[comp.os.vms] FINGER security hole

hobbit@aim.rutgers.EDU.UUCP (08/30/87)

Well, the gentleman from the other continent is right; FINGER attempts to
open the user's plan file with sysprv turned on.  The fix, if course, is to
clobber the use of priv_user_open for reading anything but the UAF.

*However*:  E protection on a directory allows access to the files within
by exact name.  Therefore if you really want to protect something, toss it
in a directory whose mode allows group and world to go eat commas.

SET FILE/ENTER, as I've flamed about before, is done completely bass-ackwards
and *wrong*, and should not exist as given.  In playing around with ridding
myself of it, I've discovered that it's not enough to simply take handling
for /enter and /remove out of SET.CLD -- this breaks SET FILE completely.
Watch this space for when I figure out how to completely nuke the sys$enter
call.

When the *fuck* is DEC going to give us *properly done* file links??

_H*
------

tli@sargas.usc.edu (Tony Li) (09/02/87)

In article <8709020502.AA07959@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> "*Hobbit*" <hobbit@aim.rutgers.edu> writes:
    
    When the *fuck* is DEC going to give us *properly done* file links??
    
This is not fixed in a future release of the system.


Tony Li - USC University Computing Services	"Fene mele kiki bobo"
Uucp: oberon!tli						-- Joe Isuzu
Bitnet: tli@uscvaxq, tli@ramoth
Internet: tli@sargas.usc.edu