leff@smu.UUCP (Laurence Leff) (11/28/88)
Subject: AI-Related Dissertations from SIGART No. 104, part 3 of 3
The following is a list of dissertation titles and
abstracts related to Artificial Intelligence taken
taken from the Dissertation Abstracts International
(DAI) database. The list is assembled by Susanne
Humphrey and myself and is published in the SIGART
Newsletter (that list doesn't include the abstracts).
The dissertation titles and abstracts contained here
are published with the permission of University Microfilms
International, publishers of the DAI database. University
Microfilms has granted permission for this list to be
redistributed electronically and for extracts and
hardcopies to be made of it, provided that this notice
is included and provided that the list is not sold.
Copies of the dissertations may be obtained by
addressing your request to:
University Microfilms International
Dissertation Copies
Post Office Box 1764
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
or by telephoning (toll-free) 1-800-521-3042
(except for Michigan, Hawaii, and Alaska).
In Canada: 1-800-268-6090.
From SIGART Newsletter No. 104
File 3 of 3
Library Science to Social Work
--------------------------------------------------------------------
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-16512.
AU DALRYMPLE, PRUDENCE WARD.
IN The University of Wisconsin - Madison Ph.D 1987, 326 pages.
TI RETRIEVAL BY REFORMULATION IN TWO LIBRARY CATALOGS: TOWARD A
COGNITIVE MODEL OF SEARCHING BEHAVIOR.
SO DAI v48(07), SecA.
DE Library Science.
AB The study was designed to test hypotheses derived from a
psychological theory of remembering. An analogy between patterns
of retrieval from human long-term memory and information retrieval
from bibliographic databases was proposed. The model, known as
retrieval by reformulation, was first articulated by Williams and
Tou in 1982. The setting for the research was the public catalog
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where a substantial
portion of the library's bibliographic records is available in two
formats, a card catalog and an online catalog. Forty university
students in two groups were randomly assigned to the two catalogs
and completed a series of five searches on specified topics. It
was hypothesized that the two searching environments were
sufficiently different, particularly in the degree and kind of
feedback provided to searchers, to allow observation of
differences on four classes of variables: search outcome, attitude
toward the search experience and assessment of search results,
perseverance, and number of reformulations. Findings indicated
that greater perseverance and more frequent query reformulations
were associated with the online searching context. Larger
retrieval sets and more favorable search assessments were
associated with the card catalog context. No significant
differences were found between groups on the attitudinal measures;
however, initial steps were taken toward identifying three
effective constructs: "affability," "frustration," and
"expectation." In order to observe the cognitive processes used in
searching, subjects were asked to "think aloud" while they
searched. Transcripts of these verbal protocols were used to
identify reformulations and to further operationalize the
theoretical construct "reformulation." Observations were made
regarding the utility of protocol analysis in information
retrieval research. Additional post hoc analyses included overlap
of sets of retrieved items and investigation of variance
associated with the use of test questions.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-23441.
AU BARLOW, JUDITH ANN.
IN University of Colorado at Boulder D.B. 1987, 175 pages.
TI INTERACTIVE DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR MULTICRITERIA OPTIMIZATION.
SO DAI v48(08), SecB.
DE Operations Research.
AB Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) models allow for the
incorporation of numerous incommensurable goals and objectives as
criteria for decision analysis. A new interactive decision
framework for use in solving MCDM problems is presented in this
dissertation. This method is an interactive form of compromise
programming which is especially appropriate for problems which are
best evaluated from multiple risk perspectives and in cases where
numerous decision making perspectives serve as the multiple
criteria in the model.
The problem of selecting the most appropriate MCDM model for a
particular application is itself a MCDM problem. Because the
majority of decision making criteria used in selecting the most
appropriate MCDM model include qualitative heuristics, traditional
mathematical MCDM methods are not appropriate for the solution of
these problems. An expert system, the Multiple Criteria Decision
Making Model Adviser presented in this dissertation, was developed
to advise the practitioner in selecting the most appropriate MCDM
method for the solution of a particular MCDM problem.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-18423.
AU LESH, STEPHEN AUGUST.
IN Duke University Ph.D 1986, 330 pages.
TI AN EVIDENTIAL THEORY APPROACH TO JUDGMENT-BASED DECISION-MAKING.
SO DAI v48(05), SecB, pp1501.
DE Operations Research.
AB In both decision analysis and artificial intelligence, the
problems of representation and manipulation of information for
prediction of likelihoods are often strikingly similar.
Particularly in highly subjective or highly uncertain domains, the
decision process is more sensitive to decision maker judgments
about likelihood information than in domains captured
satisfactorily by objective likelihoods. The mathematical theory
of evidence, applied as an underlying theory for evidential
reasoning expert systems in artificial intelligence, also
possesses attractive representation and manipulation properties as
an underlying theory for judgment-based decision analyses.
Interval expected utilities resulting from such an evidential
analysis are decisive only in action choice for nonoverlapping
intervals. For overlapping intervals, a clear choice is not
indicated given the nature of the supporting evidence. However, in
an irreducible ignorance situation where a decision must
nevertheless be made, an innovative evidential interval-based
decision index is proposed that explicitly represents evidential
ignorance as well as decision maker preferences for coping with
that ignorance. A model for ignorance preferences permits decisive
choice under overlapping intervals and irreducible ignorance. The
evidential approach is illustrated by application to an
environmental management problem: forest prescribed burn
execution. Extension of the method to utilities as well as
likelihoods is discussed. The evidential decision making approach
provides (1) an explicit representation of evidential ignorance,
(2) an index of conflict among bodies of evidence to guide
learning, and (3) a decision index for otherwise inconclusive
decision situations. For decision problems characterized by large
degrees of uncertainty, incompleteness, or imprecision or highly
subjective inputs based on a number of sources of varying
reliability and relevance (i.e., judgment-based decision making),
an evidential theory approach to decision making may provide a
useful alternative to one based on probability theory.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-23145.
AU BAR-ON, DORIT.
IN University of California, Los Angeles Ph.D 1987, 439 pages.
TI INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (QUINE).
SO DAI v48(07), SecA.
DE Philosophy.
AB To an ordinary translator, the idea that there are too many
perfect translation schemes between any two languages would come
as a surprise. Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation
expresses just this idea. It implies that most of the 'implicit
canons' actual translators use in their assessment of translations
lack objective status. My dissertation is an attempt to present a
systematic challenge to Quine's view of language (and mind) and to
support the idea that one could develop an objective theory of
translation which is also faithful to actual translation
practices.
I expose a non-superficial similarity between external-world
scepticism and Quine's meaning-scepticism, and deploy against
Quine an objection which closely resembles his own objection to
external-world scepticism. I then develop a new interpretation of
Quine's reasoning, according to which denying objective status to
intuitive 'meanings' is Quine's way of avoiding a sceptical
problem about what other people 'really' mean.
I argue that the intelligibility of Quine's meaning-scepticism
turns on an implicit contrast between the perspective of the
theorist of language and the perspective of the user of language.
Quine's defense of his scepticism features a theorist of language
trying to probe an alien language-- a 'radical translator' -- who
reasons that her own judgments as a language user lack objective
status.
I take issue with the use Quine makes of the above contrast. I
first argue that understanding the goal of radical translators
requires knowing what is to be expected of an adequate translation
scheme. Since this is something we learn from experience with
existing translation schemes, I offer a pre-theoretic description
of the practice of translation between known languages. I show how
ordinary translators' assessments of the quality of given
translations derive from systematic judgments they make as
language-users. It is these sorts of judgments that guide actual
radical translators in ruling out bizarre alternative translations
of the kind Quine entertains in defending his scepticism. A proper
theoretical account of radical translation, I conclude, must begin
with-- and include-- the perspective of the radical translator as
a language-user.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-23148.
AU BRAUN, DAVID MARTIN.
IN University of California, Los Angeles Ph.D 1987, 304 pages.
TI CONTENT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION.
SO DAI v48(07), SecA.
DE Philosophy.
AB Thought experiments show that people who are physically identical
but have different environments can have mental states with
different contents. But many philosophers think that physically
identical people must also be psychologically identical. They
therefore believe these thought experiments show that differences
in mental state content do not necessarily mark genuine
psychological differences, but are instead merely fallible signs
of psychological differences. They conclude that content
attributions do not have a fundamental role to play in
psychological explanation.
I argue that persons whose mental states have different contents
are also psychologically different. Their mental states differ in
their psychologically important causal powers. Their mental states
tend to have different environmental causes and effects and tend
to have causes and effects with different intentional properties,
and these differences are psychologically important. So to
distinguish mental states by their contents is to distinguish them
by psychologically important properties. I also develop a theory
of content suitable for psychological explanation. The theory
appears able to distinguish between any two mental states that are
psychologically different, even in puzzle cases like Kripke's
famous example of Pierre.
Some critics of content contend that for psychological purposes we
need a new notion of content, narrow content, that supervenes on
physiology. I critically examine several different theories of
narrow content. I divide the theories into two kinds: "indexical"
theories (modeled after Kaplan's theory of indexicals) and
phenomenological theories. Some of these kinds of content do not
supervene on physiology. Other kinds of narrow "content" are
actually not kinds of content, or have other problems that make
them practically unsuitable for psychological theory.
I conclude that psychology needs broad content (i.e., content as
we ordinarily conceive it), and that it needs no other notion of
content.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-23150.
AU CHRISTENSEN, DAVID PHIROZE.
IN University of California, Los Angeles Ph.D 1987, 231 pages.
TI EMPIRICAL EQUIVALENCE AND SKEPTICAL METHODOLOGY: THE CASE OF THE
SWITCHED WORDS.
SO DAI v48(07), SecA.
DE Philosophy.
AB In this dissertation, I study the strategy of giving semantical
replies to skeptical puzzles. I concentrate on a very simple kind
of puzzle, which seems to invite--and perhaps even
require--semantical responses.
Skeptical problems of this kind, which I call "switched-words"
problems, are based on alternative hypotheses about the world
which are structurally very similar to our standard hypotheses;
for example, it has been asked how we can justify choosing our
standard physical theory over an alternative hypothesis formulated
by taking the standard theory and intersubstituting 'electron' and
'molecule' at every occurrence. Switched-words skeptical puzzles
are peculiarly resistant to anti-skeptical arguments based on
non-semantical considerations such as simplicity, ontological
economy, or explanatory power; however, they leave one feeling
that there must be some easy semantical way of answering the
skeptic. Thus they offer a way to isolate and study semantical
anti-skepticism in an environment where it should thrive.
In the first Chapter, I examine, and reject, the classical
semantical response of saying that the alternative theory simply
restates the standard theory in a different notation. The second
Chapter is devoted to a more precise statement of the
switched-words problems, and involves a methodological analysis of
just what anti-skeptical premises a skeptic must accept. In
Chapter Three, I examine another recent semantical answer to
switched-words skepticism, finding a modified version of it to be
applicable, though in a limited number of cases.
In the fourth Chapter, I develop a general form for giving
semantical answers to switched-words skeptics, which has the
last-studied answer as a special case. This general strategy is
independent of any particular semantical theory; it explains the
general failure of switched-words skepticism by reference to a
general feature of any plausible semantical theory. It also
explains why, in certain cases, the switched-words skeptic is
correct (a possibility discounted by others who have written on
this issue). Studying this strategy in Chapter Five reveals that
while it is important--even necessary--in replying to certain
kinds of skepticism, it cannot offer us an anti-skeptical panacea.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-17624.
AU DREBUSHENKO, DAVID WILLIAM.
IN The Ohio State University Ph.D 1987, 185 pages.
TI ABSTRACTION AND THE 'ESSE' IS 'PERCIPI' THESIS (BERKELEY, LOCKE).
SO DAI v48(05), SecA, pp1221.
DE Philosophy.
AB The dissertation is divided into two parts. In Part One, Locke's
theory of abstract general ideas is introduced and it is explained
how it is to be used in giving an account of how certain common
nouns refer. In the second chapter, Berkeley's attack on the
theory of abstract ideas is described. In the third chapter, a
defense of the doctrine proposed by J. L. Mackie is considered. It
is argued that this fails as it stands, but the chapter goes on to
suggest how Mackie's account can be revised so as to overcome
these shortcomings. In Part Two, some aspects of current thinking
concerning one of Berkeley's central arguments for Esse is Percipi
is discussed. In the chapter following this discussion, another
interpretation of the argument for Esse is Percipi is proposed and
an attempt is made to explain how this interpretation overcomes
some of the problems connected with other interpretations. In the
last chapter, an attempt is made to show that there is a direct
connection between the doctrine of abstract ideas and the Esse is
Percipi thesis. More exactly, it is argued that if there are
abstract ideas, then the Esse is Percipi thesis is false.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-19990.
AU GLEB, GARY TIMOTHY.
IN University of California, Los Angeles Ph.D 1986, 481 pages.
TI JUSTIFICATION AND SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE EXTERNAL WORLD (DESCARTES,
EPISTEMOLOGY).
SO DAI v48(06), SecA, pp1468.
DE Philosophy.
AB I investigate the extent to which Descartes's sceptical arguments
in the Meditations show that, given a traditional view of
justification, we cannot have justified beliefs in the external
world. On this traditional view, knowledge is essentially
justified true belief, and many beliefs are justified only if they
are backed by reasons. Consequently, one's justified beliefs are
thought to form a system: an inverted pyramid, resting on
foundational beliefs, or a 'raft', held together by coherence.
To illuminate this view, I contrast it with the 'reliabilist' view
of knowledge. Within this alternative view, the demand for
justification by reasons is largely replaced by a demand that a
modal relation holds between a knower's belief and his
environment. If this relation holds, then the belief is likely to
be true.
I contend that these views really agree on this point, since a
reason for belief, on the traditional view, also involves a
relation with this character. Then, starting from some ideas due
to Bonjour, I argue that the 'reliabilist' view does not
appreciate that epistemic activity is rational activity directed
at a goal--the acquisition of true beliefs. Consequently,
epistemic agents are normally obligated to have means to this
goal, namely, reasons for belief. In making my argument, I develop
an original account of epistemic possibility and doubt.
I then examine Descartes's sceptical arguments. If one accepts the
traditional view, I argue, one holds expectations about
justification that amount to constraints on acceptable systems of
justified belief. One is that a system is acceptable only if the
beliefs in it are likely to be true. Another is that a system is
acceptable only if it is sensitive to truth: that is, if the world
were different, the system could 'shift' towards the truth. But
Descartes's Dream and Demon Arguments seem to show that these
constraints, together with others, form an inconsistent set.
I discuss several strategies against these arguments, and show
that each rejects or radically revises some of the constraints. I
end by proposing a strategy, based on a transcendental argument,
that does neither.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-20611.
AU GOETZ, STEWART CALVIN.
IN University of Notre Dame Ph.D 1987, 231 pages.
TI A NONCAUSAL THEORY OF AGENCY.
SO DAI v48(06), SecA, pp1468.
DE Philosophy.
AB My dissertation consists of two main parts. In the first part, I
begin by assuming the plausibility of the libertarian thesis that
agents sometimes could have done otherwise than they did given the
very same history of the world. In light of this assumption, I
undertake to develop a model of agency which does not employ the
concept of agent-causation. My agency theory is developed in three
main stages: (i) I suggest that any agency theory must satisfy
four desiderata: (1) It must adequately account for the freedom
and responsibility of human agents. (2) It must provide an
adequate answer to the question of what distinguishes human
actions from mere happenings. (3) It must adequately account for
the epistemological fact that human agents have an immediate and
nonobservational awareness of their actions. (4) It should have
the support of a respectable philosophical tradition. I argue that
agent-causation provides a theory of agency which fails adequately
to satisfy these four desiderata. (ii) I claim both that human
actions are uncaused exercisings by agents of their powers and
that human agents typically act for reasons. (iii) I maintain that
the central issue dividing agency theorists and nonagency
theorists is whether reasons for performing actions cause the
latter. I maintain that the sense of 'because' in 'I did x
because...' is not causal in nature, but teleological.
Having developed my model of agency, in the second part of my
dissertation I investigate what are some of the paradigmatic
actions human agents perform. I claim that bodily actions, such as
moving an arm, are psychological in nature. Essential to my
argument is the concept of a body-image. A normal agent 'feels' as
if she is present in her physical arm. The way a normal agent
feels is revealed in the case of a phantom limb. The subject of a
phantom arm feels as if her amputated physical arm is still there
and she can move while feeling armishly. I maintain that the
bodily action of moving an arm is the agent's movement as a
psychological arm-image of her physical arm, whether the physical
arm is present or not.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-17431.
AU HIX, HARVEY LEE.
IN The University of Texas at Austin Ph.D 1987, 207 pages.
TI "WHAT PART OB YU IZ DEH POEM??": AUTHORSHIP AND AUTHORITY IN
INTERPRETATION (MICHEL FOUCAULT, ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, ROLAND BARTHES,
WILLIAM GASS).
SO DAI v48(05), SecA, pp1222.
DE Philosophy.
AB It is often assumed that the correct meaning of a philosophical or
literary work is the meaning the writer intended to convey. Some
modern critics have reacted against that assumption by saying that
there is no correct meaning of a work because the work's meaning
is to each reader what that reader takes the meaning to be. In
this dissertation, I argue for a via media: I try to show that
both the writer and the reader have creative roles in determining
the meaning of a text.
In the first chapter, I examine the debate between Michael
Foucault and Alexander Nehamas on what an author is. I argue
against Foucault that the difference between the writer of a work
and the 'author-character' in it does not imply that a reader
should be indifferent to the writer. I argue against Nehamas that
the connection between the writer and the author-character is not
capable of disclosing to the reader a unique, correct meaning.
In chapter two, I consider the debate between Roland Barthes and
William Gass on the death of the author. I argue against Barthes
that the reader does not wholly determine the meaning of the text,
and against Gass that the writer does not wholly determine the
meaning of the text.
In chapter three, I analyze the creative act to show that it
consists of at least five roles (which I name the ore, arche,
archive, artisan, and artifact). I show that these five roles need
not be filled by a single individual, and that the assignment of
the creative roles influences the meaning of a text. For instance,
if God has the role of arche, the meaning of the Bible is
different than its meaning if humans have that role.
In the fourth chapter, I show how variations from the "standard"
creative act may occur. I classify these variations into three
types of 'displacement' (a variation in which an extra step is
added to the creative process) and two types of 'multiplication'
(a variation in which more than one item or individual performs a
role in creation), and show how each of the variations influences
interpretation.
In chapter five, I evaluate the notion of the "implied author" in
the work of Wayne C. Booth and Jenefer M. Robinson. I argue
against them that the implied author is not created exclusively by
the writer, and that there is more than one implied author at work
in a given text.
In the final chapter, I identify three kinds of 'implied authors':
the narrator, a character within the work, the singular proxy, the
'author' postulated by the reader to account for the features of
the individual work in question, and the synoptic proxy, the
'author' postulated to account for the features of the corpus to
which the work belongs. I classify several kinds of relationship
which may hold between these 'implied authors' and show how the
relationship that holds in a given work influences the
interpretation of that work.
AN This item is not available from University Microfilms International
ADG05-60732.
AU JACOBSEN, ROCKNEY ALAN.
IN University of Alberta (Canada) Ph.D 1987.
TI PERCEPTION AND JUDGEMENT.
SO DAI v48(05), SecA, pp1222.
DE Philosophy.
AB Beginning with a criticism of the adequacy of a causal framework
for discussing human action and with a minimal explication of a
teleological framework, an account of the acts subordinated to
language learning and use is developed and defended. This account
emphasizes the nature of the semantic conventions of a language
and the role of a community in establishing and maintaining those
conventions.
The teleological framework is brought to bear to explain the
intensional character of indirect discourse. Well known
isomorphisms between indirect discourse and belief reports then
make it possible to extend the account of acts of speech to
explain belief acquisition, thus completing an account of the
nature of judgement. The result of employing teleological notions
is that our judgements are no longer viewed as mental artifacts,
or products of mental activity, which serve to represent the
world. Our judgements about the world, both what we say and what
we think, are, rather, the achievements we reach through the
coordinated exercise of skills acquired in a community setting.
Success in an inquiry depends upon skill in judging, but it also
requires an opportunity adequate for bringing us to knowledge or
justified belief. Perception provides that opportunity. An account
of perception is defended which emphasizes its role in providing
opportunities for taking discriminatory action towards the world
of public particulars. A consequence of the accounts of belief
acquisition and language learning is that perception is
non-epistemic.
The theories of judgement and perception presented appear to
create special difficulties for understanding how perception
contributes towards our arriving at opinions which we are
justified in holding to be true. The conclusion defended, contrary
to traditional empiricist theories of knowledge, is that
perception does not contribute towards the evaluation of
judgements. The role of perception in inquiry is remote and
causal; it makes it possible for us to make judgements about the
world, but does not contribute to our getting things right.
Skepticism is blocked, and our beliefs are justified, by the work
of linguistic communities in preserving semantic conventions for
speech and thought. Perception belongs to the natural world, but
the adjudication of contrary opinions and the conduct of inquiries
belongs to the social world.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-21418.
AU KOEHN, MARK ALLEN.
IN The University of Iowa Ph.D 1987, 166 pages.
TI THE LINGUISTIC LIMITATION (EPISTEMOLOGY, JUSTIFICATION).
SO DAI v48(07), SecA.
DE Philosophy.
AB There is often thought to be an inconsistency involved in the
holding of a sceptical view with regard to knowledge, especially
if one's scepticism approaches the level of a universal
scepticism. It is, of course, obvious that if I deny that we ever
know anything then I cannot claim to know such a fact, and, more
generally, it is equally clear that a sceptical doctrine cannot
have a higher epistemic status than the highest epistemic status
allowed by the doctrine itself. In my case, then, since my
scepticism is complete, it seems that the propositions making up
my position must be devoid of epistemic value. However, there are
other reasons for making assertions than simply the belief that
one knows them to be true or even that one has reason to believe
that they are true. One of the goals of my argument is to show
what follows from a particular set of assumptions, a set of
assumptions that is quite generally accepted. I am, in part,
attempting to make clear the consequences of certain views. At
various levels this project is an investigation into the nature of
the relations among various propositions and sets of propositions,
an attempt to show the connections between certain epistemological
doctrines and metaphysical views, between the ongoing rounds of
'example counter-example' epistemology and the fundamental
assumptions the epistemologists engaged in it, between absolute
justification and weaker forms of justification, between views
about the nature of thought, language and rationality and the
consequences such views have for what can consistently be held
within the fields of epistemology and metaphysics, between changes
in the concepts of 'truth', 'justification', and 'certainty' and
the consequences for the meaning and significance of actualized
knowledge claims. Thus, an epistemological view whose statements
are by the decree of that very view without epistemic value may
provide the context for discussion and understanding of more
general topics.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-20033.
AU KOONS, ROBERT CHARLES.
IN University of California, Los Angeles Ph.D 1987, 213 pages.
TI ANALOGUES OF THE LIAR PARADOX IN SYSTEMS OF EPISTEMIC LOGIC
REPRESENTING META-MATHEMATICAL REASONING AND STRATEGIC RATIONALITY
IN NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES.
SO DAI v48(06), SecA, pp1469.
DE Philosophy.
AB The ancient puzzle of the Liar (a sentence which says, in effect,
"I am untrue") was shown by Tarski to be a genuine paradox or
antinomy. I show, analogously, that certain puzzles of
contemporary game theory are genuinely paradoxical, i.e., certain
very plausible principles of rationality, which are in fact
presupposed by game theorists, are inconsistent as naively
formulated.
I use Godel theory to construct three versions of this new
paradox, in which the role of 'true' in the Liar paradox is
played, respectively, by 'provable', 'self-evident', and
'justifiable'. I also construct in modal operator logic a paradox
involving reflexive empirical reasoning. Unlike the paradox of the
Liar, the paradox of reflexive reasoning does not depend on
self-reference.
I consider various solutions to the Liar paradox and evaluate how
well these solutions cope with the paradox of reflexive reasoning.
I then formalize the solution to the paradoxes which I favor: the
indexical-hierarchical approach, first sketched out by Charles
Parsons and Tyler Burge. In this solution, occurrences of the
predicate 'true' (and, analogously, of 'self-evident' and
'justified') in sentence-tokens are contextually relativized to
levels of a hierarchy. Drawing also on some brief remarks of
Bertrand Russell and Charles Parsons, I develop an account of the
kind of schematic generality (or type-ambiguity) needed for this
theory to be statable.
Finally, I demonstrate that the principles shown to be paradoxical
are in fact presupposed by contemporary game theorists in their
reliance on the notion of common knowledge or, more precisely,
mutual belief. I create novel analyses of and corresponding
solutions to several recalcitrant puzzles within game theory,
including the "chain-store paradox".
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-23037.
AU LANGHOLM, TORE.
IN Stanford University Ph.D 1987, 174 pages.
TI PARTIALITY, TRUTH AND PERSISTENCE (SEMANTICS).
SO DAI v48(07), SecA.
DE Philosophy.
AB In recent years, semantical partiality has emerged as an important
explanatory concept in philosophical logic as well as in the study
of natural language semantics. Despite the many applications,
however, a number of mathematically intriguing questions
associated with this concept have received only very limited
attention.
The present dissertation aims to present a systematic study of
certain types of partiality in the area of basic model theory. Two
types of issues are given special attention: Introducing partially
defined models, there are many ways to generalize the classical
truth definition for sentences of a simple first order language
relative to standard, complete models. Different interpretations
of the formal framework motivate conflicting truth definitions
between language and partial models: A partial model can be taken
to represent a part of the world, or a partial information set.
The truth of a sentence can be supported directly by a part of the
world, but can also follow indirectly from an information set.
These notions are related, and the relation motivates a comparison
between various weaker and stronger alternative truth definitions.
Results are obtained about the extent to which these truth
definitions differ, and a number of characterization results are
deduced.
Among other conditions that are not expressible in the framework
of standard, complete model theory, a condition of monotonicity or
persistence of truth relative to partial models is argued to
follow under both the given interpretations of the formal
framework. The final chapter investigates the relation between
such conditions and expressibility properties in general. These
discussions culminate with a combined Lindstrom and persistence
characterization theorem.
AN This item is not available from University Microfilms International
ADG05-60893.
AU MALPAS, JEFFERY EDWARD.
IN The Australian National University Ph.D 1986.
TI AGREEMENT AND INTERPRETATION.
SO DAI v48(07), SecA.
DE Philosophy.
AB This dissertation is an examination of certain ideas arising out
of the philosophy of Donald Davidson and specifically out of his
conception of 'radical interpretation'. The aim of the work is
only partly one of exegesis; primarily it attempts to develop the
idea of 'interpretative holism' implicit in Davidson's work and to
develop also the implications which flow from that holism. The
notion of interpretative holism is a development on the
Davidsonian idea of the interdependence of meaning and belief--an
interdependence which sets the essential problem of radical
interpretation--but it also encompasses the other Davidsonian
marriage of truth with meaning. This emphasis on interpretative
holism and the particular way in which the notion is developed in
the dissertation brings with it an orientation more towards
hermeneutic theories of interpretation than to traditional
philosophy of language. The first part of the work lays out the
basic account of Davidsonian radical interpretation with respect
to its Quinean background and as it is developed through
Davidson's own work. Here the basic ideas of holism, charity and
indeterminacy are set out. The second part takes up Davidson's
application of these ideas to the problems of conceptual
relativism and epistemological scepticism; the question of the
transcendental and verificationist status of Davidson's argument
on these matters is also discussed. The third and final part looks
at the Davidsonian position in the context of Putnam's distinction
between metaphysical and 'internal' realisms and looks more
closely at the conception of truth implicit in interpretative
holism.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-17689.
AU METZLER, THEODORE ALBERT.
IN The Ohio State University Ph.D 1987, 216 pages.
TI A MODEL OF INTERACTING VISUAL AND VERBAL COMPONENTS IN HUMAN THOUGHT.
SO DAI v48(05), SecA, pp1223.
DE Philosophy.
AB The problem addressed in this dissertation is the problem of
explaining interaction between visual and verbal components of
human thought. The fundamental strategy adopted in this work for
solution of the problem consists of treating both visual and
verbal modes of thinking in terms of a common formalism that
describes plausible information processing operations of the human
brain.
In Chapter I basic elements of the problem are identified through
critical examination of Western philosophic history. The resulting
composite definition of the problem challenges us to explain how
visual components of human thought interact with verbal components
to support comprehension of certain words that are used with
general application, as well as comprehension of combinations of
such words in sentences and larger units of discourse. Although
major Western philosophers are shown to have engaged elements of
this problem repeatedly--over a period of approximately two
thousand years--various deficiencies in each of their efforts
indicate that we are addressing an abiding, important, and
unresolved difficulty.
In Chapter II and Chapter III a review of contemporary scientific
resources is employed to further refine formulation of the problem
and to identify guidelines for a modern "cognitive science"
approach to its solution. In particular, Chapter II introduces
relevant evidence obtained by contemporary experimental
psychologists, and Chapter III provides complementary
neuroanatomic and neuropsychological information.
In Chapter IV a general system design for a formal explanatory
model is proposed, showing linkage among functional components of
verbal and visual information processing subsystems, and relating
these components to the structure of the human brain. The basic
processing units of this model are represented as associative
matrix memory modules, and the mathematical resources of linear
algebra are employed to describe the operations they perform.
After its elementary features have been explained, the model is
applied to the problem originally defined in Chapter I.
In Chapter V the proposed model is discussed with respect to the
work of Western philosophers examined in Chapter I, and with
respect to future research projects that it may be expected to
generate.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-17810.
AU PECCHIONI, FRANK.
IN Indiana University Ph.D 1987, 274 pages.
TI META-LANGUAGE AND OBJECT CALCULUS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CARNAP'S 'LOGICAL SYNTAX' (GODEL).
SO DAI v48(05), SecA, pp1224.
DE Philosophy.
AB By developing some recent ideas on the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century history of logic, this dissertation lays a
foundation for re-examining the major product of Carnap's early
philosophical career.
The pioneering work of Gottlob Frege is the prime example of logic
as language. According to this view, a purely formal meaning is
intrinsic to logic and plays a significant role in the conduct of
inference. Moreover, this intrinsic meaning renders logic
self-justifying. Currently dominant attitudes adhere more closely
to logic as calculus. On this view, logic is an empty formalism to
which an extrinsic meaning may be loosely attached. The
justification of the system consists in showing it sound and
complete under a set-theoretically characterized range of
interpretations.
The success of this latter view is primarily due to its
association, first established in Godel's completeness proof, with
a quite distinct position which we may call meta-linguism. On this
view, which came to prominence in the work of David Hilbert,
language is a proper subject for cognitive study. Carnap defended
this position against one he found in Wittgenstein's work, a
position we may call extra-linguism. He has therefore been seen as
ascribing also to the associated calculus view.
A close examination of certain seminal works of Frege and Hilbert
shows the compatability of meta-linguism with the language view
and provides an opening for a reappraisal of Carnap's work. In
particular, his emphasis on a formal calculus can be seen as only
a tactic in his argument against extra-linguism, and the language
view emerges as a significant element in his implicit semantics.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-23068.
AU PEFEROEN, LUDOVIC.
IN Stanford University Ph.D 1987, 179 pages.
TI THE VARIETIES OF THINKING: RYLEAN REFLECTIONS ON THOUGHT AND
INTELLIGENCE.
SO DAI v48(07), SecA.
DE Philosophy.
AB Ryle, in The Concept of Mind and in his later papers, has
formulated views on the notions of thinking and intelligence. In
the first part of the thesis I argue that Ryle's dispositional and
adverbial account of intelligence is mistaken. I provide an
analysis of the notion of intelligence that shows it to be related
to the notion of intention. Ryle's position is vindicated,
however, in that in calling an act intelligent we are not implying
that it is the outcome of a process of thinking.
In a second part I address Ryle's views on thinking. I argue that
Ryle's adverbial account of thinking is mistaken, but that another
thesis of Ryle, that thinking is heterogeneous, is correct. I
review six different forms of thinking and show that they do not
share any property except the property of being intentional
episodes. This shows that almost any thesis that historically has
been held about thinking is false. The analysis of the different
forms of thinking, moreover, provides a precise formulation and
defense of Ryle's claim that thinking is not sui generis, but that
there is a conceptual relation between the various forms of
thinking and human capacities or skills other than thinking.
Finally, I argue that thinking is not a form of computation and
that thinking a thought, contrary to what certain philosophers
have held, can be a genuine action on the part of the agent.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-20970.
AU ROBERTS, MARK STEVEN.
IN University of Dallas Ph.D 1987, 264 pages.
TI THE ETERNAL EXISTENCE OF TRUE PROPOSITIONS.
SO DAI v48(06), SecA, pp1469.
DE Philosophy.
AB One central issue concerning the relationship between truth and
time is the mode of being of true propositions. In order to
understand what mode of being they have one must recognize that a
proposition is different from any type of mental act whose content
is a proposition such as an act of judging or doubting.
Propositions are also different from declarative sentences used to
express propositions. Moreover, propositions are different from
states of affairs, the referents of propositions.
Within the copula of each proposition is a syncategorematic
positing-concept. Its function is to posit the existence of a
state of affairs. This is the "claim to truth" made by each
proposition, and is independent of the asserting of a proposition
through an act of judging. Proposition are true when there is a
correspondence between a proposition and an existing state of
affairs. Truth is a property of a proposition itself and not the
actual correspondence.
True propositions are existentially independent of the mental acts
of persons for two or more persons can think the identical truth.
Also, there are logical relationships among true propositions
which obtain although only some of these true propositions have
been thought. For instance, the contrapositive of each true
proposition must be true even though the contrapositive
proposition is not also thought. Furthermore, because of their
unity and universality true propositions cannot be characterized
in terms of when and where they came into existence or how long
they existed. These features of true propositions cannot be
explained by granting merely the existence of states of affairs,
or merely the existence of possible true propositions.
Thus, all true (and false) propositions exist eternally and are
immutable. However, some eternally true propositions still refer
to temporallly-existing states of affairs. Nevertheless, they are
immutable due to the necessary presence of a temporal modality.
Furthermore, eternally true propositions are not identical to
necessary truths. The former can be either necessarily true or
contingently true.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-18768.
AU SKIPPER, ROBERT BOYD.
IN Rice University Ph.D 1987, 286 pages.
TI A CAUSAL THEORY OF 'ABOUT'.
SO DAI v48(05), SecA, pp1224.
DE Philosophy.
AB Whenever we make a claim about a fictional entity, we seem to
embroil ourselves in familiar problems of reference. This
appearance is misleading, because what a sentence is about bears a
greater resemblance to a Fregean sense than to a reference. All
previous attempts to define 'about' consist of two approaches: (1)
"metalinguistic" theories of 'about', proposed by Ryle and Carnap,
which fail to counterexamples wherein transparent contexts
generate paradoxical consequences; and (2) "semantic" theories of
'about' proposed by Putnam and by Goodman, which fail to
counterexamples wherein no term refers to that which the sentence
is about.
An untried alternative is to replace 'S is about k ' with 'S is
about k for person p '. Clearly, such a definition need not
confine itself to sentences, but may apply to works of art as
well. A detailed examination of how one actually goes about
arguing to an audience that some work of art W is about some
topic, yields a definition that approximates normal usage, yet
avoids many problematic notions, such as 'beliefs', 'ideas', and
'intentional states'. Necessary and sufficient truth conditions
for 'W is about k for p at time T' turn out to include as major
elements (1) a causal chain leading from W to a set of "explicit
thoughts" and dispositions, and (2) the lack of an "aesthetic
environment" which excludes W.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-13178.
AU THOMADSEN, NANCY SWEET.
IN The University of Wisconsin - Madison Ph.D 1987, 181 pages.
TI OPTIMAL ACTS AND OPTIMAL CONSEQUENCES: ON SOME LIMITATIONS OF
PRACTICAL REASONING.
SO DAI v48(05), SecA, pp1224.
DE Philosophy.
AB In this work I claim that practical reasoning aims at determining
acts that would be all in all optimal (best) to perform. This
claim is taken to characterize practical reasoning in the same way
that the claim that theoretical reasoning aims at determining true
propositions characterizes theoretical reasoning. It is, in other
words, not directly a claim about rationality. Rationality is a
characteristic of beliefs and choices, rather than of propositions
or, directly, of acts.
A characterization of what it is for an act to be all in all
optimal is developed. A particular act, to be performed by a
particular agent, is all in all optimal only if it is one of the
best acts that agent could perform, relative to all the facts, all
evaluative factors and all the act's alternatives. Only acts which
can be the subject of practical thinking are admitted as practical
alternatives.
Since it is here assumed that the value of an act is determined by
the value of its consequences, it may seem obvious that an optimal
act is an act which would have optimal consequences. This,
however, need not be the case. Practical reasoning essentially
involves the comparison of possible alternatives, some of which
are not actually performed. Non-performed alternative acts, it
will be argued, are vague. Therefore, each such act will be
associated not with a single set of consequences it would have,
but rather with a set of equally possible alternative outcomes it
might have. I argue that there is no way to evaluate possible acts
so that optimal acts must be acts associated exclusively with
optimal outcomes. The fact that optimal acts may be acts that
would have less than optimal consequences is attributed neither to
human epistemological shortcomings, nor to physical indeterminism.
It is instead attributed to human behavioral limitations, and to
the apparently ineliminable vagueness associated with possible
acts.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-19264.
AU PERERA, A. G. UNIL.
IN University of Pittsburgh Ph.D 1987, 113 pages.
TI INJECTION MODE DEVICES (IMDS) FOR INFRARED DETECTION AND NEURAL
NETWORK EMULATION.
SO DAI v48(06), SecB, pp1732.
DE Physics, Solid State.
AB Spontaneous pulsing has been observed in circuits containing
cryogenically cooled silicon p-i-n (p$\sp{+}$-n-n$\sp{+}$) diodes
under dc forward bias. The intensity of infrared radiation
incident on the diodes and the bias voltage controls the pulse
rate with no appreciable effect on the shape or size of the
pulses. The substantial voltage, current, and power output
eliminates the need for on-chip or off-chip amplifiers. The
spectral response of such a detector as measured from 22 to
32$\mu$m with a liquid-helium-cooled monochromator is reported.
The response is modulated by a multiple internal reflection
interference pattern. The interference pattern and the origin of
optical absorption are analyzed. A strong similarity is noted
between observed properties and the nearly universal means of
coding of visual information by animal photoreceptors and neural
networks. Infrared analogs of neural color coding and color vision
are proposed.
Time intervals T$\sb{\rm n}$ between successive pulses in spike
trains with durations up to 30 hours were analyzed as a function
of n. Temporal patterns depend on bias voltage and are
characterized by symmetric sets of Farey fraction frequencies
associated with remarkably narrow peaks in power spectra.
Resolution permitted identification of 115 of the 129 Farey
fractions with period $\le$ 40. A rule involving fractions
appearing in this system and other nonlinear systems is proposed.
Detector concepts are expanded to incorporate the nonlinear
dynamics concept of mode locking, which reduces fluctuations in
detector output without a corresponding reduction in detector
responsivity, showing minimum resolvable temperatures of 0.01K.
Simulation of neuron transient phenomena by electronic processes
in semiconductors is discussed from the point of view of hardware
for new approaches to electronic processing of information which
parallel the means by which information is processed in
intelligent organisms. The typical speed of the observed
transients has been slow by the standards of electronic switching
in computers. New results for such transients show much faster
switching times. Development of this hardware basis is pursued
through exploratory work on circuits which exhibit some basic
features of biological neural networks. The features discussed
include action potentials, refractory periods, excitation,
inhibition, summation over synaptic inputs, synaptic weights,
temporal integration, memory, network connectivity modification
based on experience, pacemaker activity, firing thresholds,
coupling to sensors with graded signal outputs and the dependence
of firing rate on input current.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-20594.
AU O'DONOHUE, WILLIAM THOMAS.
IN State University of New York at Stony Brook Ph.D 1986, 151
pages.
TI THE MEANING AND DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS: A BEHAVIORAL
APPROACH.
SO DAI v48(06), SecB, pp1817.
DE Psychology, Clinical.
AB The purpose of the present investigation is to develop and employ
a method of defining psychological terms. To this end, the major
philosophical views regarding meaning are critically reviewed. The
approach adopted here--experimental semantics--is most heavily
influenced by radical behaviorism, but also adopts some of the
views of ordinary language philosophy, logical positivism and
operationalism. This approach views language and linguistic units
as human behavior that can potentially be analyzed in terms of
their functional relationships with antecedent and consequential
environmental events. Certain antecedent stimulus conditions that
systematically influence the probability of the use of a word are
viewed as giving the word's meaning. This method, then, is used to
analyze the meaning of the words "prejudice" and "alcoholic".
General descriptions of the antecedent stimulus conditions found
functionally related to the use of these words are provided and
are argued to provide comprise an important part of the lexical
definitions of these words.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-20055.
AU COOKE, NANCY MARIE.
IN New Mexico State University Ph.D 1987, 135 pages.
TI THE ELICITATION OF UNITS OF KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIONS: ENHANCING
EMPIRICALLY DERIVED SEMANTIC NETWORKS.
SO DAI v48(06), SecB, pp1831.
DE Psychology, Experimental.
AB The notion that associations of units of knowledge underlie memory
has been pervasive throughout many psychological paradigms and is
especially prevalent in current semantic network theories. Units
of knowledge have been represented in semantic networks as nodes
and associations between units have been represented as links
between nodes. Unlike previous associational theories, semantic
network theories have attributed meaning to associations through
the use of links labeled with particular relations. Unfortunately,
there have been as many different types of units and relations
proposed as semantic network models. Attempts to address these
variations have been made through the development of semantic
network formalisms. An alternate approach is through the empirical
generation of networks using algorithms such as Pathfinder.
Semantic networks derived from human judgments can be used to
verify the psychological meaningfulness of intuitively derived
networks. In addition, the networks have some useful applications
as knowledge elicitation tools. However, there are limitations
inherent in the Pathfinder methodology that must be overcome
before it can be successfully applied. The research discussed in
this paper addressed two limitations that are also particularly
relevant to the historical issues of units of knowledge and
associations. More specifically, the problems of identifying the
critical units of domain knowledge to be represented by nodes and
of interpreting or labeling links in the resulting networks were
investigated.
In the first two studies units of knowledge were elicited from
experts in the domains of driving and flight maneuvers. The
elicitation tasks that were used included the listing of concepts,
steps, or chapter headings, and the extraction of main ideas from
an interview. The elicitation techniques differed in terms of the
quantity of ideas elicited, as well as the type of knowledge that
was elicited. A second series of studies addressed the link
interpretation issue using relations in a set of common concepts
and a set of programming concepts. Subjects either sorted linked
pairs into groups having the same meaning or labeled links with
the appropriate relation. Links were ultimately classified using
cluster analysis techniques. Results indicated that the clusters
were meaningful and that the link types represented by each
cluster corresponded to an independently derived taxonomy of link
types. In general, the techniques investigated in this paper
represent steps toward the formalization of aspects of the
Pathfinder methodology that are critical to its application as a
knowledge elicitation tool and as a tool for validating
intuitively derived semantic networks.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-20392.
AU GLUCK, MARK ALAN.
IN Stanford University Ph.D 1987, 75 pages.
TI FROM CONDITIONING TO CATEGORIZATION: AN ADAPTIVE NETWORK MODEL.
SO DAI v48(06), SecB, pp1832.
DE Psychology, Experimental.
AB We used adaptive network theory to extend the Rescorla-Wagner
model of associative learning to phenomena of human learning and
judgment. In three experiments, subjects learned to categorize
hypothetical patients with particular symptom patterns as having
certain diseases. When one disease is far more likely than
another, the model predicts that subjects will substantially
overestimate the diagnosticity of the more valid symptom for the
Rare disease. The results of Experiment 1 and 2 provided clear
support for this prediction in contradistinction to predictions
from probability matching, exemplar retrieval, or simple prototype
learning models. Experiment 3 contrasted the adaptive network
model to one predicting pattern-probability matching when patients
always had four symptoms (chosen from four opponent pairs) rather
than the presence/absence of each of four symptoms, as in
Experiment 1. The results again supported the Rescorla-Wagner
learning rule as embedded within an adaptive network model.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-22407.
AU KLUSMAN, PATRICIA M.
IN The University of Nebraska - Lincoln Ph.D 1987, 98 pages.
TI BOOTSTRAPPING: THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK IN AN OBSTETRIC DECISION
CONTEXT.
SO DAI v48(07), SecB.
DE Psychology, Experimental.
AB The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effects of
feedback on bootstrapped decisions in a natural setting. Ten
obstetric nurses from St. Elizabeth Community Health Center and
ten graduate students enrolled in the Psychology Department at the
University of Nebraska served as expert and novice decision
makers, respectively. A correlational analysis provided veridical
rankings for each of 41 community attitude survey items'
relationship to hospitalization length. To obtain subjective
rankings, both experts and novices rated the importance of the
survey items to the criterion. Based on the veridical and
subjective rankings, the experimenter then prepared obstetric
profiles from 12 randomly selected surveys. In a split-plot design
both experts and novices were randomly selected to one of two
feedback conditions. Subjects' task during the judgment phase of
the study was to predict the number of days obstetric patients
were hospitalized for the delivery of their babies on the basis of
eight cues. Half of the subjects received outcome feedback after
each of their predictions, while the remaining half received no
feedback information. Least squares regression weights were used
to construct subjects' response systems (e.g. bootstrapped models)
and the environmental system (e.g. optimal linear model). Using
the lens model approach, the results were that feedback produced
significant expertise differences in subjects' bootstrapped
judgments (p $\approx$.05), in the incremental validity of the
model over human judgments (p $<$.05) and in subjects' response
matching (p $\approx$.05). On each of these measures, feedback had
a detrimental effect on novices' performance, while having
virtually no effect on experts' performance. Edgell's hypothesis
that professional decision makers may obtain "blinders" in
processing information was supported. Implications of these
findings to other professional decision making contexts were
discussed.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-17482.
AU MCDONALD, KAREN JUNE.
IN The University of Texas at Austin Ph.D 1987, 221 pages.
TI A DISTRIBUTED MEMORY MODEL OF PRIMING AND SEMANTIC DISTANCE CONTEXT
EFFECTS IN A CATEGORIZATION DECISION TASK.
SO DAI v48(05), SecB, pp1536.
DE Psychology, Experimental.
AB One task which is often used in cognitive research is a
categorization decision task. In a categorization decision
experiment, a possible instance (e.g., rose or cedar) and a
category (e.g., flower) are presented to a subject who must decide
whether or not the possible instance belongs to the category.
When a propositional network model is used to describe what occurs
in the mind during categorization decision tasks, reaction times
are presumed to be related to the semantic distance between
concepts. Decision reaction times depend on the number of possible
choices in the system and the distances between nodes which must
be searched.
In the present research, a different metaphor is used. An analogue
model using the ideas of habituation and sensitization and the
information theory idea of signal detection is used to explain the
relative speed of reaction times for different decisions. This
model has similarities with distributed memory - matrix models
which have been used for computer simulations of various mental
processes.
The results of the research indicate the need for an interactive
and transformational representation model. Reaction time effects
are demonstrated not only for different kinds of word pairs but
for consecutive word pairs and within and between series of word
pairs. These effects are consistent with an interactive and
transformational model of mind but not with a propositional
network model.
Furthermore, despite the usefulness of propositional network
models for Artificial Intelligence purposes and for psychological
simulations of many kinds of thought processes, the distributed
memory - matrix model appears to be a better model of mind than
propositional network models for at least two reasons. First, the
distributed memory - matrix model appears to be a better candidate
for an interactive and transformational model of mind. Second, the
distributed memory - matrix model is more congruent with simple
models of brain functioning.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-11922.
AU PEREZ-COFFIE, JORGE.
IN De Paul University Ph.D 1986, 74 pages.
TI NAIVE REASONING: STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES.
SO DAI v48(05), SecB, pp1536.
DE Psychology, Experimental.
AB The process of understanding and completing analogies and
metaphors can be thought of as the result of the subjects' use of
specific structures and processes. The purpose of this study was
to determine which structures and processes mediate performance in
analogical and metaphorical reasoning tasks. In the practice phase
of the experiment, the subjects in the Analogies and Metaphors
groups were asked to explain analogies and metaphors,
respectively. In the testing phase, the subjects were asked to
complete both analogies and metaphors. A group not having a prior
practice session was included as the Control group. The analysis
revealed that subjects tended to use a relatively small number of
structures and processes to explain analogies and metaphors. In
addition, a regression analysis revealed that subjects'
correctness scores can be predicted above chance fluctuations
using as independent variables the mean frequencies of the
subjects' preferred structures and processes, and the mean number
of interconnections used by each subject. The results were
discussed in terms of their applicability to the study of
information processing models of reasoning.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-19266.
AU ROTH, CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL.
IN University of Pittsburgh Ph.D 1987, 742 pages.
TI NAIVE PHYSICS: A STUDY OF QUALITATIVE KNOWLEDGE AND REASONING AND
ITS ROLE IN SOLVING NUMERICAL PROBLEMS IN MECHANICS.
SO DAI v48(06), SecB, pp1833.
DE Psychology, Experimental.
AB This research explores the content of naive qualitative knowledge
and reasoning and its use to represent numerical problems.
Previous studies of misconceptions about mechanics demonstrate
that novices can provide qualitative analyses of phenomena and
often hold erroneous beliefs. In contrast, studies of numerical
problem solving in mechanics have shown that novices differ from
experts in not formulating qualitative analyses of a problem but
do possess valid, if incomplete, knowledge. The initial premise of
the dissertation research was that the incompatible findings
across studies of problem solving were due to using an
insufficient methodology. The research describes a more powerful
method and its application to these issues. Generally, the method
employed a wide range of situations and applied subtractive logic
and formal modeling to develop details about a novice's
qualitative knowledge that were then used to account for solutions
to numerical problems. The main findings about qualitative
knowledge and reasoning were (1) novices possessed articulated
beliefs; (2) those beliefs exhibited some degree of localized
generality; (3) novice knowledge was a mix of correct, incomplete,
and invalid propositions; and (4) most errors were attributable to
using defective knowledge rather than invalid reasoning. These
findings, although not entirely novel, are placed on a firm
empirical foundation through use of the method. The main findings
about numerical problem solving were: (1) novices used qualitative
knowledge to represent and solve numerical problems; and (2)
novices used forward search strategies under certain conditions,
suggesting that direction of search was a function of experience,
not expertise. Several findings cut across the kinds of problem
solving: (1) novices possessed alternative forms of some concepts
that were not necessarily informationally or computationally
equivalent; (2) novices did not hold all beliefs with equal
conviction; (3) relationships varied in the amount of information
they conveyed, resulting in levels of knowledge intermediate to
the qualitative and quantitative; and (4) in order for a
relationship to enter into reasoning, it must be expressible at a
level of information at least comparable to that embodied in other
participating knowledge components. Finally, an important feature
of the dissertation is a description of the method at a level of
generality permitting extension to other domains.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-24203.
AU STASZEWSKI, JAMES JOHN.
IN Cornell University Ph.D 1987, 125 pages.
TI THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY OF RETRIEVAL STRUCTURES: AN INVESTIGATION
OF EXPERT KNOWLEDGE.
SO DAI v48(07), SecB.
DE Psychology, Experimental.
AB This research investigates memory mechanisms called retrieval
structures and their relation to expert skills. Theoretically,
retrieval structures enhance skilled performance by enabling
experts to efficiently encode and retrieve large amounts of
information in long-term memory (LTM).
Hypotheses about retrieval structure organization, the loci of
their effects, and their functional properties were derived from
Chase & Ericsson's (1982) description of these mechanisms and
tested by having an exceptional mnemonist (DD) memorize and
retrieve long random digit lists under varied conditions.
Retrieval structure organization was studied by analyzing pauses
in DD's serial recall of 100+ digit lists. A detailed structural
hypothesis predicted the temporal pattern observed. The ability of
a process-model of retrieval structure operation to predict this
temporal pattern further supports the hypothesized underlying
memory architecture.
Predictions regarding the loci of retrieval structure effects were
tested by measuring (a) DD's encoding times for individual digits
of 25-, 50-, and 75-digit lists and (b) the pauses in his
subsequent serial recall. Correlational analyses show that a
common temporal structure characterizes DD's encoding and recall
of lists. The ability of length-specific variants of a general
retrieval structure model to fit these temporal patterns confirms
that retrieval structures mediate both DD's encoding and retrieval
of lists.
Two key properties of retrieval structures were studied using a
memory scanning task. After memorizing a rapidly presented
50-digit list, DD then received list probes to which he responded
by naming targets that either preceded or followed the probe in
the list. Analyses of response latencies and verbal reports
confirmed DD's ability to directly access information encoded via
retrieval structures. Results also support the claim that
retrieval structures encode ordinal relations in memory.
Finally, parameter estimates of DD's memory search rate obtained
by fitting retrieval structure models to serial recall and
scanning times show that these mechanisms enable DD to access
information stored in LTM with the speed and accuracy typical of
novices' short-term memory retrieval.
These findings argue for the psychological reality of retrieval
structures and provide insights into what experts know and how
they use their knowledge to achieve exceptional performance.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-16612.
AU HOFER, PAUL JEFFREY.
IN The Johns Hopkins University Ph.D 1987, 223 pages.
TI COGNITIVE STRATEGIES FOR INTERPRETING LAW.
SO DAI v48(05), SecB, pp1504.
DE Psychology, General.
AB A cognitive analysis of the information and problem-solving
components needed for legal reasoning is presented, focusing on
the judicial interpretation of vague legal rules. There are four
perspectives or roles from which lawyers reason: the philosophic,
judicial, advisory, and advocatory. The major structural
components of the law are the conditions and consequences of
rules, and the purposes of rules. Purposes are divided into
policies and principles. To evaluate a rule justified on policy
grounds, we need to analyse the cause-and-effect relation between
rule and purpose. Evaluating rules justified by principle does not
require causal reasoning.
There are two sources of legal rules, legislative enactments and
judicial opinions. The source can affect the type of reasoning
used for interpretation. Several cognitive strategies for
interpreting vague language and deciding if a rule applies to a
case are modeled. These are the literal, the instrumental, and
strategies that weight and combine literal and instrumental
factors. Literal strategies highlight the lexical properties of
rule conditions, and require that reasoners make category
membership or similarity judgments. Instrumental strategies
highlight the purpose of a rule and the causal link between the
rule and purpose. The strategies correspond to alternative
theories of jurisprudence.
A computerized test designed to diagnose which strategy a person
uses was created and administered to law students. Results
demonstrate that for most people, ratings of the applicability of
a rule to a case can be well predicted by two factors: (1) the
extent to which the facts of a case are subsumed under the
categorical terms in rule conditions, and (2) how useful applying
the rule's consequence to the facts of a case would be for
accomplishing the rule's purpose. Statutes and precedents are
treated differently by some reasoners. The implications of this
model, and the computerized assessment, for legal education, legal
practice, and the development of computer-assisted legal reasoning
systems are discussed. Our understanding of high-level reasoning
skills is greatly increased by a cognitive analysis. A model of
legal reasoning demonstrates how legal and scientific thinking can
be integrated.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-17865.
AU COBB, NORMAN, HAROLD-, R.
IN University of California, Berkeley D.S. 1986, 234 pages.
TI ANALYSIS OF JUDGEMENT IN PSYCHOSOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL CASEWORK.
SO DAI v48(05), SecA, pp1317.
DE Social Work.
AB Social workers are becoming aware of the impact of their decisions
on people's lives. Unfortunately, research on human judgement
demonstrates how poorly people make decisions. By looking closer
at the inferential process in making judgements, we can examine
the inferences social workers make about the importance or
relevance of client information.
Psychological decision theory describes the cognitive processes
decision makers use. Two common judgement heuristics,
representativeness and availability, are assumed to influence
decision makers and explain the occurrence of a common judgement
error called the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE). FAE is the
tendency of an observer to overemphasize the internal causes for
someone's behavior and underemphasize the influence of external
causes. The representativeness heuristic describes how persons
make judgements based on the similarity of objects. For example, a
person observed dancing in the street may be judged to have a
happy personality. The availability heuristic explains how people
base judgements on salient or vivid information, e.g. the rather
unusual sighting of someone dancing on the street may give rise to
a judgement questioning the dancers mental health status.
Five psychosocial and five behavioral caseworkers were videotaped
in assessment interviews with the same actress, acting a
prescribed client role. The interviews were structured to allow
the caseworkers the opportunity to think out-loud about the
client. The transcripts were analyzed for the presence of
Fundamental Attribution Error and, the implications are discussed
for the use or misuse of the judgement heuristics. The project
evaluated each method's potential for unbiased judgements. The
caseworkers' inferences were evaluated to determine how the
heuristics were applied. The project documents that psychosocial
and behavioral caseworkers emphasize different types of client
data and differentially emphasize the client's problems.
Implications for social work clinicians are discussed.
AN University Microfilms Order Number ADG87-18645.
AU HAGA, MYRNA PEARL.
IN University of Minnesota Ph.D 1987, 216 pages.
TI A DESCRIPTION OF EXPERT AND NOVICE CLINICAL REASONING IN AN
ILL-DEFINED PROBLEM AREA.
SO DAI v48(05), SecA, pp1318.
DE Social Work.
AB A process tracing methodology was used to gain access to the
clinical reasoning skills used by expert and novice social workers
during the performance of a novel social work task. The major aim
was to understand what is actually done by an individual as a
situation is analyzed and evaluated in order to make a response.
The rationale for the study lies in the assumption that if the
skill is to be taught, it must first be identified and understood.
The methodology used verbal protocols to obtain the data from
three experts and three novices, who "thought aloud" as they
progressed toward making a recommendation based on a simulated
case file. The literal translation was used to obtain episode
representations, which begin and end with a change in problem
solving activity. Episode representation was then evaluated as to
the type of process it contains, with the processes being derived
from the data. The identified processes become the data for
analysis. The expert and novice responses were contrasted in each
phase of the study.
Phase one identified the processes obtained in the subject
protocols. The findings indicated that expert and novice social
workers had the same clinical reasoning processes available for
use in simulated situations.
Phase two identified quantitative differences in the processes
used. The amount of time used by each subject in each process was
computed and differences between groups were found in five of the
ten processes. Qualitative differences were observed in three of
the remaining processes. Quantitative differences between subjects
in the processes used in differing quartiles was the focus of
phase three. The total time involved in each process per quartile
was computed, and a quantitative difference between groups was
observed.
Phase four concentrated on the amount of data subjects obtained
prior to making a recommendation. Results demonstrated that
experts used less data in reaching a decision and that the data
accessed was of a different type.
The final phase concerned the formulation of evaluative statements
and their position in the protocols. The results showed that early
evaluative statements were used most often by the novice group.
END OF FILE 3 OF 3