KLEMOSG@YALEVM.BITNET (Jeff Coggshall) (07/12/88)
Date: Sun, 3 Jul 88 04:47 EDT From: Jeff Coggshall <KLEMOSG%YALEVM.BITNET@MITVMA.MIT.EDU> Subject: Metaepistemology & Phil. of Science To: "Ailist: Submissions" <AILIST@AI.AI.MIT.EDU> ======================================================================== 273 >Date: Fri, 24 Jun 88 18:46 O >From: <YLIKOSKI%FINFUN.BITNET@MITVMA.MIT.EDU> >It is obvious the agent only can have a representation of the Ding an >Sich. In this sense the reality is unknowable. We only have >descriptions of the actual world. >It seems that for the most part evolution has been responsible for >developing life forms which have good descriptions of the Ding an Sich I don't think that it's even obvious that we have anything that is in any sense a "representation" of the Ding an Sich. The argument from "well, hey, - look, we're doing pretty well at surviving, so therefore what we think is really out there must have some sort of _correspondence_ with what's really out there" just doesn't hold up. It doesn't follow. Yes, we are adapted to survive, but that doesn't mean that our thoughts about what's going on are even incomplete "representations" of some Ding an Sich. Some may say: "well - who cares if we've got a real _representation_ of some "really real reality", so long as our theoretical assumptions continue to yeild fruitful results - then why worry?" The problem is that our theoretical assumptions will bias our empirical results. "facts" are theory-laden and theories are value laden. It all comes down to ethics. Our human perceptual world is at least as real (and in many ways more real) to us (and to who else would it make sense to talk about it's being real to?) as the world of theoretical physics. Once we assume that there is no priveledged source knowledge about the way things really are, then, it seems, we are left with either saying that "anything goes" (as in astrology is just as valdid as physics and so is voodoo) or with insisting that "reality", however it is constued, must constrain cognitive activity and that one must cultivate an openness to this constraint. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >Date: 27 Jun 88 00:18:24 GMT >From: bc@media-lab.media.mit.edu (bill coderre and his pets) >Subject: Re: Who else isn't a science? >The bottom line is that it is unimportant for us to argue whether or >not this or that is Real Science (TM). Well, yes and no. It doesn't make any sense to go around accusing other people of not doing science when you haven't established any criteria for considering some kind of discovery/inquiry-activity as a science. Is math a science? There doesn't seem to be any empirical exploration going on... Is math just a conceptual tool used to model empirical insights? Could AI be the same? I found a quote from Nelson Goodman that might interest you. Tell me what you think, y'all: "Standards of rightness in science do not rest on uniformity and constancy of particular judgments. Inductive validity, fairness of sample, relevance of c ategorization, all of them essential elements in judging the correctness of obs ervations and theories, do depend upon conformity with practic - but upon a ten uous conformity hard won by give-and-take adjustment involving extensive revisi on of both observations and theories." (from _Mind and other Matters_, 1984, p. 12) >What is important is for us to create new knowledge either >analytically (which you endorse) OR SYNTHETICALLY (which is just as >much SCIENCE as the other). - are you using Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction? because if you are (or want to be), then you should realize that all new knowledge is synthetic. You might even be interested in an article by W. V. O. Quine in the book "From a Logical Point of View". It is called "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and therein he convincingly trashes any possible analytic/synthetic distinction. I agree with him. I think that the burden of proof lies on anyone who wants to claim that there is any a priori knowledge. Believing this presupposes a God's eye (or actually a no-eye) point of view on reality, which doesn't make sense. Jeff Coggshall (Jcoggshall@hampvms or Klemosg@yalevm)
CHESS@ibm.COM (David Chess) (07/18/88)
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 88 09:55 EDT From: David Chess <CHESS@ibm.com> To: ailist@ai.ai.mit.edu Subject: Metaepistemology & Phil. of Science >In this sense the reality is unknowable. We only have >descriptions of the actual world. This "only" seems to be the key to the force of the argument. If it were "we have descriptions of the actual world", it would sound considerably tamer. The "only" suggests that there is something else (besides "descriptions") that we *might* have, but that we do not. What might this something else be? What, besides "descriptions", could we have of the actual world? I certainly wouldn't want the actual world *itself* in my brain (wouldn't fit). Can anyone complete the sentence "The actual world is unknowable to us, because we have only descriptions/representations of it, and not..."? (I would tend to claim that "knowing" is just (roughly) "having the right kind of descriptions/representations of", and that there's no genuine "unknowability" here; but that's another debate...) Dave Chess Watson Research * Disclaimer: Who, me?