hansw@cs.vu.nl (Hans Weigand) (07/17/87)
It seems to me that _at least_ three kinds of "natural kinds" should be
distinguished:
(1) genetic kinds, existing by virtue of reproduction
("a horse is a horse because it is born from a horse")
Examples: animal and vegetable species
(2) mimetic kinds, existing by virtue of imitation, to be
subdivided in
(a) iconic kinds (by causally determined representation)
(the "Xerox-principle" of Dretske: an image of an image of x is
again an image of x)
Examples: all linguistic symbols (graphic or phonemic)
(b) artificial kinds (by imitation on purpose),
existing by virtue of preconceived design followed by
numerous production (the "Ford-principle" |-) )
Examples: car models, coins
(c) fashion kinds (by copying behavior, largely uncontrolled)
Examples: social groups (punks, yuppies, ..), styles of art, etc.
(3) anthropic/functional kinds, existing by virtue of readiness_to_hand
Examples: chair, cup, house, knife, game
The last one needs some comments. Each human being needs
certain things in order to survive and live in a satisfactory way.
These things are mainly determined by the functioning of the
human body and community, although there are also environmental and
historical-cultural influences. Thus we may recognize an
Eskimo iglo, and an African pile-dwelling both as "houses".
I think it is not so much the form (iconicity) that matters,
but rather that we feel that, when we would live in Greenland
(resp. the jungle), we would naturally appreciate or use these things
as houses too (to protect us against cold, dangers). Similar
arguments can be made for chair etc.. Moreover, (3) combines
with (2). We are born into a human society. Our parents
had the same needs as we have, so each generation copies these
"anthropic kinds" and transfers them to a next generation. This
makes it the more easy to recognize a (say Western) house. [In
most discussions on "family kinds" and so on, (2) and (3) are
not properly distinguished].
"Don't ask what a kind _is_, but rather how it _persists_"
Hans Weigand (hansw@cs.vu.nl)roberts@cognos.uucp (Robert Stanley) (07/30/87)
In article <1526@botter.cs.vu.nl> hansw@cs.vu.nl (Hans Weigand) writes: > (3) anthropic/functional kinds, existing by virtue of readiness_to_hand > Examples: chair, cup, house, knife, game >.... Thus we may recognize an Eskimo iglo, and an African pile-dwelling both >as "houses". I think it is not so much the form (iconicity) that matters, >but rather that we feel that, when we would live in Greenland >(resp. the jungle), we would naturally appreciate or use these things >as houses too (to protect us against cold, dangers).... This raises some very interesting points, most particularly the fact that anthropic kinds cannot generally have simple definitions. A very young child gets away with calling a crude drawing or sand castle a 'house', but an architect or construction engineer sees a house in much more specific terms. In fact, we are entering the realms of the working vocabulary, and what is the lowest common denominator which allows for completely successful transfer between two disparate working sets. Perhaps a strong example will serve. Kenya became an independent nation in 1964, and was faced with the problem of codifying laws, and deciding on official languages. The two numerically superior tribal groupings were the Luo and the Kikuyu, each with their own language, but colonial administration had been exclusively English (at least in writing), and the standard interlingua of the whole East African coast was Swahili (an Arabic-based patois). To further complicate the issue, the very powerful, nomadic tribe of the Masai (with their own language) had do be taken into account. English and Swahili both were adopted as official languages, and a determined effort made to create a formal body of law in both. In the Swahili version is a formal definition of house which runs to some 96 pages of text! Why? Because the term house has a whole slew of legal meanings in English common law, on which Kenya's laws are based, which are totally alien to many of the Kenyan tribes, especially the nomadic Masai. Therefore, each and every such legal referent has to be precisely defined. I leave as an exercise to the reader....... I am not sure that house or any other cultural artifact can be called a natural object unless its cultural matrix is expressly defined as part of the object's name. Or that all objects in a given grouping are stated to exist within an explicitly defined cultural context. I am absolutely sure that when I say house and an Eskimo says igloo we are not talking about the same thing at all. In fact the only common denominator appears to be shelter from the elements in the winter months, albeit those are different for the two of us. -- Robert Stanley Compuserve: 76174,3024 Cognos Incorporated uucp: decvax!utzoo!dciem!nrcaer!cognos!roberts 3755 Riverside Drive or ...nrcaer!uottawa!robs Ottawa, Ontario Voice: (613) 738-1440 - Tuesdays only (don't ask) CANADA K1G 3N3