[sci.space.shuttle] Mishap investigation board completes report on improper raising of Discovery's payload bay door

yee@trident.arc.nasa.gov (Peter E. Yee) (08/01/90)

  Lisa Malone                                        July 31, 1990
  (407) 867-2468

  KSC Release No.  133-90


  MISHAP INVESTIGATION BOARD COMPLETES REPORT ON  IMPROPER  RAISING
  OF DISCOVERY'S PAYLOAD BAY DOOR

       Movement  of  an overhead access bridge while connected to a
  payload bay door was the primary cause cited by an  investigation
  board for the improper raising of a payload bay door on the Space
  Shuttle Orbiter Discovery on June 4, 1990. Contributing causes to
  the improper raising included failure to follow the approved pro-
  cedure,  deficient  work control systems to preclude bridge move-
  ment while connected to a payload bay door,  and  deficient  work
  scheduling.

       Discovery  was  located in Orbiter Processing Facility bay 1
  undergoing pre-launch preparations for  its  next  mission,  STS-
  41/Ulysses,  when  the  incident  occurred.  The  aft  portion of
  Discovery's right hand payload bay door was raised improperly ap-
  proximately 31 to 33 inches.  The right  hand  payload  bay  door
  Zero-G system,  which is attached to overhead access bridges, was
  configured to support a scheduled door closing operation when  an
  overhead access bridge was moved for another use,  causing damage
  to support equipment and improper  raising  of  the  payload  bay
  door.

       A  pulley  and  wire  cable  used  in the Zero-G system were
  damaged in the process. The cost of the mishap, including inspec-
  tion of the payload bay door and repair of the support equipment,
  was estimated at $120,000.

       The board, which was chaired by Paul Myers, technical assis-
  tant to  KSC's  director  of  Engineering  Development,  was  not
  charged with determining any damage to flight hardware.  However,
  thorough inspections have been performed and it has  been  deter-
  mined  that  there  was no damage to Discovery's payload bay door
  from this mishap.

       Board members included Hector Delgado, Systems Assurance Of-
  fice,  Reliability and Quality Assurance Directorate,  who served
  as deputy chairman;  Charles Stevenson, chief, Orbiter Mechanical
  Systems Branch, Vehicle Engineering; Tim Yang, facilities systems
  engineer,  Mechanical and Electrical Systems Branch,  Center Sup-
  port  Operations  Directorate;  and Laurie Walls,  orbiter ground
  support equipment and facilities engineer,  Structures,  Handling
  and  Access  Systems Section,  Vehicle Engineering.  Elliot Kick-
  lighter of the National Space  Transportation  System  Operations
  office was the appointed Level II observer. Ex-officio Board mem-
  bers  included  Elizabeth  Gruhler,  safety  advisor;  Douglas G.
  Hendriksen,  legal advisor and Lisa Malone,  public  affairs  ad-
  visor.

			       # # # #

  Editor's  Note:  A  copy  of  the board's report is available for
  review in the newsroom at the Kennedy Space Center.