rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) (09/29/88)
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO
BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM
1988-1989
Second Meeting
Joint meeting with the Philosophy Colloquium
NICOLAS GOODMAN
Department of Mathematics
SUNY Buffalo
"IN DEFENSE OF AN INFINITISTIC MATHEMATICS OF NATURE"
Wednesday, October 12, 1988
4:00 P.M.
684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus
There is a skeptical tradition in the philosophy of mathematics that
goes back at least to Hilbert in the 1920s and that is well represented
in a recent paper by Stephen Simpson in _J. Symbolic Logic_ 53 (1988)
349-363. This tradition holds that mathematical analysis, even as
applied to the description of nature, is so abstract and infinitary that
it is implausible, even meaningless, as it stands. To remedy this, the
tradition proposes to reduce analysis to some more secure finitistic
theory. In the present paper, I defend applied analysis by appealing to
ideas from the recent philosophy of the empirical sciences. Specifi-
cally, I deny that there is a clear distinction between mathematics and
physics, and conclude that mathematical analysis is our best established
theory of nature.
For further information, contact John Corcoran, (716) 636-2438.