gwalsh@kilroy.jpl.nasa.gov (Gerald J. Walsh) (07/23/90)
"NASA: What Goes Up -- A Can-Do Agency Becomes A Can't Do Bureaucracy" (from the Los Angeles Times Opinion Section - Sunday July 22, 1990) (by Gregg Easterbrook - contributing editor to Newsweek and the Atlantic) Think the United States should go to Mars? Or back to the moon? Build a space station? Or even just launch satellites and probes on a timely basis? The National Aeronautics and Space Administration used to be the answer to such questions; today it's the obstacle. NASA now stands between the United States and success in space. Recent problems such as the defective Hubble telescope and the grounded shuttle fleet are inklings of much deeper flaws rippling through the agency. NASA has been transformed from a can-do agency that represented the best in government to a can't-do bureaucracy embodying the worst aspect of British Admiralty stagnation, ass-protection and the military-industrial mind-set. At NASA, it no longer matters how many months or millions anything takes, as long as all personnel keep their jobs and all contractors continue receiving business. "We absolutely cannot get anything done any more," said a recently retired NASA official. "We've stopped thinking and stopped innovating. All NASA energy now goes to endlessly rejustifying the budgets for bad ideas from the past. We haven't had a winner new idea since Skylab." Skylab was launched in 1973. Consider these current NASA failings: -The Hubble telescope's most basic quality - whether its two primary lenses worked - was never tested before launch. This happened despite the fact that NASA had an unexpected three extra years - caused by flight suspension after Challenger - to work on the instrument. After the flaw was revealed, NASA complained it was because there was not enough money. The project came in about $400 million over budget as it was. -Two shuttle mission commanders were recently suspended from flight duty. -The space station, with construction costs up from $8 million to $37 billion even as the design has shrunk, will require more maintenance than previously acknowledged, NASA now admits. And there's still barely any explanation of what astronauts will [do] once aboard. -Though environmental science is a pressing political issue, NASA's $17 billion "crash" initiative won't put the first environmental research satellite into orbit until the next century. -A Mars mission, whose potential price tag NASA will not discuss publicly, may cost $500 billion, according to internal agency estimates. -The White House just announced permission for U.S.-built satellites to be launched aboard Soviet rockets from a for-profit spaceport to be built in Cape York, Australia. The U.S. commercial satellite industry had been pressuring for this, because the Cape York consortium promises lower prices than NASA or any U.S. company can provide. That they can do something in space we can't is perhaps the most frightening indictment of the U.S. space effort. -The space shuttle fleet is indefinitely grounded because of hydrogen-fuel leaks, but that's the least of its problems. Launching cargo on the shuttle can cost 10 times as much as using expendable rockets. The shuttle continues to be unreliable, with a peak launch rate of nine flights per year instead of the 50 NASA promised. Statistical studies by NASA continue to suggest another shuttle flight catastrophe is probable. The shuttle still relies on the no-turning-back- solid-rocket boosters that destroyed Challenger. "The way you get ahead inside NASA," said the former NASA official, "is by denying there are problems and being the loudest one to attach the blame for anything that goes wrong to critics." In the wake of the Challenger disaster, no NASA official was fired - not even those involved in trying to hush up the warnings from Morton Thiokol engineers. The career of NASA Deputy Administrator James R. Thompson is a case in point. Thompson was director of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center. Marshall was responsible for designing and supervising the solid rocket boosters that destroyed Challenger. Marshall also supervised testing of the Hubble. Yet Thompson is now No. 2 for the U.S. space program. Today, the White House is upset about NASA performance, but continues to allow Vice President Dan Quayle to run space policy. Nothing could please NASA deadwood more. Quayle does not challenge NASA's basic assumptions. With much fanfare last week, he announced a high-level task force to assess NASA priorities and performance. Who will sit on it? Quayle said NASA would pick the members. It's hard to believe these words came form an adult. Look for a hard-hitting report. Actually, although significant segments of the engineering and space-science communities are dismayed about NASA, it might be difficult to find experts who would say this publicly. This is partly due to disgust with the fact that the thorough report of the Rogers Commision - after the Challenger disaster - went straight to the discard pile. But it is largely because, if your career involves space science or engineering, you cannot be on record criticizing NASA. It is a monopoly, the only game in town. What is the most basic problem with NASA that many people know but refuse to say in public? That the agency must move on from the space shuttle. Technologically, the shuttle is a remarkable achievement. But operationally, the system is a white elephant. The shuttle is far too expensive to launch more than a few times a year;far too complex to be reliable, and its premise is elementally flawed because it risks precious human lives on prosaic cargo- delivery missions. How can the Soviets stage some 90 space launches per year and the United States only about 15? Because, for the majority of missions, Soviets use relatively low-tech, low-cost "dumb" boosters. The Soviet Union has a space shuttle. It's been launched once - because the Soviets cannot afford to operate it. Under perestroika, Soviet scientists have been more open about criticizing its impracticality than U.S. scientists have been about our shuttles. NASA refuses to make the slightest concession about shuttle use because any alternative would diminish the role of astronauts. Full employment for astronauts is NASA's non-negotiable demand: the reason for NASA's insistence in the early 1970's both on building a space shuttle and halting all research into throwaway rockets;the reason for insistence on a space station that is [continuously habited]. Astronaut employment is a NASA fixation not so much because of the relative handful of astronaut jobs, but because of the thousands of astronaut-related jobs in the NASA hierarchy and at NASA contractors. Shuttle fixation lies at the heart of NASA's bureaucratic miasma. How can the NASA logjam be broken? The nature of the U.S. space fleet must be changed. Here's the program: 1) [Park the shuttle]. The shuttle fleet should be converted from a payload- delivery system into scientific research vehicles able to stay in space for a few weeks at a time. For pure research purposes, the shuttle would fly three or four times per year. Astronauts and scientists working in the shuttle bay could perform all the basic research and commercial manufacturing experiments proposed for the space station. 2) [Cancel the space station]. It won't be necessary if step 1 is taken, and money saved could be used to fund steps 3 and 4. 3) [Build new boosters]. It's absurd for the United States to debate a Mars mission when we can't even get routine payloads into low-Earth orbit. This is like arguing over the rules for a road race when you don't even own a car. NASA's first priority should be developing affordable launch systems that work. Because NASA stopped all rocket research to prevent shuttle competitors from developing, the United States has not designed a new expandable space booster in almost 25 years. Using current advances in computer science, materials technology and aerodynamics, it should be possible to design new throwaway boosters that would have at least as much power as those in use - yet be far cheaper. Four years ago, when the Air Force thought the Strategic Defense Initiative would happen, generals realized SDI could never be practically launched from the shuttle - putting the system into orbit would cost more than SDI itself. So the Air Force initiated a cheap booster project, Advanced Launch System. NASA jumped into hyperspace over this program, lobbying frantically for its cancellation. Now, with the military budget shrinking, Advanced Launch System research has all but stopped. It should be revised. 4) [Build a spaceplane]. More than 30 years ago, the Air Force was routinely dropping the X-15 spaceplane from a B-52 bomber, flying it to the lower reaches of orbit and bringing it back for standard landings on runways. The X-15 program was put together quickly, didn't cost much and never had an accident. Forward into the past! For those missions when people are required, a new spaceplane may be the answer. Several proposals are circulating for a spaceplane that would be carried aloft on the back of a 747, then released to ignite rocket engines and transport six to 10 people into orbit. The spaceplane does have one technical drawback that drives NASA crazy: It would be impossible to build a huge spaceplane. The vehicle would be for crew and small payloads only, which means spaceplanes could not take large satellites into orbit, resulting in a lower percentage of manned space launches. It is for this reason that NASA hates, hates hates any mention of the word spaceplane. A new U.S. space fleet based on science-only shuttles, cheap new "dumb" boosters for most cargo launches and a spaceplane would make NASA programs affordable, flexible and reliable. The agency would be shaken up from top to bottom during the conversion, breaking bad habits and instilling new vision. NASA would have an exciting short-term goal - building and testing the new fleet - and far greater prospects for exciting long-term goals, once affordable and practical means of access to space comes into existence. These are the kinds of issues - not whether to send men to Mars - that ought to be attracting White House attention. Leadership starts at the top. It is no coincidence that NASA was most effective during a period when two Presidents, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, showed they were personally concerned with outcome of missions. Since then the United States has not had a President who exerted constructive pressure on NASA, one reason for its institutional decline. Richard M. Nixon hated space, which he considered a Democratic program; he pushed the agency toward issuing lies about shuttle cheapness, creating the self-deception that still haunts NASA. Ronald Reagan had a negative impact, imposing no cost controls during the heady first-term; then, after Challenger, firing no one and granting an immediate budget increase - the worst message to send a bureaucracy that has screwed up. Now comes George Bush. He's already hiked the NASA budget 36% in the last two years. And he is talking about vast new NASA budget increases for the space station, a moon base and perhaps Mars. Dangling the carrot of big budget increases, Bush ought to win significant concessions from NASA. Presidential leadership is the key to reform. The agency will not reform itself; and too many congressman will fight to the death to preserve existing spending in their districts to make Congress a likely source of NASA change. But Bush has yet to send the get-tough signal. Letting NASA appoint its own self-study commision is hardly going to get the agency's attention. Putting Quayle in charge of space policy will not make any entrenched bureaucrat lose a moment's sleep. In fact, Quayle's presence sends the signal that NASA can get away with murder. If Bush were serious about NASA reform, Washington insiders know, he would have assigned somebody else. It's time to chart NASA a new course to the stars. ============================================================================= Now its time for my comments I suppose... I've been defending NASA everytime they're attacked regarding the latest problems with the shuttle and the Hubble. I've always said, "those people just don't understand the complexities of these things. They never praise the good, only condemn the bad." Well, after reading this article I've realized that people always have, and always will, condemn the bad. People will always expect 100% no matter how complex the technology is. I'm still a student and I've always been awed by space. NASA and its achievements have always impressed me and I'm proud to have the opportunity to work with some of the finest scientist and engineers in the entire World. I think the future is in space. Humans are known for their curiosity and drive for exploration. Where in history would we be now if Columbus had not been curious about what was over the horizon? We've reached the point where its time to start looking beyond the horizon and outward into space and beyond. The author of this article has shown the flaws in NASA and has suggested some good reforms. Unfortunately, when Congress becomes confused or dismayed about something they take the most logical approach they can think of... cut the funding off. What can this possibly solve?? As the author has suggested, we need to come up with new visions and a new direction. We are relying too much on one launch vehicle. The scariest part for the U.S. is that commercial satellites are going to be launched by the Soviet Union! We've got to use expendable launch vehicles, cut the cost and increase the number of launches per year. We will still need the shuttle to grapple disabled satellites, but it just costs too much to have it carry up new satellites that could easily be lifted by cheap rockets. I still believe a moon base and a manned landing on Mars are great long-term goals. I'm all for it! But if the shuttle can't even get off the ground, how can we even think about achieving these goals. Our future [is] in space. But to make that future a reality, we've got to change our direction in the present.
roberts@larry.sal.wisc.edu (Tim Roberts) (07/23/90)
In article <8824@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> gwalsh@kilroy.jpl.nasa.gov (Gregg Easterbrook) writes: > >"NASA: What Goes Up -- A Can-Do Agency Becomes A Can't Do Bureaucracy" >(by Gregg Easterbrook - contributing editor to Newsweek and the Atlantic) > >The X-15 >program was put together quickly, didn't cost much and never had an accident. I suppose the men that were killed then died on purpose. This one statement displays profound ignorance. I aggree with Easterbrook's ideas but wonder if he wouldn't make a better football coach by claiming twenty years from now that he had "never lost a game until this year." That makes _anyone_ look like an idiot compared to their records. I don't use false examples to back my claims. Appearently Newsweek and the Atlantic do.
mvk@pawl.rpi.edu (Michael V. Kent) (07/23/90)
In article <8824@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> gwalsh@kilroy.jpl.nasa.gov (Gerald J. Walsh) writes: > >"NASA: What Goes Up -- A Can-Do Agency Becomes A Can't Do Bureaucracy" > >(from the Los Angeles Times Opinion Section - Sunday July 22, 1990) >(by Gregg Easterbrook - contributing editor to Newsweek and the Atlantic) > > Ordinarily, I wouldn't respond to such trash, but since there may be some people out there who might take this too seriously, here goes: >Consider these current NASA failings: > >-The space station, with construction costs up from $8 million to $37 billion >even as the design has shrunk, will require more maintenance than previously >acknowledged, NASA now admits. And there's still barely any explanation of >what astronauts will [do] once aboard. $8M for a space station, is he kidding? $37G may be correct, if you count a lot of things we'd build anyway as part of the station because they will be used on the station. As for work, they'll be doing mainly materials research, with quite a few medical, biological, astronomy, and earth resources experiments as well. The most important task they'll accomplish is to learn how to live in space. It may not sound all that exciting, but it's got to be done if we want a spacefaring civilization. > >-Though environmental science is a pressing political issue, NASA's $17 billion >"crash" initiative won't put the first environmental research satellite into >orbit until the next century. The "Earth Observing System", to which he probably refers, is a comprehensive system designed to study the Earth as one ecosystem. There are several other satellites already being built which could be called environmental satellites. These will be launched shortly. > >-A Mars mission, whose potential price tag NASA will not discuss publicly, may >cost $500 billion, according to internal agency estimates. Mars is 400 times as far from Earth as the moon is. Sending a crew there and bringing it back will take at least a year and a half -- 50 times the length of a lunar mission. Do this safely will require new technology and quite a bit of money. But the money will be spent over a 30 year period. > >-The White House just announced permission for U.S.-built satellites to be >launched aboard Soviet rockets from a for-profit spaceport to be built in Cape >York, Australia. The U.S. commercial satellite industry had been pressuring >for this, because the Cape York consortium promises lower prices than NASA or >any U.S. company can provide. That they can do something in space we can't is >perhaps the most frightening indictment of the U.S. space effort. Right now, the American companies are launching all the satellites they can handle. McDonnell Douglas is launching about ten per year, and Martin Marietta, Orbital Sciences Corp., and General Dynamics should reach that mark shortly. Cape York is still in the planning stages. It will be many years before it is operational, if ever. By that time McDonnell Douglas and perhaps Martin Marietta plan to have new, heavy-lift boosters available.> >-The space shuttle fleet is indefinitely grounded because of hydrogen-fuel >leaks, but that's the least of its problems. Launching cargo on the shuttle >can cost 10 times as much as using expendable rockets. The shuttle continues >to be unreliable, with a peak launch rate of nine flights per year instead of >the 50 NASA promised. Shuttles are not the only launch vehicles that have fuel leaks. As for costing ten times as much as an expendible -- no way! At least not any expendible we're currently building. > >Statistical studies by NASA continue to suggest another shuttle flight >catastrophe is probable. The shuttle still relies on the no-turning-back- >solid-rocket boosters that destroyed Challenger. Spaceflight is dangerous -- always has been and always will be. To not expect another accident is to bury one's head in the sand. There will be more Shuttle disasters; there will be more ELV failures, airplane crashes, and automobile accidents as well. The estimated failure rate for the Shuttle is 1 in 78. For Apollo it was 1 in 10. That puts the Shuttle at 8 times as safe as Apollo. If you like actual numbers: 1 accident in 35 launches. 3.5 times as safe as Apollo. The SRB's have been redesigned, and the ASRM's come online in 1995.> >Today, the White House is upset about NASA performance, but continues to allow >Vice President Dan Quayle to run space policy. Nothing could please NASA see below. >Technologically, the shuttle is a remarkable achievement. But operationally, >the system is a white elephant. The shuttle is far too expensive to launch >more than a few times a year;far too complex to be reliable, and its premise is >elementally flawed because it risks precious human lives on prosaic cargo- >delivery missions. The Shuttle has not made "prosaic cargo-delivery missions" since the Challenger accident. It does carry up items which will not fit on an ELV due to size or weight constraints. The Shuttle is the only heavy-lift booster the US will have for the next five years. Look at the manifest. The Shuttle is being used for (1) Spacelab science missions, (2) heavy-lift launches, (3) satellite retrieval missions, (4) satellite repair missions, and (5) assembly and supply of the Space Station. >How can the Soviets stage some 90 space launches per year and the United States >only about 15? Because, for the majority of missions, Soviets use relatively >low-tech, low-cost "dumb" boosters. Part of the answer is that the Soviets need 90 launches per year to maintiain their capability. There satellites last only a couple of weeks to a couple of months each. American satellites usually last for several years. I believe it was NORAD that recently said that the number of American and Soviet operational satellites is about equal. > >How can the NASA logjam be broken? The nature of the U.S. space fleet must be >changed. Here's the program: > >1) [Park the shuttle]. The shuttle fleet should be converted from a payload- >delivery system into scientific research vehicles able to stay in space for a >few weeks at a time. For pure research purposes, the shuttle would fly three >or four times per year. Astronauts and scientists working in the shuttle bay >could perform all the basic research and commercial manufacturing experiments >proposed for the space station. This *IS* the primary purpose of the Space Shuttle over the next five years. About 30% to 50% of the scheduled flights are Spacelab flights. Astro, SLS, IML, Spacelab Dx, Spacelab Jx, USML, Starlab, ATLAS, and SRL are all Spacelab flights, most of which will be flying more than once in the next five years. > >2) [Cancel the space station]. It won't be necessary if step 1 is taken, and >money saved could be used to fund steps 3 and 4. Wrong. If we want to explore the solar system and create a spacefaring civil- ization, we need to learn how to live and work in space. For that we need a permanent manned prescence. The Space Station will give us that knowledge and allow us to perform some long-term experiments. 2 to 4 weeks in Spacelab is not enough time for most of the experiments planned for the Station. > >3) [Build new boosters]. It's absurd for the United States to debate a Mars >mission when we can't even get routine payloads into low-Earth orbit. This is >like arguing over the rules for a road race when you don't even own a car. >NASA's first priority should be developing affordable launch systems that work. >Because NASA stopped all rocket research to prevent shuttle competitors from >developing, the United States has not designed a new expandable space booster >in almost 25 years. Using current advances in computer science, materials >technology and aerodynamics, it should be possible to design new throwaway >boosters that would have at least as much power as those in use - yet be far >cheaper. It's called Pegasus, and it's brand spanking new. No, NASA didn't build it, but NASA has decided (with some coercion) that it should not be doing things that private enterprise can do. So Pegasus was built by OSC. The Delta, Atlas, and Titan rockets have also undergone modifications. NASA no longer owns these but instead contracts out launch services from the parent company. This is now free enterprise. Because there is a market for larger expendibles, Martin Marietta and McDonnell Douglas plan to build the Titan IV and the Heavy Lift Delta respectively within about five years. >Four years ago, when the Air Force thought the Strategic Defense Initiative >would happen, generals realized SDI could never be practically launched from >the shuttle - putting the system into orbit would cost more than SDI itself. >So the Air Force initiated a cheap booster project, Advanced Launch System. >NASA jumped into hyperspace over this program, lobbying frantically for its >cancellation. Now, with the military budget shrinking, Advanced Launch System >research has all but stopped. It should be revised. All proposed funding for ALS was recently cut by the House of Representatives. NASA wanted it but didn't get it. > >4) [Build a spaceplane]. More than 30 years ago, the Air Force was routinely >dropping the X-15 spaceplane from a B-52 bomber, flying it to the lower reaches >of orbit and bringing it back for standard landings on runways. The X-15 >program was put together quickly, didn't cost much and never had an accident. >Forward into the past! It's called the National AeroSpace Plane, and it's being funded in the follow- ing ratios: NASA and DoD: 25% each, McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, Rockwell, Rocketdyne, and Pratt and Whitney: 10% each. It's scheduled for suborbital test flight in 1998 and orbital test flight in 1999. > >The spaceplane does have one technical drawback that drives NASA crazy: It >would be impossible to build a huge spaceplane. The vehicle would be for crew >and small payloads only, which means spaceplanes could not take large >satellites into orbit, resulting in a lower percentage of manned space >launches. It is for this reason that NASA hates, hates hates any mention of >the word spaceplane. We're not NASA-bashing here, are we? ;) > >A new U.S. space fleet based on science-only shuttles, cheap new "dumb" >boosters for most cargo launches and a spaceplane would make NASA programs >affordable, flexible and reliable. The agency would be shaken up from top to >bottom during the conversion, breaking bad habits and instilling new vision. >NASA would have an exciting short-term goal - building and testing the new >fleet - and far greater prospects for exciting long-term goals, once affordable >and practical means of access to space comes into existence. It seems like most of his plan is already in existance, although not all of it is being carried out by NASA. > >Leadership starts at the top. It is no coincidence that NASA was most >effective during a period when two Presidents, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. >Johnson, showed they were personally concerned with outcome of missions. > >But Bush has yet to send the get-tough signal. Letting NASA appoint its own >self-study commision is hardly going to get the agency's attention. Putting >Quayle in charge of space policy will not make any entrenched bureaucrat lose a >moment's sleep. In fact, Quayle's presence sends the signal that NASA can get >away with murder. If Bush were serious about NASA reform, Washington insiders >know, he would have assigned somebody else. It's time to chart NASA a new >course to the stars. It seems he has a political axe to grind. Can you tell what politcal party he's affiliated with? :) Having the President, Vice President, and National Budget Director all personally "pro-space" is something this country hasn't had in a long, long, time. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- I'm sorry if my attitude annoyed anyone, but I perceived the article as hostile and replied as such. I am not against open discussion of alternatives to NASA plans or to the agency itself, but this guy seemed to criticizing the current agency with no idea of current programs, plans, or goals. He doesn't want to reform the space program as much as he wants to sell papers. Let's face it, NASA is having its problems, but, IMHO, it's really just bad timing. Remember all the problems the U. S. Navy had about a year ago? Not unlike the situation NASA is in. We gave the Navy some time, and the rash of problems subsided. We should do the same for NASA. Mike mvk@pawl.rpi.edu >
serre@boulder.Colorado.EDU (SERRE GLENN) (07/23/90)
1) The shuttle is not a heavy-lift booster. 2) The Titan IV is not a heavy-lift booster. 3) The Titan IV is on-line now, not five years from now (Although it will only be launching Air Force payloads for a while). 4) The Titan IV (with upgraded SRMs) will be able to launch shuttle-sized payloads (the Titan IV can launch almost-shuttle-sized payloads now) and will be online in a couple of years (not five). 5) There isn't much civilian market for launches of satellites weighing over 30k lbs. (this is one of the reasons that the Commercial Titan is dying). The steadily increasing price tag of the Space Station is outrageous, even if it has increased from 8 billion to 37 billion instead of 8 million to 37 billion (so Newsweek got a decimal a little wrong :-). As for NASA being O.K., but just having a little trouble temporarily, I'll paraphrase one of Henry's signatures: "Apollo - 8 years to the moon, Space Station - 8 years to nothing." Finally, does anyone out there have any idea of what the Shuttle costs in dollars per pound to LEO? E-mail me your data, and I'll summarize. Thanks for your attention. --Glenn Serre serre@tramp.colorado.edu
shafer@skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov (Mary Shafer) (07/24/90)
In article <8824@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> gwalsh@kilroy.jpl.nasa.gov (Gerald J. Walsh) writes: >"NASA: What Goes Up -- A Can-Do Agency Becomes A Can't Do Bureaucracy" >(from the Los Angeles Times Opinion Section - Sunday July 22, 1990) >(by Gregg Easterbrook - contributing editor to Newsweek and the Atlantic) >4) [Build a spaceplane]. More than 30 years ago, the Air Force was routinely ^^^^^^^^^ NASA FRC was the RTO >dropping the X-15 spaceplane from a B-52 bomber, flying it to the lower reaches >of orbit and bringing it back for standard landings on runways. The X-15 >program was put together quickly, didn't cost much and never had an accident. Would you care to tell this to Mike Adams' widow? RTO = Responsible Test Organization. We ran all the operation, including safety of flight, flight planning, test conduct, maintainence, etc. The planes lived in our hangar and were "ours", as is the B-52. -- Mary Shafer shafer@skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov ames!skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov!shafer NASA Ames Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA Of course I don't speak for NASA "A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all"--Unknown US fighter pilot
root@edat.UUCP (Superuser) (07/24/90)
In article <8824@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> you write: > >"NASA: What Goes Up -- A Can-Do Agency Becomes A Can't Do Bureaucracy" > >(from the Los Angeles Times Opinion Section - Sunday July 22, 1990) >(by Gregg Easterbrook - contributing editor to Newsweek and the Atlantic) With all the back and forth about NASA, I guess it's time for my two cents. 1) Bureaucracies by their nature are interested in propagating their existance, rather than necessarily achieving their charter. This in particularly true in the social agencies, but even in the military bureaurcracies there is constant pressure to justify your existence. Academians call it publish or perish? It is no different in the military, NASA, or American Business. Management (Congress, maybe even your own boss ) do not usually evaluate the merits of something based on its pure technical aspects. Hence, the common management approach is to 1) shelve it and see if they scream about it. If they do it means it is important. 2) Assume they asked for too much money and cut at least 10% off the top. If they accept that it means they over budgeted in the first place so cut another 10% off the top. This behaviour always results in a game of under estimates to get the project started, so when it needs more money, management is stuck with giving it more funding to get a return. Management then retaliates by giving less money then you really need, hence you are forced to implement a grade C answer instead of the grade A. I've seen this in the Government, big business, small business, mom & pop shops. It is myopic indeed to assume these are NASA only problems. 2) Somewhere, long ago I read an anonomous (?) quote that I feel summs up the necessity of space. We are explorers, Forever moving outwards, Or we die inwards. It's a haikue, cinquain, something like that. Regardless, I think clearly shows the necessity of space, both robot and manned. That space by its nature is deadly and cannot be predicted with the certainty of the Big Mac Constant (that each and every one is prepared identical in each and every McDonalds around the world), requires that only grade A solutions provide the extra leeway sometimes needed in space. Therefore A solutions should be the only only solutions effected, regardless of the cost. If there isn't enough money, then maybe we should wait until there is. Afterall space isn't going anywhere. No matter what technology has been derived from space, potential technologies, materials research, ecology satellites that go up (maybe this should be in philosophy), politicians, scientists, engineers, and the public all alike need to understand that exploration is one of the most basic qualities of mankind. It is why insects are studied, oceans delved, animals brought back from extinction, stars looked at in telescopes, diseases conquered. The quest, the exploration of all that there is, for the sake of knowledge, is fundamental to who and what we are. Only we ask why (or so we know). That men and women have died in the quest is an inseparable aspect of the quest, but it can never stop it. Others will die (Panama Canal, >20,000), and so we cannot squander their investment. We must go forward with dumb boosters, robots, shuttles, space stations, moon bases, Mars landings, Challengers and Voyagers, no matter what the cost is in dollars, or in lives. Because sometimes you've done all that you can, and all that is left is to say yours prayers and light the candle. (geez this soap box has suddenly gotten high, time to rappel off) "If you ain't fallen, you ain't pushin'"-- Randall Grandstaff Brian Douglass Electronic Data Technologies 1085 Palms Airport Drive Las Vegas, NV 89119-3715 Voice: 702-361-1510 X311 FAX #: 702-361-2545 uunet!edat!brian
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (07/25/90)
In article <=^1$NW#@rpi.edu> mvk@pawl.rpi.edu (Michael V. Kent) writes: >>The space station, with construction costs up from $8 million to $37 billion > >$8M for a space station, is he kidding? $37G may be correct... I think he meant $8G, which at one point was what NASA was solemnly promising as the total cost of the space station. Times change... >Right now, the American companies are launching all the satellites they can >handle. McDonnell Douglas is launching about ten per year, and Martin Marietta, >Orbital Sciences Corp., and General Dynamics should reach that mark shortly. Um, really? McDD is doing well because of Navstar, but that's not going to last, and they've attracted very little commercial business. Current speculation is that MM is going to dump the commercial market altogether, since their sales in it have been nearly zero. (They do have a fair bit of government business.) GD is actually doing fairly well these days, but I think 10/year is an exaggeration even for them. And I'm sure OSC/H (Pegasus is Hercules too, not just OSC) would jump for joy at the prospect of 10 launches per year, but they're nowhere near that now. There is near-unanimous agreement that once the post-Challenger backlog clears, the US commercial launch industry is facing a major capacity glut and will hit hard times. >... there will be more ELV failures, airplane crashes, and automobile >accidents as well. The estimated failure rate for the Shuttle is 1 in 78. >For Apollo it was 1 in 10. That puts the Shuttle at 8 times as safe as Apollo. Um, on what do you base this number? Apart from the fact that we don't have a statistically-meaningful sample for either one, the definitive version of the Apollo spacecraft had one in-space failure, period, and the Saturn V never had a failure at all. (If you're going to count the engine trouble on Apollo 6, remember that the same thing happened on at least one shuttle mission.) In any case, we have only the vaguest notion of the failure rates of systems with such small samples. If I recall the numbers correctly -- they have gotten a little better since, but not a lot -- we have only something like 50% confidence that shuttle failure rate is under 1 in 25. Even if you count ground tests, the shuttle has already killed twice as many astronauts as Apollo did. (This is an equally meaningless number, of course.) >The Shuttle has not made "prosaic cargo-delivery missions" since the Challenger >accident. It does carry up items which will not fit on an ELV due to size or >weight constraints. The Shuttle is the only heavy-lift booster the US will >have for the next five years... Oh really? Titan IV can carry more to a higher orbit. A significant fraction of the near-future shuttle missions are, to put it bluntly, prosaic cargo-delivery missions. NASA has paid lip service to the "no more routine cargo missions" rule, but there have been a remarkable number of exceptions, sometimes on the flimsiest grounds. >>How can the Soviets stage some 90 space launches per year... > >Part of the answer is that the Soviets need 90 launches per year to maintiain >their capability... No, that is not part of the answer at all. That tells why they need such a capability; it says nothing about *how they achieve that capability*, which was the question being asked. The US very definitely could use more timely and cheaper launches, even if it doesn't need 90 a year. As you said elsewhere, look at the shuttle manifest. The backlog is half a decade or more, and some missions have quietly died because of the delays. (Ever wonder why Astro 1 is just being called Astro now? It's because Astro 2 and 3 are defunct. Remember when LDEF was going to be going up and down at regular intervals?) >>... it should be possible to design new throwaway >>boosters that would have at least as much power as those in use - yet be far >>cheaper. > >It's called Pegasus, and it's brand spanking new... I'm sure OSC/H would be flattered to hear that Pegasus has "as much power" as, say, Titan IV, but it's not true. -- NFS: all the nice semantics of MSDOS, | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology and its performance and security too. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
yamauchi@crash.dpl.scg.hac.com (Brian Yamauchi) (07/26/90)
In article <1990Jul25.155957.27656@zoo.toronto.edu> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: > >There is >near-unanimous agreement that once the post-Challenger backlog clears, >the US commercial launch industry is facing a major capacity glut and >will hit hard times. >>Part of the answer is that the Soviets need 90 launches per year to maintiain >>their capability... > >No, that is not part of the answer at all. That tells why they need such a >capability; it says nothing about *how they achieve that capability*, >which was the question being asked. The US very definitely could use more >timely and cheaper launches, even if it doesn't need 90 a year. As you >said elsewhere, look at the shuttle manifest. The backlog is half a decade >or more, and some missions have quietly died because of the delays. These statements seem a bit contradictory. Does the U.S. have a launch capacity shortage or an oversupply? I know you included "once the backlog clears" in the first statement, but the latter statement indicates that this won't be for a while. And even once the backlog clears, is the shuttle _really_ going to be launching often enough to meet its promises (what was that about 24 launches/year?) and take all of the customers away from the private launch companies? ______________________________________________________________________________ Brian Yamauchi Hughes Research Laboratories yamauchi@aic.hrl.hac.com Artificial Intelligence Center ______________________________________________________________________________
tneff@bfmny0.BFM.COM (Tom Neff) (07/26/90)
(This is a sci.space topic.) In article <9718@hacgate.UUCP> yamauchi@aic.hrl.hac.com writes: >Does the U.S. have a launch capacity shortage or an oversupply? Never mind the U.S. -- the WORLD has a launch overcapacity. Read the current SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN. Ariane has had a huge impact. Counting all nations we have an estimated capacity of 40 payloads/year to GEO. Comsats, which are the overwhelming majority of non-defense payloads, need 15 payloads/year to GEO to cover replacement and growth in the satellite communications market. This low number is the result of smarter, higher bandwidth birds plus the rise of fiber optics as an alternative to satellites. So there will be intense competition for those 15 birds, which means aggressive pricing and comparison of reliability. If costs to orbit were lowered, it might pay to launch other things besides comsats, so we'd fill the capacity. -- To have a horror of the bourgeois (\( Tom Neff is bourgeois. -- Jules Renard )\) tneff@bfmny0.BFM.COM
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (07/30/90)
In article <9718@hacgate.UUCP> yamauchi@aic.hrl.hac.com writes: >>the US commercial launch industry is facing a major capacity glut ... >>... The US very definitely could use more >>timely and cheaper launches, even if it doesn't need 90 a year... > >These statements seem a bit contradictory. Does the U.S. have a >launch capacity shortage or an oversupply? ... The US has an oversupply of expensive, long-lead-time launches, and a distinct shortage of timely, cheap, convenient launches. >And even once the backlog clears, is the shuttle _really_ going to be >launching often enough to meet its promises (what was that about 24 >launches/year?) and take all of the customers away from the private >launch companies? The shuttle won't be taking the customers away from them; Ariane will. :-) There aren't enough to keep them all going even without that competition, actually. -- The 486 is to a modern CPU as a Jules | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology Verne reprint is to a modern SF novel. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
john@frog.UUCP (John Woods) (07/31/90)
In article <9718@hacgate.UUCP>, yamauchi@crash.dpl.scg.hac.com (Brian Yamauchi) writes: > In article <1990Jul25.155957.27656@zoo.toronto.edu> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: > >The US very definitely could use more > >timely and cheaper launches, even if it doesn't need 90 a year. As you > >said elsewhere, look at the shuttle manifest. The backlog is half a decade > >or more, and some missions have quietly died because of the delays. > These statements seem a bit contradictory. Does the U.S. have a > launch capacity shortage or an oversupply? I know you included "once > the backlog clears" in the first statement, but the latter statement > indicates that this won't be for a while. The key here is that there are no *new* customers because launches are too expen$ive and unreliable. Once the current backlog is cleared, launches will still be just as expensive, so the only customers will STILL be the military and communications companies, who just don't need all that many flights. Second, the untimeliness of flights means that spur-of-the- moment applications are impossible, and (when several launcher classes are all down at the same time) the prospect of a payload having to wait a decade kills a lot of potential projects that aren't spur of the moment. Pegasus is a hopeful step; while the per-pound cost isn't less, your entry cost is less--you don't need to get $60 million of value out of an entire launch, you only need about $6 million. That may open up new applications that were just too tricky to piggyback on someone else's flight. Furthermore, with their promised ability to launch on a couple of days' notice, they will be great for spontaneous projects. Now all we need is a big stack of cheap, B-52 launched Titan IVs.... ;-) -- John Woods, Charles River Data Systems, Framingham MA, (508) 626-1101 ...!decvax!frog!john, john@frog.UUCP, ...!mit-eddie!jfw, jfw@eddie.mit.edu
jhyde@convex.com (John Hyde) (08/03/90)
I did not save this excellent and thought-provoking article into a file, and now suddenly I need it. Did anyone save a copy? email jhyde@convex.com Thanks. -- -John C. Hyde |"Only a brave person is willing honestly to admit, |and fearlessly to face, what a sincere and logical |mind discovers." -Rodan of Alexandria
pstinson@pbs.org (08/06/90)
In article <SHAFER.90Jul23102049@skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov>, shafer@skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov (Mary Shafer) writes: > In article <8824@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> gwalsh@kilroy.jpl.nasa.gov (Gerald J. Walsh) writes: > >>"NASA: What Goes Up -- A Can-Do Agency Becomes A Can't Do Bureaucracy" > >>(from the Los Angeles Times Opinion Section - Sunday July 22, 1990) >> The X-15 >>program was put together quickly, didn't cost much and never had an accident. > > Would you care to tell this to Mike Adams' widow? > For anyone who hasn't heard about it, the fatal crash happened in 1967 near the end of the program and involved X-15 No.3, the one that set the altitude record a few years before.