dietz@cs.rochester.edu (Paul Dietz) (09/26/89)
Is anyone but me increasingly perplexed by NASA's snail-like launch schedule? If the shuttles can be flown faster than they currently are, why isn't NASA doing it? At the current flight rates the shuttle is prohibitively expensive, much worse than expendables. It's an old trick to say that the shuttle is really as cheap as expendables, by assuming faster flight rates. But the last time NASA tried to launch that fast they screwed up fatally. Paul F. Dietz dietz@cs.rochester.edu
henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (09/26/89)
In article <1989Sep26.005923.15211@cs.rochester.edu> dietz@cs.rochester.edu (Paul Dietz) writes: >Is anyone but me increasingly perplexed by NASA's snail-like >launch schedule? If the shuttles can be flown faster than they >currently are, why isn't NASA doing it? Probably mostly shortage of manpower for orbiter processing work. Which boils down to shortage of money. >At the current flight rates the shuttle is prohibitively expensive, >much worse than expendables... The NRC shuttle-launch-frequency report a couple of years ago concluded that there was no significant cost difference for heavy payloads. (The Titan 4 isn't what any sane man would call "cheap".) For medium-sized payloads the expendables are probably ahead somewhat now because of the availability of commercial launches with less paperwork. -- "Where is D.D. Harriman now, | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology when we really *need* him?" | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
pstinson@pbs.org (09/24/90)
Here is the comparative data for Shuttle and Saturn V launch rates.
1981..1982..1983..1984..1985..1986..1987..1988..1989..1990 TOTAL
Columbia 2 3 1 1 1 1 9
Challenger 3 3 3 1 10
Discovery 2 4 1 2 1 10
Atlantis 2 1 2 5
TOTAL 2 3 4 5 9 2 0 2 5 2 34
Average launch rate per year = 3.4
1967..1968..1969..1970..1971..1972..1973 TOTAL
Saturn V 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 12
Average launch rate per year = 1.7
The Shuttle is alrady doing twice as good as Saturn V and will get better once
Endeavour joins the fleet. 12 launches a year will be a realistic possibility.tneff@bfmny0.BFM.COM (Tom Neff) (09/25/90)
In article <10208.26ff55cf@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: >So. Add one more launch in 1969. The average launch rate changes as a result >only from 1.71 to 1.85 and the basic conclusion of the comnparison remains the >same. Shuttle is beating the pants off the old Saturn V launch rate. That's a >fact. However, I think the yearly average MOON LANDING rate was somewhat higher then, nicht wahr? Get real! If all Apollo had to do was go to LEO every time I'm sure they could have ramped it up past 1.85. The Shuttle is not Apollo: it is Gemini with an attitude problem. :-) -- 'We have luck only with women -- not spacecraft!' \\ Tom Neff -- R. Kremnev, builder of failed Soviet FOBOS probes // tneff@bfmny0.BFM.COM
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (09/25/90)
In article <10195.26fde341@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: > 1967..1968..1969..1970..1971..1972..1973 TOTAL > >Saturn V 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 12 Um, could we get the numbers right? 1969 saw four Saturn V launches, not three. Note, also, that pre-1969 launches were ramping up the launch rate -- Apollo 9, in early 1969, was the first Saturn V launch that was considered a "production" launch, not encumbered by major debugging work on KSC facilities and equipment -- and post-1969 launches were slowed down by the Apollo 13 accident (which is why there was only one in 1970) and by a deliberate decision to slow the pace to give more time for science feedback in a no-longer-open-ended program. The original schedule, set just before Apollo 11, called for an 11-week interval between launches through 1971 -- note that only in 1985 did NASA exceed that rate with the shuttle, with KSC visibly overstrained -- and presumed still brisker operations following that for work leading up to a lunar base. -- TCP/IP: handling tomorrow's loads today| Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology OSI: handling yesterday's loads someday| henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
tneff@bfmny0.BFM.COM (Tom Neff) (09/25/90)
The eeriest thing about that Shuttle launch rate list, in my opinion, is seeing Discovery ALONE launched 4 times in 1985! Talk about the workhorse of the fleet, eh? Somehow it's hard to imagine that ever happening again. -- 'The Nazis have no sense of humor, so why -| Tom Neff should they want television?' -- Phil Dick |- tneff@bfmny0.BFM.COM
steve@goofy.paradyne.com (Steve Fowler) (09/25/90)
In article <10195.26fde341@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: >Average launch rate [for the shuttle] per year = 3.4 > >The Shuttle is alrady doing twice as good as Saturn V and will get better once >Endeavour joins the fleet. 12 launches a year will be a realistic possibility. I Don't see how this can be possible seeing the problems they are currently having at the Cape. Yes, Endeavour will be a new system and hopefully free of wear and tear, but, the other three systems are starting to show lots of problems that I think are due to age and improper maintenance. Steve -------------------------------------------------------- I~ Teenage Mutant Steve Fowler |UUCP: ..!{uunet|att}!pdn!steve | =.== Ninja Brewers. AT&T Paradyne |DOMAIN: steve@pdn.paradyne.com | =...== Brewers P.O. Box 2826 |LAND: (813)530-2186 | ==.=== Drinking Largo, FL 34649-2826 |ICBM: 27 53 30 N / 82 45 30 W | ==== Half Kegs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Here with my beer I sit, while golden moments flit: Alas! They pass unheeded by: and as they fly, I being dry, sit, idly sipping here, my beer." George Arnold: "Beer" c. 1855
pstinson@pbs.org (09/26/90)
In article <1990Sep25.033816.16652@zoo.toronto.edu>, henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: > In article <10195.26fde341@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: >> 1967..1968..1969..1970..1971..1972..1973 TOTAL >> >>Saturn V 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 12 > > Um, could we get the numbers right? 1969 saw four Saturn V launches, not > three. So. Add one more launch in 1969. The average launch rate changes as a result only from 1.71 to 1.85 and the basic conclusion of the comnparison remains the same. Shuttle is beating the pants off the old Saturn V launch rate. That's a fact.
pstinson@pbs.org (09/26/90)
In article <1990Sep25.033816.16652@zoo.toronto.edu>, henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: > -- Apollo 9, in early 1969, was the first Saturn V launch that was > considered a "production" launch, not encumbered by major debugging work > on KSC facilities and equipment -- and post-1969 launches were slowed down > by the Apollo 13 accident (which is why there was only one in 1970) And STS-5 was the first comparable launch in the Shuttle proram. STS-1 through STS-4 were billed as test flights and were encumbered by revamping of KSC facilities. Shuttle launches had to recover from Challenger (which is why there weren't any launches in 1987.) Shuttle went through the same stuff Saturn V did. You can not argue away the Shuttle's better performance as compared to Saturn V by claiming extenuating circumstances. I made no allowances when I compiled the Shuttle launch figures and I see no reason why I should have with the Saturn V data. I treated them both the same.
leech@bodie.cs.unc.edu (Jonathan Leech) (09/26/90)
In article <10209.26ff5e6c@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: >You can not argue away the Shuttle's better performance as compared to >Saturn V by claiming extenuating circumstances. I made no allowances when I >compiled the Shuttle launch figures and I see no reason why I should have with >the Saturn V data. If you're trying to evaluate Saturn vs. Shuttle, do keep in mind the relative payload capacity far outweighs the relative launch frequency. -- Jon Leech (leech@cs.unc.edu) __@/ ``Thus Mathematics helps / our brains and hands and feet and can make / a race of supermen out of us.'' - The Education of T. C. Mits
serre@boulder.Colorado.EDU (SERRE GLENN) (09/26/90)
In article <10208.26ff55cf@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: >So. Add one more launch in 1969. The average launch rate changes as a result >only from 1.71 to 1.85 and the basic conclusion of the comnparison remains the >same. Shuttle is beating the pants off the old Saturn V launch rate. That's a >fact. Note, however, that the Saturn V could put ~265,000 pounds into LEO in one launch, while the shuttle puts up ~60,000 pounds (?). Also, the question should really be "What was the availability of the Saturn V vs. that for the Shuttle?" By availability I mean something like the average length of launch slips that booster-caused (I'm sure some commercial aviation type out there could tell us how the airlines define it). --Glenn Serre serre@tramp.colorado.edu planned to launch versus the
dil@mace.cc.purdue.edu (Perry G Ramsey) (09/26/90)
In article <26970@boulder.Colorado.EDU>, serre@boulder.Colorado.EDU (SERRE GLENN) writes: > Note, however, that the Saturn V could put ~265,000 pounds into LEO in one > launch, while the shuttle puts up ~60,000 pounds (?). Not exactly a fair comparison, because the 265Klb the Saturn is given credit for included the crew and life support, (which WAS the useable payload) but the 60klb the Shuttle gets credit for doesn't. OTOH, why do you need a crew and life support to launch a communications satellite? It would probably be fair to count the life support and crew weight of the Shuttle when it is being used for, say, Spacelab, but not when it's doing routine satellite launching. The unique capabilities of the Shuttle are wasted by using it as a dumb booster. It was dumb to design it as one. If you want reliable, inexpensive manned access to space, you need a much smaller vehicle, which is what Max Faget wanted in the first place, but political considerations overruled engineering considerations. > Also, the question > should really be "What was the availability of the Saturn V vs. that for the > Shuttle?" By availability I mean something like the average length of launch > slips that booster-caused (I'm sure some commercial aviation type out there > could tell us how the airlines define it). > > --Glenn Serre > serre@tramp.colorado.edu Absolutely. We also need to think about the expendibles which were fired during the Saturn days, and compare the FLEET reliablility, since NASA trashed the entire expendible fleet in favor of the Shuttle, claiming higher reliablity, lower cost, etc., etc. -- Perry G. Ramsey Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences perryr@vm.cc.purdue.edu Purdue University, W. Lafayette, IN USA dil@mace.cc.purdue.edu We've looked at clouds from ten sides now, And we REALLY don't know clouds, at all.
ahughes@dg-rtp.dg.com (Arch Hughes) (09/26/90)
In article <10209.26ff5e6c@pbs.org>, pstinson@pbs.org writes: |> In article <1990Sep25.033816.16652@zoo.toronto.edu>, henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: |> |> > -- Apollo 9, in early 1969, was the first Saturn V launch that was |> > considered a "production" launch, not encumbered by major debugging work |> > on KSC facilities and equipment -- and post-1969 launches were slowed down |> > by the Apollo 13 accident (which is why there was only one in 1970) |> And STS-5 was the first comparable launch in the Shuttle proram. STS-1 through |> STS-4 were billed as test flights and were encumbered by revamping of KSC |> facilities. Shuttle launches had to recover from Challenger (which is why |> there weren't any launches in 1987.) Shuttle went through the same stuff Saturn |> V did. You can not argue away the Shuttle's better performance as compared to |> Saturn V by claiming extenuating circumstances. I made no allowances when I |> compiled the Shuttle launch figures and I see no reason why I should have with |> the Saturn V data. I treated them both the same. It also appears that you counted the last Challenger launch in '86 in the statistics. Perhaps once it clears the tower and is handed off to Houston it counts as a launch, regardless of flight duration? Another interesting calculation might be total weight (of cargo) put into orbit versus the number (or cost) of the launches.
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (09/27/90)
In article <10209.26ff5e6c@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: >> -- Apollo 9, in early 1969, was the first Saturn V launch that was >> considered a "production" launch, not encumbered by major debugging work >> on KSC facilities and equipment -- and post-1969 launches were slowed down >> by the Apollo 13 accident (which is why there was only one in 1970) >And STS-5 was the first comparable launch in the Shuttle proram. STS-1 through >STS-4 were billed as test flights and were encumbered by revamping of KSC >facilities. Shuttle launches had to recover from Challenger (which is why >there weren't any launches in 1987.) Shuttle went through the same stuff Saturn >V did... You haven't addressed my basic point. There was only about one year -- late 1968 through late 1969 -- when efforts were really being made to get as many Saturns up as possible, and even that was relatively early in the program, with facilities not yet completely shaken down. In that year (not quite lined up with a calendar year), they managed five, and were prepared for six if necessary. (The pressure eased with the success of Apollo 11; had it failed, the next launch would have been in October.) The shuttle program, trying year after year for maximum launch rate, with far more launch experience behind it now than the Saturns, has only beaten five *once*, and disaster ensued immediately. As you point out, both programs had hiatuses and test periods. What this means is that your averages are *meaningless*. If you want to see what the programs could do, you have to look at what they could do when they were cleared to try. The Saturn had reached a launch rate that the shuttle is struggling, so far mostly unsuccessfully, to beat. -- TCP/IP: handling tomorrow's loads today| Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology OSI: handling yesterday's loads someday| henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
john@newave.UUCP (John A. Weeks III) (09/27/90)
In article <10208.26ff55cf@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: > > In article <10195.26fde341@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: > > > 1967..1968..1969..1970..1971..1972..1973 TOTAL > > > Saturn V 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 12 > So. Add one more launch in 1969. The average launch rate changes as a > result only from 1.71 to 1.85 and the basic conclusion of the comnparison > remains the same. Shuttle is beating the pants off the old Saturn V launch > rate. That's a fact. Your conclusion is incorrect. All you can conclude is that there have been more shuttle launches. Have you considered adding in the Saturn 1B numbers? Or comparing against the Gemini program? Kennedy refered to the Apollo program as the most difficult and dangerous project that humans have ever attempted. NASA refered to the space shuttle as routine access to space. I don't see the factor of two difference in launches per year as being the difference between heroric and routine. Perhaps you should look at how each program met its design. Saturn V flew every mission that was scheduled to fly. The shuttle launch rate has only been about 10% of what NASA expected. In this light, I consider the shuttle a big failure. One more angle to look at. The Saturn V was only a piece of a space program. It supported a very expensive moon exploration program. The shuttle, however, is a program all by its self. There really is no other primary goal other than to launch the shuttle. Many of the missions could be flown on other vehicles. Had there been funding for 50 moon shots a year, I think NASA could have scaled the Saturn V program to support this level of activity. The shuttle, however, has all of the funding that it needs to fly more missions, it just isn't ready or able to fly them. -john- -- =============================================================================== John A. Weeks III (612) 942-6969 john@newave.mn.org NeWave Communications ...uunet!rosevax!bungia!wd0gol!newave!john ===============================================================================
GIPP@gecrdvm1.crd.ge.com (09/27/90)
In article <10209.26ff5e6c@pbs.org>, pstinson@pbs.org says: > >In article <1990Sep25.033816.16652@zoo.toronto.edu>, henry@zoo.toronto.edu >(Henry Spencer) writes: > >> -- Apollo 9, in early 1969, was the first Saturn V launch that was >> considered a "production" launch, not encumbered by major debugging work >> on KSC facilities and equipment -- and post-1969 launches were slowed down >> by the Apollo 13 accident (which is why there was only one in 1970) >And STS-5 was the first comparable launch in the Shuttle proram. STS-1 >through >STS-4 were billed as test flights and were encumbered by revamping of KSC >facilities. Shuttle launches had to recover from Challenger (which is why >there weren't any launches in 1987.) Shuttle went through the same stuff n >Satur >V did. You can not argue away the Shuttle's better performance as compared >to >Saturn V by claiming extenuating circumstances. I made no allowances when I >compiled the Shuttle launch figures and I see no reason why I should have with >the Saturn V data. I treated them both the same. Perhaps a better measure of reliability would be a comparison of each vehicles ratio of launch success vs launch attempts. I think it's pretty well documented that the shuttle, throughout its career, has encountered numerous delays of launch (of days and months). What is the record of saturn v, or saturn 1b? Also, how does each vehicle compare against intended useage? Methinks Saturn V was launched approximately as often as desired, whereas the Shuttle family is way behind on the launches intended. Aw, heck, as long as we're comparing, how much environmental damage did the RP-1/LOX do vs the SRB (been meaning to ask that one since the great ozone destruction debate)?
David.Anderman@ofa123.fidonet.org (David Anderman) (09/28/90)
Hey shuttle fans: instead of calculating shuttle launch rates vs. Saturn, try figuring payload in space per year. You'll be impressed by our efforts in the 1960's. Then remember that in some of those years, the US lofted 60-70 unmanned space launchers, and you'll be really impressed. This doesn't count the odd Saturn I-B or so, each of which carried a payload similar to the shuttle in *its* payload bay. -- David Anderman Internet: David.Anderman@ofa123.fidonet.org --------------------------------------------------------------------------
ptc@b15.INGR.COM (Paul Carter) (09/28/90)
>Perhaps a better measure of reliability would be a comparison of each >vehicles ratio of launch success vs launch attempts. I think it's >pretty well documented that the shuttle, throughout its career, has >encountered numerous delays of launch (of days and months). What is >the record of saturn v, or saturn 1b? Also, how does each vehicle >compare against intended useage? Methinks Saturn V was launched >approximately as often as desired, whereas the Shuttle family is >way behind on the launches intended. I haven't been in on this whole argument, but one important variable to thow into this apples and oranges equation is the fact that the ONLY piece of the entire 36 story Saturn V stack to return to earth (whole) is the command module (capsule) and its only reuse is that of a museum piece. Every Saturn V was Brand Spanking New!! The shuttle fleet ages with every launch!! Just my $0.02.... Paul Carter
gregc@cimage.com (Greg Cronau/10000) (10/02/90)
In article <1990Sep25.033816.16652@zoo.toronto.edu> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: >In article <10195.26fde341@pbs.org> pstinson@pbs.org writes: >> 1967..1968..1969..1970..1971..1972..1973 TOTAL >> >>Saturn V 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 12 > >Um, could we get the numbers right? 1969 saw four Saturn V launches, not >three. Note, also, that pre-1969 launches were ramping up the launch >rate -- Apollo 9, in early 1969, was the first Saturn V launch that was >considered a "production" launch, not encumbered by major debugging work >on KSC facilities and equipment -- and post-1969 launches were slowed down >by the Apollo 13 accident (which is why there was only one in 1970) and by >a deliberate decision to slow the pace to give more time for science >feedback in a no-longer-open-ended program. The original schedule, set >just before Apollo 11, called for an 11-week interval between launches >through 1971 -- note that only in 1985 did NASA exceed that rate with the >shuttle, with KSC visibly overstrained -- and presumed still brisker >operations following that for work leading up to a lunar base. >-- >TCP/IP: handling tomorrow's loads today| Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology >OSI: handling yesterday's loads someday| henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry You're right, there were 13 Saturn V launches. But I believe the original intent of posting this chart was to counter the claims by a number of people to the effect of: "We had a better launch rate with Saturn Vs. Why can't NASA get the shuttle flying as well as the Saturn V?" You cite the Apollo 13 incident as a factor in the launch rate. Well, the shuttle has the Challenger incident as a factor in it's launch rate. You state that the pre-1969 saturns can't be considered production launches, by that same argument, you couldn't consider the first 4 launches of Columbia to be "production" launches either. Your arguments about "ramping up" and "major debugging" could be applied equaly to the shuttle program. You also state that "the original schedule ... called for an 11-week schedule between launches." So what? The original shuttle schedule called for 52 launchs per year(1 per week). The Saturn program had problems, the shuttle program is having problems. The *FACTS* are that the average number of shuttle launches per year is nearly double what the average number of Saturn launches were. I think these discussions should be based on "what is" rather than "what could have been". gregc@cimage.com
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (10/02/90)
In article <1990Oct1.191917.24542@cimage.com> gregc@dgsi.UUCP (Greg Cronau/10000) writes: >... The *FACTS* are that the average number of shuttle launches >per year is nearly double what the average number of Saturn launches were. That is a fact. A thoroughly meaningless one. Ask any statistician what he thinks of an average as a useful measure of such an uneven distribution. or see any modern book on data analysis. >I think these discussions should be based on "what is" rather than "what could >have been". Yup. "What is" is that the Saturn V achieved 5/year, briefly, from late 1968 to late 1969. "What is" is that the shuttle has only once exceeded that rate, and the evidence clearly shows that this overstrained the system. Now, personally I suspect that the sustainable shuttle launch rate is higher than that, but if we are to be obsessed with numbers to the exclusion of thinking about what they mean, we can't consider that. -- Imagine life with OS/360 the standard | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology operating system. Now think about X. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
nickw@syma.sussex.ac.uk (Nick Watkins) (10/03/90)
From article <1239.270314E8@ofa123.fidonet.org>, by David.Anderman@ofa123.fidonet.org (David Anderman): > ... try figuring payload in space per year. You'll be impressed by > our efforts in the 1960's. Or look at the Box Score in the back of TRW Space Log, which is effectively a rather sobering histogram of launches vs year. Nick -- Dr. Nick Watkins, Space & Plasma Physics Group, School of Mathematical & Physical Sciences, Univ. of Sussex, Brighton, E.Sussex, BN1 9QH, ENGLAND JANET: nickw@syma.sussex.ac.uk BITNET: nickw%syma.sussex.ac.uk@uk.ac
gregc@cimage.com (Greg Cronau/10000) (10/04/90)
In article <1990Oct2.031535.6556@zoo.toronto.edu> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: >In article <1990Oct1.191917.24542@cimage.com> gregc@dgsi.UUCP (Greg Cronau/10000) writes: >>... The *FACTS* are that the average number of shuttle launches >>per year is nearly double what the average number of Saturn launches were. > >That is a fact. A thoroughly meaningless one. Ask any statistician what >he thinks of an average as a useful measure of such an uneven distribution. >or see any modern book on data analysis. > > >>I think these discussions should be based on "what is" rather than "what could >>have been". > >Yup. "What is" is that the Saturn V achieved 5/year, briefly, from late >1968 to late 1969. "What is" is that the shuttle has only once exceeded >that rate, and the evidence clearly shows that this overstrained the system. >Now, personally I suspect that the sustainable shuttle launch rate is >higher than that, but if we are to be obsessed with numbers to the exclusion >of thinking about what they mean, we can't consider that. >-- >Imagine life with OS/360 the standard | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology >operating system. Now think about X. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry Henry this is really getting ridiculous. You continue to put down my assertions based on a set of data that you contend is meaningless, and then turn around and make your own assertions based on that very same data. 1.) I am not "Obsessed" with numbers. But the space launch question revolves around numbers: maximum thrust, weight, tonnage to LEO, launch turn around time, etc. If you can provide a qualitative vs. quantitative way to evaluate boosters, please, I'd like to hear about it. 2.) You state that the "Saturn V achieved 5[launches]/year, briefly," It did that *once*. You asked me to talk to a statitician about my conclusions, what do you think statiticians call a one-time unrepeatable spike in data? I'll tell you: noise. 3.) You state that: "The evidence clearly shows..." No. Sorry. The evidence shows no such thing. The design flaw in the SRB was aggravated by the cold on the morning of the launch. It was an accident waiting to happen. It would have happened if it had been preceded by 1 or 20 launches in the previous year. I will grant, however, that the evidence does "suggest". 4.) If, however, you would like to use that argument, what about Apollo 13? Memory fails me right now, and I don't have any of my ref books handy, but didn't it occur shortly after that 5/year period you mentioned? It could just as easily be blamed on the hurry up syndrome that you claim caused challenger. Don't get me wrong, I was unhappy to see Saturn pass into history. Few things make me as sad as seeing one of those great birds laying on thier sides corroding into dust. I wish there had been the funds to keep Saturn active in addtion to the shuttle program, but consider this: Saturn, because it is expendable, has an absolute lower limit to it's cost. How often do you think congress would have approved a launch with NASA saying it's going to cost $XXX million and it can't get any cheaper. The shuttle *can* be cheaper, it was promisied and designed that way. It didn't work out that way and I'm not surprised. Do you have any idea how hard it is to estimate what it's going to cost to build and maintian somthing *that's never been built before!!!* There are people that ernestly believe that somthing like that can be accurately estimated, I believe that's a fantasy. But, the shuttle *can* become cheaper. As we learn better ways to do things, the cost will come down and that can be sold to congress. I think we tend to loose perspective about the space program. Getting into space is several orders of magnitude more difficult than getting into the air. It is therefore going to require several orders of magnitude more work, time, money, and experience. While I won't put us at the level of the Wright flyer, I do believe that the shuttle is about the equivalent of a 1910 biplane. We've worked out some problems, but we've barely scratched the surface of the problems/possibiliies. Compare the total number of rocket launches with the total number of airplane flights, How much experience do we *really* have? I know the damned shuttle isn't perfect. It's far from it. I am surprised at how much of a jump it is from it's predecessor though. Few things make that much progress in one evolutionary step. But that's what it should be. A step. A step towards the next, better, design. Even if the shuttle had been built the way it was originally proposed back in the late 60's, I believe it would have been flawed. We just don't know enough. Someone stated in a previous message a few weeks ago: (I paraphrase) "People don't understand how nasty it is to get into space" I have worked with computers, mechanics, and electronics for almost 20 years now and I am still awed at the delicate ballet of barely controlled energys and precision timing that is required to get a rocket into space. Engines that are designed to run for 7 minutes, but not 8, and withstand temperatures just a hair below thier melting temp. Superstructure thrust points that can take 100 lbs of force here, but not 110. Electronics that have to be able to withstand multi-G shocks and keep working. I am amazed when it works and not surprised when it doesn't. Because it is nasty. But we seem to live in a world where something done once is now expected to be routine. The technocrats are expected to serve up thier magic on a regular schedule and are crucified when they don't. End Of Catharthis. gregc@cimage.com
petej@phred.UUCP (Pete Jarvis) (10/07/90)
In article <1990Oct3.232201.5196@cimage.com> gregc@dgsi.UUCP (Greg Cronau/10000) writes: >> >Don't get me wrong, I was unhappy to see Saturn pass into history. Few >things make me as sad as seeing one of those great birds laying on thier >sides corroding into dust.....<etc> > If you want to see one that is *not* corroding into dust, then visit the Space and Rocket Center in Huntsville, Alabama. There is one there, segmented and on its side, painted and cared for. That whole complex including the Space Camp/Academy, Space Dome (OMNI-MAX) theater, and Space Station Habitat, and Space Museum is quite spectacular to visit. Peter Jarvis......Physio-Control
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (10/07/90)
In article <1990Oct3.232201.5196@cimage.com> gregc@dgsi.UUCP (Greg Cronau/10000) writes: >Henry this is really getting ridiculous. You continue to put down my >assertions based on a set of data that you contend is meaningless, and then >turn around and make your own assertions based on that very same data. If you really think that, then this discussion is pointless. Let me make one more try. You do not find out whether Joe Doakes can run faster than Fred Bloggs by holding a race between Joe, in sneakers and a track suit, and Fred, in an arctic parka with a lead ball chained to one ankle. You will not find out whether the Saturn V could sustain a higher launch rate than the Shuttle by comparing the Shuttle, trying year after year for the highest possible rate, to the Saturn V, deliberately held back to a lower-than-possible launch rate to give more time for scientific assessment of each mission's results. If you want to compare maximum sustained launch rate, you look only at the subsections of each launcher's record where they were trying for a high launch rate with no extraneous restrictions. That means you delete the early development ramp-up, the aftermath of catastrophic problems, and periods when launch rate was deliberately held back for reasons unrelated to technical problems. What are you left with? For the Saturn V, a bit over a year, from about Apollo 8 through Apollo 13. If you want to compare launch rates, you compare *that* against the period from about STS-5 to the present, omitting the post-Challenger hiatus. And you get the results I cited: the Shuttle beats the Saturn V just once, and ends in disaster doing it. If you look carefully at the numbers, actually, you conclude that even this most-meaningful comparison doesn't mean much. On the Saturn V end, that's an awfully small set of data; clearly the Saturn V never really had much chance to demonstrate what it could do. On the Shuttle end, cutting off the development period at STS-5 is a doubtful procedure, even if that was the end of the development period according to NASA, and you have to wonder whether things like this year's hydrogen leaks should get special treatment. Looking at the facts behind the numbers is harder, because you have to make guesses, but we can try. The Saturn V got about 5/year with no great strain, and contingency plans to add an October launch in 1969 were far enough along -- with no serious problems seen -- that there is at least weak evidence for a sustainable 6/year rate there. On the Shuttle side, many of the strains experienced in 1985 were preventable, and would not recur today, so there is at least weak evidence for a sustainable rate of 9/year. The latter also fits with the NRC report on shuttle launch frequency, which put the limit about there with a surge capacity slightly higher. >1.) I am not "Obsessed" with numbers. But the space launch question revolves > around numbers: maximum thrust, weight, tonnage to LEO, launch turn > around time, etc. If you can provide a qualitative vs. quantitative way > to evaluate boosters, please, I'd like to hear about it. We need numbers, but we need to look at what the numbers signify, and not just crunch through the calculations blindly without understanding the meaning -- or lack thereof -- of the results. >2.) You state that the "Saturn V achieved 5[launches]/year, briefly," > It did that *once*. You asked me to talk to a statitician about my > conclusions, what do you think statiticians call a one-time unrepeatable > spike in data? I'll tell you: noise. The same comment, of course, can be made about the shuttle's 9/year in 1985. Deduct that "noise" and the shuttle average doesn't look so good. As I discussed above, when one looks at the *reasons* for those peaks, one concludes that they probably represent attainable performance much more closely than the averages do. >3.) You state that: "The evidence clearly shows..." No. Sorry. The evidence > shows no such thing. The design flaw in the SRB was aggravated by the > cold on the morning of the launch. It was an accident waiting to happen. > It would have happened if it had been preceded by 1 or 20 launches in the > previous year. I will grant, however, that the evidence does "suggest". If you read the Rogers Commission report, you will find that they make much stronger statements than this. There were quite a number of things that were accidents waiting to happen, many of them aggravated by the higher launch rates. And the major reason why the cold-weather launch triggered that accident was the intense pressure to keep up the high rate. >4.) If, however, you would like to use that argument, what about Apollo 13? > Memory fails me right now, and I don't have any of my ref books handy, but > didn't it occur shortly after that 5/year period you mentioned? It could > just as easily be blamed on the hurry up syndrome that you claim caused > challenger. Please construct a plausible argument for this before proposing it, preferably with references. The Rogers Commission was quite explicit about the role of the hurry-up syndrome in Challenger. I know of no equivalent line of reasoning for Apollo 13. Deadline pressure does not seem to have been a factor that I am aware of. >... consider this: Saturn, because >it is expendable, has an absolute lower limit to it's cost... Unless you start looking at making the stages recoverable, which was indeed on the agenda. Recovering the first stage should not have been prohibitively difficult -- a recoverable S-IC almost became the shuttle's booster -- and I've seen proposals for recovering the third stage from Earth-orbit missions. And that "absolute lower limit" is set by manufacturing considerations, which change considerably if you commit to volume production as originally planned for the Saturns. Comparisons are difficult because of changes in the value of the dollar, but I've seen studies which concluded that the cost per kilo of a Saturn V launch to orbit -- at Apollo prices, no recoverable stages, no volume production -- equalled or bettered current Shuttle prices. >... The shuttle *can* be cheaper, >it was promisied and designed that way... I'd be interested to hear your rationale for this; there is no evidence to support it that I'm aware of. (There *is* evidence for cost reduction due to volume production of expendables, by the way.) Promised, yes; designed, debatable; "can be cheaper", it's only been getting more expensive as lessons have been learned and hidden subsidies removed. I agree that *reusable launch systems* in general have the potential of being cheaper than expendables. It is not so very clear that actually doing this is practical today, especially if you assume comparable funds for development work on both approaches. It is very clear that the Shuttle is never going to do it. >... Do you have any idea how hard it is to estimate what it's going >to cost to build and maintian somthing *that's never been built before!!!* The airliner manufacturers do it all the time, quite successfully. I would recommend the OTA report "Reducing Launch Operations Costs" as background reading on the subject. -- Imagine life with OS/360 the standard | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology operating system. Now think about X. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry