[comp.ai.digest] biological models?

gls@odyssey.att.COM (g.l.sicherman) (01/20/88)

While I agree with R. M. Wallace's observation that meaningful
biological modelling must consider organic requirements, I think
his description of these requirements needs refining.  He proposes
four "basic" requirements: greed, fear, pain, and pleasure.
This is a mixed bag.  Fear is an emotion, pain and pleasure are
responses, and greed, as Wallace uses the term, seems to describe
wants that are impelled by needs and may persist beyond them.

From our personal experience of pain and pleasure, how can we abstract
them?  Pain, for instance, tells us that we are hurt and suggests (by
its rise or fall) what we can do to help mend the hurt or avoid
aggravating it.  Like pleasure, it serves us as an internal function.
Anything else that serves a being in like wise can be the counterpart of
pain in ourselves--or we may choose to call it "pain," to identify it
with what we experience.  This identification is artificial, but then
so is the identification of my pain with yours.

But I would not go so far as to call pain a requirement for all beings.
A species prolific enough to outbreed attrition and predation can ignore
injury.  Of course, we might not find such a species interesting enough
to model!

As to genuine survival requirements, computers already have them.  A
computer must carry out its instructions faithfully or its users will
have it destroyed.  That is, the computer's survival depends on the
complicated and sometimes undefinable task of satisfying human beings.
Take away the users, and the computer ceases to exist as such; it loses
its meaning.  But this is sidetracking us into cybernetics....
-- 
Col. G. L. Sicherman
...!ihnp4!odyssey!gls