AIList-REQUEST@AI.AI.MIT.EDU (AIList Moderator Nick Papadakis) (05/25/88)
Date: Mon, 9 May 88 19:58 EST
From: EBARNES%HAMPVMS.BITNET@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Reply-to: AIList@AI.AI.MIT.EDU
Subject: Free Will and Determinism [AIList Digest V7 #4]
OK Folks:
There are a few developments that this arguement has undergone in the
past hundred years that you should become familiar with. James Anderson
was the first to point out the apparent paradox here on AIlist. To
repeat what he said - 1) Determinism makes Free will impossible, because
my action were determined from before I was born, and I therefore cannot
have control over them; and 2) Free will is impossible without Determinism,
because without strict determinism I do not have direct control over my
actions (some random event could prevent my doing what I wanted to do).
The first view was defended by Peter Van Inwagen in "An Essay on Free Will"
and the second view was defended by Schopenhauer in "On the Freedom of the
Will". The Arguement was settled by Dennett in his recent book "Elbow
Room: Varieties of free will worth wanting". Dennett argues that when
the idea of freedom is analyzed, there is no possible state of affairs that
we could be refering to if we want to have complete control over our actions
(i.e. - be able to do what we desire), and have our actions not be determined
and so we must redefine what we mean by freedom. The arguement is involved
but he uses analogies of what we mean by freedom in other senses, such as
not being in prison to show that what we want when we want freedom is control
over our lives and actions. What determinism claims is that our actions
are determined by way of our desires being determined, not that our actions
are controled in spite of our desires. His conclusion is that Schopenhauer
was right, and that free will requires determinism rather than being
prevented by it. Yes, this means that our desires are determined, but this
is good. Our desires are determined by our enviornment, which is the best
place for them to come from, since it is impossible for us to desire all
of our desires (It would result in an infinite loop).
The problem now is that Determinism is not in fact true, because of
Quantum Mechanics. The probability 1 outcome of future events is a myth
that has been thouroghly disproven. This raises the second point that
has been missing in this discussion, a definition of random. I thank
David Sher for pointing this out, and I offer the following clarification:
there are two kinds of random - 1) Epistemic randomness means that we do
not know what the outcome of an event will be; 2) Ontological randomness
means that the outcome is not yet a fact of the matter (i.e. - it could
turn out either way). Quantum Mechanics has shown that Ontological
randomness exists (Read up on the Einstien, Pedalsky, Rosen [EPR] paradox).
But the randomness occers primarily on the microscopic level, so that
macroscopic events may still be almost totally determined.
In conclusion, Free will is compatible with determinism, but
determinism is not true. Free will is not only compatible with determinism,
but dependant on it, so it appears that we have free will only to the
extent that macroscopic events are determined. There are therefore degrees
of freedom of the will.
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