acha@centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu (Anurag Acharya) (05/04/88)
In article <1069@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: >I am always suspicious of any academic activity which has to request that it >becomes a philosophical no-go area. I know of no other area of activity which >is so dependent on such a wide range of unwarranted assumptions. Perhaps this >has something to do with the axiomatic preferences of its founders, who came >from mathematical traditions where you could believe anything as long as it was >logically consistent. Just when is an assumption warranted ? By your yardstick (it seems ), 'logically inconsistent' assumptions are more likely to be warranted than the logically consistent ones. Am I parsing you wrong or do you really claim that ?! >logical errors in an argument is not enough to sensibly dismiss it, otherwise >we would have to become resigned to widespread ignorance. Same problem again ( sigh ! ). Just how do you propose to argue with logically inconsistent arguments ? Come on Mr. Cockton, what gives ? > My concern over AI >is, like some psychology, it has no integration with social theories, especially >those which see 'reality' as a negotiated outcome of social processes, and not >logically consistent rules. You wish to assert that reality is a negotiated outcome of social processes ??? Imagine Mr. Cockton, you are standing on the 36th floor of a building and you and your mates decide that you are Superman and can jump out without getting hurt. By the 'negotiated outcome of social processes' claptrap, you really are Superman. Would you then jump out and have fun ? > Your system should prevaricate, stall, duck the >issue, deny there's a problem, pray, write to an agony aunt, ask its >mum, wait a while, get its friends to ring it up and ask it out ... Whatever does all that stuff have to do with intelligence per se ? Mr. Cockton, what constitutes a proof among you and your "philosopher/sociologist/.." colleagues ? Since logical consistency is taboo, logical errors are acceptable, reality and truth are functions of the current whim of the largest organized gang around ( oh! I am sorry, they are the 'negotiated ( who by ? ) outcomes of social processes ( what processes ? )') how do you guys conduct research ? Get together and vote on motions or what ? -- anurag -- Anurag Acharya Arpanet: acharya@centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu "There's no sense in being precise when you don't even know what you're talking about" -- John von Neumann
marty1@houdi.UUCP (M.BRILLIANT) (05/04/88)
In article <1588@pt.cs.cmu.edu>, acha@centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu (Anurag Acharya) writes: > In article <1069@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > ... > > Your system should prevaricate, stall, duck the > >issue, deny there's a problem, pray, write to an agony aunt, ask its > >mum, wait a while, get its friends to ring it up and ask it out ... > > Whatever does all that stuff have to do with intelligence per se ? > .... Pardon me for abstracting out of context. Also for daring to comment when I am not an AI researcher, only an engineer waiting for a useful result. But I see that as an illuminating bit of dialogue. Cockton wants to emulate the real human decision maker, and I cannot say with certainty that he's wrong. Acharya wants to avoid the pitfalls of human fallibility, and I cannot say with certainty that he's wrong either. I wish we could see these arguments as a conflict between researchers who want to model the human mind, and researchers who want to make more useful computer programs. Then we could acknowledge that both schools belong in AI, and stop arguing over which should drive out the other. M. B. Brilliant Marty AT&T-BL HO 3D-520 (201)-949-1858 Holmdel, NJ 07733 ihnp4!houdi!marty1 Disclaimer: Opinions stated herein are mine unless and until my employer explicitly claims them; then I lose all rights to them.
nancyk@hpfclp.SDE.HP.COM (Nancy Kirkwood) (05/05/88)
nancyk@hpfclp.sde.hp.com Nancy Kirkwood at HP, Fort Collins Come now!!! Don't try to defend "logical consistency" with exaggeration and personal attack. > Just when is an assumption warranted ? By your yardstick (it seems ), > 'logically inconsistent' assumptions are more likely to be warranted than ^^^^ > the logically consistent ones. It's important to remember that the rules of logic we are discussing come from Western (European) cultural traditions, and derive much of their power "from the consent of the governed," so to speak. We have agreed that if we present arguments which satisfy the rules of this system, that the arguments are correct, and we are speaking "truth." This is a very useful protocol, but we should not be so narrow as to believe that it is the only yardstick for truth. The "laws" of physics certainly preclude jumping off a 36 story building and expecting not to get hurt, but physicists would be the first to admit that these laws are incomplete, and the natural processes involved are *not* completely known, and possibly never will be. Nor can we be sure, being fallible humans who don't know all the facts, that our supposed logical arguments are useful or even correct. "Reality" in the area of human social interactions is largely if not completely the "negotiated outcome of social processes." It has been a topic of debate for thousands of years at least as to whether morality has an abstract truth unrelated to the social milieu it is found in. > Since logical consistency is taboo, logical errors are acceptable, > reality and truth are functions of the current whim of the largest organized > gang around ( oh! I am sorry, they are the 'negotiated ( who by ? ) outcomes > of social processes ( what processes ? )') how do you guys conduct research ? Distorting someone's statements and then attacking the distortions is not an effective means of carrying on a productive discussion (though it does stir up interest :-)). -nancyk * * * *********************************************** * * * * "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, * * than are dreamt of in your philosophy." * * -Shakespeare * * * * *********************************************** * * *
byerly@cars.rutgers.edu (Boyce Byerly ) (05/07/88)
|In article <1069@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk |(Gilbert Cockton) writes: |>logical errors in an argument is not enough to sensibly dismiss it, otherwise |>we would have to become resigned to widespread ignorance. | |To which acha@centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu (Anurag Acharya) replies: Just |when is an assumption warranted ? By your yardstick (it seems ), |'logically inconsistent' assumptions are more likely to be warranted |than the logically consistent ones. Am I parsing you wrong or do you |really claim that ?! My feelings on this are that "hard logic", as perfected in first-order predicate calculus, is a wonderful and very powerful form of reasoning. However, it seems to have a number of drawbacks as a rigorous standard for AI systems, from both the cognitive modeling and engineering standpoints. 1) It is not a natural or easy way to represent probabalistic or intuitive knowledge. 2) In representing human knowledge and discourse, it fails because it does not recognize or deal with contradiction. In a rigorously logical system, if P ==> Q ~Q P Then we have the tautology ~Q and Q. If you don't believe human beings can have the above deriveably contradictory structures in their logical environments, I suggest you spend a few hours listening to some of our great political leaders :-) Mr. Reagan's statements on dealing with terrorists shortly before Iranscam/Contragate leap to mind, but I am sure you can find equally good examples in any political party. People normally keep a lot of contradictory information in their minds, and not from dishonesty - you simply can't tear out a premise because it causes a contradiction after exhaustive derivation. 3) Logic also falls down in manipulating "belief-structures" about the world. The gap between belief and reality ( whatever THAT is) is often large. I am aware of this problem from reading texts on natural language, but I think the problem occurs elsewhere, too. Perhaps the logical deduction of western philosophy needs to take a back seat for a bit and let less sensitive, more probalistic rationalities drive for a while. Boyce Rutgers University DCS
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (05/09/88)
In article <May.6.18.48.07.1988.29690@cars.rutgers.edu> byerly@cars.rutgers.edu (Boyce Byerly ) writes: > >Perhaps the logical deduction of western philosophy needs to take a >back seat for a bit and let less sensitive, more probalistic >rationalities drive for a while. > I have a favoire paper which I always like to recommend when folks like Boyce propose putting probabilistic reasoning "in the driver's seat:" Alvan R. Feinstein Clinical biostatistics XXXIX. The haze of Bayes, the aerial palaces of decision analysis, and the computerized Ouija board. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPUTICS Vol. 21, No. 4 pp. 482-496 This is an excellent (as well as entertaining) exposition of many of the pitfalls of such reasoning written by a Professor of Medicine and Epidemiology at the Yale University School of Medicine. I do not wish this endorsement to be interpreted as a wholesale condemnation of the use of probabilities . . . just a warning that they can lead to just as much trouble as an attempt to reduce the entire world of first-order predicate calculus. We DEFINITELY need abstractions better than such logical constructs to deal with issues such as uncertainty and belief, but it is most unclear that probability theory is going to provide those abstractions. More likely, we should be investigating the shortcomings of natural deduction as a set of rules which represent the control of reasoning and consider, instead, possibilities of alternative rules, as well as the possibility that there is no one rule set which is used universally but that different sets of rules are engaged under different circumstances.
rjc@edai.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley) (05/10/88)
In article <1069@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > { that 'reality' is seen in some theories as the negotiated outcome of > social processes } In reply acha@centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu writes >You wish to assert that reality is a negotiated outcome of social processes ? No he said that some theories said that and there are good arguments for them and AI tends to ignore them. > Imagine Mr. Cockton, you are standing on the 36th floor of a building and > you and your mates decide that you are Superman and can jump out without > getting hurt. Then there is something going wrong in the negotiations within the group!! > By the 'negotiated outcome of social processes' claptrap, you really are > Superman. Calling something claptrap is not a very good argument against it, especially when you are talking through your hat. Saying that Y is the result of process X does not imply that any result from X is a valid Y. In particular 'reality is the outcome of social negotiation' does not imply that "real world" (whatever that is) constraints do not have an effect. Peoples' view of the world is very restricted and so their model of how the world really is is massively underconstrained; social and logical norms are used to fill in the gaps. I have no proof that Australia exists since I've never been there; I accept the picture of reallity which has developed in this society which includes the existence of Australia. > Would you then jump out and have fun ? If we decided that I was Superman then presumably there is good evidence for that assumption, since it is pretty hard to swallow. _In_such_a_case_ I might jump. Being a careful soul I would probably try some smaller drops first! To say you would not jump would be to say that you would not accept that you were Superman no matter _how_ good the evidence. Unless you say that the concept of you being Superman is impossible ( say logically inconsistent with your basic assumptions about the world ), which is ruled out by the presuppositions of the example ( since if this was so you would never come to the consensus that you were him ), then you _must_ accept that sufficient evidence would cause you to believe and hence be prepared to jump. -- Real Mailers rjc@uk.ac.ed.edai Imaginary Mailers . . . .!mcvax!ukc!cstvax!edai!rjc
cwp@otter.hple.hp.com (Chris Preist) (05/10/88)
M. Brilliant, you have made a very valid, but not entirely fair, point. This debate is not really about Cog Sci style AI vs Engineering AI, but rather the claims of Cog Sci style AI. Even if someone waves a magic wand and proves once and for all that machines canot be 'intelligent', it does not mean that nothing useful can come out of AI.. Now THAT's ANOTHER debate!!!!! Chris
acha@centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu.UUCP (05/12/88)
In article <86@edai.ed.ac.uk> rjc@edai.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley) writes: >> Imagine Mr. Cockton, you are standing on the 36th floor of a building and >> you and your mates decide that you are Superman and can jump out without >> getting hurt. >Then there is something going wrong in the negotiations within the group!! Oh, yes! There definitely is! But it is still is a "negotiation" and it is "social"!. Since 'reality' and 'truth' are being defined as "negotiated outcomes of social processes", there are no constraints on what these outcomes may be. I can see no reason why a group couldn't conclude that ( esp. since physical world constraints are not necessarilly a part of these "negotiations"). >Saying that Y is the result of process X does not imply that any result >from X is a valid Y. In particular 'reality is the outcome >of social negotiation' does not imply that "real world" (whatever that is) >constraints do not have an effect. Do we have "valid" and "invalid" realities around ? >If we decided that I was Superman then presumably there is good evidence >for that assumption, since it is pretty hard to swallow. _In_such_a_case_ >I might jump. Being a careful soul I would probably try some smaller drops >first! Why would it be pretty hard to swallow ? And why do you need "good" evidence ? For that matter, what IS good evidence - that ten guys ( possibly deranged or malicious ) say so ? Have you thought why would you consider getting some real hard data by trying out smaller drops ? It is because Physical World just won't go away and the only real evidence that even you would accept are actual outcomes of physical events. Physical world is the final arbiter of "reality" and "truth" no matter what process you use to decide on your course of action. >To say you would not jump would be to say that you would not accept that >you were Superman no matter _how_ good the evidence. If you accept consensus of a group of people as "evidence", does the degree of goodness depend on the number of people, or what ? > Unless you say that the >concept of you being Superman is impossible ( say logically inconsistent with >your basic assumptions about the world ), which is ruled out by the >presuppositions of the example ( since if this was so you would never come >to the consensus that you were him ), then you _must_ accept that sufficient >evidence would cause you to believe and hence be prepared to jump. Ah, well.. if you reject logical consistency as a valid basis for argument then you could come to any conclusion/consensus in the world you please - you could conclude that you (simultaneously) were and were not Superman! Then, do you jump out or not ? ( or maybe teeter at the edge :-)) On the other hand, if you accept logical consistency as a valid basis for argument - you have no need for a crowd to back you up. Come on, does anyone really believe that if he and his pals reach a consensus on some aspect of the world - the world would change to suit them ? That is the conclusion I keep getting out of all these nebulous and hazy stuff about 'reality' being a function of 'social processes'. -- Anurag Acharya Arpanet: acharya@centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu "There's no sense in being precise when you don't even know what you're talking about" -- John von Neumann