sarge@thirdi.UUCP (01/01/70)
In article <17963@aero.ARPA> crummer@aero.UUCP (Dr. C. A. Crummer (Charlie)) writes: >How about this for a definition? A symbol, in addition to being a thing in >itself, is a *pointer*. As a pointer it points, or evokes in the one >perceiving the symbol. A symbol is a pointer only because the one >perceiving it defines it to be one. A person from an aboriginal >civilization might see a photograph and just eat it. For him it may >signify or symbolize nothing. That sounds very reasonable. Are there any constrictions on what a symbol can point to? It seems to me that some symbols point to concepts, others to objects, others (like a swatch of cloth) to themselves. >Communication apparently depends on a >community of agreement as to the meaning of symbols. As was pointed out, >the photon that has interacted with matter in a certain way might be >interpreted by a physicist as a token or signal, which is just a certain >kind of symbol. The physicist may understand enough about the physical >world to know that a photon generated in this way can be seen as a signal >from the world and as such can not be mendacious. I agree totally about the community of agreement. The idea of a physical phenemanon as a signal from the world is intriguing also. I believe it was Berkeley (I believe) who viewed the physical universe as a communication from God. Thus, for him, all perceived physical events were *symbols*, and we could understand them as communications. Plato had a similar concept, with his Ideas that exist above the plane of physical existence, which Ideas are conveyed, or "pointed to" by physical events. Thus in Plato's case, the communication was from the higher plane of ideas (in God's mind) and in Berkeley's, directly from God, who, helpfully, gave us a universe of discourse. We can rely on such communication, because God (in whatever form) does not lie. Descartes based his reconstruction of the universe, after his reduction to "I am", on the non-mendacity of God, also. What I find intriguing is the similarity between this notion and the notion of there being an "absolute objective reality out there". In both cases, the phenomena we see are from something and pointers to or indicators of, that thing. In the Platonic and Berklean case, that reality is God or God's thought. In the materialist case, the phenomena are a "communication from": and "pointers to" an absolute material reality. In both cases, the more accurately we can decode this "communication" the closer we are to the "truth". It seems, therefore, to be only a short step from pantheism to utter materialism, a fact that neither the one nor the other might relish. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/15/87)
In article <164@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >So, there are the following categories of messages: > >1. Those that make statements. >2. Those that try to evoke specific experiences. >3. Those that stimulate and act as "inkblots" for the imagination of the > audience. > >Of these three forms of messages, only the first has truth value or >(therefore) mendaciousness. OK, although I would quibble about category 2. Suppose someone writes a book in which he attempts to get the reader to feel what it is like to drive a truck. Suppose that the author does not actually know what it is like to drive a truck, and therefore the experience evoked is all wrong. Or suppose he *does* what it is like to drive a truck, but deliberately evokes a different (perhaps more exciting) experience. I think there are grounds for calling either of these cases mendacious. Still, I think the original claim referred to the *symbols*, not the *messages*. Can you imagine symbols which can be used for messages of types 2 and 3, but not of type 1? I can't. So I'm at least willing to accept that the ability to be used mendaciously is one of the characteristic properties of symbols. I'm not yet prepared to accept it as part of the definition. (It certainly can't be the whole definition -- a message as a whole can be used mendaciously, yet the message is composed of symbols rather than being a symbol itself. Likewise, individual phonemes are parts of symbols, not symbols themselves.) Perhaps the originator of this discussion (whose name I have lost) can take a stab at filling out the definition. -- Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Ashton-Tate 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
myers@tybalt.caltech.edu (Bob Myers) (09/16/87)
In article <2374@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >In article <164@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >> >>1. Those that make statements. >>2. Those that try to evoke specific experiences. >>3. Those that stimulate and act as "inkblots" for the imagination of the >> audience. > >Still, I think the original claim referred to the *symbols*, not the >*messages*. Can you imagine symbols which can be used for messages of types >2 and 3, but not of type 1? Sure. How about music? What statements does Bach's Brandenburg Concertos make? Or for that matter, what specific experiences does it try to evoke? (though I think an argument can be made for this (type 2), it seems rather weak to me. I'll let someone else make the argument.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bob Myers myers@tybalt.caltech.edu {rutgers,amdahl}!cit-vax!tybalt.caltech.edu!myers
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (09/17/87)
In article <2374@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >In article <164@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >>So, there are the following categories of messages: >> >>1. Those that make statements. >>2. Those that try to evoke specific experiences. >>3. Those that stimulate and act as "inkblots" for the imagination of the >> audience. >> >>Of these three forms of messages, only the first has truth value or >>(therefore) mendaciousness. > >OK, although I would quibble about category 2. Suppose someone writes a >book in which he attempts to get the reader to feel what it is like to drive >a truck. Suppose that the author does not actually know what it is like to >drive a truck, and therefore the experience evoked is all wrong. Or suppose >he *does* what it is like to drive a truck, but deliberately evokes a >different (perhaps more exciting) experience. I think there are grounds for >calling either of these cases mendacious. The diciding factor would be the intention of the author. If the author intended to make a statement to the reader about what it felt like to drive a truck, then he could be mendacious, and it would be type 1, not type 2. If he only intended to give the reader a "trip", then it was not mendacious and it was type 2. I don't think you can lie without intending to say something! >Still, I think the original claim referred to the *symbols*, not the >*messages*. Can you imagine symbols which can be used for messages of types >2 and 3, but not of type 1? Sure! The Ankh, the Cross, the Swastica, Mandalas. Of course human nature is extremely resourceful, and a person can use almost *anything* to lie and deceive others. A person can rearrange the bed clothes to make it seem as though he *hasn't* been screwing his mistress in it, of he can frame another person by planting false evidence. Detective stories are full of examples of cases where things not normally thought of as signs of symbols are used to lie and deceive (or create false impressions). So there's no reason teh Cross, the Ankh, the Swastica can't be used deceptively. But it's not really because they are symbols that they can be so used. >I'm not >yet prepared to accept it as part of the definition. Me neither. Being used to lie or deceive is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for being a symbol. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (09/17/87)
In article <3997@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> myers@tybalt.caltech.edu.UUCP (Bob Myers) writes: > >What statements does Bach's Brandenburg Concertos >make? Or for that matter, what specific experiences does it try to evoke? >(though I think an argument can be made for this (type 2), it seems >rather weak to me. I'll let someone else make the argument.) > How about a tear-jerker? It tries to evoke grief. Or humor, that tries to evoke amusement? Or religious music that tries to evoke devotion or awe? A possible weakness with this type might be that one can never be sure exactly what experience the other person might be happening, since only the other person can actually experience it. But if this were really the case, we would never be sure when we were communicating at all, so we kind of have to take this point of faith, I think. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/19/87)
In article <3997@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> myers@tybalt.caltech.edu.UUCP (Bob Myers) writes: |In article <2374@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: |>In article <164@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: |>>[Kinds of messages] |>>1. Those that make statements. |>>2. Those that try to evoke specific experiences. |>>3. Those that stimulate and act as "inkblots" for the imagination of the |>> audience. |> |>Still, I think the original claim referred to the *symbols*, not the |>*messages*. Can you imagine symbols which can be used for messages of types |>2 and 3, but not of type 1? | |Sure. How about music? Are the constituent elements of music *symbols*? I think not; and the fact that they are not symbols, and cannot be used to make statements, rather strongly corroborates the claim. -- Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Ashton-Tate 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (09/21/87)
In article <2392@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >Are the constituent elements of music *symbols*? I think not; and the fact >that they are not symbols, and cannot be used to make statements, rather >strongly corroborates the claim. I think music most certainly symbolic. For instance, Renaissance musicians considered the type of scale used (Ionian, Dorian, Mixolydian, etc.) to represent different sentiments. Also -- how about tone poems? Word painting? And what about the Cross, the Crucifix, the Swastica, the Hammer and Sickle? Aren't these symbols? But can they be used to make statements (other than ostensive statements, of course, like "<showing the cross> is a Cross." In the ostensive sense, anything demonstrable could be used to make a statement). -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
myers@tybalt.caltech.edu (Bob Myers) (09/21/87)
In article <2392@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: > >Are the constituent elements of music *symbols*? I think not; and the fact >that they are not symbols, and cannot be used to make statements, rather >strongly corroborates the claim. I get the feeling we're running into definitional problems with 'symbol'. Are you sure you're not defining symbols so that your statement is true by definition? I think music is, in some sense, made up of symbols, which are musical structures. If you ask me just what they symbolize, I'm going to have a really hard time answering that, though. I think the problem arises because music symbolizes feelings, states of mind, etc., things which are not readily translatable into written language, and in ways that written language just cannot. Which is why they are expressed in music to begin with. Another problem is that the music is not readily broken down into its constituent elements -- the structure itself is the symbols, and once you start breaking it down, you destroy it. I do know this: when I listen to certain pieces of music, certain thoughts, memories, and emotions are evoked in my mind. At least within my mind, a particular piece of music symbolizes a particular state of mind (and fairly consistently). And different 'parts' of the music make up different 'parts' of that state of mind, insofar as either can be divided up. Anyone else want to try this? I don't think I've said this well. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bob Myers myers@tybalt.caltech.edu {rutgers,amdahl}!cit-vax!tybalt.caltech.edu!myers
seshadri@hpindda.HP.COM (Raghu Seshadri) (09/22/87)
>/ hpindda:sci.philosophy.tech / myers@tybalt.caltech.edu (Bob Myers) / 12:18 am Sep 21, 1987 / >I think music is, in some sense, made up of symbols, which are musical >structures. If you ask me just what they symbolize, I'm going to have >a really hard time answering that, though. I think the problem arises >because music symbolizes feelings, states of mind, etc., things which >are not readily translatable into written language, and in ways that >written language just cannot. Which is why they are expressed in >music to begin with. It seems to me that if music were made up of symbols (which,by definition merely stand for something else ) , we should be able to redefine the symbology and arrive at the same psychological reactions through any set of combinations of these symbols. But , in practice , this hardly happens. " The language of music knows no boundaries". In other words, these sound - sets already seem to have a predefined meaning in our minds and are capable of evoking precise moods. Without overstating this, in some sense, it must be hardwired in our mental make-up. RS
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (09/23/87)
In article <4750001@hpindda.HP.COM> seshadri@hpindda.HP.COM (Raghu Seshadri) writes: >The language of music knows no boundaries". In other words, >these sound - sets already seem to have a predefined meaning in our >minds and are capable of evoking precise moods. Without overstating >this, in some sense, it must be hardwired in our mental make-up. I think there is also "software" involved, surely. A Western repsponse to eastern music is surely different, emotionally and in other ways, from an Eastern response to the same music. Maybe it is sort of in between -- cultural "firmware"? -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
nash@su-russell.ARPA (Ron Nash) (09/23/87)
In article <4750001@hpindda.HP.COM> seshadri@hpindda.HP.COM (Raghu Seshadri) writes: >It seems to me that if music were made up of symbols (which,by definition >merely stand for something else ) ... I don't know where this idea got started, but it seems that, in some cases at least, symbols refer not to something else, but to properties they themselves possess. Consider Nelson Goodman's example of the tailor's swatch: it refers to properties possessed by itself -- color, weave, texture, and so on (but not, of course, size, shape, location, etc.). Goodman calls this "exemplification," and in his book Languages of Art he applies the idea in an interesting way to the question of symbolic meaning in music. Ron Nash Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University
bryan@seradg.Dayton.NCR.COM (Bryan Klopfenstein) (09/24/87)
Forgive me if the reference is inaccurate -- I do not remember the
appropriate articles to reference. Also, I am unable to quote previous
articles for the above reason. This is a problem with being new to the net.
It is sure to resolve with experience.
Anyway...
Music is definitely symbolic. A piece of music evokes a certain feeling
consistently. As stated in previous articles by others, the structure of the
music itself is what contains the symbolism. I fail to see, as someone
appeared to imply, that symbols in one language (ie. music) must necessarily
be translatable into another language (ie. written english). If this were the
case, what would be the need (or desire) for both languages, since one serves
the purpose successfully?
From the desk of :
Bryan Klopfenstein
NCR Corporation
Dayton OH
Note: These opinions have nothing
to do with my employers and may not
even reflect my thoughts... franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/29/87)
In article <189@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >I think music most certainly symbolic. It has become clear to me that the participants in this discussion are quite simply using different meanings for "symbolic". I detect no non-semantic content to the discussion at this point, and propose that it be terminated. -- Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Ashton-Tate 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
crummer@aero.ARPA (Dr. C. A. Crummer ) (10/01/87)
In article <4037@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> myers@tybalt.caltech.edu.UUCP (Bob Myers) writes: > >I get the feeling we're running into definitional problems with 'symbol'. How about this for a definition? A symbol, in addition to being a thing in itself, is a *pointer*. As a pointer it points, or evokes in the one perceiving the symbol. A symbol is a pointer only because the one perceiving it defines it to be one. A person from an aboriginal civilization might see a photograph and just eat it. For him it may signify or symbolize nothing. Communication apparently depends on a community of agreement as to the meaning of symbols. As was pointed out, the photon that has interacted with matter in a certain way might be interpreted by a physicist as a token or signal, which is just a certain kind of symbol. The physicist may understand enough about the physical world to know that a photon generated in this way can be seen as a signal from the world and as such can not be mendacious. In our quantum world one photon doesn't convey much information, however. Many an experiment has been scuttled because of the lack of a sufficient statistical sample. --Charlie