bnevin@CCH.BBN.COM (Bruce E. Nevin) (06/11/88)
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 88 08:16 EDT
From: Bruce E. Nevin <bnevin@cch.bbn.com>
Subject: Re: Consensus and Reality, Consensus and Reality
In-Reply-To: Your message of 9 Jun 88 16:14 PDT
To: hayes.pa@xerox.com
cc: bnevin@cch.bbn.com, ailist@ai.ai.mit.edu, jmc@sail.stanford.edu, bn@cch.bbn.com
From: hayes.pa@Xerox.COM
Subject: Re: Consensus and Reality
PH> First, what we believe ( know ) about the world - or, indeed, about
PH> anything else - can only be believed by virtue of it being expressed in
PH> some sort of descriptive framework, what is often called a `language of
PH> thought': hence, we must apprehend the world in some categorical
PH> framework: we think of our desks as being DESKS.
I would add that we must distinguish this 'language of thought' from our
various languages of communication. They are surely related: our
cognitive categories surely influence natural language use, and the
influence may even go the other way, though the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis
is certainly controversial. But there is no reason to suppose that they
are identical, and many reasons to suppose that they differ. (Quests
for a Universal Grammar Grail notwithstanding, languages and cultures do
differ in sometimes quite profound ways. Different paradigms do exist
in science, different predilections in philosophy, though the same
natural language be spoken.)
Note also that what we know about a 'language of thought' is inferred
from natural language (problematic), from nonlinguistic human behavior,
and sometimes introspection (arguably a special case of the first two).
If we have some direct evidence on it I would like to know.
I agree with your second statement that learning occurs in a social
matrix. It is not clear that all the "terms which comprise our
conceptual framework" are learned, however. Some may be innate, either
as evolutionary adaptations or as artefacts of the electrochemical means
our bodies seem to use (such as characteristics of neuropeptides and
their receptors in the lower brain, at the entry points of sensory
nerves to the spinal cord, in the kidney, and elsewhere throughout the
body, for instance, apparently mediating emotion--cf recent work of
Candace Pert & others at NIH). I also agree that the nature/nurture
controversy (which probably has the free will controversy at its root)
is unproductive here.
PH> I suspect that the difference is that you think that when we talk of
PH> reality we mean something more: some `absolute Reality', whatever the
PH> hell that is. All I mean is the physical world in which we live, the
PH> one whose existence no-one, it seems, doubts.
No, I only want to establish agreement that we are NOT talking about
some 'absolute Reality' (Ding an Sich), whatever the hell that is. That
we are constrained to talking about something much less absolute. That
is the point.
The business about what you are looking at now being an ensemble of
molecules >>instead of<< a CRT screen is an unfortunate red herring. I
did not express myself clearly enough. Of course it is both or either,
depending on your perspective and present purposes. If you are a
computer scientist reading mail, one is appropriate and useful and
therefore "correct". If you are a chemist or physicist contemplating it
as a possible participant in an experiment, the other "take" is
appropriate and useful and therefore "correct". And the Ultimate
Reality of it (whatever the hell that is) is neither, but it lets us get
away with pretending it "really is" one or the other (or that it "really
is" some other "take" from some other perspective with some other
purposes). We are remarkably adept at ignoring what doesn't fit so long
as it doesn't interfere, and that is an admirably adaptive, pro-survival
way to behave. Not a thing wrong with it. But I hope to reach
agreement that that is what we are doing. Maybe we already have:
PH> . . . neither of these frameworks
PH> IS the reality. Of course not: no description of something IS that
PH> thing. We dont mix up beliefs about a world with the world itself: what
PH> makes you think we do? But to say that a belief about ( say ) my CRT is
PH> true is not to say that the belief IS the CRT.
But we do mix up our language of communication with our 'language of
thought' (first two paragraphs above), perhaps unavoidably since we have
only the latter as means for reaching agreement about the former, and
only the former (adapted to conduct in an environment) for cognizing
itself. And although you and I agree that we do not and cannot know
what is "really Real" (certainly if we could we could not communicate
about it or prove it to anyone), my experience is that many folks do
indeed mix up beliefs about a world with the world itself. They want a
WYSIWYG reality, and react with violent allergy to suggestions that what
they see is only a particular "take" on what is going on. They never
get past that to hear the further message that this is OK; that it has
survival value; that it is even fun.
Ad hominem comments ("wierdos") are demeaning to you. I will be glad to
reach an agreement to disagree about what Prigogine, Pask, Winograd &
Flores, Maturana & Varela, McCulloch, Bateson, or anyone else has said,
but I have to know >what< it is that you are disagreeing with--not just
who.
Brucehayes.pa@XEROX.COM (06/14/88)
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 88 21:22 EDT From: hayes.pa@Xerox.COM Subject: Re: Consensus and Reality, Consensus and Reality In-reply-to: "Bruce E. Nevin" <bnevin@cch.bbn.com>'s message of Fri, 10 Jun 88 08:16:19 EDT To: bnevin@cch.bbn.com In-Reply-To: your message of 10 June 88 08:16 EDT cc: hayes.pa@Xerox.COM, ailist@ai.ai.mit.edu, jmc@sail.stanford.edu, bn@cch.bbn.com OK, my last communication on this topic, I swear. I absolutely agree that the internal representation ( LofT ) is different from the languages of communication ( I suspect profoundly different, in fact ). I had a remark to that effect in the first draft of my last note, but removed it as it seemed to be aside from the point. Oddly enough, I am more impressed by the way in which speakers of different languages can communiate so easily, ie by the apparent unity of LofT in the face of an external babel; whereas you seem to be more impressed with the opposite: BN> Different paradigms do exist in science, different BN> predilections in philosophy, though the same BN> natural language be spoken so perhaps we are still disagreeing: but let that pass. Of course its not obvious that all the terms we use are learned: I tend to think that many cant be ( eg enough about spatial relationships to recognise a visual cliff, and see T. Bowers work ). I was trying to lean over as far as I could in the `social' direction, and pass you an olive branch. But let me pass again to the central point of difficulty: BN> No, I only want to establish agreement that we are BN> NOT talking about some 'absolute Reality' (Ding an BN> Sich), whatever the hell that is. That we are constrained BN> to talking about something much less absolute. That BN> is the point. My point was that there is no NEED to establish agreement: that in saying that the world is real, and that ( for example ) the CRT in front of ( the same one, by the way ) really is a CRT, I am not claiming that the DinganSich is CRT-shaped: I dont find the concept of an ultimate Reality ( your term ) useful or perhaps even coherent: Im just talking about the ordinary world we all inhabit. This `absolute', `ultimate' talk is yours, not mine. I feel a little as though you had come up with an accusing air and told me forcefully that we CANT refer to Froodle; and when I assured you that I had no intention of talking about Froodle, you replied rather sternly that that was all right then, just so long as we agreed that Froodle was unmentionable. I am in a double bind: if I disagree you will keep on arguing with me; but if I agree, then it seems that I agree with your strange 19th-century views about the Ultimate: BN> ...you and I agree that we do not and cannot know BN> what is "really Real" No: I dont think this talk is useful. In agreeing that all our beliefs are expressed in a framework and that it doesnt make sense to imagine that we could somehow avoid this, I am not agreeing that we can never get to what is really real: Im saying that this idea of a reality which is somehow more absolute than ordinary reality is just smoke. I DO think that we can know what is really real, that some of our beliefs can be true: REALLY true, that is, true so that no reality could make them truer, as absolutely and ultimately true as it is possible to be. They are true when the world is in fact the way they claim it to be, thats all. AS for ad hominem, well, Im afraid Im getting tired. As far as I can discover, there isnt anything in Winograd and Flores ( I refer to the book ), McCulloch ( on this sort of topic, not his technical work ) or Bateson which is sharp enough to be worth arguing about. I confess to not having read recent Pask, or any Prigogine or Manturana & Varela: but there are only so many hours in a day, and so many days in a life, and the odds that I will find anything interesting there seem to me to be low. OK, no more from Pat on this topic.
bnevin@CCH.BBN.COM (Bruce E. Nevin) (06/14/88)
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 88 09:36 EDT From: Bruce E. Nevin <bnevin@cch.bbn.com> Subject: Re: Consensus and Reality, Consensus and Reality In-Reply-To: Your message of 10 Jun 88 18:22 PDT To: hayes.pa@xerox.com cc: ailist@ai.ai.mit.edu, jmc@sail.stanford.edu, bn@cch.bbn.com We have some confusion of persons here. It was in "Simon Brooke's acidic comments on William Wells' rather brusquely expressed response to Cockton's social-science screaming" that you perceived "a three-hundred-year old DOUBT about the world, and how we know it's there." (V7 #24) On the contrary, my opening remark was: BN> I can't speak for Simon Brooke, but personally I don't think anyone BN> seriously doubts the existence of the physical world in which we live. BN> Something is going on here. The question is, what. I then said that it is the anti-consensus view that lays claim to an absolute reality (WYSIWYG realism--the "naive realism" I thought was unhorsed by Russell in 1940, in _An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth_), and that a consensual realist, like myself, acknowledges that we should not attribute such absoluteness to what we perceive and know. PH> . . . I am more impressed by the way in which HP> speakers of different languages can communiate so easily, ie by the apparent PH> unity of LofT in the face of an external babel; whereas you seem to be more PH> impressed with the opposite Speakers of different languages can communicate when there is mutual good will and intent to communicate, and when they come to (or come with a prior) agreement on a domain that constrains the semantics and pragmatics sufficiently to make the ambiguities manageable. Same applies to speakers of the same language. Get into rougher waters where the discourse is no longer constrained by subject-matter (sublanguage syntax) and social convention, however, and lifelong speakers of the same neighborhood dialect can and often do find one another incomprehensible. PH> Of course its not obvious that all the terms we use are learned: I tend PH> to think that many cant be ( eg enough about spatial relationships to PH> recognise a visual cliff, and see T. Bowers work ). I was trying to lean PH> over as far as I could in the `social' direction, and pass you an olive PH> branch. Thanks, an easy olive branch to accept and to reciprocate as follows: it seems obvious to me that some of this is learned, some biologically innate. With the caveat that I believe it is sounder science not to _assume_ a lot is innate (reference here to the sillier biologicist claims of Generativists). BN> I only want to establish agreement that we are BN> NOT talking about some 'absolute Reality' BN> . . . that we do not and cannot know BN> what is "really Real" PH> My point was that there is no NEED to establish agreement I did not intend that you and I should be the only parties to such agreement. Some earlier messages seemed to claim that the world of naive realism was in some sense absolute, e.g. Mr. T. William Wells. TW> OK, answer me this: how in the world do they reach a consensus TW> without some underlying reality which they communicate through. PH> . . . this idea of a reality which is somehow more absolute than ordinary PH> reality is just smoke. I DO think that we can know what is really real, PH> that some of our beliefs can be true: REALLY true, that is, true so that PH> no reality could make them truer, as absolutely and ultimately true as PH> it is possible to be. "Some of our beliefs." Certainly. The hard question is, which ones, and how can we tell the difference. PH> They [some of our beliefs] are true when the world is in fact the way PH> they claim it to be, thats all. If one takes the appropriate perspective, has the appropriate purposes and intentions, is prepared to ignore irrelevancies, and is able to get away with ignoring what doesn't fit, then, yes, the world is "in fact" and "really" the way our beliefs claim it to be. From another perspective, with other purposes and intentions, ignoring other irrelevancies that the world (in that context) lets us get away with ignoring, the world is in fact the way our rather different beliefs claim it to be. For all practical purposes, the earth is flat with lots of hills, valleys, cliffs, bodies of water, plains, etc. From an astronomical or astronautical perspective, different beliefs apply. Neither view can falsify the other (pace my 9th grade science teacher, many years ago), because they are incommensurate, they do not communicate with each other. We can "act as if" the world were flat most of the time, and get away with it. And most of the time the astronomical "truth" about the shape of the earth is irrelevant and pointless to talk about. Lucky for us! We might otherwise have to include a quantum physical statement about the shape of the earth in everyday discourse--and act on it! So sure, some of our beliefs are REALLY true--as far as they go. However, where one set of beliefs contradicts another set of beliefs couched in another perspective and serving another purpose, they can't both be REALLY true, can they? Well, yes, they can. You just have to assume one perspective at a time, and not try to reconcile them. To try to reconcile them all is tantamount to trying to establish knowledge of Absolute Reality, and we know that is a fruitless quest. I am willing to let this dialog between you and me rest here. I hope that it is plain to those who objected to "consensual reality" that the consensual aspects of knowledge and belief are neither silly nor trivial. I have tried to clarify that "consensual reality" refers to shared beliefs, institutionalized as social convention, that the world lets us get away with. Our late 20th century American (techie subculture) consensus reality has no greater and no less claim to being absolutely real than any other. It works really well in some respects. It courts disaster in others. Time will tell how much the world will let us get away with. It is of course an evolving consensus, and the process of adaptation can allow for better accomodation with other competing/cooperating perspectives that do exist in the biosphere. Bruce Nevin bn@cch.bbn.com <usual_disclaimer>