[ont.events] ICR Feb 3 Donald Norman The Psychology of Everyday Things

cfry@watdcsu.waterloo.edu (C.Fry - Inst. Computer Research) (01/25/88)

                          The Psychology of Everyday Things

          by

          Donald A. Norman

          of

          Institute for Cognitive Science
          University of California, San Diego

          Abstract

          How do we manage the tasks of  everyday  life?   The  traditional
          answer   is  that  we  engage  in  problem solving, planning, and
          thought.  How do we know what  to  do?   Again,  the  traditional
          answer  is   that   we  learn,  in part  through  experience,  in
          part through instruction.  I suggest that this view  is  mislead-
          ing.   Less  planning  and  problem solving is  required than  is
          commonly  supposed.   Many  tasks  need never  be  learned:   the
          proper  behavior  is  obvious  from the start.  The problem space
          for  most everyday  tasks  is  shallow  or narrow, not  wide  and
          deep  as  the traditional approach suggests.  The minimization of
          the problem space  occurs because  natural  and contrived proper-
          ties  of the environment combine to constrain the set of possible
          actions.  The effect is as if one had  put the knowledge required
          to  do  a  thing  on  the  thing itself:  the knowledge is in the
          world.

          I show that seven stages are relevant to the performance  of   an
          action,  including  three  stages  for execution of an act, three
          for evaluation, and a goal stage.  Consideration of the  rule  of
          each stage,  along  with the  principles  of natural mappings and
          natural constraints, leads to a set of  psychological  principles
          for   design.    Couple   these  principles with  the  suggestion
          that most real tasks are shallow or narrow, and we start to  have
          a psychology of everyday things and everyday actions.

          The talk itself is meant to be  light  and  enjoyable.   However,
          there   are  profound  implications  for  the  type of theory one
          develops for simulating cognitive computation.  There are   seri-
          ous  implications  for  massively parallel  structures  (what  we
          call  Parallel  Distributed  Processing  or   connectionist   ap-
          proaches),  for  memory storage and retrieval via descriptions or
          coarse coding, and, in general, for a central  role  for  pattern
          matching,  constraint  satisfaction,  and  nonsymbolic processing
          mechanisms in  human cognition.   But the  main  implications  of
          the work are for the design of understandable and usable objects.

          DATE:     Wednesday February 3, 1988

          TIME:     3:30 p.m.

          PLACE:    MC 5158

          Everyone is welcome.  Refreshments served.