[news.groups] STV, WEIP, MAUVE - a comparison

alien@cpoint.UUCP (Alien Wells) (11/22/89)

The previous example on STV voting shows clearly how STV works.  Let me point
out what I consider a number of deficiencies in STV.  For the following, 
consider the recent .aquaria vote with a ballot:
	A) sci.aquaria
	B) rec.aquaria
	C) NO

	- There is no way to vote NO for a particular name.  The best you 
can do is put it last (or omit it) on your list.  Take the example of 
*.aquaria where the group was uncontroversial (and thus there would be 
few NOs in an STV vote) but the name was controversial.  If most of the 
sci.aquaria votes came in ABC and the opposition came in CB - it is 
definitely conceivable that sci.aquaria could have still won even with the
large opposition.

	- This brings me to my main objection to STV - and this is a 
fundamental one.  STV is an attempt to find the choice with the strongest
support.  MAUVE (and similar concensus schemes) are an attempt to find the
choice with the widest concensus.  This is a subtle but significant 
difference.  STV might stop votes like sci.aquaria - but it might not.
The problem with sci.aquaria wasn't a weakness of the support, but a lack
of concensus.  If the goal is to stop power plays and minimize flaming,
a concensus voting scheme is preferable over a ranking voting scheme.

	- Supporters of STV have complained (correctly) that in a concensus
scheme you can only list what you are willing to accept, you can't give
a weighting to them.  I would turn that around and say that in STV you have
no way to say 'I'll take any of these, but this other group is unacceptable'.
You are forced to rank your preferences, even if you really don't care.  In
addition, the ranking is very primitive.  There is no indication in the vote
of whether there is a large or a small difference in preference between two
ranked choices.  This leads to a case where mild preferences have the same
strength as vehement objections.  

	- If you ARE going to use a ranking voting scheme, I would much 
rather see a weighted parallel vote (WEIP) where you have something like:
	Vote for the following using this scale:
		10		Strongly approve
		 7.5		approve
		 5		don't care
		 2.5		disapprove
		 0		strongly disapprove
	The votes for each get averaged, the highest average vote (over a
	certain threshold with a minimum number of votes) wins.  

Note:  The previous 8 lines qulify the scheme under the 'explainable in 25 
	lines' criteria ...
	
	Consider the following example of a vote under WEIP, STV, and MAUVE:

		NAME		WEIP	STV	MAUVE
	Ballot 1: (67%)
		sci.aquaria	10	 1	 YES
		rec.aquaria	 9	 2	 YES
		No Group
	Ballot 2: (33%)
		sci.aquaria	 0		  NO
		rec.aquaria	10	 1	 YES
		No Group		 2
	Imagine a situation where 2/3 of the voters sent in the first ballot 
	and 1/3 of the people sent in the second.  Under STV, sci.aquaria 
	wins.  Under either MAUVE or WEIP rec.aquaria wins.

	- Finally, STV can even fail to do what it claims to, finding the 
group with the most support.  Imagine a situation where people have widely
varying first choices, but everyone has the same second choice.  That second
choice could be eliminated in the first round, leading the vote to settle on
a choice that had much less overall support and much more vehement opposition.
Both MAUVE and WEIP would correctly find that support.  Consider the following
example:
		NAME		WEIP	STV	MAUVE
	Ballot 1: (20%)
		sci.aquaria	 10	 1	 YES
		sci.bio.marine    6      3	 YES
		rec.pets.fish     2      5	  NO
		rec.pets.aquatic  2      4	  NO
		rec.aquarium      1      6	  NO
		rec.aquaria       9      2	 YES
	Ballot 2: (20%)
		sci.aquaria	  6	 3	 YES
		sci.bio.marine   10      1	 YES
		rec.pets.fish     2      5	  NO
		rec.pets.aquatic  2      4	  NO
		rec.aquarium      1      6	  NO
		rec.aquaria       9      2	 YES
	Ballot 3: (20%)
		sci.aquaria	  2	 5	  NO
		sci.bio.marine    1      6	  NO
		rec.pets.fish    10      1	 YES
		rec.pets.aquatic  8      3	 YES
		rec.aquarium      6      4	 YES
		rec.aquaria       9      2	 YES
	Ballot 4: (20%)
		sci.aquaria	  2	 5	  NO
		sci.bio.marine    1      6	  NO
		rec.pets.fish     8      3	 YES
		rec.pets.aquatic 10      1	 YES
		rec.aquarium      6      4	 YES
		rec.aquaria       9      2	 YES
	Ballot 5: (20%)
		sci.aquaria	  2	 5	  NO
		sci.bio.marine    1      6	  NO
		rec.pets.fish     4      4	  NO
		rec.pets.aquatic  3      3	  NO
		rec.aquarium     10      1	 YES
		rec.aquaria       9      2	 YES

In this case, you get the following vote results:
	MAUVE:
		sci.aquaria	  YES 40%	NO 60%
		sci.bio.marine	  YES 40%	NO 60%
		rec.pets.fish	  YES 40%	NO 60%
		rec.pets.aquatic  YES 40%	NO 60%
		rec.aquarium	  YES 60%	NO 40%
		rec.aquaria	  YES 100%	NO 0%	*** wins ***
		
	WEIP:
		sci.aquaria	  4.4
		sci.bio.marine	  3.8
		rec.pets.fish	  5.2
		rec.pets.aquatic  5.0
		rec.aquarium	  4.8
		rec.aquaria	  9.0			*** wins ***
	STV:
		Well, in this particular example STV elimates rec.aquaria
		and runs into deadlock.  If the votes were slightly 
		assymetric (not all exactly 20%), you can construct 
		scenarios where almost ANY of the others can win, depending
		on what order the 'dominos' fall.  I didn't try to artfully
		construct a paradox (I tried to use 'common sense' votes
		based on what people might want to do), but paradox shows
		its ugly head anyway.

CONCLUSION:
	I feel that STV is not only complicated to explain and adjudicate,
but it is fundamentally flawed as well.  It does make an attempt to choose
based on preference, but playing some simple games with non-trivial votes
shows how truly non-intuitive the percolation of votes can be.  Its ranking
is also very primitive, and doesn't come any closer to showing the strength
of a vote than the simple concensus MAUVE scheme.
	I think that the MAUVE scheme, as simple as it is, accomplishes the
main objective of newgroup voting, finding the proposal with the widest
approval and the least objection.  It is very easy to explain and adjudicate,
and it is intuitively obvious what the effect of your vote will be.
	If MAUVE is deemed unacceptable because of its lack of preference
expression, I think that the WEIP scheme implements preference voting in a
fundamentally sound way.  It not only has much more flexibility than STV
(it is able to show not only the preferences, but the magnitude of preferences
- and even ties in preference), but it also incorporates the basic algorithmic
nature that makes MAUVE work - the mutual INDEPENDENCE of the votes.  Keeping
the votes independent removes the cross-dependencies that lead to paradox and
non-intuitive vote results under STV.

I thank you for having the patience to read this far ...
-- 
--------|	If you need help, call the FBI.
Alien   |   					- Deteriorata
--------|     decvax!frog!cpoint!alien      bu-cs!mirror!frog!cpoint!alien

brad@looking.on.ca (Brad Templeton) (11/23/89)

STV was explained (the voting process only) in 25 lines in news.groups.

But the fact that we're seing dozens of 100 line clarifications and questions
does not bode well.  We're going to get this with each newcomer, each new
self apointed net.police officer.
-- 
Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Waterloo, Ontario 519/884-7473

edhew@xenitec.on.ca (Ed Hew) (11/26/89)

In article <51370@looking.on.ca> brad@looking.on.ca (Brad Templeton) writes:
>STV was explained (the voting process only) in 25 lines in news.groups.
>
>But the fact that we're seing dozens of 100 line clarifications and questions
>does not bode well.  We're going to get this with each newcomer, each new
>self apointed net.police officer.

....and all this without even so much as a contested vote!  Considering
the net.flameage we see with the current simple scheme, I can just imagine
the results the very first time someone doesn't like the outcome of an STV
vote.  Sure, it may be more flexible, but it also appears to be open to
so many interpretations that it will settle nothing.

>Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Waterloo, Ontario 519/884-7473

  Ed. A. Hew, SCO Authorized Technical Trainer, XeniTec Consulting Services
  edhew@xenitec.on.ca	       -or-	   ..!{uunet!}watmath!xenitec!edhew