rapaport@sunybcs (William J. Rapaport) (03/08/88)
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO
BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM
RANDALL R. DIPERT
Department of Philosophy
SUNY Fredonia
THE INADEQUACY OF THE TURING TEST AND ALTERNATIVES
AS CRITERIA OF MACHINE UNDERSTANDING:
Reflections on the Logic of the Confirmation of Mental States
In this paper, I address the question of how we would confirm a
machine's, or any entity's, "understanding". I argue that knowledge of
the internal properties of an entity--as opposed to "external" proper-
ties and relations, such as to a linguistic or social community, or to
abstract entities such as propositions--may not be sufficient for the
justified attribution of understanding. I also argue that our knowledge
of the internal construction or of the origin of an artificial system
may serve as defeating conditions in the analogical reasoning that oth-
erwise supports the claim of a system's understanding. (That is, the
logic of the confirmation of understanding is itself non-monotonic!)
These issues are discussed within an analysis of the complex fabric of
analogical reasoning in which, for example, the Turing Test and Searle's
Chinese Room counterexample are merely examples of larger issues. No
previous contact with the logic of analogy, artificial intelligence, or
the philosophy of mind (other than having one) is assumed. [Shorter
summary: Will we (ever) be able justifiably to say that an artificial
system has "understanding"? Probably not.]
Tuesday, March 15, 1988
4:00 P.M.
Fronczak 454, Amherst Campus
For further information, contact John Corcoran, (716) 636-2438.rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) (04/04/89)
UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM
GRADUATE GROUP IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE
and
GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES
PRESENT
JACEK PASNICZEK
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology
Department of Logic
Marie Curie-Sklodowska University
Lublin, Poland
FIRST- AND HIGHER-ORDER MEINONGIAN LOGIC
Meinongian logic is a logic based on Alexius Meinong's ontological
views. Meinong was an Austrian philosopher who lived and worked around
the turn of the century. He is known as a creator of a very rich objec-
tual ontology including non-existent objects, and even incomplete and
impossible ones, e.g., "the round square". Such objects are formally
treated by Meinongian logic. The Meinongian logic presented here (M-
logic) is not the only Meinongian one: there are some other theories
that are formalizations of Meinong's ontology and that may be considered
as Meinongian logics (e.g., Parsons's, Zalta's, Rapaport's, and
Jacquette's theories). But the distinctive feature of M-logic is that
it is a very natural and straightforward extension of classical first-
order logic--the only primitive symbols of the language of M-logic are
those occurring in the first-order classical language. Individual con-
stants and quantifiers are treated as expressions of the same category.
This makes the syntax of M-logic close to natural-language syntax. M-
logic is presented as an axiomatic system and as a semantical theory.
Not only is first-order logic developed, but the higher-order M-logic as
well.
Wednesday, April 26, 1989
4:00 P.M.
684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus
For further information, contact John Corcoran, Dept. of Philosophy,
716-636-2444, or Bill Rapaport, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193.