larry@uunet.uu.net> (04/08/90)
In article <6120@accuvax.nwu.edu> kaufman@neon.stanford.edu (Marc T. Kaufman) writes: > >In single-slot pre-pay coin stations, the totalizer provided a > >shunt contact across the rotary or DTMF dial which was not removed > >until the full initial rate was deposited. No money, no dial. End > >of *this* :-) fraud problem. > So, then, will my Casio Watch/Telephone Dialer work through the mouthpiece? Yes, on a touch-tone coin station arranged for pre-pay operation. However, pre-pay coin stations have become rather rare, so this type of fraud becomes almost a moot point. In article <6121@accuvax.nwu.edu> pacolley@violet.waterloo.edu (Paul Colley) writes: > I have a friend who can pulse-dial phone numbers by rapidly tapping > the hang-up button. It's kind of impressive to see him dialling a > number with lots of 9's and 0's in it. He has about an 80% success > rate (i.e., 20% wrong numbers). > He claims, though I've never seen it, that this works at pay phones > without having to pay. The above scenario requires a coin station arranged for pre-pay service, which is no longer very common (at least in BOC serving areas). It is difficult, but not impossible to "pulse dial" the switchhook on a single-slot coin station (i.e., like 1A or 1C type coin telephone set). The difficulty arises because the switchhook on these coin stations has quite a bit of travel, and the "trigger point" has to be identified in order to pulse fast enough with a % break that the CO apparatus will accept. In addition, the switchhook on these coin stations has four sets of contacts, each of which has a different timing, two of which are connected in *parallel* to frustrate would-be switchhook dialers. As far as I am concerned, if your friend is adept enough to "switchhook dial" one of these coin stations, he *deserves* to get the call for free. :-) In article <6122@accuvax.nwu.edu> wb8foz@mthvax.cs.miami.edu (David Lesher) writes: > There was another type of fraud that seemed to be common a few years > ago in San Francisco. The {direct} victim, however was the user. > Someone was opening the one side of the line. Folks would come up, not > bother to listen for DTF, and drop in money. The powerless > one_arm_bandit would hold onto the money. After half a day or so, the > thief would come back, reconnect the pair, and collect all the money > spilling into the return chute. This fraud is almost as old as the coin station itself, although it has become less of a problem since the extensive introduction of DTF (Dial Tone First) service. These perpetrators are kept in business, though, because many people still drop a coin into a DTF station without first listening for dial tone. This fraud reached its peak, however, during the 1960's in New York City. There were organized gangs of criminals who plied this trade, aided by accomplices working for New York Telephone who furnished pair assignment information. A perpetrator could therefore find a cross-connect box located a thousand feet or more from the target coin station and lift the pair without there being any obvious association between the perpetrator and the target coin station. Since many telephone installation and repair personnel work in New York City without a truck, there is almost never any suspicion upon seeing a lone individual with a tool belt working on outside telephone plant. > On a larger scale, every so often mention shows up of person/persons > unknown who can clean out a coinslot box in 30 seconds. Seems that the > powers_that_be have been chasing {him,her,them} from coast to coast, > following a string of now_empty slots. Manipulation of coin station locks is not easy because they are intentionally designed to require a great deal of force to open with a key. The perpetrator of this larceny has obviously mastered this art, since it is unlikely that he could have obtained duplicate keys for the extensive geographical area in the Southwest which has been hit by apparently one person. <> Larry Lippman @ Recognition Research Corp. - Uniquex Corp. - Viatran Corp. <> UUCP {boulder|decvax|rutgers|watmath}!acsu.buffalo.edu!kitty!larry <> TEL 716/688-1231 || 716/773-1700 {utzoo|uunet}!/ \uniquex!larry <> FAX 716/741-9635 || 716/773-2488