channic@uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu (05/12/88)
bettingr@sunybcs.uucp replies to an earlier posting of mine: >> }I see plenty of room -- my own subjective experience. I make mental >> }decisions which are not random and are not completely determined (although >> }certainly influenced) by past determinism. >> How do you know that? Do you think that your mind is powerful enough to >> comprehend the immense combination of effects of determinism and chance? >> No one's is. "How do I know?" is as old a question as western philosophy if not all philosophy. The reason the question is that old is because subjective personal experience is undeniable. I know I have free will because that is my experience. No, my mind is not powerful enough to fathom the unfathomable. And I agree that no one's is, save God's. But if no one's mind can comprehend the effects of determinism and randomness on free will, what is the use of postulating them as a model for free will? As a basis for machine simulation? Okay, it's a start, but if a human mind cannot develop a formalism for structuring free will from an incomprehensible combination of determinism and chance, I can't reasonably expect a machine to magically create and use its own free will. > }[...] But this BEGS THE QUESTION of intelligent machines in the worst way. > }Show me the deterministic > }laws that create mind, Dr. Minsky, then I will believe there is no free will. > > No one denies that we humans experience free will. But that experience says > nothing about its nature; at least, nothing ruling out determinism and chance. From where does this tendency to IGNORE subjective experience when discussing SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA originate? My own (and your own) experience of free will tells me (and you) a great deal about its nature. In fact, this experience is the most reliable source of information regarding free will. And the experience is neither deterministic or random. No matter what decision I make, whether choosing a political candidate, a career, or a flavor of ice cream, I experience neither that my choice is determined, nor random, NOR some nebulous combination of the two. From an objective standpoint, a choice can be described as somewhere between these opposites, but a choice can also be described as "some combination" of good and bad, altruistic and selfish, physical and meta-physical, socially acceptable and unacceptable, imaginative and practical, and perhaps most importantly, responsible and irresponsible. Such measures provide no less insight into free will than the deterministic/random continuum, in fact I would say that they provide far more insight. > }Do you believe your career was merely the result of some bizarre genetic > }combination or pure chance? > The answer can be "yes" here, if the conjunction is changed to "and". If so, no one can be held responsible or need to feel responsible for his/her actions. I cannot accept that. > }The attack is over. The following is a plea to all AI researchers. Please > }do not try to persuade anyone, especially impressionable students, that s\he > }does not have free will. Everyone has the ability to choose to bring peace > }to his or her own life and to the rest of society, and has the ability to > }MAKE A DIFFERENCE in the world. Free will should not be compromised for the > }mere prospect of creating an intelligent machine. > > Believe it or not, Minsky makes a similar plea in his discussion of free will > in _The Society of Mind_. He says that we may not be able to figure out where > free will comes from, but it is so deeply ingrained in us that we cannot deny > it or ignore it. Since it can't be denied, let's go one step further. Free will has created civilization as we know it. People, using their individual free wills, chose to make the world the way it is. Minsky chose to write his book, I chose to disagree, someone chose to design computers, plumbing, buildings, automobiles, symphonies and everything that makes life enjoyable. Our reality is our choice, the product of our free will operating on our value system. Another poster in this discussion noted that our values are not as universal as number because values cause factions, rivalries and wars. I claim that the fault is not in the nature of values but in the values themselves. We need to, and can, choose values which facilitate peace among individuals, cultures and nations, just as we have chosen a number system which accurately and effectively transcends international boundaries. I believe all people, especially leading scientific minds, have the wisdom to use their undeniable free will to making choices in values which will promote world harmony. Unfortunately, as many postings in this discussion indicate, the attempted mechanization or formalization of intelligence and free will -- the reductionist approach -- tends not only to reduce their complexity but also tends to reduce their significance of their role in improving life on this planet. Free will explained as an additive blend of determinism and chance directly attacks the concept of individual responsibility. Can any machine, based on this theory of free will, possibly benefit society enough to counteract the detrimental effect of a philosophy which implies that we aren't accountable for our choices? I do not imply that AI researches are not responsible to society. I do wonder why so many seem to accept a theory of free will which includes no notion of responsibilty whatsoever. Minsky seems to be suggesting that if we throw a little randomness into our deterministic automata, what we'll get is just as good as free will, and therefore, more intelligent. Does anyone else see danger here? As AI researchers we are in a BUSINESS, the business of making intelligent machines. To maximize profits in this business, we must demonstrate that our machines really are more intelligent. To this end there are two approaches, one is to make machines that do something new and useful, the other is to define intelligence in such a way that a machine can do it. Minsky's theory on free will is guilty of the latter. It reduces free will to ignore responsibility. I implore AI researchers not to fall prey to this second approach. Real, living, human intelligence is our best hope for the survival of the world. Don't trivialize it for a new improved toy! Simplify it, yes, but not without a clear demarcation of the shortcomings of the simplification in relation to the real thing. I feel that I'm on a soap box and I apologize. I do not wish to single out AI researchers as the cause of the world's problems. In fact, the great response to this topic indicates many more people are thinking about these issues than the literature of the field suggests. I only wish to add the observation that free will, values, and beliefs are the reason we're all in this game, so while we're playing we shouldn't pretend these things don't exist or are any less complicated and miraculous than they really are. Tom Channic University of Illinois channic@uiucdcs.cs.uiuc.edu {decvax|ihnp4}!pur-ee!uiucdcs!channic
jackson@esosun.UUCP (Jerry Jackson) (05/12/88)
>If so, no one can be held responsible or need to feel responsible for his/her >actions. I cannot accept that. >> }The attack is over. The following is a plea to all AI researchers. Please >> }do not try to persuade anyone, especially impressionable students, that s\he >> }does not have free will. Everyone has the ability to choose to bring peace >> }to his or her own life and to the rest of society, and has the ability to >> }MAKE A DIFFERENCE in the world. Free will should not be compromised for the >> }mere prospect of creating an intelligent machine. >> >> Believe it or not, Minsky makes a similar plea in his discussion of free will >> in _The Society of Mind_. He says that we may not be able to figure out where >> free will comes from, but it is so deeply ingrained in us that we cannot deny >> it or ignore it. > >Since it can't be denied, let's go one step further. Free will has created >civilization as we know it. People, using their individual free wills, >chose to make the world the way it is. Minsky chose to write his book, Is this intended to be a convincing argument? The fact that you cannot accept something is hardly a valid reason for me to reject it. Saying it's so doesn't make it so. I agree that if free will is unreal, the foundations of our society in terms of laws, praise, blame and responsibility in general fall apart... This seems to me (initially anyway) to be a bad thing. That's not, however, a good reason to ignore the problem. I think it is clear that within the standard causal model of the world that most science-oriented folks have adopted, there is no room for free will. Sure, one can introduce "quantum uncertainty" into the picture, but I don't think having a decision made by a sub-atomic event is really what people like to think of as "free will"... If events actually do have causes (What a novel idea!), then free will must somehow come from outside the causal stream (from some *non-physical* realm?). So, I contend, belief in free will constitutes belief in some sort of non-physical entity interacting with the physical body. I'm certainly not about to say this is wrong; I just wish the free will proponents would admit where they are coming from. On a different note, consider what is meant by making a 'choice'.. I submit that when the options presented to a 'chooser' differ greatly in value, there is really no choice to be made -- it makes itself. However, when the options are very close in value, the choice becomes difficult (exactly when it makes the least difference). In fact, the most difficult choices occur when the options at hand are virtually equal in value. At that point one might as well roll the dice anyway. Finally, to be honest, I think the question of free will/determinism is illusory. It pre-supposes a rigid separation between the 'actor' and the 'outside world'. Within a causal framework, the only 'entity' that can possibly act on its own is the universe itself (of which we are not so separate parts). So, to really experience free will, try to identify with a greater and greater piece of the whole pie, instead of some arbitrary individual. --Jerry Jackson
barr@pineapple.bbn.com (Hunter Barr) (05/13/88)
In article <3200017@uiucdcsm> channic@uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu writes: >"How do I know?" is as old a question as western philosophy if not all >philosophy. The reason the question is that old is because subjective >personal experience is undeniable. I know I have free will because that >is my experience. You have seen optical illusions where a straight line is made to appear curved. No-one doubts that your subjective experience tells you that the line is curved. In fact, because all humans are built the same in certain respects (at least those who are able to see and thus can experience optical illusions), all humans will have that same subjective experience when they look at that straight line. The same is true of many other optical illusions, auditory illusions, and, naturally, the illusion that we call free will. No-one says we do not experience it, only that we *mis-understand* what we experience. After I have taken a straight-edge to determine that the line is straight, I may still "feel" that I am looking at a curved line, but I now believe the drawing's caption, which calls it a straight line. No-one has yet defined free-will so that a straight-edge can be found for it. But many humans activities have been shown to be less voluntary than they appear subjectively. For expample: As a child, I thought that I chose what I wanted to eat, and I felt I had completely free will in this matter. I noticed that I always chose the M&Ms over the spinach (no matter what Popeye said), but I still felt that my choice was completely free. Now I know a little about the human digestive track, body-chemistry, and psychology; I can see that these played a big part in my "choices". Such a big part that I now think they completely determined my choices. So it seems useless to talk about free will in this case. Any child will make similar choices, most the exact same ones, because that is how children are built. Only external factors will change the child's choices, such as reward/punishment for choosing one food over another. (I consider learning about the real world to be a form of external reward/punishment. For example, I learned that a steady diet of M&Ms could lead to a scary visit to the Dentist.) Choices we make as adults seem much the same, probably depending on factors we do not yet comprehend, just as we did not comprehend the factors which led us to choose M&Ms as children. As I said, no-one has yet provided a reliable straight-edge for us to use on the free will experience (a definition of free will would help.) But each experience with a choice which we *do* understand (like M&Ms over spinach) provides one little peice of that straight edge. All the little peices in my experience look like they will fit a straight-edge called " determinism." When we learn more about the factors which influence our choices, we will develop more or less confidence in this hypothetical straight-edge. But until we understand most of these factors, we cannot claim to have this ill-defined "free will", whatever our subjective experience. This puts me in agreemnet with someone you quoted who said: >> No one denies that we humans experience free will. But that >> experience says nothing about its nature; at least, nothing ruling >> out determinism and chance. I think this gives me an answer to your question: >From where does this tendency to IGNORE subjective experience when discussing >SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA originate? My own (and your own) experience of free will >tells me (and you) a great deal about its nature. In fact, this experience is >the most reliable source of information regarding free will. And the >experience is neither deterministic or random. No matter what decision I make, >whether choosing a political candidate, a career, or a flavor of ice cream, >I experience neither that my choice is determined, nor random, NOR some >nebulous combination of the two. I answer that this discussion itself is proof that we do not ignore subjective experience. It does indeed tell us a great deal, and provides essential insight, but it is by no stretch of the imagination our most reliable source of information. Try to adapt your reasoning to the straight line illusion. Following your reasoning, I should not bother to rummage around in my desk for a straight-edge; nor should I doubt in any way my subjective experience that it is curved. Why, you don't want me to think about things at all! You just want me to sit there and "experience" that the line is curved, as if that experience matched reality. What if my ability to better understand reality makes me able to help people? What if my ability to distinguish germ theory from superstition enables me to wipe out smallpox? What if my ability to distinguish straight lines from curved ones enables me to build safer cars? Then maybe my ability to distinguish demermined behaviour from this nebulous "free will" will enable me to wipe out a mental disease. Whatever turns out to be the root our "free will" experience, we will not learn to understand it merely by sitting here and experiencing it subjectively. >Free will explained as an additive blend of determinism and chance >directly attacks the concept of individual responsibility. Can any >machine, based on this theory of free will, possibly benefit society >enough to counteract the detrimental effect of a philosophy which >implies that we aren't accountable for our choices? We say, "A tornado was responsible for destroying my house," and, "John's dog is responisble for this scar on my leg." If we could stop the tornado from touching down elsewhere, we would. Under most circumstances we actually do prevent John's dog from biting anyone else, either by incarcerating it or killing it. The same will always be true of people. Where we can stop them from repeating their offenses, we will. What about one-time offenders? Say someone kills her husband and we don't think she'll do it again. Punish her on the basis of how likely it is that she will commit the same crime again? No. This would produce the damage you fear. For the prevention of crime it is important that punishment be applied predictably and evenly, with as few exceptions as possible. This means we should keep the current idea of responsibility around in Law to do the job it has always done-- support prevention by making sure a crime is punished predictably. This may mean a stricter interpretation of "Ignorance of the Law is no excuse." Yours is an excellent argument against treating insane offenders differently from sane ones. It is too easy to say that anyone who commits a crime has demonstrated mental illness by committing the crime. But if in fact determinism turns out to be true, then we will want to convert all our prisons to mental hospitals. Can we work to prevent crime as the same time as we work to cure the offenders? Hmmm... why is there such a thing as an "insanity defense" in Law? I guess the more we learn about determinism in the mind, the fewer places "free will" has to hide. So psychologists really can claim "She didn't know what she was doing, your Honor." If our ability to diagnose mental illness continues to outstrip our ability to correct it, then we will have the unpleasant necessity of punishing people who really couldn't help it. But this has been happening for thousands of years anyway. I guess the only course I can see is to continue the perceived injustice of punishing the mentally ill, except in cases where we can cure them. Can we cure them now? Not reliably, but... oh, this *is* a hard problem! We may have to continue the age old system of punishment, sacrificing cures for prevention for a very long time after some cures become possible. There are lifetimes of thinking yet to be done on this topic. We may really get started figuring out how to solve crime when we figure out what the free will experience is. > >I feel that I'm on a soap box and I apologize. I do not wish to >single out AI researchers as the cause of the world's problems. >In fact, the great response to this topic indicates many more >people are thinking about these issues than the literature of >the field suggests. I only wish to add the observation that free will, >values, and beliefs are the reason we're all in this game, so while >we're playing we shouldn't pretend these things don't exist or are >any less complicated and miraculous than they really are. > > >Tom Channic >University of Illinois >channic@uiucdcs.cs.uiuc.edu >{decvax|ihnp4}!pur-ee!uiucdcs!channic I have no problem with your getting up on a soapbax-- after all, you left room for me up here next to you! The only way I can get the benefit of your knowledge is to expose my ignorance and spark some true communication. I, myself, apologize for taking up so much space saying what I have to say. Thanks for listening (reading, that is.) ______ HUNTER
channic@uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu (05/14/88)
"HUNTER" (barr@pineapple.bbn.com) writes: ] In article <3200017@uiucdcsm> channic@uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu writes: ] >"How do I know?" is as old a question as western philosophy if not all ] >philosophy. The reason the question is that old is because subjective ] >personal experience is undeniable. I know I have free will because that ] >is my experience. ] You have seen optical illusions where a straight line is made to ] appear curved. No-one doubts that your subjective experience tells ] you that the line is curved... ] The same ] is true of many other optical illusions, auditory illusions, and, ] naturally, the illusion that we call free will. No-one says we do not ] experience it, only that we *mis-understand* what we experience. Are you saying I can't believe anything I perceive? Even that I can't believe most of what I perceive -- that we *mis-understand* most of what we experience? Certainly I modify my knowledge based on additional experience (placing a ruler on the line), but I acquire additional information because I choose to, and I choose to because I have free will. Don't you? The point is that in order to know (or believe or whatever) that the line is straight you must accept some personal experience (that indeed the ruler exactly adheres to the line) as valid. We have reason to believe the line is straight, so we discard the opinion that the line is curved. If I had experience to suggest that I did not have free will, I would accept that my choices are determined by external forces. But no posting thus far has provided evidence contrary to my free will experience, so I must continue to maintain that my free will is not an illusion in the least, but real. ] As a child, I thought that I chose what I wanted to eat, and I felt I ] had completely free will in this matter. Now I know a little ] about the human digestive track, body-chemistry, and psychology; I can ] see that these played a big part in my "choices". Such a big part ] that I now think they completely determined my choices. So it seems ] useless to talk about free will in this case. Only external factors ] will change the child's choices, such as reward/punishment for choosing ] one food over another. Did you never get anything you wanted as a child? I had choices as a child and still do. Of course biologic factors played a part, but is the part sufficient to justify the generalization that ALL free will is the result of external factors? Why does it "seem useless to talk about free will in this case?" That is a subjective choice on your part. To make that choice you are exercising free will. It is your choice to post your argument. Free will, again. Please explain to me how you can make all these choices and not have free will. ] Choices we make as adults seem much the same, probably depending on ] factors we do not yet comprehend, just as we did not comprehend the ] factors which led us to choose M&Ms as children. As I said, no-one ] has yet provided a reliable straight-edge for us to use on the free ] will experience (a definition of free will would help.) But each ] experience with a choice which we *do* understand (like M&Ms over ] spinach) provides one little peice of that straight edge. All the ] little peices in my experience look like they will fit a straight-edge ] called " determinism." When we learn more about the factors which ] influence our choices, we will develop more or less confidence in this ] hypothetical straight-edge. But until we understand most of these ] factors, we cannot claim to have this ill-defined "free will", ] whatever our subjective experience. "When we learn more" then I will accept this "deterministic straight-edge". Until that time, we MUST claim to have this ill-defined free will because it is our primal motivation for ""learning more about the factors which influence our choices." We cannot learn more without choosing to learn and this constitutes free will. I cannot comprehend why you are so eager to deny your free will on so little evidence! My free will is my most powerful tool in influencing my external reality. Isn't yours? I do not deny that external reality has an influence in return, but imagine how overwhelming this external influence would be without free will. In fact, it is largely the "illusory" free will of others which cause external influences to impinge on you. You are bombarded every day by people choosing to sell this, to argue that, to drive cars there, to assemble homes and offices here. Look around. The structuring of virtually the entire environment is a result of people who have chosen to do something by exercising their free will. Ill-defined as it is, it is the prime force of change on the planet. I can neither ignore it, nor deny my fair share of it. ] >From where does this tendency to IGNORE subjective experience when ] >discussing SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA originate? My own ] >(and your own) experience of free will tells me (and you) a great deal ] >about its nature. In fact, this experience is the most reliable source ] >of information regarding free will. ] I answer that this discussion itself is proof that we do not ignore ] subjective experience. It does indeed tell us a great deal, and ] provides essential insight, but it is by no stretch of the imagination ] our most reliable source of information. Try to adapt your reasoning ] to the straight line illusion. Following your reasoning, I should not ] bother to rummage around in my desk for a straight-edge; nor should I ] doubt in any way my subjective experience that it is curved. Why, you ] don't want me to think about things at all! You just want me to sit ] there and "experience" that the line is curved, as if that experience ] matched reality. What if my ability to better understand reality ] makes me able to help people? What if my ability to distinguish germ ] theory from superstition enables me to wipe out smallpox? What if my ] ability to distinguish straight lines from curved ones enables me to ] build safer cars? Then maybe my ability to distinguish demermined ] behaviour from this nebulous "free will" will enable me to wipe out a ] mental disease. Whatever turns out to be the root our "free will" ] experience, we will not learn to understand it merely by sitting here ] and experiencing it subjectively. Who said anything about sitting? "Sitting there and experiencing" is what I imagine someone without free will doing. A rock has no free will and just sits there. If you had no free will you would just sit there, too. When I argue that free will exists, I am arguing precisely that you have the ability to think, help people, build safer cars, wipe out smallpox, and cure mental illnesses. In fact, doing all these provides the clearest subjective experience of free will. The experience is in the EXERCISE of free will, not sitting and thinking about it. In terms of the straight-line illusion, you are asking me to accept that the line is straight when only a part of the line matches the true straight edge. Furthermore, your argument is along the lines of "If you look at a small enough section of the line, it sort of looks straight." I have no problem with the looking, but I urge you not to presuppose that the non-linearity does not exist, especially when it (free will) is motivating your search in the first place. You just may find that free will stands up under your most intense scrutiny. Free will is nebulous - agreed. Given this, how will we know that we have created free will deterministically if we're not sure what free will is? We have no choice but to use our subjective experience of EXERCISING free will as a model to which deterministic models can be compared. (Is that such a great "stretch of the imagination?") My main argument through all these postings is simply: Minsky's proposed model of free will as determinism with some added randomness fails to account for responsiblity inherent in free will, and thus fails as a plausible model for free will. I won't argue that no deterministic algorithm and/or theory will ever account for free will, but since this algorithm or theory would have to account for every external influence on our persons, I can't expect that anyone is anywhere near a plausible formulation of deterministic free will. I can't help but wonder. What if, instead of this discussion and instead of striving to prove the non-existence of free will in the hope that along the way some insight into mental illness will pop out at us, we chose rather to simply try to make life a bit better by respecting those around us, smiling at them and telling them we enjoy sharing our time with them, letting go of an old grudge, or reminding someone of how much we care? Which use of time would be the most beneficial for the world? Tom Channic University of Illinois channic@uiucdcs.cs.uiuc.edu {decvax|ihnp4}!pur-ee!uiucdcs!channic
paulg@iisat.UUCP (Paul Gauthier) (05/14/88)
I'm sorry, but there is no free will. Every one of us is bound by the
laws of physics. No one can lift a 2000 tonne block of concrete with his
bare hands. No one can do the impossible, and in this sense none of us have
free will.
I am partially wrong there, as long as you don't WANT to do the impossible
you can have a sort of free will. But as soon as you feel that you want to
do something that cannot be done then your free will is gone.
Let me define my idea of free will: Free will is being able to take any
course of action which you want to take. So if you never want to take a
course of action which is forbidden to you, your free will is retained.
Free will is completely subjective. There is no 'absolute free will.' At
least that is how I look at free will. Since it is subjective to the person
whose free will is in question it follows that as long as this person THINKS
he is experiencing free will then he is. If he doesn't know that his decisions
are being made for him, and he THINKS they are his own free choices then he
is NOT being forced into a course of action he doesn't desire so he has free
will.
Anyways, I suppose there'll be a pile of rebuttles against this (gosh, I
hope so -- I love debates!).
--
==============================================================================
=== Paul Gauthier at International Information Services ===
=== {uunet, utai, watmath}!dalcs!iisat!paulg ===
========================================================================vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (05/15/88)
In article <2@iisat.UUCP> paulg@iisat.UUCP (Paul Gauthier) writes: > I am partially wrong there, as long as you don't WANT to do the impossible >you can have a sort of free will. But as soon as you feel that you want to >do something that cannot be done then your free will is gone. > > [ other good comments deleted ] I'm totally perplexed why the concept of *RELATIVE FREEDOM* is so difficult for people to adhere to. Can someone *please* rebut the following: 1) Absolute freedom is theoretically impossible. Absolute freedom is perhaps best characterized as a uniform distribution on the real line. This distribution is not well formed. The concept of *absolute randomness* is not well defined. For example, it is *determined* that the six sided die cannot roll a seven. 2) Absolute determinism, while theoretically possible, is both physically impossible and theoretically unobservable. Computers are one of the most determined systems we have, but a variety of low-level errors, up to and including quantum effects, pollute its pure determinism. Further, any sufficiently large determined system will yield to chaotic processes, so that its determinism is itself undeterminable. 3) Therefore all real systems are *RELATIVELY FREE*, and *RELATIVELY DETERMINED*, some more, some less, depending on their nature, and on how they are observed and modeled. Certainly all organisms, including people, fall into this range. 4) Since when we qualify an adjective, the adjective still holds (something a little hot is still hot), therefore, it *IS TRUE* that *PEOPLE ARE FREE* and it *IS TRUE* that *PEOPLE ARE DETERMINED*. No problem. 5) As biological systems evolve, their freedom increases, so that, e.g. people are more free than cats or snails. When people project this relatively more freedom into their own absolute freedom they are committing arrogance and folly. When people project ideological (naive?) ideas about causality, and conclude that we are completely determined, they are also commiting folly. Any takers? -- O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Cybernetician at Large | Systems Science, SUNY Binghamton, vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
shani@TAURUS.BITNET (05/16/88)
In article <2@iisat.UUCP>, paulg@iisat.BITNET writes: > Let me define my idea of free will: Free will is being able to take any > course of action which you want to take. So if you never want to take a > course of action which is forbidden to you, your free will is retained. > Hmm... quite correct. But did it ever occured to you that we WANT to be limited by the laws of physics, because this is the only way to form a realm? Why do you think people are so willing to pay lot's of $ to TSR, just to play with other limitations?... O.S.
dharvey@wsccs.UUCP (David Harvey) (05/17/88)
In article <3200017@uiucdcsm>, channic@uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu writes: > ... > Since it can't be denied, let's go one step further. Free will has created > civilization as we know it. People, using their individual free wills, > chose to make the world the way it is. Minsky chose to write his book, > I chose to disagree, someone chose to design computers, plumbing, buildings, > automobiles, symphonies and everything that makes life enjoyable. > Our reality is our choice, the product of our free will operating on our > value system. > ... If free will has created civilization as we know it, then it must be accepted with mixed emotions. This means that Hitler, Stalin, some of the Catholic Popes during the middle ages and others have created a great deal of havoc that was not good. One of the prime reasons for AI is to perhaps develop systems that prevent things like this from happening. If we with our free will (you said it, not me) can't seem to create a decent world to live in, perhaps a machine without free will operating within prescribed boundaries may do a better job. We sure haven't done too well. > > ...................... I believe all people, especially leading > scientific minds, have the wisdom to use their undeniable free will ^^^^^^^^^^^^ > to making choices in values which will promote world harmony. ... > ... > Free will explained as an additive blend of determinism and chance > directly attacks the concept of individual responsibility. Can any > machine, based on this theory of free will, possibly benefit society > enough to counteract the detrimental effect of a philosophy which > implies that we aren't accountable for our choices? > ... > > > Tom Channic > University of Illinois > channic@uiucdcs.cs.uiuc.edu > {decvax|ihnp4}!pur-ee!uiucdcs!channic You choose to believe that free will is undeniable. The very fact that many people do deny it is sufficient to prove that it is deniable. It is like the existence of God; impossible to prove, and either accepted or rejected by each individual. While it is rather disturbing (to me at least) that we may not be responsible for our choices, it is even more disturbing that by our choices we are destroying the world. For heaven's sake, Reagan and friends for years banned a Canadian film on Acid Rain because it was political propaganda. Never mind the fact that we are denuding forests at an alarming rate. To repeat, if we with our free will (you said it, not me) aren't doing such a great job it is time to consider other courses of action. By considering them, we are NOT adopting them as some religious dogma, but intelligently using them to see what will happen. David A Harvey Utah Institute of Technology (Weber State College) dharvey@wsccs
paulg@iisat.UUCP (Paul Gauthier) (05/18/88)
In article <738@taurus.BITNET>, shani@TAURUS.BITNET writes: > Hmm... quite correct. But did it ever occured to you that we WANT to be limited > by the laws of physics, because this is the only way to form a realm? > O.S. I suppose, but I am sure that at one time or another you have wished that some law of physics wasn't around to burdon you (like when you're rearranging heavy furniture, wouldn't it be nice to lose gravity for a few minutes?). -- ============================================================================== === Paul Gauthier at International Information Services === === {uunet, utai, watmath}!dalcs!iisat!paulg === ========================================================================
shani@TAURUS.BITNET (05/30/88)
In article <532@wsccs.UUCP>, dharvey@wsccs.BITNET writes: > If free will has created civilization as we know it, then it must be > accepted with mixed emotions. This means that Hitler, Stalin, some of > the Catholic Popes during the middle ages and others have created a > great deal of havoc that was not good. One of the prime reasons for AI > is to perhaps develop systems that prevent things like this from > happening. If we with our free will (you said it, not me) can't seem to > create a decent world to live in, perhaps a machine without free will > operating within prescribed boundaries may do a better job. We sure > haven't done too well. Oh no! wer'e back where we started! Gee! I think that the problem with weather this world is decent or not is in your misconception, not with the system. The whole point (Which I said more then once, I think) is that THERE ISN'T SUCH A THING LIKE OBJECTIVE GOOD OR OBJECTIVE EVIL OR OBJECTIVE ANY VALUE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! because anything that is objective is completly indifferent to our values and other meanings that we human beings give to things! Therfore, HOW ON EARTH can AI define things that does not exist?!?!?! Hmm... on second thought, you may use AI to detect self-contradicting ideas, but realy, it doesn't worth the mony as you can do that with a bit of common sense... your all idea seem to mean that people will have to accept things only because the machin have said this... how do you know that the bad guys will not use false machines to mislead the innosence and poor again??? How about investing in making PEOPLE think, instead??? O.S.
piet@ruuinf.UUCP (Piet van Oostrum) (05/30/88)
In article <532@wsccs.UUCP> dharvey@wsccs.UUCP (David Harvey) writes:
If free will has created civilization as we know it, then it must be
accepted with mixed emotions. This means that Hitler, Stalin, some of
the Catholic Popes during the middle ages and others have created a
great deal of havoc that was not good. One of the prime reasons for AI
is to perhaps develop systems that prevent things like this from
happening. If we with our free will (you said it, not me) can't seem to
create a decent world to live in, perhaps a machine without free will
operating within prescribed boundaries may do a better job. We sure
haven't done too well.
I agree we haven't done too well, but if these same persons (i.e. WE) are
going to design a machine, what make you think this machine will do a
better job???
If the machine doesn't have a free will, the designers must decide what
kind of decisions it will make, and it will be based upon their insights,
ideas, moral etc.
Or would you believe AI researchers (or scientists in general) are
inherently better than rulers, popes, nazi's, communists or catholics, to
name a few?
Hitler and Stalin had scientists work for them, and there are now AI
researchers working on war-robots and similar nasty things. That doesn't give
ME much hope from that area.
--
Piet van Oostrum, Dept of Computer Science, University of Utrecht
Padualaan 14, P.O. Box 80.089, 3508 TB Utrecht, The Netherlands
Telephone: +31-30-531806 UUCP: ...!mcvax!ruuinf!piet