news@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu (Usenet netnews) (11/07/86)
Organization : California Institute of Technology Keywords: From: jon@oddhack.Caltech.Edu (Jon Leech) Path: oddhack!jon In article <201@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes: >In article <7279@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >> [...] Not risky enough not to do it, but risky enough to think twice >>about launching one-of-a-kind payloads like the Space Telescope. The >>loss of a single military payload wouldn't be a tenth of the disaster >>that losing the HST would be. > > As much as I agree with your sentiment (that shuttle launches should >resume ASAP), the above makes no real sense, except perhaps politically. >The $1G HST doesn't add significantly to the risk of losing the $2.5G >orbiter (certainly not "ten times"!). > > -- David desJardins The only qualified people (the current members of the Astronaut Corps) say they will be happy to fly it - as soon as the SRBs are understood, fixed, and tested (at least, this is what Sally Ride said in a talk she gave at Caltech last night). Since these are the people who have been putting their lives on the line all along, I tend to trust their judgement. By the time any of the well-meaning volunteers could be trained, the joint redesign and testing program will hopefully be completed anyway. -- Jon Leech (jon@csvax.caltech.edu || ...seismo!cit-vax!jon) Caltech Computer Science Graphics Group __@/
desj@brahms (David desJardins) (11/08/86)
In article <1132@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> jon@cit-vax.UUCP (Jon Leech) writes: > The only qualified people (the current members of the Astronaut Corps) >say they will be happy to fly it - as soon as the SRBs are understood, >fixed, and tested (at least, this is what Sally Ride said in a talk she >gave at Caltech last night). I find this very hard to believe. Certainly there was no problem with finding people to fly on the first shuttle flight, with a *much* greater risk than the 26th -- why would they suddenly not want to fly? From what I read in the media (admittedly a very poor source of such information) Sally Ride in particular is the most outspoken and insistent of the astronauts on the safety issue. I wouldn't take her views as representative without further evidence. Finally, if the astronauts we have aren't willing to fly, then we should be training some who are (whether or not shuttle flights are to be resumed). -- David desJardins
news@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu (Usenet netnews) (11/08/86)
Organization : California Institute of Technology Keywords: From: jon@oddhack.Caltech.Edu (Jon Leech) Path: oddhack!jon In article <207@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes: >In article <1132@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> jon@cit-vax.UUCP (Jon Leech) writes: >> The only qualified people (the current members of the Astronaut Corps) >>say they will be happy to fly it - as soon as the SRBs are understood, >>fixed, and tested (at least, this is what Sally Ride said in a talk she >>gave at Caltech last night). > > I find this very hard to believe. Certainly there was no problem with >finding people to fly on the first shuttle flight, with a *much* greater >risk than the 26th -- why would they suddenly not want to fly? I find it very easy to believe. The first flights of the shuttle were flown by experienced test pilots who knew and accepted high risks. The Mission Specialists and Payload Specialists are there to do a different job, one which should not require undue risk of life. Without these people, perhaps shuttles can be flown, but they won't be doing nearly as much. > > From what I read in the media (admittedly a very poor source of such >information) Sally Ride in particular is the most outspoken and insistent >of the astronauts on the safety issue. I wouldn't take her views as >representative without further evidence. If so, perhaps it is because her membership on the Rogers Commission gave her a better understanding of the many flaws in NASA and the shuttle program. Her views are certainly representative of Sally Ride, at least. > > Finally, if the astronauts we have aren't willing to fly, then we >should be training some who are (whether or not shuttle flights are to >be resumed). > > -- David desJardins This is ridiculous. We certainly don't need astronauts if the shuttle is not going to fly again. Since it is, we need the current astronauts, who have the most experience and familiarity with the system. Offering their - or any - lives to a system with at least one demonstrated fatal failure mode is very generous for people who are NOT that familiar and who won't fly themselves. Waiting until 1988 for another shuttle flight is unpleasant, but we'll be waiting a hell of a lot longer if we start flying them again and lose another one. -- Jon Leech (jon@csvax.caltech.edu || ...seismo!cit-vax!jon) Caltech Computer Science Graphics Group __@/
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (11/09/86)
> The only qualified people (the current members of the Astronaut Corps) > say they will be happy to fly it - as soon as the SRBs are understood, > fixed, and tested (at least, this is what Sally Ride said in a talk she > gave at Caltech last night). Since these are the people who have been putting > their lives on the line all along, I tend to trust their judgement. By the > time any of the well-meaning volunteers could be trained, the joint redesign > and testing program will hopefully be completed anyway. When I said "qualified volunteers", I meant from the current astronauts. Sally Ride is not the whole astronaut corps. The astronauts have an obvious vested interest in pushing the safety issue as hard as they can; this should be seen as what it is, a political maneuver to encourage badly-needed changes. If there was a top-level decision to the effect that there *will* be launches at once but that the safety cleanup will continue, I don't think there would be any problem getting astronauts for the flights. Also, as I have observed before, a good fraction of the astronauts are military officers, who are sworn to risk their lives for their country on request anyway. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (11/09/86)
> ...The first flights of the shuttle > were flown by experienced test pilots who knew and accepted high risks. > The Mission Specialists and Payload Specialists are there to do a different > job, one which should not require undue risk of life. Without these people, > perhaps shuttles can be flown, but they won't be doing nearly as much. It is a verifiable fact that there are Payload Specialists who would fly on the Shuttle tomorrow if they could; the "Spacefaring Nation" report identified some. And if you look at the record, I think you'll find that Mission Specialists flew pretty early in the program. I'm sure that not all of the Mission/Payload Specialists would volunteer; I'm equally sure that enough of them would. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
desj@brahms (David desJardins) (11/09/86)
In article <1135@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> jon@cit-vax.UUCP (Jon Leech) writes: >> I find this very hard to believe. Certainly there was no problem with >>finding people to fly on the first shuttle flight, with a *much* greater >>risk than the 26th -- why would they suddenly not want to fly? > > I find it very easy to believe. The first flights of the shuttle >were flown by experienced test pilots who knew and accepted high risks. >The Mission Specialists and Payload Specialists are there to do a different >job, one which should not require undue risk of life. Without these people, >perhaps shuttles can be flown, but they won't be doing nearly as much. The original proposal was a resumption of flights with military crews. In any case, those who are willing to fly should fly, and those who are not should not. I still believe (Ms. Ride's statements notwithstanding) that there will be plenty of volunteers. > If so, perhaps it is because her membership on the Rogers Commission >gave her a better understanding of the many flaws in NASA and the shuttle >program. Certainly possible. The converse is also possible -- that she was chosen for the commission because of her views on safety. The Rogers Commission "discovered" very little, and what they did every- one else now knows from their report. Mostly what the Rogers Commission did is publish their opinions about how NASA should be run (or, if you prefer, "the many flaws in NASA and the shuttle program"). I seriously doubt that it would cause any serious change in the opinions of any person who was already knowledgeable about the program. The basic question should be, "What is an acceptable level of risk?" Not, "How can we completely minimize risk?" We do the latter simply by never flying at all. >> Finally, if the astronauts we have aren't willing to fly, then we >>should be training some who are (whether or not shuttle flights are to >>be resumed). > > This is ridiculous. We certainly don't need astronauts if the >shuttle is not going to fly again. If at some time in the future (say, after another accident) we need to fly the shuttle despite known safety problems, it would certainly be desirable to have trained crews who are willing to fly. >Since it is, we need the current astronauts, who have the most experience >and familiarity with the system. But mostly we need people who are willing to do their jobs when the need arises. At any rate, I really doubt that this is seriously a problem, since I still find it impossible to imagine that any substantial number of the current astronauts would refuse to fly. >Offering their - or any - lives to a system with at least one demonstrated >fatal failure mode is very generous for people who are NOT that familiar >and who won't fly themselves. Why is it different than the 25th flight, where we DID offer the crew's lives to a system with at least one (undemonstrated) fatal failure mode? Or the 27th flight, on which we WILL offer their lives to a system with at least one still undemonstrated fatal failure mode? You are just as dead if you are killed by an undemonstrated failure mode as you are if you are killed by a demonstrated mode. If you are saying that we should never fly the shuttle unless and until we are certain that there are NO fatal failure modes, then we are never going to fly it at all, and one is left to wonder why we built them in the first place. > Waiting until 1988 for another shuttle flight is unpleasant, >but we'll be waiting a hell of a lot longer if we start flying them >again and lose another one. We definitely need a commitment to replace any shuttles that are lost. Self-insurance is hardly a complicated notion. Let us make the pessimistic assumption that there is a 1% additional chance of joint failure for each launch before the problem is fixed, and the optimistic assumption that we can conduct 5 launches in this time. At $2.5G per shuttle, this comes to $125M expected additional cost for these flights. Can we really not afford this? -- David desJardins
news@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu (Usenet netnews) (11/10/86)
Organization : California Institute of Technology Keywords: From: jon@oddhack.Caltech.Edu (Jon Leech) Path: oddhack!jon In article <227@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes: > The Rogers Commission "discovered" very little, and what they did every- >one else now knows from their report. Mostly what the Rogers Commission >did is publish their opinions about how NASA should be run (or, if you >prefer, "the many flaws in NASA and the shuttle program"). I seriously >doubt that it would cause any serious change in the opinions of any person >who was already knowledgeable about the program. What exactly does `knowledgeable about the program' mean? People who were supposedly `knowedgeable' about the SRBs either were never informed about the O-ring erosion problem, or chose to ignore it repeatedly. Without changes in `how NASA should be run', I see no reason to believe exactly the same thing will not happen with some other potentially fatal problem, enough times that potential turns into reality. Perhaps the Commission recommendations are not the best way to fix NASA management problems, but SOMETHING should be done if we are to avoid another Challenger (ideally an infusion of money big enough to restore the quality-control procedures and `can do' attitude of the Apollo days). > >>Offering their - or any - lives to a system with at least one demonstrated >>fatal failure mode is very generous for people who are NOT that familiar >>and who won't fly themselves. > > Why is it different than the 25th flight, where we DID offer the crew's >lives to a system with at least one (undemonstrated) fatal failure mode? >Or the 27th flight, on which we WILL offer their lives to a system with >at least one still undemonstrated fatal failure mode? You are just as >dead if you are killed by an undemonstrated failure mode as you are if >you are killed by a demonstrated mode. > If you are saying that we should never fly the shuttle unless and until >we are certain that there are NO fatal failure modes, then we are never >going to fly it at all, and one is left to wonder why we built them in >the first place. No, that's not what I'm saying. Consider an analogy to automobiles or airplanes: when something seriously wrong happens (engines falling off, say, or doors flying open at 30,000 feet), the vehicle is grounded until the fundamental problem is fixed. Then it continues flying - with the knowledge that there are unquantifiable further risks. This happens even with military aircraft on occasion. In an ideal world we could afford to take the (probably low) risks of flying shuttles immediately. In the real world, where another shuttle loss would almost certainly not be replaced and might even spell the end of civilian manned space flight, it behooves NASA to be careful. This does not mean being `certain that there are NO fatal failure modes'; it DOES mean being confident that the joint erosion problem will not occur again, and fixing all the other problems possible while the joint fix is going on. As long as I'm saying things people disagree with, how about this: the Challenger disaster is in certain respects the BEST possible thing to happen to the American space effort recently; by shoving commerical payloads off the Shuttle, we may finally get a healthy private ELV industry. -- Jon Leech (jon@csvax.caltech.edu || ...seismo!cit-vax!jon) Caltech Computer Science Graphics Group __@/
rjnoe@uniq.UUCP (Roger J. Noe) (11/10/86)
In article <207@cartan.Berkeley.EDU>, desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes: > In article <1132@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> jon@cit-vax.UUCP (Jon Leech) writes: > > The only qualified people (the current members of the Astronaut Corps) > >say they will be happy to fly it - as soon as the SRBs are understood, > >fixed, and tested (at least, this is what Sally Ride said in a talk she > >gave at Caltech last night). > > I find this very hard to believe. Certainly there was no problem with > finding people to fly on the first shuttle flight, with a *much* greater > risk than the 26th -- why would they suddenly not want to fly? Because there is a *known* problem which poses a serious hazard to flying the shuttle. A problem of this magnitude cannot go ignored, certainly not by those who have the privilege and responsibility of risking their lives as crew members. The most rational philosophy is to seek out and identify all the problems and potential problems we can find. Once those problems are known, solutions can be devised for them, within the limits of prac- ticality (time, money, available technology, so forth). Once this is done what remains are problems for which perfect solutions have not been found and unknown problems. We cannot do anything about unknown problems except to make a cautious effort to make them known problems. Again, we're faced with an issue of practicality; there's always going to be some risk but at some point we have to decide if we're going to assume that risk. Only one who is foolhardy would choose to ignore a known problem such as with the SRBs right now and say, "Sounds like an acceptable risk to me." Young and Crippen (and all the other astronauts who could have been chosen as the first two shuttle crew) believed they understood what could go wrong and what could be done about such problems. Certainly they knew that some problems were unsolvable and would result in loss of orbiter and crew. Those problems were undoubtedly given most careful consideration and the conclusion was such problems were unlikely in the extreme. The risk was deemed to be acceptable. Had they known about this SRB misfeature I would hope that they would have said the risk is unacceptable; let's do something about this problem first, then we'll fly. And that's what the astronauts seem to be saying now. > Finally, if the astronauts we have aren't willing to fly, then we > should be training some who are (whether or not shuttle flights are to > be resumed). > -- David desJardins Why don't we just get suicidal maniacs instead of astronauts? :-) Seriously, there is a big difference between bravery and stupidity. I think the astronauts who say they want to continue flying after the SRBs are fixed display a great deal of courage. I wouldn't want to fly with anyone so reckless as to propose resuming launch of shuttles without attempting to understand and fix the SRB problem. It's not that I don't think the goal is worth risking lives. Quite the contrary, I do think the risk is worthwhile and I'm willing to take that risk personally. But flying the shuttle now, without fixing the SRBs (at least!) first, is unconscionable. Should the tragedy repeat itself, the result would be a waste of human life. I cannot condone such a waste, whether the life at stake is mine or not. I hope there are not too many people who disagree. Roger Noe ihnp4!uniq!rjnoe -- "While chaotic and inane ramblings abound, [USENET] is quite popular." Communications of the ACM, vol. 29, no. 10 (Oct. 1986), p. 958.
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (11/11/86)
> ... Consider an analogy to automobiles > or airplanes: when something seriously wrong happens (engines falling > off, say, or doors flying open at 30,000 feet), the vehicle is grounded > until the fundamental problem is fixed... Not always. It will probably be grounded until something is understood about the causes of the problem. Often it will then resume flying, under restrictions (e.g. the door flies off at 30,000 feet so max altitude is 25,000 for the moment), while the definitive fix is devised. The suggestion I and others are making is that applying the same standard to the Shuttle would be reasonable. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
desj@brahms (David desJardins) (11/13/86)
In article <137@uniq.UUCP> rjnoe@uniq.UUCP (Roger Noe) writes: >Because there is a *known* problem which poses a serious hazard to flying >the shuttle. A problem of this magnitude cannot go ignored.... The most >rational philosophy is to seek out and identify all the problems and >potential problems we can find. Once those problems are known, solutions >can be devised for them, within the limits of practicality (time, money, >available technology, so forth). Exactly. In this particular case the limit is not one of money -- the cost of SRB redesign is amply justified by the resulting increase in launch reliability -- but one of time. >Once this is done what remains are problems for which perfect solutions have >not been found and unknown problems. The SRB problem falls into the former category. There is no perfect solution (i.e., one which would be ready to fly tomorrow). >[...] there's always going to be some risk, but at some point we have to >decide if we're going to assume that risk. Only one who is foolhardy would >choose to ignore a known problem such as with the SRBs right now and say, >"Sounds like an acceptable risk to me." This is where you are wrong. What is foolish is to refuse to fly until all known problems are fixed, regardless of the cost (in time and money). It is also hypocritical, in that other equally serious problems are being neglected while others get the publicity. I think that any person who is knowledgeable about the shuttle would agree that if the shuttle were to be launched immediately, with simple precautions (e.g., not launching in arctic weather!), that the risk of loss due to SSME malfunction would be substan- tially than the risk of SRB failure. The main engines are extremely com- plicated, and an internal failure which would be minor in a more ordinary piece of hardware could easily prove fatal inside of the SSME. But we accept this (known) risk of flying the shuttle; why are the SRB risks any different? In each case the only rational approach is to analyze the risks and benefits of a launch and determine if it is desirable. >Young and Crippen (and all the other astronauts who could have been chosen >as the first two shuttle crew) believed they understood what could go wrong >and what could be done about such problems. Certainly they knew that some >problems were unsolvable and would result in loss of orbiter and crew. >Those problems were undoubtedly given most careful consideration and the >conclusion was such problems were unlikely in the extreme. Nonsense. I don't have access to internal NASA documents, but I'm sure that the estimated probability of mission failure was at least 10-20%. And if it was at the low end of this range they were being unrealistic. The risk now, after 25 flights, is *much* less. >The risk was deemed to be acceptable. Had they known about this SRB mis- >feature I would hope that they would have said the risk is unacceptable; >let's do something about this problem first, then we'll fly. Why would you hope this? >And that's what the astronauts seem to be saying now. As I have said, I find this impossible to believe. Henry has quoted sources which say otherwise. >> Finally, if the astronauts we have aren't willing to fly, then we >> should be training some who are (whether or not shuttle flights are to >> be resumed). > >Seriously, there is a big difference between bravery and stupidity. >I think the astronauts who say they want to continue flying after the >SRBs are fixed display a great deal of courage. Are you joking? Why would anyone become an astronaut who is not willing to accept the risks? The point is that the astronauts were willing to accept much greater risks on the early flights, so why are lesser risks suddenly too much to accept? >I wouldn't want to fly with anyone so reckless as to propose resuming launch >of shuttles without attempting to understand and fix the SRB problem. The problem *is* understood, and a large part of the fix is not flying in certain conditions and taking certain precautions. *I* wouldn't want to fly with someone so irrational as to demand that certain risks be reduced while other, larger risks remain. Nor with someone so irrational as to be willing to fly with a 10% unknown risk but not with a 1% known risk. >It's not that I don't think the goal is worth risking lives. Quite the >contrary, I do think the risk is worthwhile and I'm willing to take that >risk personally. But flying the shuttle now, without fixing the SRBs (at >least!) first, is unconscionable. Should the tragedy repeat itself, the >result would be a waste of human life. I cannot condone such a waste.... I have this feeling that we are never going to understand each other. I can't understand how you can worry so much about a few lives while millions die every year whom you could have saved by giving them some food. Or while thousands are killed with weapons paid for by your tax dollars. Or while thousands of accident victims could be saved by an investment in trauma centers. If your desire is to save lives, it makes a lot more sense to invest your dollars and time in those things than to worry about making the shuttle safe. It seems instead that your interest is in saving a few *particular* lives. And if you value the possible preservation of those particular lives more than the benefits of resuming shuttle launches, then I can note that you are being irrational, but I don't see how I can change your mind. -- David desJardins
patrick@mcc-pp.UUCP (Patrick McGehearty) (11/13/86)
I think this extended discussion of when the astronauts are willing to fly is based on a misapprehension about why they raised the issue. I am basing my opinions on books such as The Right Stuff, and general knowledge of risk-takers and organization politics. The astronauts are not afraid to fly when a reasonable risk/cost/feasiblity tradeoff has been and the best available (in terms of time/cost/etc) fixes have been implemented. However, the crash and following investigation gives strong evidence that they disagree with previous policy on what are the reasonable tradeoffs. Therefore, they are trying to change the organization structure so that the "astronauts" as a group have significant input in making these tradeoff decisions. Statements like "We won't fly until its fixed" are made for reasons of political positioning. While legally it is feasible to order flights over astronaut objections, it is politically shakey. Imagine what would happen to NASA if some number of astronauts were saying the shuttle was unsafe, and another one blew up!!? (as an organization, and to the decision makers, never mind the national tragedy aspects) Witch hunts instead of white washes would be the order of the day. I suspect that the astronauts will knowing accept considerable risks if they feel in control of the risk assessment process. I also believe that they are more concerned with the success of the space program as a whole than their individual risk, but that like the rest of the above is just my opinion. - Patrick McGehearty (A Space Advocate like (most of) the rest of you)
ronc@fai.UUCP (Ronald O. Christian) (11/14/86)
In article <137@uniq.UUCP> rjnoe@uniq.UUCP (Roger J. Noe) writes: >But flying the shuttle now, without fixing the SRBs (at least!) first, is >unconscionable. Should the tragedy repeat itself, the result would be a >waste of human life. I cannot condone such a waste, whether the life at >stake is mine or not. I hope there are not too many people who disagree. > Roger Noe ihnp4!uniq!rjnoe Well, at first I did. I got the impression that we understood the SRB failure well enough not to launch when conditions are right for a second failure. Right? I mean, I had a car once that wouldn't run when it rained. Just stalled out. I simply didn't try to drive it when it rained... Furthermore, although one can't deny the value of human life, (at least that's the way I feel about *mine*) there *are* things that are more important. What constitutes an acceptable risk varies widely from one individual to another. Not suicidal. Just placing a higher value on the goal of the mission. Then I got to thinking. (Exit knee-jerk mode :-)) What happens if *another* shuttle does the old skyrocket trick? Does Congress shut down NASA until the year 3000? The point is, there is more at stake here than a few lives. Also, what happens when the weather's cold and the President just has to be on television with the astronauts again? :-) Let's fix the SRB's first. Ron -- -- Ronald O. Christian (Fujitsu America Inc., San Jose, Calif.) seismo!amdahl!fai!ronc -or- ihnp4!pesnta!fai!ronc Oliver's law of assumed responsibility: "If you are seen fixing it, you will be blamed for breaking it."
caggiano@esquire.UUCP (Frank Caggiano) (11/14/86)
In article <260@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes: >I think that any person who is >knowledgeable about the shuttle would agree that if the shuttle were to be >launched immediately, with simple precautions (e.g., not launching in arctic >weather!), that the risk of loss due to SSME malfunction would be substan- >tially than the risk of SRB failure. I never relized that the weather in Florida during January was considered arctic. I always wondered why so many people went there on vacation :-) Frank Caggiano
eugene@nike.uucp (Eugene Miya N.) (11/15/86)
The following is a bit to think. Under no circumstance should this
be considered policy or a sign of how NASA (my employer) thinks
about policy. This is strictly my opinion. Enough disclaimer.
Shortly, after the Challenger accident it amazed me the attention
given the the crew as Heros. Roger Noe and I discussed this a bit
because we saw them more as victims. Shortly there after, I signed
off due to the volume of trash in the space and shuttle groups.
[I've only returned because of the reorganization of the net groups,
and will leave when it gets bad again.] No discussion about sending
crews up can take place with adequately considering some other
major accidents. We typically think of an accident as a single
focused event: Chernobyl is a good counter to this way of thinking.
Consider, as I did several months ago, SUPPOSE there had existed a
different emergency situation on the Challenger. Let's say it made
it into orbit, but badily damaged, but the crew could live 10 days
(stretching it), and further SUPPOSE, we had the capability to launch
another shuttle during this time frame, but that since the weather
was basically the same, we had to risk a rescue/second accident.
(Assuming a potentially time wear-out problem.) Do we let the crew die
in orbit (or try and re-enter in a crippled craft)? Do we risk
a second crew to the potential of a similar accident under near
identical conditions (remember we did not know within 10 days the cause
of the accident) [give more thought to this condition, would you go up
knowing the odds to save another crew in orbit, or is it a futile
gesture]? These are the kinds of conditions which bring out
heroism (or more victims). The space program has had many close calls
in the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs (as well as similar Soviet
problems).
Sure, we are all going to be careful the NEXT time. It's our history.
It's how mankind progresses. Sure, the next mission and subsequent ones
are going to have increased awareness, but don't focus on this one
problem. Don't forget there were other identified problems. Keep
general awareness.
--eugene miya
NASA Ames Research Center
eugene@ames-aurora.ARPA
"You trust the `reply' command with all those different mailers out there?"
{hplabs,hao,nike,ihnp4,decwrl,allegra,tektronix,menlo70}!ames!aurora!eugenealex@xios.UUCP (Alex B Laney) (11/21/86)
In article <7309@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: > ... Often it will then resume flying, under >restrictions (e.g. the door flies off at 30,000 feet so max altitude is >25,000 for the moment), while the definitive fix is devised. The suggestion >I and others are making is that applying the same standard to the Shuttle >would be reasonable. Ok -- but how much reasonable work can be done in under about 1 minute of flying time and about 5 miles altitude limit per flight? [ Announcing a new service -- Shuttle thrill rides! ] -- - + - + - Alex Laney, Xios Systems Corp, 105-1600 Carling Av, Ottawa (613)725-5411x402 utzoo - > !dciem allegra!ihnp4!utcsri -- > nrcaer!xios!lib!alex ucbvax!hplabs -- / > !seismo!hadron!netex!prcrs/ decvax --