[comp.dcom.lans] Detecting Unauthorized Connections on Network

mliu@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU (Mei-Ling L. Liu) (11/10/88)

       *** Detecting Unauthorized Connections on Your Network ***

       I am anxious to hear from people who  have  looked  into  or  have
       implemented tools to detect unauthorized connections on their net-
       works.
       I  have  a  campus  network with a broadband backbone and ethernet
       basebands.   We are running XNS now but will soon be switching  to
       TCP/IP.    Users  are supposed to notify us (the Computing Center)
       before they hook anything up to the network, but naturally some of
       them conveniently overlook this rule.   Up to  now  we  have  been
       relying on everybody's decency to cooperate,  but now it seems in-
       evitable that we are going to have to police the network to  catch
       intruders.
       If you know of any software/hardware tool for what I need,  please
       respond.  Thanks.
       ******************************************************************
       Mei-Ling L. Liu, Coordinator, Network Administration
       Communications Services
       Cal Poly San Luis Obispo
       Internet: mliu@polyslo.calpoly.edu
       BITNET: mliu@calpoly
       ******************************************************************


kwe@bu-cs.BU.EDU (kwe@bu-it.bu.edu (Kent W. England)) (11/11/88)

In article <5571@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU>
mliu@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU (Mei-Ling L. Liu) writes:
>
>       I am anxious to hear from people who  have  looked  into  or  have
>       implemented tools to detect unauthorized connections on their net-
>       works.
>       I  have  a  campus  network with a broadband backbone and ethernet
>       basebands.   We are running XNS now but will soon be switching  to
>       TCP/IP.    Users  are supposed to notify us (the Computing Center)
>       before they hook anything up to the network, but naturally some of
>       them conveniently overlook this rule.

	I am assuming you are talking about people just "plugging in"
a PC or other device onto one of your LANs and not bothering to
coordinate with you.  You are not talking about people trying to break
into your LAN for some devious purpose.
	This is a problem a lot of people are going to have in future
as it becomes easier to buy and install workstations or PCs.
	Fortunately in this case, the lack of dynamic discovery
mechanisms in TCP/IP is an advantage.  For this unauthorized PC to
participate fully in tcp/ip applications requires some registrations.
Perhaps one way to get people to register their PCs would be for the
academic computing service to provide some specific services, like
domain name service and e-mail to the outside world.  The PC installer
would have to call you to get:
	a valid domain name
	a valid IP address
	authorization to use a mail exchanger.

	Would this be enough to entice the typical PC user to call
you?  Of course, he can use an /etc/hosts table and smtp for himself,
but I assume you could set things up so that most other people on
campus would not be able to easily communicate with this PC.
	Ok, assume this person *still* won't call you and register, so
he's out there with an unauthorized IP address and you want to find
him and have the Protocol Police pay him a visit.  Before too long if
you have IP routers with SNMP or a smart bridge with some kind of mgmt
s/w, you can have these bridges or routers send an event report
whenever their arp tables have an entry made, assuming the vendor
gives you that option.  Log the event.  Have another application run
these events through a filter which compares them against an
authorized list and report those arp entries that are unauthorized.
Then have the Protocol Police track down the offending node and put a
Denver boot on it.  :-) Guaranteed to please the user community.  If
routers with SNMP and smart bridges of that nature are not available
to you, buy an ethernet analyzer (notice I didn't say lanalyzer or
LANalyzer(tm).  Ok, excelan?) and once in a while plug it into a
subnet and take a reading and build an arp table or just log Ethernet
addresses seen in the source.  Manually check against the authorized
list.  If you have one undifferentiated Ethernet, this is the easiest
check to do.

	At Boston University we provide complete Ethernet systems.  It
is relatively easy for anyone to request an Ethernet installation.  We
will do the cable install and verify its operation and we will ask for
the proper registrations and give advice on subnet masks and broadcast
fill patterns and default gateways to use.  We don't get innocent people
just plugging in.  We try to make it easier to call than not to call.
That is my advice to you, but as I said above it will happen more and
more anyway.
	As to snoopers and crackers, that's another level of threat
altogether.  This is much harder to thoroughly protect against.  But
if you can accurately describe the threat, we can figure out a
defense.  ONe of the problems with security issues is that people
don't understand that you build security systems against a specified
level of threat.  It's like people think you can do statistics without
a model of the system producing the data.  It may not be explicit, but
the model is there.  Same with security systems; if the threat isn't
specified before it will be apparent after.  Problem is, that after
you may find it isn't a credible threat or is the wrong one.

	Kent England, Boston University

bob@rel.eds.com (Bob Leffler) (11/11/88)

In article <5571@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU>, mliu@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU (Mei-Ling L. Liu) writes:
> 
>        *** Detecting Unauthorized Connections on Your Network ***
> 
>        I am anxious to hear from people who  have  looked  into  or  have
>        implemented tools to detect unauthorized connections on their net-
>        works.

I have an application that listens to ethernet and collects ethernet
hardware addresses.  We then compare this listing to the list of known
nodes.  With a lanalyzer it is then pretty simple to locate the foreign
node.

This works pretty well in our environment where we have physical security
of most devices.  The only real problem we get is a user that decides
he wants to re-arrange his cube and starts unplugging cables.

bob



-- 
Bob Leffler - EDS, GM Truck & Bus Account (313)456-5375
bob@rel.eds.com or {uunet!edsews, rutgers, umix}!rel!bob
Opinions expressed may not be those of my employer.