[ont.events] CogSci Colloq: Discourse Representation Theory

nobody@sunybcs.UUCP (Unprivileged User) (09/30/86)

representation theory, Hans Kamp
From: rapaport@sunybcs.UUCP (William J. Rapaport)
Path: rapaport


                         UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO
                      STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

                  GRADUATE GROUP IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE

                                PRESENTS

                               HANS KAMP

       Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science
                     University of Texas at Austin

SOME REMARKS ON THE REPRESENTATION OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR REPORTS

Many extant theories of belief sentences and other attitude reports have
failed to pay sufficient attention to the importance of internal connec-
tions that typically exist between the different attitudes  of  one  and
the same person, and the influence these connections exert on the inten-
tional significance that can be attributed to each  of  those  attitudes
individually.   Ignoring  this  aspect  of cognition not only leads to a
distorted understanding of it, it also  prevents  one  from  formulating
intuitively  plausible  solutions  to many of the puzzles about attitude
reports that have preoccupied  philosophers  of  language  and  mind  in
recent years.

Discourse Representation Theory, which emphasizes the  pervasively  con-
textual nature of sentence interpretation (typically, the interpretation
of a sentence that occurs as part of a longer discourse is guided by the
interpretation already assigned to the preceding part of the discourse),
is naturally extended to a theory of attitudes in which  their  internal
connectedness  is  central,  and explicitly articulated.  I will outline
this theory and demonstrate its workings in connection with a few  (rea-
sonably) familiar examples from the philosophical literature.

References:

 (1)   Asher, Nicholas, "Belief in Discourse  Representation  Theory,"
       Journal of Philosophical Logic (1986).

 (2)   Kamp, Hans, "Context, Thought and  Communication,"  Proceedings
       of the Aristotelian Society (1984-85).

                           Monday, October 20, 1986
                                   3:30 P.M.
                           Baldy 684, Amherst Campus

                               Co-sponsored by:
             Buffalo Logic Colloquium and Department of Philosophy

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For further information, contact:
				William J. Rapaport
				Assistant Professor

Dept. of Computer Science, SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260

(716) 636-3193, 3180

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