B2H@PSUVMA.BITNET (Brian W. Hart) (04/06/88)
I was browsing this news group when I noticed a discussion about whether "Water is H2O" is an analytic or synthetic statement. I have recently been reading many of Ayn Rand's books, and I thought that perhaps some of you might like to read what L. Piekov (sp?) has to say on the subject of the Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy. His essay on the problem can be found in Rand's book _An Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_. Piekov (sp?) contends that there is no such Dichotomy since all definitions actually cover all characteristics of a concept in the context of man's knowledge. He states that since definitions cover *all* characteristics, not just the general characteristics found in dictionaries, etc., a dichotomy is not possible within the context of man's knowledge. For example, the statement "Water is H2O" would be analytic, since one of the characteristics of water (in the context of man's entire knowledge) is that it is formed by the combination of two H atoms and one O atom. Thus, the statement evaluates effectively to "H2O is H2O" which is obviously analytic. Piekov (sp?), however, presents his argument in a much more detailed and structured manner, and I recommend that you read it before you crucify me for leaving out details, etc.
turpin@ut-sally.UUCP (Russell Turpin) (04/07/88)
In article <38334B2H@PSUVMA>, B2H@PSUVMA.BITNET (Brian W. Hart) writes: > I have recently been reading many of Ayn Rand's books, and I thought that > perhaps some of you might like to read what L. Piekov (sp?) has to say on > the subject of the Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy. ... > Piekov (sp?) contends that there is no such Dichotomy since all definitions > actually cover all characteristics of a concept in the context of man's > knowledge. He states that since definitions cover *all* characteristics, not > just the general characteristics found in dictionaries, etc., a dichotomy is > not possible within the context of man's knowledge. > For example, the statement "Water is H2O" would be analytic, since one of > the characteristics of water (in the context of man's entire knowledge) is > that it is formed by the combination of two H atoms and one O atom. Thus, > the statement evaluates effectively to "H2O is H2O" which is obviously > analytic. What Piekov does (as you describe) is simply to change the question under discussion, unfortunately without stating that he is doing so or why he thinks the classical question(s) shouldn't be answered. By shifting the meaning of definition away from "defining characteristics" and toward "all we know about something", he bypasses (and misses the point of) the analytic/synthetic distinction. But ignoring the question doesn't cause it to go away. There is a difference in kind between the following two pieces of knowledge: "A triangle's angles sum to 180 degrees", and "Reagan was elected US president in 1980", even though "the man who was elected US president in 1980" is, in some sense, a sufficient defining characteristic of Ronald Reagan. It is true that many philosophical advances are often the result of changing the questions that are asked. But before this is considered an advance, what is desired is an explanation of why the old question is misleading, futile, or misconcieved and why the new question is more appropriate. Simply shifting the question, without addressing the old concerns, is nowadays considered shoddy philosophy. In bypassing, rather than addressing, various philosophical questions, Leonard Piekov (isn't there an "h" somewhere in his name?) is following in the footsteps of his teacher, Ayn Rand. (He is also riding on her coattails, but that is another story.) For example, at least since Descartes's "cogito", people have wondered about any statement which seems to undermine the basis of or purpose for making the statement. These are sometimes called performative contradictions. Ayn Rand "solves" this problem by creating a new "logical fallacy": the "fallacy of the stolen concept". The problem with this is that there is no such logical fallacy, and I seriously doubt that a successful logic can be formalized that highlights such a "fallacy". The whole issue is tied to self-reference, which has been a knotty problem in the development of logic, and also to the meaning and purpose of dialogue, a problem that is (currently) outside the realm of formal logic. Before Rand even escaped Russia, Russell was working on the problem of self-reference. Why did Rand not read his work (amongst others'), enabling her to add to the serious dialog on the problem? There are many reasons, of which I will mention two. (1) Rand didn't really take most philosophers, or most philosophical questions, seriously. She was only interested in philosophizing to the extent necessary to justify her "sense of life" and her egoistic ethics. Thus, when she claims that her philosophical thought is influenced only by Aristotle and Aquinas, she is almost speaking the truth. She simply didn't read much philosophy. (I say "almost speaking the truth" because she was also influenced by Nietzsche, but later decided she didn't like him, so stopped acknowledging his influence. This is ironic, since his influence is much more visible in her work than that of Aquinas.) (2) She never developed the technical skills required to add to the corpus of serious philosophy. Despite early mathetical prowess, and a great concern with "logic", she never really developed the ability to deal with formal questions. Often the followers of Rand, or even just those of us who have seen something worthwhile in her writings, are puzzled by the fact that she is almost totally ignored by the philosophical community. (Yes, I know about Rasmussen's book, and Nozick's acknowledgements, but two books and a few mentions in prefaces to books hardly constitutes much attention.) The reason for this lack of attention is not any cabalistic stance on the part of philosophers, but rather the fact that Rand just completely and utterly failed to do the things that would bring her into the community. One could credit this as a sign of exceptional individual achievement, except that it is not clear that she achieved much as a philosopher, as opposed to her obvious achievements as a novelist and a visionary. To those who would contend otherwise, I ask one question: what new knowledge has she wrought? Russell