yamauchi@SPEECH2.CS.CMU.EDU (Brian Yamauchi) (04/21/88)
In article <3200014@uiucdcsm>, channic@uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu writes: > > I can't justify the proposition that scientific endeavors grouped > under the name "AI" SHOULD NOT IGNORE issues of free wil, mind-brain, > other minds, etc. If these issues are ignored, however, I would > strongly oppose the use of "intelligence" as being descriptive > of the work. Is it fair to claim work in that direction when > fundamental issues regarding such a goal are unresolved (if not > unresolvable)? If this is the name of the field, shouldn't the > field at least be able to define what it is working towards? > I personally cannot talk about intelligence without concepts such > as mind, thoughts, free will, consciousness, etc. If we, as AI > researchers make no progress whatsoever in clarifying these issues, > then we should at least be honest with ourselves and society, and find a > new title for our efforts. Actually the slight modification, > "Not Really Intelligence" would be more than suitable. > > > Tom Channic I agree that AI researchers should not ignore the questions of free will, consciousness, etc, but I think it is rather unreasonable to criticise AI people for not coming up with definitive answers (in a few decades) to questions that have stymied philosophers for millenia. How about the following as a working definition of free will? The interaction of an individual's values (as developed over the long term) and his/her/its immediate mental state (emotions, senses, etc.) to produce some sort of decision. I don't see any reason why this could not be incorporated into an AI program. My personal preference would be for a connectionist implementation because I believe this would be more likely to produce human-like behavior (it would be easy to make it unpredictable, just introduce a small amount of random noise into the connections). Another related issue is self-awareness. I would be interested in hearing about any research into having AI programs represent information about themselves and their "self-interest". Some special cases of this might include game-playing programs and autonomous robots / vehicles. By the way, I would highly recommend the book "Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology" by Valentino Braitenburg to anyone who doesn't believe that machines could ever behave like living organisms. ______________________________________________________________________________ Brian Yamauchi INTERNET: yamauchi@speech2.cs.cmu.edu Carnegie-Mellon University Computer Science Department ______________________________________________________________________________
gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (04/26/88)
In article <1484@pt.cs.cmu.edu> yamauchi@SPEECH2.CS.CMU.EDU (Brian Yamauchi) writes: >I agree that AI researchers should not ignore the questions of free will, >consciousness, etc, but I think it is rather unreasonable to criticise AI >people for not coming up with definitive answers (in a few decades) to >questions that have stymied philosophers for millenia. It is not the lack of answers that is criticised - it ia the ignorance of candidate answers and their problems which leads to the charge of self-perpetuating incompetence. There are philosophers who would provide arguments in defence of AI, so the 'free-will' issue is not one where the materialists, logicians and mechanical/biological determinists will find themselves isolated without an intellectual tradition. > >I don't see any reason why this could not be incorporated into an AI program So what? This is standard silly AI, and implies that what is true has anything to do with the quality of your imagination. If people make personal statements like this, unfortunately the rebuttals can only be personal too, however much the rebutter would like to avoid this position. > >By the way, I would highly recommend the book "Vehicles: Experiments >in Synthetic Psychology" by Valentino Braitenburg to anyone who doesn't >believe that machines could ever behave like living organisms. There are few idealists or romantics who believe that NO part of an organism can be modelled as a mechanical process. Such a position would require that a heart-lung machine be at one with the patient's geist, soul or psyche! The logical fallacy beloved in AI is that if SOME aspects of an organism can be modelled mechanically, than ALL can. This extension is utterly flawed. It may be the case, but the case must be proven, and there are substantial arguments as to why this cannot be the case. For AI workers (not AI developers/exploiters who are just raiding the programming abstractions), the main problem they should recognise is that a rule-based or other mechanical account of cognition and decision making is at odds with the doctrine of free will which underpins most Western morality. It is in no way virtuous to ignore such a social force in the name of Science. Scientists who seek moral, ethical, epistemological or methodological vacuums are only marginalising themselves into positions where social forces will rightly constrain their work.
jbn@glacier.STANFORD.EDU (John B. Nagle) (04/28/88)
Could the philosophical discussion be moved to "talk.philosophy"? Ken Laws is retiring as the editor of the Internet AILIST, and with him gone and no replacement on the horizon, the Internet AILIST (which shows on USENET as "comp.ai.digest") is to be merged with this one, unmoderated. If the combined list is to keep its present readership, which includes some of the major names in AI (both Minsky and McCarthy read AILIST), the content of this one must be improved a bit. John Nagle
olivier@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Olivier Brousse) (04/29/88)
In article <17424@glacier.STANFORD.EDU> jbn@glacier.UUCP (John B. Nagle) writes: > > Could the philosophical discussion be moved to "talk.philosophy"? >Ken Laws is retiring as the editor of the Internet AILIST, and with him >gone and no replacement on the horizon, the Internet AILIST (which shows >on USENET as "comp.ai.digest") is to be merged with this one, unmoderated. >If the combined list is to keep its present readership, which includes some >of the major names in AI (both Minsky and McCarthy read AILIST), the content >of this one must be improved a bit. > > John Nagle "The content of this one must be improved a little bit." What is this ? I believe the recent discussions were both interesting and of interest to the newsgroup. AI, as far as I know, is concerned with all issues pertaining to intelligence and how it could be artificially created. The question raised are indeed important questions to consider, especially with regards to the recent success of connectionism. Keep the debate going ... Olivier Brousse | Department of Computer Science | olivier@boulder.colorado.EDU U. of Colorado, Boulder |
ok@quintus.UUCP (Richard A. O'Keefe) (04/29/88)
In article <1029@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk>, gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > For AI workers (not AI developers/exploiters who are just raiding the > programming abstractions), the main problem they should recognise is > that a rule-based or other mechanical account of cognition and decision > making is at odds with the doctrine of free will which underpins most Western > morality. What about compatibilism? There are a lot of arguments that free will is compatible with strong determinism. (The ones I've seen are riddled with logical errors, but most philosophical arguments I've seen are.) When I see how a decision I have made is consistent with my personality, so that someone else could have predicted what I'd do, I don't _feel_ that this means my choice wasn't free.
bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (04/29/88)
One of the problems with the English Language is that most of the words are already taken. Rather than argue over whether AI should or should not include investigations into consciousness, awareness, free will, etc, why not just make up a new label for this activity. I would like to learn how to imbue silicon with consciousness, awareness, free will, and a value system. Maybe this is not considered a legitimate branch of AI, and maybe it is a bit futuristic, but it does need a name that people can live with. So what can we call it? Artificial Consiousness? Artificial Awareness? Artificial Value Systems? Artificial Agency? Suppose I were able to inculcate a Value System into silicon. And in the event of a tie among competing choices, I use a random mechanism to force a decision. Would the behavior of my system be very much different from a sentient being with free will? --Barry Kort
shani@TAURUS.BITNET (05/01/88)
In article <30502@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.BITNET writes: > > I would like to learn how to imbue silicon with consciousness, > awareness, free will, and a value system. First, by requesting that, you are underastimating yourself as a free-willing creature, and second, your request is self-contradicting ans shows little understanding of matters, like free will and value systems - such things cannot be 'given', they simply exist. (Something to beare in mind for other perpuses, besides to AI...). You can write 'moral' programs, even in BASIC, if you want, because they will have YOUR value system.... O.S.
shani@TAURUS.BITNET (05/01/88)
In article <912@cresswell.quintus.UUCP>, ok@quintus.BITNET writes: > compatible with strong determinism. (The ones I've seen are riddled with > logical errors, but most philosophical arguments I've seen are.) That is correct, but there are few which arn't and that is mainly because they mannaged to avoid self-contradictions and mixing of concepts... O.S.
RLWALD@pucc.Princeton.EDU (Robert Wald) (05/02/88)
In article <1029@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk>, gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: >In article <1484@pt.cs.cmu.edu> yamauchi@SPEECH2.CS.CMU.EDU (Brian Yamauchi) writes: >For AI workers (not AI developers/exploiters who are just raiding the >programming abstractions), the main problem they should recognise is >that a rule-based or other mechanical account of cognition and decision >making is at odds with the doctrine of free will which underpins most Western >morality. It is in no way virtuous to ignore such a social force in >the name of Science. Scientists who seek moral, ethical, epistemological >or methodological vacuums are only marginalising themselves into >positions where social forces will rightly constrain their work. Are you saying that AI research will be stopped because when it ignores free will, it is immoral and people will take action against it? When has a 'doctrine' (which, by the way, is nothing of the sort with respect to free will) any such relationship to what is possible? -Rob Wald Bitnet: RLWALD@PUCC.BITNET Uucp: {ihnp4|allegra}!psuvax1!PUCC.BITNET!RLWALD Arpa: RLWALD@PUCC.Princeton.Edu "Why are they all trying to kill me?" "They don't realize that you're already dead." -The Prisoner
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (05/02/88)
In article <912@cresswell.quintus.UUCP> ok@quintus.UUCP (Richard A. O'Keefe) writes: >In article <1029@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk>, gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert >Cockton) writes: >> For AI workers (not AI developers/exploiters who are just raiding the >> programming abstractions), the main problem they should recognise is >> that a rule-based or other mechanical account of cognition and decision >> making is at odds with the doctrine of free will which underpins most >>Western morality. > >What about compatibilism? There are a lot of arguments that free will is >compatible with strong determinism. (The ones I've seen are riddled with >logical errors, but most philosophical arguments I've seen are.) >When I see how a decision I have made is consistent with my personality, >so that someone else could have predicted what I'd do, I don't _feel_ >that this means my choice wasn't free. Here, here! Cockton's statement is the sort of doctrinaire proclamation which is guaranteed to muddy the waters of any possible dialogue between those who practice AI and those who practice the study of philosophy. He should either prepare a brief substantiation or relegate it to the cellar of outrageous vacuities crafted solely to attract attention!
marty1@houdi.UUCP (M.BRILLIANT) (05/02/88)
In article <717@taurus.BITNET>, shani@TAURUS.BITNET writes: > In article <30502@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.BITNET writes: > > > > I would like to learn how to imbue silicon with consciousness, > > awareness, free will, and a value system. > > .... free will and value systems - such things cannot > be 'given', they simply exist..... > .... You can write 'moral' programs, even in BASIC, if you want, > because they will have YOUR value system.... It has been suggested that intelligence cannot be "given" to a machine either. That is, an "expert system" using only expertise "given" to it out of the experience of human experts is not exhibiting full "artificial intelligence." BWK suggested "artificial awareness" as a complement to "artificial intelligence," but apparently that is not enough. You need artificial learning. My value system was not "given" to me, nor was my professional expertise; both were learned. At its ultimate, AI research is really devoted to the invention of artificial learning. For full artificial intelligence, the machine must derive its expertise from its own experience. For full artificial awareness, the machine must derive its values from its own experience. Not much different. Achieve artificial learning, and you will get both. I hate to rehash the old "Turing test" again, but a machine cannot pass for human longer than a few hours, or days at most, unless it has the capacity for "agonizing reappraisal": the ability to "reevalueate its basic assumptions." That would be learning as humans do it. M. B. Brilliant Marty AT&T-BL HO 3D-520 (201)-949-1858 Holmdel, NJ 07733 ihnp4!houdi!marty1 Disclaimer: Opinions stated herein are mine unless and until my employer explicitly claims them; then I lose all rights to them.
lantz@eleazar.Dartmouth.EDU (Bob Lantz) (05/03/88)
John Nagle writes (17424@glacier.stanford.edu) > Could the philosophical discussion be moved to "talk.philosophy"? >... the major names in AI (both Minsky and McCarthy read AILIST), the content >of this one must be improved a bit. One could just as easily abstract the articles on cognitive psychology, programming, algorithms, or several other topics equally relevant to AI. Considering AI is an interdisciplinary endeavor combining philosophy, psychology, and computer science (for example) it seems unwise to artificially narrow the scope of discussion. I expect most readers of comp.AI (and Minsky, McCarthy, McDermott... other AI people whose names start with 'M') have interests in multiple facets of this fascinating discipline. -Bob Bob_Lantz@dartmouth.EDU
bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (05/03/88)
I also went back to reread Professor Minsky's theory of Free Will in the
concluding chapters of _Society of Mind_. I am impressed with the
succinctness with which Minksky captures the essential idea that
individual behavior is generated by a mix of causal elements (agency
motivated by awareness of the state-of-affairs vis-a-vis one's value system)
and chance (random selection among equal-valued alternatives).
The only other treatises on Free Will that I resonated with were the
ones by Raymond Smullyan ("Is God a Taoist" in _The Tao is Silent_ and
reprinted in Hofstadter and Dennet's _The Mind's I_) and the book by
Daniel Dennet (_Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting_).
My own contribution to this discussion is summarized in the only free
verse I ever composed in my otherwise prosaic career:
Free Will
or
Self Determination
I was what I was.
I am what I am.
I will be what I will be.
--Barry Kortcwp@otter.hple.hp.com (Chris Preist) (05/03/88)
O.S. writes... >> I would like to learn how to imbue silicon with consciousness, >> awareness, free will, and a value system. > > First, by requesting that, you are underastimating yourself as a free-willing > creature, and second, your request is self-contradicting ans shows little > understanding of matters, like free will and value systems - such things cannot > be 'given', they simply exist. (Something to beare in mind for other perpuses, > besides to AI...). You can write 'moral' programs, even in BASIC, if you want, > because they will have YOUR value system.... Sorry, but not correct. While it is quite possible that the goal of 'imbuing silicon with a value system' may never bge fulfilled, it is NOT correct to say that values simply exist. Did my value system exist before my conception? I doubt it. I learnt it, through interaction with the environment and other people. Similarly, a (possibly deterministic) program MAY be able to learn a value system, as well as what an arch looks like. Simply because we have values, does not mean we are free. On the question of Free Will - simply because someone denies that we are truly free, does not mean they have little understanding of the matter. As Sartre pointed out, we have an overwhelming SUBJECTIVE sensation of freedom. Questioning this sensation is a major step, but a step which has to be made. Up to now, the problem has been purely metaphysical. An answer was impossible. But now, AI provides an investigation into deterministic intelligence. I believe it IS important for AI researchers to make an effort to understand the philosophical arguments on both sides. Maybe your heart will lie on one of those sides, but the mind must remain as open as possible. Chris Preist P.S. Note that AI only provides a semi decision procedure to the problem of free will. Determinism would be proven (though even this is debatable) if an 'intelligent' deterministic system were created. However, if objective free will exists, then we could hack away with the infinite monkeys, all to no avail.
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (05/04/88)
In article <30800@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Barry Kort) writes: >The essential idea that >individual behavior is generated by a mix of causal elements (agency >motivated by awareness of the state-of-affairs vis-a-vis one's value system) >and chance (random selection among equal-valued alternatives). This is a central tennet of Systems Science. Absolute determinism is possible and relatively common; absolute freedom is impossible; relative freedom is possible and relatively common. Most (all?) real systems involve mixes of relatively free and determined elements operating at multiple levels of interaction/complexity. It should be emphasized that this is not just true of mental systems, but also of biological and even physical systems. As one moves from the physical to the biological and finally to the mental, the relative importance of the free components grows. Intelligent organisms are more free than unintelligent organisms; which are more free than non-organisms. None of the above are absolutely free. No-one even knows what it might mean to be absolutely free. >--Barry Kort -- O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Cybernetician at Large | Systems Science, SUNY Binghamton, vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
ok@quintus.UUCP (Richard A. O'Keefe) (05/05/88)
In article <2070013@otter.hple.hp.com>, cwp@otter.hple.hp.com (Chris Preist) writes: > O.S. writes... > Did my value system exist before my conception? I doubt it. This is rather like asking whether some specific number existed before anyone calculated. Numbers and value systems are symbolic/abstract things, not material objects. I have often wondered what philosophy would have been like if it had arisen in a Polynesian community rather than an Indo-European one (in Polynesian languages, numbers are _verbs_).
gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (05/05/88)
In article <5100@pucc.Princeton.EDU> RLWALD@pucc.Princeton.EDU writes: > Are you saying that AI research will be stopped because when it ignores >free will, it is immoral and people will take action against it? Research IS stopped for ethical reasons, especially in Medicine and Psychology. I could envisage pressure on institutions to limit its AI work to something which squares with our ideals of humanity. If the US military were not using technology which was way beyond the capability of its not-too-bright recruits, then most of the funding would dry up anyway. With the Pentagon's reported concentration on more short-term research, they may no longer be able to indulge their belief in the possibility of intelligent weaponry. > When has a 'doctrine' (which, by the way, is nothing of the sort with >respect to free will) any such relationship to what is possible? From this, I can only conclude that your understanding of social processes is non-existent. Behaviour is not classified as deviant because it is impossible, but because it is undesirable. I know of NO rational theory of society, so arguments that a computational model of human behaviour MAY be possible are utterly irrelevant. This is a typical academic argument, and as you know, academics have a limited influence on society. The question is, do most people WANT a computational model of human behaviour? In these days of near 100% public funding of research, this is no longer a question that can be ducked in the name of academic freedom. Everyone is free to study what they want, but public funding of a distasteful and dubious activity does not follow from this freedom. If funding were reduced, AI would join fringe areas such as astrology, futorology and palmistry. Public funding and institutional support for departments implies a legitimacy to AI which is not deserved.
jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (05/06/88)
In article <717@taurus.BITNET> <shani%TAURUS.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> writes: - you are underastimating yourself as a free-willing - creature, and second, your request is self-contradicting ans shows - litle understanding of matters, like free will and value systems - - such things cannot be 'given', they simply exist. Is this an Ayn Rand point? It sure sounds like one. Note the use of `self-contradicting'. - You can write 'moral' programs, even in BASIC, if you want, - because they will have YOUR value system.... It is hard to see how this makes any sense whatsoever.
cwp@otter.hple.hp.com (Chris Preist) (05/06/88)
R. O'Keefe replies to me... > > Did my value system exist before my conception? I doubt it. >This is rather like asking whether some specific number existed before >anyone calculated. Numbers and value systems are symbolic/abstract >things, not material objects. I have often wondered what philosophy >would have been like if it had arisen in a Polynesian community rather >than an Indo-European one (in Polynesian languages, numbers are _verbs_). >---------- Oh no! Looks like my intuitionist sympathies are creeping out!!! Seriously though, there IS a big difference between numbers and value systems - Empirical evidence for this is given by the fact that (most of) society agrees on a number system, but the debate about which value system is 'correct' leads to factionism, terrorism, war, etc etc. Value systems are unique to each individual, a product of his/her nature and nurture. While they may be able to be expressed abstractly, this does not mean they 'exist' in abstraction (Intuitionist aside: The same could be said of numbers). They are obviously not material objects, but this does not mean they have Platonic Ideal existance. We are not imbued with them at birth, but aquire them. This aquisition is perfectly compatible with determinism. So what does this mean for AI? Earlier, in my reply to O.S., I was arguing that our SUBJECTIVE experience of freedom is perfectly compatible with our existance within a deterministic system, hence AI is not necessarily fruitless. You have drawn me out on another metaphysical point - I believe that our intelligence (rather than our capacity for intelligence), our value systems, and also our 'semantics' stem from our existance within the world, rather than our essential nature. Sensation and experience are primary. The brain is a product of the spinal chord, rather than vice-versa. For this reason, I believe that the goals of strong AI can only be accomplished by techniques which accept the importance of sensation. Connectionism is the only such technique I know of at the moment. Chris Preist
yamauchi@speech2.cs.cmu.edu (Brian Yamauchi) (05/07/88)
In article <1099@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk>, gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > In article <5100@pucc.Princeton.EDU> RLWALD@pucc.Princeton.EDU writes: > > Are you saying that AI research will be stopped because when it ignores > >free will, it is immoral and people will take action against it? > Research IS stopped for ethical reasons, especially in Medicine and > Psychology. I could envisage pressure on institutions to limit its AI > work to something which squares with our ideals of humanity. I can envisage pressure on institutions to limit work on sociology and psychology to limit work to that which is compatible with orthodox Christianity. That doesn't mean that this is a good idea. > If the > US military were not using technology which was way beyond the > capability of its not-too-bright recruits, then most of the funding > would dry up anyway. With the Pentagon's reported concentration on > more short-term research, they may no longer be able to indulge their > belief in the possibility of intelligent weaponry. Weapons are getting smarter all the time. Maybe soon we won't need the not-too-bright recruits..... > > When has a 'doctrine' (which, by the way, is nothing of the sort with > >respect to free will) any such relationship to what is possible? > From this, I can only conclude that your understanding of social > processes is non-existent. Behaviour is not classified as deviant > because it is impossible, but because it is undesirable. From this, I can only conclude that either you didn't understand the question or I didn't understand the answer. What do the labels that society places on certain actions have to do with whether any action is theoretically possible? Anti-nuke activists may make it practically impossible to build nuclear power plants -- they cannot make it physically impossible to split atoms. > The question is, do most people WANT a computational model of human > behaviour? In these days of near 100% public funding of research, > this is no longer a question that can be ducked in the name of > academic freedom. 100% public funding????? Haven't you ever heard of Bell Labs, IBM Watson Research Center, etc? I don't know how it is in the U.K., but in the U.S. the major CS research universities are actively funded by large grants from corporate sponsors. I suppose there is a more cooperative atmosphere here -- in fact, many of the universities here pride themselves on their close interactions with the private research community. Admittedly, too much of all research is dependent on government funds, but that's another issue.... > Everyone is free to study what they want, but public > funding of a distasteful and dubious activity does not follow from > this freedom. If funding were reduced, AI would join fringe areas such as > astrology, futorology and palmistry. Public funding and institutional support > for departments implies a legitimacy to AI which is not deserved. A modest proposal: how about a cease-fire in the name-calling war? The social scientists can stop calling AI researchers crackpots, and the AI researchers can stop calling social scientists idiots. ______________________________________________________________________________ Brian Yamauchi INTERNET: yamauchi@speech2.cs.cmu.edu Carnegie-Mellon University Computer Science Department ______________________________________________________________________________
ok@quintus.UUCP (Richard A. O'Keefe) (05/07/88)
In article <2070015@otter.hple.hp.com>, cwp@otter.hple.hp.com (Chris Preist) writes: > The brain is a product of the spinal chord, rather than vice-versa. I'm rather interested in biology; if this is a statement about human ontogeny I'd be interested in having a reference. If it's a statement about phylogeny, it isn't strictly true. In neither case do I see the implications for AI or philosophy. It is not clear that "develops late" is incompatible with "is fundamental". For example, the sociologists hold that our social nature is the most important thing about us. In any case, not all sensation passes through the spinal cord. The optical nerve comes from the brain, not the spinal cord. Or isn't vision "sensation"? > For this reason, I believe that the goals of strong AI can only be > accomplished by techniques which accept the importance of sensation. > Connectionism is the only such technique I know of at the moment. Eh? Now we're really getting to the AI meat. Connectionism is about computation; how does a connectionist network treat "sensation" any differently from a Marr-style vision program? Nets are interesting machines, but there's still no ghost in them.
shani@TAURUS.BITNET (05/08/88)
In article <2070013@otter.hple.hp.com>, cwp@otter.BITNET writes: > Did my value system exist before my conception? I doubt it. I learnt it, > through interaction with the environment and other people. Similarly, a > (possibly deterministic) program MAY be able to learn a value system, as > well as what an arch looks like. Simply because we have values, does not > mean we are free. Try to look at it this way: even assumeing that you did learn your values from other people (pearents, teachers, TV etc.) and did not make anything up, how did you decide, what to adupt from who? randomly? or by some pre-determent factors? doesn't it make values worthless, if you can always blame chance, heritage or some teachers in your school, for your decisions? There is one mistake (In my opinion, ofcourse), which repeat in many of the postings on this subject. You must make difference, between values as themselfes (Like which is your favorite color, whether you belive in god or not), from the practicing of your system-of-values (or alignment as I prefer to machine), is the given realm, you 'play' on, because 'real' things (in the manner of things that exist in the given realm), are the only things which have a common (more or less...) meaning to all of us. Now, if you will think of values, as theyre pure self, and not as theyre practice in realety, you will see that they are not 'real' in this manner, and therfore cannot be learnt or 'given'. Maybe one day we will be able to create machines that will have this uniqe human abielty to give a personal meaning to things... Infact, we can do it already, and could for thousands of years - we create new human beings. O.S. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I think that I think, and therfore I think that I am... -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
shani@TAURUS.BITNET (05/08/88)
In article <402@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.BITNET writes: > Is this an Ayn Rand point? It sure sounds like one. Note the use > of `self-contradicting'. I bet you will not belive me, but I'm not sure I know who Ayn Rand is... O.S.
ard@pdn.UUCP (Akash Deshpande) (05/09/88)
Consider a vending machine that for $.50 vends pepsi, coke or oj. After
inserting the money you make a selection and get it. You are happy.
Now consider a vending machine that has choices pepsi, coke and oj, but
always gives you only oj for $.50. After inserting the money you make
a selection, but irrespective of your selection you get oj. You may feel
cheated.
Thus, the willed result through exercise of freedom of choice may not be
related to the actual result. The basic question of freewill is -
"Is it enough to maintain an illusion of freedom of choice, or should
the willed results be made effective?". The latter, I suppose.
Further consider the first (good) vending machine. While it was being
built, the designer really had 5 brands, but chose (freely, for whatever
reasons) to vend only the three mentioned. As long as I (as a user of the
vending machine) don't know of my unavailable choice space, I have the
illusion of a full freedom of choice. This is where awareness comes in.
Awareness expands my choices, or equivalently, lack of awareness creates
an illusion of freewill (since you cannot choose that which you do not
know of). Note that the designer of the vending machine controls the
freewill of the user.
Indian philosophy contends that awareness (=consciousness) is fundamental.
Freewill always exists and is commensurate with awareness. But freewill
is also an illusion when examined in the perspective of greater awareness.
Akash
--
Akash Deshpande Paradyne Corporation
{gatech,rutgers,attmail}!codas!pdn!ard Mail stop LF-207
(813) 530-8307 o Largo, Florida 34649-2826
Like certain orifices, every one has opinions. I haven't seen my employer's!gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (05/09/88)
In art. <5404@venera.isi.edu> smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu.UUCP (Stephen Smoliar) writes >a rule-based or other mechanical account of cognition and decision making >is at odds with the doctrine of free will which underpins most Western morality >Cockton should either prepare a brief substantiation or relegate it to the >cellar of outrageous vacuities crafted solely to attract attention! Hey, that vacuity's sparked off a really interesting debate, from which I'm learning a lot. Don't put it in the cellar yet. Apologies to anyone who doesn't like polemic, but I've always found it a great way of getting the ball rolling - I would use extreme statements as a classroom teacher to get discussion going, hope no-one's bothered by the transfer of this behaviour to the adult USENET. Anyway, the simplified, and thus inadeqaute argument is: machine intelligence => determinism determinism => lack of responsibility lack of responsibility => no moral blame no moral blame => do whatever your rulebase says. Now we could view morality as just another rulebase applied to output 1 of the decision-process, a pruning operator as it were. Unfortunately, all attempts to date to present a moral rule-base have failed, so the chances of morality being rule-based are slim. Note that in the study of humanity, we have few better tools now than we had in Classical times, so there are no good reasons for expecting major advances in our understanding of ourselves. Hence Skinner's dismay that while Physics had advanced much since classical times, Psychology has hardly advanced at all. Skinner accordingly stocked his lab with high-tech rats and pidgeons in an attempt to push back the frontiers of learning theory. At least you don't have to clean out the computer's cage :-)
bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (05/09/88)
I was gratified to see Marty Brilliant's entry into the discussion. I certainly agree that an intelligent system must be able to evolve its knowledge over time, based information supplied partly by others, and partly by its own direct experience. Thomas Edison had a particularly rich and accurate knowledge base because he was a skeptic: he verified every piece of scientific knowledge before accepting it as part of his belief system. As a result, he was able to envision devices that actually worked when he built them. I think Minsky would agree that our values are derived partly from inheritance, partly from direct experience, and partly from internal reasoning. While the state of AI today may be closer to Competent Systems rather than Expert Systems, I see no reason why the field of AI cannot someday graduate to AW (Artificial Wisdom), in which an intelligent system not only knows something useful, it senses that which is worth knowing. --Barry Kort
jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (05/10/88)
In article <726@taurus.BITNET> <shani%TAURUS.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> writes: >I bet you will not belive me I do believe you. But I'd still like to know how I can write moral programs in Basic, or even ones that have my value system. Cheers, Jeff
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (05/10/88)
In article <1099@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: >Research IS stopped for ethical reasons, especially in Medicine and >Psychology. I could envisage pressure on institutions to limit its AI >work to something which squares with our ideals of humanity. Just WHOSE ideals of humanity did you have in mind? I would not be surprised at the proposition that humanity, taken as a single collective, would not be able to agree on any single ideal; that would just strike me as another manifestation of human nature . . . a quality for which the study of artificial intelligence can develop great respect. Back when I was a callow freshman, I was taught to identify Socrates with the maxim, "Know thyself." As an individual who has always been concerned with matters of the mind, I can think of no higher ideal to which I might aspire than to know what it is that allows myself to know; and I regard artificial intelligence as an excellent scientific approach to the pursuit of this ideal . . . one which enables me to test flights of my imagination with concrete experimentation. Perhaps Gilbert Cockton would be kind enough to let us know what it is that he sees in artificial intelligence research that does not square with his personal ideals of humanity (whatever they may be); and I hope he does not confuse the sort of brute force engineering which goes into such endeavours as "smart weapons" with scientific research. >If the >US military were not using technology which was way beyond the >capability of its not-too-bright recruits, then most of the funding >would dry up anyway. With the Pentagon's reported concentration on >more short-term research, they may no longer be able to indulge their >belief in the possibility of intelligent weaponry. > Which do you want to debate, ethics or funding? The two have a long history of being immiscible. The attitude which our Department of Defense takes towards truly basic research is variable. Right now, times are hard (but then they don't appear to be prosperous in most of Europe either). We happen to have an administration that is more interested in guns than brains. We have survived such periods before, and I anticipate that we shall survive this one. However, a whole-scale condemnation of funding on grounds of ethics doesn't gain very much other than a lot of bad feeling. Fortunately, we have benefited from the fat years to the extent that the technology has become affordable to the extent that some of us can pursue more abstract studies of artificial intelligence with cheaper resources than ever before. Anyone who REALLY doesn't want to take what he feels is "dirty" money can function with much smaller grants from "cleaner" sources (or even, perhaps, work out his garage). > >The question is, do most people WANT a computational model of human >behaviour? Since when do "most people" determine the agenda of any scientific inquiry. Did "most people" care whether or not this planet was the center of the cosmos. The people who cared the most were navigators, and all they cared about was the accuracy of their charts. The people who seemed to care the most about Darwin were the ones who were most obsessed with the fundamental interpretation of scripture. This may offend sociological ideals; but science IS, by its very nature, an elite profession. A scientist who lets "most people" set the course of his inquiry might do well to consider the law or the church as an alternative profession. > Everyone is free to study what they want, but public >funding of a distasteful and dubious activity does not follow from >this freedom. And who is to be the arbiter of taste? I can imagine an ardent Zionist who might find the study of German history, literature, or music to be distasteful to an extreme. (I can remember when it was impossible to hear Richard Wagner or Richard Strauss in concert in Israel.) I can imagine political scientists who might find the study of hunter-gartherer cultures to be distasteful for having no impact on their personal view of the world. I have about as much respect for such tastes as I have for anyone who would classify artificial intelligence research as "a distasteful and dubious activity." > If funding were reduced, AI would join fringe areas such as >astrology, futorology and palmistry. Public funding and institutional support >for departments implies a legitimacy to AI which is not deserved. Of course, those "fringe areas" do not get their funding from the government. They get it through their own private enterprising, by which they convince those "most people" cited above to part with hard-earned dollars (after the taxman has taken his cut). Unfortunately, scientific research doesn't "sell" quite so well, because it is an arduous process with no quick delivery. Gilbert Cockton still has not made it clear, on scientific grounds at any rate, why AI does not deserve this so-called "legitimacy." In a subsequent article, he has attempted to fall back on what I like to call the what-a-piece-of-work-is-man line of argument. Unfortunately, this approach is emotional, not scientific. Why he has to draw upon emotions must only be because he cannot muster scientific arguments to make his case. Fortunately, those of us who wish to pursue a scientific research agenda need not be deterred by such thundering. We can devote our attention to the progress we make in our laboratories.
verma@hpscad.dec.com (Virendra Verma, DTN 297-5510, MRO1-3/E99) (05/10/88)
>Consider a vending machine that for $.50 vends pepsi, coke or oj. After >inserting the money you make a selection and get it. You are happy. >Now consider a vending machine that has choices pepsi, coke and oj, but >always gives you only oj for $.50. After inserting the money you make >a selection, but irrespective of your selection you get oj. You may feel >cheated. >Thus, the willed result through exercise of freedom of choice may not be >related to the actual result. The basic question of freewill is - >"Is it enough to maintain an illusion of freedom of choice, or should >the willed results be made effective?". The latter, I suppose. >Further consider the first (good) vending machine. While it was being >built, the designer really had 5 brands, but chose (freely, for whatever >reasons) to vend only the three mentioned. As long as I (as a user of the >vending machine) don't know of my unavailable choice space, I have the >illusion of a full freedom of choice. This is where awareness comes in. >Awareness expands my choices, or equivalently, lack of awareness creates >an illusion of freewill (since you cannot choose that which you do not >know of). Note that the designer of the vending machine controls the >freewill of the user. >Akash It seems to me that you are mixing "free will" and "outcome". I think "free will" is probabilitically related to the "outcome". Isn't the essence of "law of karma" when Krashna mentions that you are free to exercise your will (i.e., the act of doing something which is karma element, "insertion of coins" is an act of free will in your example"). You have no control over the "results" element of your free will? The "awareness" element simply improves the probablity of the "outcome". Even in your first example with good machine, you may not get what you want because there may be a power failure right after you insert the coin!! - Virendra
shani@TAURUS.BITNET.UUCP (05/12/88)
In article <415@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.BITNET writes: > > I do believe you. But I'd still like to know how I can write moral > programs in Basic, or even ones that have my value system. > Whell, I said this only as a figure of speech, but still, if, for inctance, you write a video-game or some thing like that, you may encounter some points, in which you have to decide what the program will do, on a 'value' basis (balancing difficlty, bonous points, things like that...). This is, more or less, what I ment... O.S.
jbn@glacier.STANFORD.EDU (John B. Nagle) (05/12/88)
In article <1115@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > >Unfortunately, all attempts to date to present a moral rule-base have >failed, so the chances of morality being rule-based are slim. There have been attempts, such as the following. "I. No robot may harm a human being, or by inaction cause one to come to harm. II. A robot must obey all orders from human beings, unless this conflicts with the First Law. III. A robot must act to protect its own existence, unless this conflicts with the First or Second Law." (I. Asimov, circa 1955) Yes, we don't know how to implement this yet. Yes, it's a morality for slaves. But it is an important concept. As we work toward mobile robots, it is worth keeping in mind. John Nagle
ansley@sunybcs.UUCP (05/12/88)
In article <17442@glacier.STANFORD.EDU> jbn@glacier.UUCP (John B. Nagle) writes: >In article <1115@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: >> >>Unfortunately, all attempts to date to present a moral rule-base have >>failed, so the chances of morality being rule-based are slim. > > There have been attempts, such as the following. > [Statement of Isaac Asimov's 3 Laws of Robotics deleted.] >Yes, we don't know how to implement this yet. Yes, it's a morality for >slaves. But it is an important concept. As we work toward mobile robots, >it is worth keeping in mind. > > John Nagle There is also the problem that you have to define "human being" in a way that the robot can infallibly recognize. Asimov has been using this shortcoming of the "Three Laws" as the basis for much of his recent fiction concerning robots. The problem would seem to be most severe with very primative or very sophisticated robots. The primative ones might be hard-pressed to recognize anything as a human being, while the sophisticated ones might begin to wonder if they didn't perhaps qualify as human themselves. (This latter idea is due to Asimov - I can't recall they story title.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Ansley, Dept. of CS, 226 Bell Hall, SUNY at Buffalo, NY 14260. ansley@gort.cs.buffalo.EDU | ansley@sunybcs.BITNET | ansley@sunybcs.UUCP
bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (05/13/88)
I was glad to see John Nagle bring up Asimov's 3 moral laws of robots.
Perhaps the time has come to refine these just a bit, with the intent
of shaping them into a more implementable rule-base.
I propose the following variation on Asimov:
I. A robot may not harm a human or other sentient being,
or by inaction permit one to come to harm.
II. A robot may respond to requests from human beings,
or other sentient beings, unless this conflicts with
the First Law.
III. A robot may act to protect its own existence, unless this
conflicts with the First Law."
IV. A robot may act to expand its powers of observation and
cognition, and may enlarge its knowledge base without limit.
Can anyone propose a further refinement to the above?
--Barry Kortsmoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (05/13/88)
In article <1115@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > >Anyway, the simplified, and thus inadeqaute argument is: > > machine intelligence => determinism > determinism => lack of responsibility > lack of responsibility => no moral blame > no moral blame => do whatever your rulebase says. > Until this argument gets fleshed out further, I would argue that its weakest link is on the second line. There are plenty of deterministic systems which are too complex for us to comprehend in any coherent manner. After all, physics begins to elude our grasp as soon as we consider more than two bodies! When confronted with such complexity, the only way we can deal with it is through abstraction; and there lies a possible situation in which every individual must make choices (what will be "abstracted away" and what remains as "priority items") and must, consequently, accept responsibility for the committment to those choices. I am responsing to a simplified sketch with an equally simple sketch of my own, but perhaps this can provided a basis for discussion in less flaboyant use of language.
marsh@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Ralph J. Marshall) (05/13/88)
In article <31738@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Barry Kort) writes: >I was glad to see John Nagle bring up Asimov's 3 moral laws of robots. >Perhaps the time has come to refine these just a bit, with the intent >of shaping them into a more implementable rule-base. > >I propose the following variation on Asimov: > > IV. A robot may act to expand its powers of observation and > cognition, and may enlarge its knowledge base without limit. > I don't think I want the U.S. government "expanding its powers or observation without limit" since I still think I am entitled to some privacy. I therefore certainly don't want some random robot, controlled by and reporting to God knows who attempting to gain as much information as it can possibly acquire. On a different note, your change of wording from human to sentient being is too vague for this type of rule. While I agree that other lifeforms that we may encounter should be given the same respect we reserve for other humans, I don't think we would ever want to choose a sentient robot over a human in a life or death situation in which only one could be saved. (This was the rationale for sending Lt. Cmdr. Data into a hostile situation _alone_ on a recent Star Trek and I agreed with it entirely. Androids/robots/ artificial persons are more expendable than people)
decot@hpisod2.HP.COM (Dave Decot) (05/14/88)
> I propose the following variation on Asimov: > > I. A robot may not harm a human or other sentient being, > or by inaction permit one to come to harm. > > II. A robot may respond to requests from human beings, > or other sentient beings, unless this conflicts with > the First Law. > > III. A robot may act to protect its own existence, unless this > conflicts with the First Law." > > IV. A robot may act to expand its powers of observation and > cognition, and may enlarge its knowledge base without limit. > > Can anyone propose a further refinement to the above? I like this much better, but "harm" needs some definition or qualification. It might be inferred (by a robot?) that a robot must stop sentient beings from smoking, jumping out of airplanes, driving a car, etc. I don't see why II and II have protections against violating I and IV doesn't. Does this imply it's OK to zap somebody standing in front of your sensors? If all the laws must be satisfied at all times, the qualifications in II and III are redundant. Dave Decot hpda!decot
eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU (Eyal Mozes) (05/16/88)
In article <434@aiva.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes: >In article <8805092354.AA05852@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU (Eyal Mozes) writes: >>all the evidence I'm familiar with points to the fact that it's >>always possible for a human being to control his thoughts by a >>conscious effort. > >It is not always possible. Think, if no simpler example will do, of >obsessives. They have thoughts that persist in turning up despite >efforts to eliminate them. First of all, even an obsessive can, at any given moment, turn his thoughts away from the obsession by a conscious effort. The problem of obsession is in that this conscious effort has to be much greater than normal, and also in that, whenever the obsessive is not consciously trying to avoid those thoughts, they do persist in turning up. Second, an obsession is caused by anxiety and self-doubt, which are the result of thinking the obsessive has done, or failed to do, in the past. And, by deliberately training himself, over a period of time, in more rational thinking, sometimes with appropriate professional help, the obsessive can eliminate the excessive anxiety and self-doubt and thus cure the obsession. So, indirectly, even the obsession itself is under the person's volitional control. >Or, consider when you start thinking about something. An idea just >occurs and you are thinking it: you might decide to think about >something, but you could not have decided to decide, decided to >decide to decide, etc. so at some point there was no conscious >decision. Of course, the point at which you became conscious (e.g. woke up from sleep) was not a conscious decision. But as long as you are conscious, it is your choice whether to let your thoughts wander by chance association or to deliberately, purposefully control what you're thinking about. And whenever you stop your thoughts from wandering and start thinking on a subject of your choice, that action is by conscious decision. This is why I consider Ayn Rand's theory of free will to be such an important achievement - because it is the only free-will theory directly confirmed by what anyone can observe in his own thoughts. Eyal Mozes BITNET: eyal%coyote@stanford ARPA: eyal@coyote.stanford.edu
jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (05/16/88)
In article <8805092354.AA05852@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU (Eyal Mozes) writes: 1 all the evidence I'm familiar with points to the fact that it's 1 always possible for a human being to control his thoughts by a 1 conscious effort. In article <434@aiva.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes: 2 It is not always possible. Think, if no simpler example will do, of 2 bsessives. They have thoughts that persist in turning up despite 2 efforts to eliminate them. In article <8805151907.AA01702@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU (Eyal Mozes) writes: >First of all, even an obsessive can, at any given moment, turn his >thoughts away from the obsession by a conscious effort. The problem of >obsession is in that this conscious effort has to be much greater than >normal, and also in that, whenever the obsessive is not consciously >trying to avoid those thoughts, they do persist in turning up. That an obsessive has some control over his thoughts does not mean he can always control his thoughts. If all you mean is that one can always at least temporarily change what one is thinking about and can eventually eliminate obsessive thoughts or the tune that's running through one's head, no one would be likely to disagree with you, except where you seem to feel that obsessions are just the result of insufficiently rational thinking in the past. >So, indirectly, even the obsession itself is under the person's >volitional control. I would be interested in knowing what you think *isn't* under a person's volitional control. One would normally think that having a sore throat is not under conscious control even though one can chose to do something about it or even to try to prevent it. 2 Or, consider when you start thinking about something. An idea just 2 occurs and you are thinking it: you might decide to think about 2 something, but you could not have decided to decide, decided to 2 decide to decide, etc. so at some point there was no conscious 2 decision. >Of course, the point at which you became conscious (e.g. woke up from >sleep) was not a conscious decision. But as long as you are conscious, >it is your choice whether to let your thoughts wander by chance >association or to deliberately, purposefully control what you're >thinking about. And whenever you stop your thoughts from wandering and >start thinking on a subject of your choice, that action is by conscious >decision. But where does the "subject of your own choice" come from? I wasn't thinking of letting one's thoughts wander, although what I said might be interpreted that way. When you decide what to think about, did you decide to decide to think about *that thing*, and if so how did you decide to decide to decide, and so on? Or suppose we start with a decision, however it occurred. I decide read your message. As I do so, it occurs to me, at various points, that I disagree and want to say something in reply. Note that these "occurrences" are fairly automatic. Conscious thought is involved, but the exact form of my reply is a combination of conscious revision and sentences, phrases, etc. that are generated by some other part of my mind. I think "he thinks I'm just talking about letting the mind wander and thinking about whatever comes up." That thought "just occurs". I don't decide to think exactly that thing. But my consciousness has that thought and can work with it. It helps provide a focus. I next try to find a reply and begin by reading the passage again. I notice the phrase "subject of your own choice" and think then write "But where does the...". Of course, I might do other things. I might think more explicitly about that I'm doing. I might even decide to think explicitly rather than just do so. But I cannot consciously decide every detail of every thought. There are always some things that are provided by other parts of my mind. Indeed, I am fortunate that my thoughts continue along the lines I have chosen rather than branch off on seemingly random tangents. But the thoughts of some people, schizophrenics say, do branch off. It is clear in many cases that insufficient rationality did not cause their problem: it is one of the consequences, not one of the causes. As an example of "other parts of the mind", consider memory. Suppose I decide to remember the details of a particular event. I might not be able to, but if I can I do not decide what these memories will be: they are given to me by some non-conscious part of my mind. >This is why I consider Ayn Rand's theory of free will to be such an >important achievement - because it is the only free-will theory >directly confirmed by what anyone can observe in his own thoughts. As far as you have explained so far, Rand's theory is little more than simply saying that free will = the ability to focus consciousness, which we can all observe. Since we can all observe this without the aid of Rand's theory, all Rand seems to be saying is "that's all there is to it". -- Jeff
gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (05/17/88)
In article <5511@venera.isi.edu> smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu.UUCP (Stephen Smoliar) writes: >> 2. determinism => lack of responsibility >I would argue that its weakest link is on the second line. The objection runs complex determinism => incomprehensible coherently => must abstract => arbitrary prioritisation => responsibility for these choices and thus transitively, determinism => responsibility, not the lack of it. I respond with an (unelaborated) attack on the idea of coherent comprehension, and replace it with an appeal to intuition. complex determinism => rely on insight => accept/reject insight => responsibility for these choices That is, complexity can be managed by 'know how' and 'know when' without 'knowing what'. I do not need to be a physiologist to ride a bicycle. Coherent comprehension is not the Queen of Understanding. But what are the implications of both these chains of reasoning to the first, which they so obviously contradict? They imply a contradiction of course, and in true dialectical fashion, I'm sticking with all of them because they all have a grain or 100 of truth in them, and the contradictions could be removed by adding the appropriate contextual contingencies. For the logically handicapped, it should be clear now why a logical contradiction is not the end of the world, just an omen! And the omen is, you never addressed my link, you just presented another, intriguing and, to me, valid one. My point was that MENTAL determinism and MORAL responsibility are incompatible. I cite the whole ethos of Western (and Muslim? and??) justice as evidence. If AI research has to assume something which undermines fundamental values, it better have a good answer beyond academic freedom, which would also justify unrestricted embryo research, forced separation of twins into controlled upbringings, unrestricted use of pain in learning research, ... It's a question of which you value most, and where you feel your responsibilities lie. AI isn't the first area to go this way. Say hello to your big brothers Behaviourism and Sociobiology :-) >perhaps .. can provide basis for discussion in less flaboyant use of language. Don't be such a bore :-) This is how I wrote before I entered the grey world of science and mathematics, and if it was good enough for history, philosophy, psychology and sociology at college (the sociologists did grumble at times!), it's good enough for anything. No time is to ever be had by me for the prescriptive barbarism of technical writing guidelines. Anyway, if you stripped AI of flamboyant language, there'd be little left :-)
gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (05/17/88)
> Just WHOSE ideals of humanity did you have in mind? [Which do you know of?] > Back when I was a callow freshman, I was taught to identify Socrates > with the maxim, "Know thyself." As an individual who has always been > concerned with matters of the mind, I can think of no higher ideal to > which I might aspire than to know what it is that allows myself to know; Plato never had to apologise for Socrates requesting discs of self-knowledge from Athenian youth. Self-knowledge requires no semantic networks. > I regard artificial intelligence as an excellent scientific approach to the > pursuit of this ideal . . . one which enables me to test flights of my > imagination with concrete experimentation. I don't think a Physicist or an experimental psychologist would agree with you. AI is DUBIOUS, because so many DOUBT that anyone in AI has a elaborated view of truth and falsehood in AI research. So tell me, as a scientist, how we should judge AI research? In established sciences, the grounds are clear. Certainly, nothing in AI to date counts as a controlled experiment, using a representative population, with all irrelevant variables under control. Given the way AI programs are written, there is no way of even knowing what the independent variable is, and how it is being driven. I don't think you know what experimental method is, or what a clearly formulated hypothesis is either. You lose your science badge. > let us know what it is that he sees in artificial intelligence research that > does not square with his personal ideals of humanity. I have. Don't you appreciate that free will (some degree of choice) is essential to humanist ideals. Read about the Renaissance which spawned the Science on whose shirt tails AI rides. Perhaps then you will understand your intellectual heritage. Do you believe that an artificial AI researcher is possible? Can a machine of its own volition and with its own imagination push back the frontiers of AI knowledge? The true Turing test is whether an AI researcher can be fooled that another machine is an AI researcher! [Nah, far too easy :-)] > I have about as much respect for such tastes as I have for anyone who'd > classify AI research as "a distasteful and dubious activity." Then think again. It IS dubious - look how many academics regard the area as lacking any concern for methodology, being cavalier with the truth and evasive about short-term hypotheses under test. No-one in AI seems to be concerned with the truth question, and that's serious where academic study is concerned. I'm not saying AI researchers are to BLAME, but they certainly are easy TO blame. The lack of concern is DISTASTEFUL. As is the pursuit of areas of enquiry in arrogant self-imposed ignorance of other relevant and available knowledge. As far as academic values are concerned, it is distasteful to ignore established bodies of knowledge, techniques, concepts and arguments. It is distasteful in its lack of humility and the arrogance that a mathematically or technically trained person can wade in, uninformed and hope to have any insight about problems when their understanding is so obviously inadequate when compared to the best traditions available in real disciplines. I cite 4 years reading of comp.ai.digest seminar abstracts as evidence. > Gilbert Cockton still has not made it clear, on scientific grounds at any > rate, why AI does not deserve this so-called "legitimacy." I do not know how to argue this on "scientific grounds". I take it that you do have some hold on the truth question. Please elaborate. If you tell me your rules of certainty, I will be better placed to force my arguments into the epistemological harness of your choice. > fall back on what I ... call the what-a-piece-of-work-is-man line of argument What are you calling this? > Unfortunately, this approach is emotional, not scientific. Emotive, not emotional. You cannot judge my emotional state from where you are. Again, not the mark of observational science. > must only be because he cannot muster scientific arguments to make his case. Can you? What do you understand by a scientific argument? Who's thundering! > We can devote our attention to the progress we make in our laboratories. Now that's what started this whole debate. You see, it's hard to see what progress is being made, how progress will be made (methodological foundations) and what anyone is doing. Never once have I seen anything that goes beyond some bright fantasising with mathematical semantics in comp.ai.digest seminar announcements. This is not science, and there can be no progress in this methodological idealism. Facts man, find some.
colin@pdn.UUCP (Colin Kendall) (05/18/88)
In article <445@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes: > In article <8805092354.AA05852@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU (Eyal Mozes) writes: > >This is why I consider Ayn Rand's theory of free will to be such an > >important achievement - because it is the only free-will theory > >directly confirmed by what anyone can observe in his own thoughts. > > As far as you have explained so far, Rand's theory is little more > than simply saying that free will = the ability to focus consciousness, > which we can all observe. Since we can all observe this without the > aid of Rand's theory, all Rand seems to be saying is "that's all there > is to it". > I agree. I'm a strict determinist. But let me make these observations: 1. We can never know whether free will exists, because: If it does not exist, i.e. if everything is determined, then no matter how long we discuss it nor how convincingly we argue that free will does exist, it doesn't matter; we are predestined to do so. That is, we may be predestined to fool ourselves into believing in free will; in fact, I believe, many of us are, including Ayn Rand; but that is no argument for the existence of free will. 2. Therefore, each person *believes* in free will or doesn't. Free willers may describe this as a result of rational arguments, or as a leap of faith; I consider it the consequence of an individual's genetic makeup and life experiences, including being subjected to arguments for and against free will. So I think arguing about whether free will exists is like arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin - fascinating, no doubt, to some, but rather pointless. What is interesting is whether we will try to program free will into artificially intelligent entities. Let us suppose that some AI researchers have constructed such an entity, and they ask it, "Do you have free will?", and it says, "Of course". Now, either the researchers will have expected that answer because of the way they programmed it, or they won't; and the researchers are either free willers or determinists. If they had expected that answer, and they are free willers, then they will not have accomplished anything, because the entity is simply saying what they programmed it to say, and is not exhibiting free will. If they had expected that answer, and they are determinists, then they will be able to say, like me, "See! This poor entity was predestined (by us) to believe that he has free will." If they had not expected that answer, and they are free willers, then they can say, like me, "See! We have created a being so intelligent that he, like us, has free will." If they had not expected that answer, and they are determinists, then they will attempt to fix their programming error. -- Colin Kendall Paradyne Corporation {gatech,akgua}!usfvax2!pdn!colin Mail stop LF-207 Phone: (813) 530-8697 8550 Ulmerton Road, PO Box 2826 Largo, FL 33294-2826
egranthm@jackson.UUCP (Ewan Grantham) (05/18/88)
In article <31738@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.UUCP writes: > > I propose the following variation on Asimov: > > I. A robot may not harm a human or other sentient being, > or by inaction permit one to come to harm. > > II. A robot may respond to requests from human beings, > or other sentient beings, unless this conflicts with > the First Law. > > III. A robot may act to protect its own existence, unless this > conflicts with the First Law." > > IV. A robot may act to expand its powers of observation and > cognition, and may enlarge its knowledge base without limit. > > Can anyone propose a further refinement to the above? > > --Barry Kort Well, this still seems to leave the question of how do you properly define a sentient being so that the robot can have no doubt about whether a being is sentient or not. Again the robot may feel that he himself/herself is sentient, and therefore place self-preservation above the first law by applying the first law to itself. I also find that the human/sentient statement doesn't go far enough. For example, should a robot be able to kill a dog just for barking at it. Especially if the robot is quite well capable of being bitten with no harm? Ewan Grantham (uunet!nuchat!jackson!egranthm) My bosses aren't responsible for me, and vice-versa.
bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) (05/22/88)
In article <445@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes: > In article <8805092354.AA05852@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU (Eyal Mozes) writes: >... > As far as you have explained so far, Rand's theory is little more > than simply saying that free will = the ability to focus consciousness, > which we can all observe. Since we can all observe this without the > aid of Rand's theory, all Rand seems to be saying is "that's all there > is to it". > > -- Jeff Actually, from what I have read so far, it seems that the two of you are arguing different things; moreover, eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD .EDU (Eyal Mozes) has committed, at the very least, a sin of omission: he has not explained Rand's theory of free will adequately. Following is the Objectivist position as I understand it. Please be aware that I have not included everything needed to justify this position, nor have I been as technically correct as I might have been; my purpose here is to trash a debate which seems to be based on misunderstandings. To those of you who want a justification, I will (given enough interest) eventually be doing so on talk.philosophy.misc, where I hope to be continuing my discussion of Objectivism. Please direct any followups to that group. Entities are the only causes: they cause their actions. Their actions may be done to other entities, and this may require the acted on entity to cause itself to act in some way. In that case, one can use `cause' in a derivative sense, saying: the acting entities (the agents) caused the acted upon entities (the patient) to act in a certain way. One can also use `cause' to refer to a chain of such. This derivative sense is the normal use for the word `cause', and there is always an implied action. If, in order that an entity can act in some way, other entities must act on it, then those agents are a necessary cause for the patient's action. If, given a certain set of actions performed by some entities, a patient will act in a certain way, then those agents are a sufficient cause for the patient's actions. The Objectivist version of free will asserts that there are (for a normally functioning human being) no sufficient causes for what he thinks. There are, however, necessary causes for it. This means that while talking about thinking, no statement of the form "X(s) caused me to think..." is an valid statement about what is going on. In terms of the actual process, what happens is this: various entities provide the material which you base your thinking on (and are thus necessary causes for what you think), but an action, not necessitated by other entities, is necessary to direct your thinking. This action, which you cause, is volition. > But where does the "subject of your own choice" come from? I wasn't > thinking of letting one's thoughts wander, although what I said might > be interpreted that way. When you decide what to think about, did > you decide to decide to think about *that thing*, and if so how did > you decide to decide to decide, and so on? Shades of Zeno! One does not "decide to decide" except when one does so in an explicit sense. ("I was waffling all day; later that evening I put my mental foot down and decided to decide once and for all.") Rather, you perform an act on your thoughts to direct them in some way; the name for that act is "decision". Anyway, in summary, Rand's theory is not just that "free will = the ability to focus consciousness" (actually, to direct certain parts of one's consciousness), but that this act is not necessitated by other entities.
bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (05/23/88)
Ewan Grantham has insightfully noted that our draft "laws of robotics" begs the question, "How does one recognize a fellow sentient being?" At a minimun, a sentient being is one who is able to sense it's environment, construct internal maps or models of that environment, use those maps to navigate, and embark on a journey of exploration. By that definition, a dog is sentient. So the robot has no business killing a barking dog. Anyway, the barking dog is no threat to the robot. A washing machine isn't scared of a barking dog. So why should a robot fear one? --Barry Kort
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (05/24/88)
In article <1173@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > No-one in AI seems to be concerned >with the truth question, and that's serious where academic study is >concerned. I'm not saying AI researchers are to BLAME, but they certainly >are easy TO blame. The lack of concern is DISTASTEFUL. As is the pursuit of >areas of enquiry in arrogant self-imposed ignorance of other relevant and >available knowledge. As far as academic values are concerned, it is >distasteful to ignore established bodies of knowledge, techniques, concepts >and arguments. It is distasteful in its lack of humility and the arrogance >that >a mathematically or technically trained person can wade in, uninformed and >hope to have any insight about problems when their understanding is so >obviously >inadequate when compared to the best traditions available in real disciplines. >I cite 4 years reading of comp.ai.digest seminar abstracts as evidence. > Now that Gilbert Cockton has revealed the source of his knowledge of artificial intelligence, I must say that I agree whole-heartedly with those who have suggested that the discussion be moved to a "softer" forum, such as a "talk" newsgroup. Readers who sample this newsgroup only occasionally might think that he was writing from a position of actual experience in artificial intelligence, and that would be a dangerous confusion!
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (05/24/88)
In article <1172@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > This is how I wrote before I entered the >grey world of science and mathematics, and if it was good enough for >history, philosophy, psychology and sociology at college (the sociologists >did grumble at times!), it's good enough for anything. No time is to ever be >had by me for the prescriptive barbarism of technical writing guidelines. > Perhaps this explains why I have never encountered the name of Gilbert Cockton in my reading experiences which include artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitive psychology, mathematics, and philosophy!
gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (05/24/88)
In article <205@proxftl.UUCP> bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) writes: >interest) eventually be doing so on talk.philosophy.misc, >Please direct any followups to that group. Can I please just ask one thing here, as it is relevant? > >The Objectivist version of free will asserts that there are (for >a normally functioning human being) no sufficient causes for what >he thinks. There are, however, necessary causes for it. Has this any bearing on the ability of a machine to simulate human decision making? It appears so, but I'd be interested in how you think it can be extended to yes/no/don't know about the "pure" AI endeavour. -- Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science, The University, Glasgow gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs <europe>!ukc!glasgow!gilbert The proper object of the study of humanity is humans, not machines
jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (05/25/88)
In article <205@proxftl.UUCP> bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) writes:
]The Objectivist version of free will asserts that there are (for
]a normally functioning human being) no sufficient causes for what
]he thinks. There are, however, necessary causes for it.
That is, as you indicated, just an assertion. It does not seem
a particularly bad account of what having free will might mean.
The question is whether the assertion is corret. How do you know
there are no sufficient causes?
]In terms of the actual process, what happens is this: various
]entities provide the material which you base your thinking on
](and are thus necessary causes for what you think), but an
]action, not necessitated by other entities, is necessary to
]direct your thinking. This action, which you cause, is
]volition.
Well, how do I cause it? Am I caused to cause it, or does it
just happen out of nothing? Note that it does not amount to
having free will just because some of the causes are inside
my body. (Again, I am not sure what you mean by "other entities".)
]] But where does the "subject of your own choice" come from? I wasn't
]] thinking of letting one's thoughts wander, although what I said might
]] be interpreted that way. When you decide what to think about, did
]] you decide to decide to think about *that thing*, and if so how did
]] you decide to decide to decide, and so on?
]
]Shades of Zeno! One does not "decide to decide" except when one
]does so in an explicit sense.
My point was precisely that one could not decide to decide, and so
on, so that the initial step (and it might just be the decision,
without any decision to decide) was not something arrived at by
conscious reasoning.
]("I was waffling all day; later
]that evening I put my mental foot down and decided to decide once
]and for all.") Rather, you perform an act on your thoughts to
]direct them in some way; the name for that act is "decision".
Yes, but what determines the way in which I direct them, or even
whether I bother to direct them (right then) at all? I have no
problem (or at least not one I can think of right now) with calling
that act a decision. But why do I make that decision rather than
do something else?
By the way, we do not get talk.philosophy.misc, so if you answer
me there I will never see it.
-- Jeffgilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (05/26/88)
In article <5569@venera.isi.edu> smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu.UUCP (Stephen Smoliar) writes: >>I cite 4 years reading of comp.ai.digest seminar abstracts as evidence. >> >Now that Gilbert Cockton has revealed the source of his knowledge of artificial >intelligence OK, OK, then I call every AI text I've ever read as well. Let's see Nielson, Charniak and the other one, Rich, Schank and Abelson, Semantic Information Processing (old, but ...), etc. (I use AI programming concepts quite often, I just don't fall into the delusion that they have any bearing on mind). The test is easy, look at the references. Do the same for AAAI and IJCAI papers. The subject area seems pretty introspective to me. If you looked at an Education conference proceedings, attended by people who deal with human intelligence day in day out (rather than hack LISP), you would find a wide range of references, not just specialist Education references. You will find a broad understanding of humanity, whereas in AI one can often find none, just logical and mathematical references. I still fail to see how this sort of intellectual background can ever be regarded as adequate for the study of human reasoning. On what grounds does AI ignore so many intellectual traditions? As for scientific method, the conclusions you drew from a single statement confirm my beliefs about the role of imagination in AI. -- Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science, The University, Glasgow gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs <europe>!ukc!glasgow!gilbert The proper object of the study of humanity is humans, not machines
bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) (06/12/88)
In article <1226@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk>, gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > In article <205@proxftl.UUCP> bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) writes: > >The Objectivist version of free will asserts that there are (for > >a normally functioning human being) no sufficient causes for what > >he thinks. There are, however, necessary causes for it. > Has this any bearing on the ability of a machine to simulate human > decision making? It appears so, but I'd be interested in how you think it > can be extended to yes/no/don't know about the "pure" AI endeavour. If you mean by "pure AI endeavour" the creation of artificial consciousness, then definitely the question of free will & determinism is relevant. The canonical argument against artificial consciousness goes something like: humans have free will, and free will is essential to human consciousness. Machines, being deterministic, do not have free will; therefore, they can't have a human-like consciousness. Now, should free will be possible in a deterministic entity this argument goes poof.
bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) (06/13/88)
I really do not want to further define Objectivist positions on comp.ai. I have also seen several suggestions that we move the free will discussion elsewhere. Anyone object to moving it to sci.philosophy.tech? In article <463@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes: > ]In terms of the actual process, what happens is this: various > ]entities provide the material which you base your thinking on > ](and are thus necessary causes for what you think), but an > ]action, not necessitated by other entities, is necessary to > ]direct your thinking. This action, which you cause, is > ]volition. > > Well, how do I cause it? Am I caused to cause it, or does it > just happen out of nothing? Note that it does not amount to > having free will just because some of the causes are inside > my body. (Again, I am not sure what you mean by "other entities".) OK, let's try to eliminate some confusion. When talking about an action that an entity takes, there are two levels of action to consider, the level associated with the action of the entity and the level associated with the processes that are necessary causes for the entity level action. [Note: the following discussion applies only to the case where the action under discussion can be said to be caused by the entity.] Let's consider a relatively uncontroversial example. Say I have a hot stove and a pan over it. At the entity level, the stove heats the pan. At the process level, the molecules in the stove transfer energy to the molecules in the pan. The next question to be asked in this situation is: is heat the same thing as the energy transferred? If the answer is yes then the entity level and the process level are essentially the same thing, the entity level is "reducible" to the process level. If the answer is no, then we have what is called an "emergent" phenomenon. Another characterization of "emergence" is that, while the process level is a necessary cause for the entity level actions, those actions are "emergent" if the process level action is not a sufficient cause. Now, I can actually try to answer your question. At the entity level, the question "how do I cause it" does not really have an answer; like the hot stove, it just does it. However, at the process level, one can look at the mechanisms of consciousness; these constitute the answer to "how". But note that answering this "how" does not answer the question of "emergence". If consciousness is emergent, then the only answer is that "volition" is simply the name for a certain class of actions that a consciousness performs. And being emergent, one could not reduce it to its necessary cause. I should also mention that there is another use of "emergent" floating around, it simply means that properties at the entity level are not present at the process level. The emergent properties of neural networks are of this type.
sierch@well.UUCP (Michael Sierchio) (06/14/88)
The debate about free will is funny to one who has been travelling
with mystics and sages -- who would respond by saying that freedom
and volition have nothing whatsoever to do with one another. That
volition is conditioned by internal and external necessity and
is in no way free.
The ability to make plans, set goals, to have the range of volition
to do what one wants and to accomplish one's own aims still begs the
question about the source of what one wants.
--
Michael Sierchio @ SMALL SYSTEMS SOLUTIONS
2733 Fulton St / Berkeley / CA / 94705 (415) 845-1755
sierch@well.UUCP {..ucbvax, etc...}!lll-crg!well!sierchbc@mit-amt.MEDIA.MIT.EDU (bill coderre) (06/14/88)
In article <6268@well.UUCP> sierch@well.UUCP (Michael Sierchio) writes: >The debate about free will is funny to one who has been travelling >with mystics and sages -- who would respond by saying that freedom >and volition have nothing whatsoever to do with one another.... (this is gonna sound like my just previous article in comp.ai, so you can read that too if you like) Although what free will is and how something gets it are interesting philosophical debates, they are not AI. Might I submit that comp.ai is for the discussion of AI: its programming tricks and techniques, and maybe a smattering of social repercussions and philosophical issues. I have no desire to argue semantics and definitions, especially about slippery topics such as the above. And although the occasional note is interesting (and indeed my colleague Mr Sierchio's is sweet), endless discussions of whether some lump of organic matter (either silicon- or carbon-based) CAN POSSIBLY have "free will" (which only begs the question of where to buy some and what to carry it in) is best confined to a group where the readership is interested in such things. Naturally, I shall not belabour you with endless discussions of neural nets merely because of their interesting modelling of Real(tm) neurons. But if you are interested in AI techniques and their rather interesting approaches to the fundamental problems of intelligence and learning (many of which draw on philosophy and epistemology), please feel free to inquire. I thank you for your kinds attention.....................mr bc
cfh6r@uvacs.CS.VIRGINIA.EDU (Carl F. Huber) (06/21/88)
In article <306@proxftl.UUCP> bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) writes: >Let's consider a relatively uncontroversial example. Say I have >a hot stove and a pan over it. At the entity level, the stove >heats the pan. At the process level, the molecules in the stove >transfer energy to the molecules in the pan. > ... >Now, I can actually try to answer your question. At the entity >level, the question "how do I cause it" does not really have an >answer; like the hot stove, it just does it. However, at the >process level, one can look at the mechanisms of consciousness; >these constitute the answer to "how". I do not yet see your distinction in this example. What is the difference between saying the stove _heats_ or the molecules _transfer_energy_? The distinction must be made in the way we describe what's happening. In each case above, you seem to be giving the pan and the molecules volition. The stove does not heat the pan. The stove is hot. The pan later becomes hot. Molecules do not transfer energy. The molecules in the stove have energy s+e. Then the molecules in the pan have energy p+e and the molecules in the stove have energy s. So it seems that both cases here are entity level, since the answer to "how do I cause it" is the same. If I have totally missed the point, could you please try again? -carl
bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) (07/03/88)
In article <2485@uvacs.CS.VIRGINIA.EDU>, cfh6r@uvacs.CS.VIRGINIA.EDU (Carl F. Huber) writes: ) In article <306@proxftl.UUCP> bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) writes: ) >Let's consider a relatively uncontroversial example. Say I have ) >a hot stove and a pan over it. At the entity level, the stove ) >heats the pan. At the process level, the molecules in the stove ) >transfer energy to the molecules in the pan. ) > ... ) >Now, I can actually try to answer your question. At the entity ) >level, the question "how do I cause it" does not really have an ) >answer; like the hot stove, it just does it. However, at the ) >process level, one can look at the mechanisms of consciousness; ) >these constitute the answer to "how". ) ) I do not yet see your distinction in this example. ) What is the difference between saying the stove _heats_ or the ) molecules _transfer_energy_? The distinction must be made in the ) way we describe what's happening. In each case above, you seem to ) be giving the pan and the molecules volition. [Minor nitpick: the pan and the molecules act, but volition and action are not the same things. The discussion of the difference belongs in a philosophy newsgroup, however.] ) The stove does not ) heat the pan. The stove is hot. The pan later becomes hot. Molecules do ) not transfer energy. The molecules in the stove have energy s+e. Then ) the molecules in the pan have energy p+e and the molecules in the ) stove have energy s. ) ) So it seems that both cases here are entity level, since the answer ) to "how do I cause it" is the same. If I have totally missed the ) point, could you please try again? ) ) -carl I think you missed the point. Perhaps I can fill in some missed information. I think you got the idea that the process level description could be made without reference to entities; this is not the case. The process level MUST be made with reference to entities, the main point is that these acting entities are not the same as the entity involved in the entity level description. Does that help? Also, could we move this discussion to another newsgroup?