tomh@proxftl.UUCP (Tom Holroyd) (05/31/88)
In article <32403@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) writes: > It is estimated that the human mind accumulates and retains over > a lifetime enough information to fill 50,000 volumes. That's quite > a library. The human input/output channel operates at about 300 bits > per second (30 characters per second). Exchanging personal knowledge > bases is a time-consuming operation. We are destined to remain unaware > of vast portions of our civilization's collective information base. This illustrates the problem quite nicely. Obviously, if we are to achieve understanding of our fellow man, we need to use our human I/O channels as efficiently as possible. > Much of what we know is not easily reduced to language. That which > cannot be described in words may have to be demonstrated in action. > Some people speak of secret knowledge or private language. Name one thing that isn't expressible with language! :-) Even actions can be described. We can't describe the unknown, of course. A dog might "know" something and not be able to describe it, but this is a shortcoming of the dog. Humans have languages, natural and artificial, that let us manipulate and transmit knowledge. Does somebody out there want to discuss the difference between the dog's way of knowing (no language) and the human's way of knowing (using language)? Tom Holroyd UUCP: {uunet,codas}!novavax!proxftl!tomh The white knight is talking backwards.
sdutcher@netxcom.UUCP (Sylvia Dutcher) (06/01/88)
In article <238@proxftl.UUCP> tomh@proxftl.UUCP (Tom Holroyd) writes: > >Name one thing that isn't expressible with language! :-) Look out your window and describe the view to someone who's been blind since birth. Describe a complex mathematical formula, without writing it down. Describe the unusual mannerisims of a friend, without demonstrating them. When you get in a heated discussion, do you gesture with your hands and body? We can express just about anything with language, but is the listener receiving exactly what we are sending? Even the same word, with the same definition, can mean different things to different people, or in different contexts. >Tom Holroyd >UUCP: {uunet,codas}!novavax!proxftl!tomh > >The white knight is talking backwards. -- Sylvia Dutcher * "We cannot accurately describe NetExpress Communications, Inc. * the world, we can only describe 1953 Gallows Rd. * a view of it." Vienna, Va. 22180 * David Hockney
gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (06/02/88)
In article <238@proxftl.UUCP> tomh@proxftl.UUCP (Tom Holroyd) writes: > >Name one thing that isn't expressible with language! :-) Many things learnt by imitation, and taught by demonstration ;-) I used to be involved in competitive gymnastics. Last year, I got involved in coaching. The differences between the techniques I learnt and the ones now taught are substantial. There is a lot less talk, and much more video. Many moves are taught by "shaping" gymnasts into "memory positions" (aiming for some of these positions will actually put you somewhere else, but that's the intention). With young children especially, trying to describe moves is pointless. Even with adults, dance notations are a real problem. We could get pedantic and say that ultimately this is describable. For something to be USEFULLY describable by language a) someone other than the author must understand it (thus we comment programs in natural language) b) it must be more accurate and more efficient than other forms of communication. Anyone who's interested in robot movement might find some inspiration in gymnastic training programs for under-5s. The amount of knowledge and skill required to chain a few movements together is intriguing. As with all human learning, the only insights are from failures to learn (you can't observe someone learnING). Perhaps the early mistakes of young gymnasts may give a better insight into running robots :-) -- Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science, The University, Glasgow gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs <europe>!ukc!glasgow!gilbert The proper object of the study of humanity is humans, not machines
jackson@esosun.UUCP (Jerry Jackson) (06/08/88)
Some obvious examples of things inexpressible in language are: How to recognize the color red on sight (or any other color).. How to tell which of two sounds has a higher pitch by listening.. And so on... --Jerry Jackson
barr@pineapple.bbn.com (Hunter Barr) (06/09/88)
In article <198@esosun.UUCP> jackson@esosun.UUCP (Jerry Jackson) writes: > >Some obvious examples of things inexpressible in language are: > >How to recognize the color red on sight (or any other color).. > >How to tell which of two sounds has a higher pitch by listening.. > >And so on... > >--Jerry Jackson All communication is based on common ground between the communicator and the audience. Symbols are established for colors and sounds as for anything else-- by common experience, i.e., common to both communicator and audience. Often the *easiest* way to establish this common ground, is to attach a symbol to something physical. For instance, to put a young gymnast's body in the "memory position" and say, "There. That is called 'arching your back.'" Or to point to a red object and say, "That object is red." Or to play a two notes on piano and say "The second one is higher." While it is true that most of what happens in our minds (all our acts of physical perception, emotion, and some of our goal resolution) is non-linguistic, there is nothing to stop us from attaching linguistic symbols to any part of it and expressing it in language. Thus AIers find the acts of the mind equivalent to (and indistinguishable from) the manipulation of symbols. You are mistaken in thinking that language is unable to deal with non-linguistic phenomena. I will now express in language: "How to recognize the color red on sight (or any other color)..": Find a person who knows the meaning of the word "red." Ask her to point out objects which are red, and objects which are not, distinguishing between them as she goes along. If you are physically able to distinguish colors, you will soon get the hang of it. This is no different from having an English teacher write sentences on the black-board, distinguishing between those words which are verbs and those which are not. That is probably how you learned the meaning of the English word "verb." What is the difference between learning the word "red" and learning the word "verb"? Surely the latter scenario shows that the concept "verb" is expressible in language. It seems to me that we commonly make use of the word "red" when nothing red is in sight, leading me to think that lanuage expresses both concepts quite reliably, without regard to their tangible or otherwise physical existance. I am experiencing something like this scenario myself these days. I just started to study Japanese, and I have yet to pin down *aoi*; as time goes on I will ask an expert Japanese-speaker to point out things that fall under that category, and I will eventually get a very good idea of what is meant by *aoi*. (My current understanding is that it covers virtually everything which English calls "blue", and possibly many shades which English calls "green".) Someone once theorized that over the centuries our understanding of the Latin color-words may have shifted slightly. The problem is that we have no-one whose native language is Latin, who can point to ruddy objects and say, "Well, this one is not quite *ruber*, but that other one surely is." When we translate a piece of Latin text as "He wore a red cloak," who is to say that an English-speaking eye-witness would not have called it "orange" or "brown". I cannot even agree with my girlfriend which things are purple and which are blue. This could never happen with terms like *maior* and *minor*, because there are so many common objects to keep the distinction clear. If you feel that I am cheating, try to express something in language which does *not* fall back on some experience like these. And please don't forget to express it where I can read it-- either into my mailbox, or into this newsgroup. Thanks for reading and responding-- I love the attention. ______ HUNTER
kobryn@esosun.UUCP (Cris Kobryn) (06/10/88)
In article <198@esosun.UUCP> jackson@esosun.UUCP (Jerry Jackson) writes: > >Some obvious examples of things inexpressible in language are: > >How to recognize the color red on sight (or any other color).. > >How to tell which of two sounds has a higher pitch by listening.. > >And so on... > >--Jerry Jackson All communication is based on common ground between the communicator and the audience. . . . I will now express in language: "How to recognize the color red on sight (or any other color)..": Find a person who knows the meaning of the word "red." Ask her to point out objects which are red, and objects which are not, distinguishing between them as she goes along. If you are physically able to distinguish colors, you will soon get the hang of it. Right. However, I suspect Mr. Jackson was pointing to a more difficult problem than the simple one for which you have offered a solution. I believe he was addressing the well-known problem of expressing _unexpressible_ (i.e., ineffable) entities such as sensations and emotions. This is the sort of with which writers contend. While a few writers have made a reasonable dent in the problem, it remains far from resolution. (If has been resolved the word _ineffable_ should be made into an _archaic usage_ dictionary entry.) A concrete expression of the problem follows: How does one verbally explain what the color blue is to someone who was born blind? The problem here is to explain a sensory experience (e.g. seeing "blue") to someone lacking the corresponding sensory facility (e.g., vision). This problem is significantly more difficult than the one you addressed. (Although a reasonable explanation has been offered.) -- Cris Kobryn
ghh@clarity.Princeton.EDU (Gilbert Harman) (06/11/88)
In article <200@kvasir.esosun.UUCP> kobryn@esosun.UUCP (Cris Kobryn) writes: > > How does one verbally explain what the color blue is to someone > who was born blind? > >The problem here is to explain a sensory experience (e.g. seeing >"blue") to someone lacking the corresponding sensory facility >(e.g., vision). An even harder problem: How does one verbally explain what the color blue is to a stone? Gilbert Harman Princeton University Cognitive Science Laboratory 221 Nassau Street, Princeton, NJ 08542 ghh@princeton.edu HARMAN@PUCC.BITNET
terry@wsccs.UUCP (Every system needs one) (06/11/88)
In article <238@proxftl.UUCP> Tom Holroyd writes: >Name one thing that isn't expressible with language! :-) In article <839@netxcom.UUCP>, Sylvia Dutcher writes: > Describe a complex mathematical formula, without writing it down. "The Schrodinger Wave Equation" (if this is inadequate, I can tell you how to write it down). > Describe the unusual mannerisims of a friend, without demonstrating them. "He sniffs his pencil and groans a lot while scratching the stump of his left arm. You can't miss him." (this is simply dependant on the amount of detail one is to put into a verbal description). > When you get in a heated discussion, do you gesture with your hands and > body? This is "body language" (the primary definition of language is an abstract method of describing information. Body language, although not as concise [in most cases], qualifies). > We can express just about anything with language, but is the listener > receiving exactly what we are sending? Of course not, but don't take it to the extreme of phenomenology, or we will simply refuse to believe you exist and ignore any further statements :-). True phenomenologists are useless, precisely for this reason. You can't talk to them or exchange information in a meaningful fashion. > Even the same word, with the > same definition, can mean different things to different people, or in > different contexts. I waited until after this statement to follow the last one up: > Look out your window and describe the view to someone who's been blind > since birth. Since we do not share contexts, this is not possible. They would understand my referrents less than I would understand Japaneese; after all, having watched "Shogun", I do have SOME referents ;-). The entire concept pre-supposes some referents. I assume that it would be possible to use a direct-brain-visual-center stimulation of some kind to demonstrate the concepts of "color" and "light", but more likely you would simply demonstrate the concepts of "electro-shock therapy" and "cauterization" given current technological capabilities... but then you would have a referent and could, therefore, provide a description. Adequacy of the description is a matter of opinion, after that. Admittedly, a description is probably less adequate to the describee, but give us 50 years; besides, you (hopefully) do not go into some kind of a self-induced trance when something is described to you, and actually believe you "see" what is described. A description is not the same thing as the item being described; it is a paraphrase. Quality is obviously dependant on who/what is doing the paraphrasing. You have to admit that the television (a machine) can better describe a scene than I can (if you don't, I'll simply do a worse and worse job until you do ;-). This entire thread is devolving into "why AI is impossible so we can justify cutting all funding rather than reforming the welfare system or building fewer useless piles of paper instead". Everyone seems to be missing the point that the reason AI hasn't got any shining results for you to touch is that, as soon as something is useful/marketable/sellable (usually 3 mutually exclusive traits), it gets renamed so that it isn't AI any more. This happened with databases, it happened with character recognition (it's now called "optical scanning"), and seems to be trying to happen with natural language processing and knowledge-based expert systems. Most modern computer instruction technology is the result of original work in the 50's and 60's by cognitive psychologists. This doesn't mean you want one (a psychologist) running, maintaining, or administering your computer facilities; it simply means that AI has been proven to be a useful item to throw money at. Hell, most compiler technology today is a result of techniques learned exploring possibilities in AI. Whether or not current languages can do what needs to be done is an open question, and is therefore disputed. I see nothing in any previous arguments by anyone that suggest that the concept of language as a method of description is flawed. It is idiotic to make assumptions based on the likelyhood of possible future events until some form of social engineering can make 100% accurate predicitions and produce duplicable results with accuracy. Stating that machines can not produce behavior which is comparable with human behavior is as idiotic as most religious dogma. terry@wsccs
eliot@mind.UUCP (Eliot Handelman) (06/11/88)
In article <2534@mind.UUCP> ghh@clarity.UUCP (Gilbert Harman) writes: >An even harder problem: > How does one verbally explain what the color blue is to > a stone? > Gilbert Harman > Princeton University Cognitive Science Laboratory > 221 Nassau Street, Princeton, NJ 08542 We've already done that. We've run into trouble testing the stone's knowledge, though. Eliot Handelman Music & Cognition Group Department of Music Princeton University
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (06/11/88)
In article <920@papaya.bbn.com> barr@pineapple.bbn.com (Hunter Barr) writes: > >I will now express in language: >"How to recognize the color red on sight (or any other color)..": > >Find a person who knows the meaning of the word "red." Ask her to >point out objects which are red, and objects which are not, >distinguishing between them as she goes along. If you are physically >able to distinguish colors, you will soon get the hang of it. > As H. L. Menken once said: "For every complex problem, there is a simple answer . . . and it's wrong." There is a lot of subtlety lurking beneath the simplicity of the above scenario, rather like dust swept under a carpet. Let us begin with the assumption that all that is required to distinguish colors is some PHYSICAL ability. Does that really mean anything; and, if so, what does it mean? I think there is sufficient evidence that we are not talking strictly about receptors which can distinguish different frequencies of visible radiation. If that were all there were to it, we would have a lot more success with automata distinguishing colors under the same circumstances as humans (such as major variations in ambient lighting). Then there is that casual phrase about getting "the hang of it." Given how little we really know about phenomena such as memory, it is very hard to put much substance into this statement. (If we could, we probably wouldn't be studying AI any longer!) I think Wittgenstein's PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS would be appropriate reading for this discussion. Wittgenstein does a much more thorough job than I could ever do in exploring all the difficulties which plague the scenario which Hunter Barr has proposed. I found it a great adventure (albeit frustrating) to delve into such mysteries of understanding. Since reading it, I have recommended it to anyone concerned with issues of communication with humans.
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (06/11/88)
In article <905@papaya.bbn.com> barr@pineapple.bbn.com (Hunter Barr) writes: > >Now I must "get pedantic," by saying that body movement *is* >describable. As for part a), you are correct that someone other than >the author must understand it, otherwise we do not have communication. >But you ignore the existance of useful dance notations. I don't know >much about dance notation, and I am sure there is much lacking in it-- >probably standardization for one thing. But the lack of a universally >intelligable *spoken* language does not make human speech fail the >"usefulness" test. Mandarin Chinese is an even bigger problem with >adults than dance notation! If one learned a common dance notation >from childhood, it would be every bit as useful as the Chinese >language. Having just said my piece about colors, Hunter, I do not want you to get the idea that I'm picking on you; but I have to come to Gilbert Cockton's defense here. (Surprised, Gilbert?) You see, I spent several years working with a variety of different dance notations. A summary of much of my work was published in COMPUTING SURVEYS in an article I wrote with Norman Badler. Let me try to straighten out a few points here. First of all, NO dance notation provides sufficient information for the exact reproduction of a movement. Like all notations, dance notation involves introducing simplifying abstractions. Some notations are basically iconographic . . . simplified images of positions are key points in time drawn with the assumption that the brain can fill in the "between" stuff. Others attempt to describe trajectories of flexion at the major joints. However, no notation has been able to communicate some of the most fundamental information about body comportment which is vital in reproducing any movement pattern, be it for dance, athletics, or anything else. The notation I know best is Labanotation, having worked directly with the Dance Notation Bureau for a couple of years. Here are a few interesting things that I learned there: 1. Most dancers do not read Labanotation. If a dance company wants to reconstruct a work from a notated score, they bring in a notator to interpret the score for them. 2. When a notator is interpreting a score, it is usually very valuable to know WHO recorded the score. If you know who wrote the notation, you can usually make some assumptions about how most of those abstractions can be fleshed out into "real" movement. If you don't know who the notator was, you damned well better know the style of the choreographer whose work is being reconstructed! In other words, without some general mental image of "what things are supposed to look like," the notation will not do you very much good. In other words, for all its merits, dance notation is basically a sophisticated form of a memory aid with some attempt at standardization. If you wanted to compare it to music notation, today's notation of music would be a poor analogy. For some dance notations, the analogy would best fit the diacritical marks which indicate the proper incantation of Hebrew religious texts. Labanotation, on the other hand, would probably find its analogy somewhere in the 14th century attempts at notating polyphony. Regarding the learning of dance notation from childhood, there used to be (and perhaps still are . . . Gilbert?) programs in the United Kingdom which teach dance from a very early age. Some of these programs have incorporated the use of dance notation from the beginning. Since these programs have been around since the fifties, I would have thought that by now we would be seeing notation-literate dancers, at least in London. I have encountered no evidence that this is the case, nor does it appear that notation is a major element in the operation of many large-scale dance companies. Ultimately, I tend to agree with Gilbert that the problem is not in the notation but in what is trying to be communicated. Video is as valuable in reconstructing dances as it is in gymnastics, but there is still no substitute for "shaping" bodies. What Gilbert calls "memory positions" I have always called "muscular memory;" and I'm afraid there is no substitute for physical experience when it comes to acquiring it.
gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (06/13/88)
In article <905@papaya.bbn.com> barr@pineapple.bbn.com (Hunter Barr) writes: >But you ignore the existance of useful dance notations. I don't know >much about dance notation, and I am sure there is much lacking in it-- For an accessible introduction to the problem of dance notations, see Singh, Beatty, Booth and Ryman in Siggraph'83. You can chase up references from here. All I can add is that many choreographers (All I have encountered) do NOT use notations, as none are up to the job. There's research at New York into using figure animation, computer graphics and body sensors (Columbia I think). -- Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science, The University, Glasgow gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs <europe>!ukc!glasgow!gilbert The proper object of the study of humanity is humans, not machines
tomh@proxftl.UUCP (Tom Holroyd) (06/18/88)
In article <33343@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) writes: > How can we talk about that which cannot be encoded in language? [stuff deleted] > I know how to walk, how to balance on a bicycle, and how to reduce > my pulse. But I can't readily transmit that knowledge in English. > In fact, I don't even know how I know these things. You ride a bicycle by transforming input signals from your sensory system into output signals for your muscles. On the way, these signals are modified by a large number of factors, including some conscious ones which we will ignore. The input/output signals can be represented as vectors, and the transformation is a mapping from one vector space to another. If you train a neural net to learn the mapping from sense data to leg movement (and I'm only talking about simple motion here), the connections of the network encode the knowledge of how to ride a bicycle. Enough to build a robot that can ride a bike. Maybe not cross an intersection safely.. :-) Or, I could list a bunch of differential equations that describe the dynamics of riding a bike. Neither of these is complete, and the connectionist form would include a lot of floating point data, so they don't really count as describing anything in English. However, by analyzing the forms of the equations, it is often possible to develop an understanding of what is going on. Does reducing the problem to a mathematical description count? The next step would be to develop a jargon to cover the dynamics of the situation. Maybe we just don't have terms for many of the actions required for bike riding. Summary: Everything can be described mathematically, and the mathematics can be described in English. Caveat: we haven't figured out how to describe everything using mathematics yet. To me, this is the real problem. Some subjective phenomena may well prove to be irreducible in the sense that in order to understand why a person thinks something is beautiful (say), we'll need to have a large part of that person's brain state, and no amount of mathematical gymnastics will make the data any less complex. (For example, a list of numbers describing a stone falling can be reduced to a simple quadratic equation. Brain states don't seem to be this simple.) Tom Holroyd UUCP: {uunet,codas}!novavax!proxftl!tomh The white knight is talking backwards.