[comp.society] Defining language..

00HFSTAHLKE@bsu.CSNET (Herb Stahlke) (05/12/87)

Max Webb's interesting contribution raises some definitional questions,
"definitional" perhaps being redundant since most of this ill-defined 
discussion has been definitional.  Animal language studies clearly show 
that animal languages can make use of "reusable 'parts'," as in bee dance.  

One might say that a major distinction between human and animal language 
involves the degree to which the message can be segmented into such reusable 
parts.  Both have a strong analog component, e.g., the use of pitch, intensity,
and duration to express intent, urgency, etc., but human language makes
use of much richer segmentation.  Animal languages do, however, make use
of very context specific distinctions.  Some monkey danger calls can
distinguish the nature of the danger (snake, leopard, etc.).  

Furthermore, the work done, especially at Yerkes in Atlanta, on training 
chimps to communicate through language-like symbol systems proves conclusively
that chimps are capable of using a rich syntax, words, reference to objects as
well as to classes, prevarication, etc., and that they are capable of teaching
this language to their young.  This fulfills most of Hockett's design features
for language.  

But the question of whether animals are capable of language and of 
literacy is beside the point.  The essential definitional question
has to do with what language is.  The best I've been able to come up with
or find is that what we call language is an adaptive externalization of 
cognition for social communication.  The brain must operate an internal
language for purposes of cross-modal perception and multimodal problem solving
and representation, and it is that internal language that we externalize
in speech.  However, even this definition begs the question of speech vs.
language, but that question gets a better answer when we look at J. L. Austin's
definition of the speech act, which Webb was just a little inaccurate on.
To quote Austin (How to Do Things with Words, OUP 1965, p. 108), who invented
the terms, a locutionary act is "roughly equivalent to uttering a certain 
sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent 
to 'meaning' in the traditional sense."  An illocutionary act is an act "such 
as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, &c., that is, utterances that 
have a certain (conventional) force."  And a perlocutionary act is "what we 
bring about or achieve *by* saying something, such as convincing, persuading, 
deterring, and eve, say, surprising or misleading."  

A passable way of paraphrasing this is to say that a speech ace consists of 
an intention on the part of the speaker to express some meaning and to bring 
about some result, a physical event in which the speaker produces a signal 
encoding that meaning and intent, and response from the hearer indicating 
understanding or the lack of it and the other sorts of effects Austin lists.

In Austin's sense, then, the written word may be a record of a locutionary 
act, but it is not a locutionary act, much less a speech act.  It's worth 
bearing in mind that the vocal-auditory channel is only one of several 
possible channels for locutionary acts, one that evolution has selected
as particularly successful.  A visual-spatial channel works well also, although
it prevents one from using one's hands for other purposes at the same time
and it doesn't do too well in the dark or from the bathroom to the kitchen.
The written word eliminates the effects of the design feature Hockett calls
"rapid decay of the signal," which is very important in terms of how the
brain processes auditory input, and, of course, the written word creates
the possibility of cultural functions for language that are impossible without
it.  

If we want a definition of literacy, it must have something to do with
a person's ability to participate in writing-dependent cultural functions.
Literature is one of these, but to identify literate and literacy with
literature is to confuse both denotative and connotative senses of the words. 

						Herb Stahlke         
						Department of English
						Ball State University