >> Token A is a definition of token B iff Token A and token B refer >> to the same concept. >> Note that the relation "is a definition of" is commutative. So B >> would also be a definition of A. To which you answer: >This sounds like a clear case of redundant, or too many, tokens; >and not purposeful or useful `defining'. I think looking in any dictionary will demonstrate that this is in fact the way things are defined. Genus and differentia are by no means always given. Even defining by giving genus and differentia is giving another way of expressing the same thought. I think, however, that you are correct in implying that in a definition one may relate different concepts to each other, so that may be the purpose of a definition, in many cases (not all). Not, for instance, where one says, "Fleuve means river". However, even where the purpose of defining something *is* to show a relationship amongst thoughts, in defining something, you are still making an assertion that one set of tokens refers to the same concept as another set of tokens. If I say "medicine is the practice of repairing and maintaining human bodies", I am stating the conceptual equivalence of the tokens "medicine" and "the practice of repairing and maintaining human bodies". The latter phrase refers to a number of inter-related concepts for which (if we accept the definition) "medicine" becomes a shorthand. Later, I can use the word "medicine" and save all sorts of time not having to repeat the long phrase. >> Latimer's notion of definition would not cover, for instance, ostensive >> definitions. In the exchange: >> Q: "What is 'Jane'?" A: "[Points to Jane].", >This hardly seems like `defining' to me; I would refer to it as >`pointing at' so as not to confuse or obscure what I in fact was doing. Ostensive definition is a perfectly good way of defining things. In fact there is a good argument for saying that *every* definition ultimately rests on an ostensive definition, else how could we learn our first words? -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge