[comp.dcom.telecom] Computerized Collect Calls

gil@eddie.mit.edu (Gil Kloepfer Jr.) (02/01/90)

In article <3345@accuvax.nwu.edu> adamg@world.std.com (Adam M Gaffin) writes:
>X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 10, Issue 63, message 14 of 17

>When you place a collect call at one of those NE Tel pay phones that
>uses a computer to make such calls, the computer tells the person on
>the other end that he has a call from {your name here} and then tells
>him to say either "yes" or "no" to accepting the call.

Problem #2 with this:  When this 'neat' thing calls my answering
machine, as it has once already, it keeps on asking my answering
machine whether it wishes to accept the call.  In fact, the
voice-response announcement got rather angry sounding when it
continued to get no response from the answering machine!

Although I like the idea of these automated things...and yes, they do
have some interesting (though illegal I guess) side-effects of
allowing free 'message' passing capability, I see an increasing
problem with these automated devices clogging my answering machine to
wazoo.  The automated sleeze (sales) machines also do a number on the
machine.

An interesting thread to start here would be how the newer answering
machines should detect such things?  Should, perhaps, a certain amount
of call type-code signals be sent on the line?  Should automated
answering devices send a code so that a sending device can see that
they're also talking to a machine?  


Gil Kloepfer, Jr.
...!ames!limbic!gil | gil%limbic@ames.arc.nasa.gov ICUS Software
Systems -- Western Development Center P.O. Box 1 Islip Terrace, NY
11752

denbeste@cis.ohio-state.edu (William C. DenBesten) (02/02/90)

In article <3345@accuvax.nwu.edu> adamg@world.std.com (Adam M Gaffin) writes:

> When you place a collect call at one of those NE Tel pay phones that
> uses a computer to make such calls, the computer tells the person on
> the other end that he has a call from {your name here} and then tells
> him to say either "yes" or "no" to accepting the call.

 From article <3399@accuvax.nwu.edu>, by think!ames!limbic.UUCP!gil@eddie.
mit.edu (Gil Kloepfer Jr.):

> Problem #2 with this:  When this 'neat' thing calls my answering
> machine, as it has once already, it keeps on asking my answering
> machine whether it wishes to accept the call.

How about a message on your answering machine similar to:

     There is NO one able to take your call...

Maybe it will pick up on the NO.

stank@cbnewsl.ATT.COM (Stan Krieger) (02/03/90)

> [Moderator's Note: And this is also a new source for fraud, as people
> are learning that their name can be anything at all, i.e. 'I will be
> home in an hour'; 'meet me at 5:00 PM at the airport', etc....to which
> the called party responds 'no', and disconnects. No charge for the
> call, yet a message delivered quite well. At least a live operator
> knows it is unlikely your name will be 'call me back at abc-wxyz'; the
> computer knows from zilch.  PT]


I don't know if I read this in this group or somewhere else, but such
fraudulent usage can clearly be traced.  Obviously, the voice
recordings can be kept; all the telco or AOS needs to do is listen to
each day's recordings and if a message appears where the person's name
should've been, they can assume the call was made, completed, and
accepted, and bill the receiving phone anyway.  I'm sure the
technology exists, or can easily be developed, to allow a playback of
only the rejected calls, so it's a lot less listening.

True, someone may try to "prank" someone else by using an automated
collect phone to leave such a "message", but clearly how many people
who really did try to leave a message instead of their name would do
it again if they were caught?


Stan Krieger
Summit, NJ
 ...!att!attunix!smk

wmartin@stl-06sima.army.mil (Will Martin) (02/06/90)

>From: stank@cbnewsl.ATT.COM (Stan Krieger)

> ...such fraudulent usage can clearly be traced.  Obviously, the voice
>recordings can be kept; all the telco or AOS needs to do is listen to
>each day's recordings and if a message appears where the person's name
>should've been, they can assume the call was made, completed, and
>accepted, and bill the receiving phone anyway.  I'm sure the
>technology exists, or can easily be developed, to allow a playback of
>only the rejected calls, so it's a lot less listening.

>True, someone may try to "prank" someone else by using an automated
>collect phone to leave such a "message", but clearly how many people
>who really did try to leave a message instead of their name would do
>it again if they were caught?

I agree that a consistent pattern of repeated abuse of the "record-a-
'name'" computerized collect-call process would result in the parties
being caught and eventually forced to pay for the calls. However, I
think it is highly unlikely that random or rare indulgers in this
would ever be caught.

1) Given the telco's increasing push for automation, I think it is
unlikely they would ever assign a human the task of listening to these
recordings, assuming they are actually kept for any length of time. (I
really would guess they are recorded on disk or solid-state digital
memory and written over again as soon as they are used.) To keep track
of the recorded voice along with the billing info would be possible,
but would it be considered cost-effective? [What is needed here is the
NSA's fabled "monitor all call contents" voice-content-recognition AI
program. :-)]

2) They could intermix the automated collect-call processing with a
random and rare actual human operator. You'd never know *for sure*
that you are talking to a computer or a person (especially as
synthezsized voices get better); if you gave a human "I'll be home at
8" as your name, they could then flag the called phone (and the
calling one, if not a payphone or hotel phone) for surveillance of the
collect-call patterns.  They could also give you a severe
tongue-lashing, which would take you aback if all you expected was a
computerized standard response! :-) However, given point 1, this seems
unlikely, unless they assign a human to handle calls from a region of
high abuse (airports, train stations, etc.). Since those areas are
also ones of high volume, which is what they'd want the computer to
handle, it still seems unlikely.

3) There are some legal issues here. Could the telco legally use an
accumulation of such recordings, if they *did* keep them, as
evidence?  Wouldn't they have to get a wiretap authorization and only
use such recordings gathered after such a warrant was issued, in order
to use these as evidence in a legal case? This starts to sound
expensive, and not worth the possible monies that could be recovered.

4) Wrong numbers are not at all unlikely. This acts against BOTH the
abuser and the possible telco methods of detecting such abuse. That is
one reason I distinguished between occasional vs. repeated use. If I
try pulling this trick, and misdial the number, some stranger hears
"Will you accept the charges for a collect call from 'I'll be home at
8'?"  They are going to say "no" or hang up (unless they are totally
crazed).  My message to my household did NOT get through, but I don't
know this.  All I know is the call didn't complete, which is what I
expected. In order to have some reasonable chance of assurance that
the message REALLY made it to my home, I have to play this game twice,
at least.  This starts eating up enough time that it might be cheaper
in real terms to just pay for the stupid call!

On the other side, if the telco tries to stick me with a charge for a
call based on their having a recording of a call from a payphone to my
number, which I rejected, and where the text was "I'll be home at 8",
all I need say is that it was a wrong number. Unless they can show a
repeated pattern of such calls, or start playing high-tech games like
voiceprinting the message and comparing that voiceprint with those of
voices on my line or making calls from my number, there's no way they
can claim this is not an isolated instance. After all, the called
party did nothing illicit or contra-tarriffs; they just said "no" or
hung up!  Only the caller can be charged with anything.

The telco has a history of charging called numbers in cases of
long-distance abuse, like blue boxing and college-student fraud, but
there are major differences between billing the called party in cases
where the evidence is many many-minute-long calls all to that number,
versus cases in which the called party didn't do anything but
explicitly reject a call, or just hung up!

In short, I don't think the telco will make much effort to counteract
this fraud, at least until it can build in enough AI to its computers
so that they can make some guess as to what is a "name" versus what is
a "message". (And how would they handle foreign languages?) It just
isn't likely to repay the effort involved.


Regards, Will
wmartin@st-louis-emh2.army.mil OR wmartin@stl-06sima.army.mil

Leichter-Jerry@cs.yale.edu (02/09/90)

I suspect a telco would have a lot of trouble obtaining a conviction
of someone who "misused" the automated collect call system.  It would
take rather a stretch of the law to make it a crime.  The fact that
the INTENT of the service was to pass my name on isn't likely to be
binding on me, absent some specific agreement on my part, ahead of
time, that all I will ever use the system for is to pass my rightful
name.

Post cards are cheaper because they aren't private, but nothing
prevents me from encrypting my message (or, as a practical expedient
available to some people, writing it in a language few who are likely
to see it will be able to understand).  Post cards are also smaller,
but again I can write as small as I like.

Continuing the analogy, people who send out business-reply envelopes
do so with a very specific purpose in mind.  If I use such an envelope
to send something the sender didn't have in mind - well, he still gets
to pay for it.  I could even make it a policy to take every
business-reply envelope I receive and promptly seal it and send it
back empty.  I'd be rather astonished if this was a crime.  (So,
astonish me....)

Yes, "message passing" would probably contravene telco regulations -
as do many other abuses that are not illegal.  The usual recourse a
telco has is to cut off your service for such abuse.  That would be a
lot tougher to make stick in this case - after all, the abuser is the
caller, who it would be almost impossible to track down and even
harder to PROVE was really involved, not the callee, who you could act
against easily if you wished.

							-- Jerry

[Moderator's Note: Actually, the mis-use of Business Reply Envelopes
is a violation of Postal Service regulations. What constitutes the
proper use of same is spelled out in the regulations. Essentially, the
old tricks of deliberatly sending them back empty, or in large
quantities, or with other than an ounce or less of printed matter
pertaining to the business at hand is prohibited.  PT]

Mike.Riddle@f666.n285.z1.fidonet.org (Mike Riddle) (02/24/90)

In a recent message, Wm Randolph Franklin writes:
  
(inquiring as to AT&T's basis for charging the called party when the
caller refuses to pay or is unable.)

>Anyone know what the legal basis for this is?  

AT&T undoubtedly is using some theory of unjust enrichment.  The
called party, in a case where numerous calls of lengthy duration are
in question, received some benefit and therefore should pay.  While it
might not seem fair, in that the called party did not, on the record,
ask for the call, AT&T certainly did not ask for it either (except
through all the advertising?  and then they expected payment!).
  
Between the "innocent" third party provider (AT&T) or the two parties
to the call, AT&T should be the last to pay for it.
  
That would be the theory anyway.  I expect a lot of us could structure
an argument that "getting stiffed is part of the cost of doing
business."  Then we'd hightail it down to the PUC and lobby against
rate increases.
  
Rambling off.
 
{standard disclaimer:  not even *I* take my advice, why should you?}

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