[comp.ai.digest] Dual encoding, propostional memory and the epistemics of imagination

gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.UK (Gilbert Cockton) (08/05/88)

From: Gilbert Cockton <gilbert%cs.glasgow.ac.uk@NSS.Cs.Ucl.AC.UK>
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 88 05:10 EDT
To: ailist@ai.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Dual encoding, propostional memory and the epistemics of imagination


>Now think of all the
>other stuff your episodic memory has to be able to represent.  How is this
>representing done?  Maybe after a while following this thought you will begin 
>to see McCarthys footsteps on the trail in front of you.
>
>Pat Hayes

Watch out for the marsh two feet ahead though :-)
Computationalists who are bound to believe in propositional
representations (yes, I encode all my knowledge of a scene into
little FOPC like tuples, honest) have little time for dual (or more)
coding theories of memory.

The dual coding theory, which normally distinguishes between iconic
and semantic memory, has caused endless debate, more often than not
because of the tenacity of researchers who MUST, rationally or
otherwise, believe in a single propositional encoding, or else admit
limitations to computational paradigms.

Any competent text book on cognitive psychology, and especially ones
on memory, will cover the debate on episodic, iconic and semantic
memory (as well as short term memory, working memory and other
gatherings of angels in restricted spaces).  These books will lay
several trails in other directions to McCarthy's.  The barbeque spots
on the way are better too.

Pat's argument hinges on the demand that we think about something
called representation (eh?) and then describe the encoding.  The
minute you are tricked into thinking about bit level encoding
protocols, the computationalists have you.  Sure enough, the best
thing you can imagine is something like formal logic.  PDP networks
will work of course, but you can't of course IMAGINE the contents of
the network, and thus they cannot be a representation :-)

Since when did reality have anything to do with the quality of our
imagination, especially when the imaginands are rigged from the outset?
-- 
Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science,  The University, Glasgow
	gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs <europe>!ukc!glasgow!gilbert