sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (09/13/87)
>Keywords: signs symbols words concepts individuals communication In article <2360@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >In article <160@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >|[In article 1258@pdn.UUCP| Somebody writes:] >||There is no restriction which prevents communication from a source back >||to itself (self-communication is also communication). >| >|Generally, though, I think of communication as occurring between two different >|individuals. > >Yes, but what is an "individual"? There are plenty of contexts in which it >is useful to think of person's mind as composed of separate entities, which >do not completely share information. Consider "repressed" memories, for >example. If one grants that such segmentation has any validity, then it is >reasonable to talk about intra-brain communication. Good observation, but there are a couple of points to make, and they may have more to do with differences in definition of "communication" than anything really substantial: 1. I differentiate between communication and the mere obtaining of infomation. I can look at my hand, but I think it's going too far to call that a communication from my hand to me or from me to my hand. If I'm driving a car, I think it's going too far to say I am communicating to my car. Rather, what is going on is *perception* and *control*, respectively. *Communication*, as I see it, has to involve two individuals engaging in an intentional action -- one intending to receive and the other to give communication. For instance, if someone intercepts a letter I am writing, that is not a commmunication to that person because it was not intended for that person. So this would apply to my knowing what's going on in a part of my mind. It's like looking at my hand. I can of course get data about repressed memories, etc., but it's going too far to call that a communication. If we are going to call that sort of thing "communication", then we probably need another word to describe the act of intentional sharing of information between people. 2. It is also true that each individual plays many roles at different times. Some of these roles demand a different self-definition than others. In driving a car, or talking to another person, the mind is generally felt to be a part of oneself. But in psychoanalysys, one retreats into a less extensive self-definition, from which parts of the mind are external to the self. This process is called "introspection", but I think this is a misnomer. What it "feels" like is a retreat from a more extensive self-definition to a point where parts of what was formerly considered to be the "self" are now viewable as external objects. This is not really communicating to "oneself", both because of reason #1 and because one is not longer "being" the thing one is now viewing. On reading #2 above, I realize it may seem rather weird-sounding. But if we look at the way people actually *experience* the acts of perception, action, and communication, and how people experience their own self-definitions at different times, I think it is accurate. Phenomenologically, at any given time, an act of perception separates the object of perception from the perceiver. In other words, a person is not that which he perceives. The act of perception also *joins* subject and object as polar opposites. Another way of looking at this is that communication requires a *distance* across which the communication goes from the point of origination to the point of reception. If there is no distance between the two points, communication is both unnecessary and impossible. This may be getting a bit far afield for this newsgroup. If so, you can direct replies to sci.philosophy.tech, where I am cross-posting this article. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/17/87)
In article <174@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >1. I differentiate between communication and the mere obtaining of >infomation. I can look at my hand, but I think it's going too far to call >that a communication from my hand to me or from me to my hand. If I'm >driving a car, I think it's going too far to say I am communicating to my >car. Rather, what is going on is *perception* and *control*, respectively. >*Communication*, as I see it, has to involve two individuals engaging in an >intentional action -- one intending to receive and the other to give >communication. I don't think perception and control are in the same category as communication. Let me deal first with control, because I think ordinary usage is clearly on my side here. A general certainly communicates with his subordinates when he sends orders to them. Yet he is equally clearly exercizing control over them. The communication is the *means* for exercizing control; there is no one or the other. For perception, the case is less clear; we tend not to describe an event as perception unless it is "direct". It would not be stretching the definition too far to call, say, gathering information by sending out informants as "perception"; but I admit it is stretching it a bit. On the other hand, I am quite willing to accept (and in fact do accept) that when the details of perception are examined, they turn out to involve communication as one of the component steps. Specifically, communication from the sense organ to the brain. >For instance, if someone intercepts a letter I am writing, that is not a >commmunication to that person because it was not intended for that person. There does seem to be some requirement for intentionality in communication, but I don't it is nearly so strong as to require that both parties be persons. I will point out that data transmissions between people and computers, or even between two computers, are commonly termed communication. I think it is sufficient that the sender intend that the recipient receive the data. This may either be a direct intentionality, or indirect. (I.e., the sender may be a device set up by someone, who intends it to communicate.) One might argue that communication requires transfer between *stored* information on both ends. This would rule out both the automobile and the perception case, while still leaving in the cases with computers. I think this is an unnecessary restriction, however. >So this would apply to my knowing what's going on in a part of my mind. >It's like looking at my hand. I can of course get data about repressed >memories, etc., but it's going too far to call that a communication. It depends, doesn't it, on *how* you get the information? If you just remember it, there doesn't seem to be any communication going on; but what if it presents itself to you in a dream? It seems in this case that the dream is being used as a communications channel by one part of the mind to communicate with your consciousness. >This may be getting a bit far afield for this newsgroup. If so, you can >direct replies to sci.philosophy.tech, where I am cross-posting this article. I have in fact done so. Actually, does it belong here, or in talk.philosophy.misc? Barring loud objections, I am prepared to leave it here. -- Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Ashton-Tate 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108 -- Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Ashton-Tate 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108