nobody@sunybcs.UUCP (Unprivileged User) (11/03/86)
discourse representation theory
From: rapaport@sunybcs.UUCP (William J. Rapaport)
Path: rapaport
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STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO
GRADUATE GROUP IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE
HANS KAMP
Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science
University of Texas at Austin
SOME REMARKS ON THE REPRESENTATION OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR REPORTS
Many extant theories of belief sentences and other attitude reports have
failed to pay sufficient attention to the importance of internal connec-
tions that typically exist between the different attitudes of one and
the same person, and the influence these connections exert on the inten-
tional significance that can be attributed to each of those attitudes
individually. Ignoring this aspect of cognition not only leads to a
distorted understanding of it, it also prevents one from formulating
intuitively plausible solutions to many of the puzzles about attitude
reports that have preoccupied philosophers of language and mind in
recent years.
Discourse Representation Theory, which emphasizes the pervasively con-
textual nature of sentence interpretation (typically, the interpretation
of a sentence that occurs as part of a longer discourse is guided by the
interpretation already assigned to the preceding part of the discourse),
is naturally extended to a theory of attitudes in which their internal
connectedness is central, and explicitly articulated. I will outline
this theory and demonstrate its workings in connection with a few (rea-
sonably) familiar examples from the philosophical literature.
References:
Asher, Nicholas, ``Belief in Discourse Representation Theory,'' Journal
of Philosophical Logic (1986).
Kamp, Hans, ``Context, Thought and Communication,'' Proc. of the Aristo-
telian Society (1984-85).
Monday, November 10, 1986
3:30 P.M.
Baldy 684, Amherst Campus
Co-sponsored by:
Buffalo Logic Colloquium and Department of Philosophy
Informal discussion at 8:00 P.M. at Stuart Shapiro's house, 112 Parkledge Drive, Snyder, NY.
For further information, contact:
William J. Rapaport
Assistant Professor
Dept. of Computer Science, SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260
(716) 636-3193, 3180
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