rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) (04/25/89)
UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM
and
GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES
PRESENT
NICHOLAS ASHER
Department of Philosophy
and Center for Cognitive Science
University of Texas at Austin
PARADOXES OF INDIRECT DISCOURSE
In natural language and programs where we must reason about the states
of other systems, it is extremely useful to quantify over beliefs of
agents. I look at two proposals for quantifying over beliefs--one
first-order and one second-order. I then consider certain paradoxes of
indirect discourse that arise when one allows quantification over
beliefs. These were part of the mediaeval insolubilia and have recently
been discussed by Prior and Thomason. I show how inductive and semi-
inductive theories of belief (like the one recently developed by Kamp
and myself) can address the paradoxes Thomason discusses within the
first-order theory of quantification over beliefs, and I propose an
analogous way of handling these paradoxes within the higher order frame-
work.
Monday, May 8, 1989
4:00 P.M.
684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus
There will probably be an evening discussion
at a time and place to be announced.
Contact John Corcoran, Dept. of Philosophy, 716-636-2444, or Bill Rapa-
port, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for further information.