arm@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Macalalad) (04/26/89)
In article <17473@cup.portal.com> dan-hankins@cup.portal.com (Daniel B Hankins) writes: > > This is one of the major reasons why the notion of free will is held >onto so strongly by a great many people. Without free will, responsibility >(per se) goes out the window. Unable to imagine any effective alternative >to responsibility/recognition/punishment for controlling human behavior, >many see a lack of the notion of free will as leading to fatalism and >criminal anarchy. > > Instead, what those who deny free will do is to point to the >possibility of a science of human behavior as an alternative to those >ancient and often ineffective methods of control. Instead of punishing the >criminal (which suppresses the behavior in the short term but reinforces >the criminal tendencies), the determinist advocates finding ways to >permanently modify that behavior, or remove the behavior's source (capital >punishment/banishment). Once in full swing, such approaches to suppressing >behavior unwanted by society would lead to far more effective deterrents to >crime. This brings to mind a few books like A Clockwork Orange, Brave New World, and 1984. In all of these books, scientific advances enabled governments to control and modify the behavior of its citizens. That someone could even suggest that this is a good thing to do shocks me. Perhaps I wasn't clear in explaining the distinction I see between free will and will. Will is a function of who we are, whose input is stimuli from the external world and whose output is our resulting action. Free will implies that we choose our will, and can change our will, so that our resulting actions also change. Will and responsibility can exist in a deterministic universe; free will cannot. (I am not conceding that our universe is deterministic, but for the sake of argument, let's suppose that it is.) In controlling another's actions, you replace his will with another. Who, then, is responsible for his actions? He certainly isn't anymore, since it isn't his will. Of course, from your point of view, responsibility is "out the window" and therefore a moot point. There is more to responsibility, though, than assigning blame or reward, and I certainly have never thought of responsibility as a vehicle for controlling others. (Perhaps you are a behaviorist at heart? :-) Responsibility is a concept intimately connected to self-actualization and self-identity. Taking away responsibility also takes away any concept of the self. On the other hand, I don't think that a science of behaviors is completely incompatible with the idea of free will. I can imagine learning about different wills and the types of choices that are made, and freely choosing to change my will to conform more closely to who I am and who I want to be. In fact, I think that this is already happening to a degree in psychological therapy sessions. The difference, of course, is that one chooses his will, while the other has his will chosen for him. -Alex
lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) (04/27/89)
From article <10333@ihlpb.ATT.COM>, by arm@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Macalalad):
" In article <17473@cup.portal.com> dan-hankins@cup.portal.com (Daniel B Hankins) writes:
" >... Once in full swing, such approaches to suppressing
" >behavior unwanted by society would lead to far more effective deterrents to
" >crime.
"
" This brings to mind a few books like A Clockwork Orange, Brave New World,
" and 1984. In all of these books, scientific advances enabled governments
" to control and modify the behavior of its citizens.
"
" That someone could even suggest that this is a good thing to do shocks
" me. ...
Whether one judges it a good thing depends on what one compares it
to. If I understood the argument in Skinner's _Beyond freedom and
dignity_ (and I'm not sure I did), it was that our behavior *is*
controlled, and will come to be more controlled in the future.
By an LA street gang boss, a General Foods executive, a political
demagogue, Rajneesh -- but the trick is to try to name your poison.
Greg, lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edumatt@nbires.nbi.com (Matthew Meighan) (04/28/89)
In article <3850@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) writes: >From article <10333@ihlpb.ATT.COM>, by arm@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Macalalad): >" In article <17473@cup.portal.com> dan-hankins@cup.portal.com (Daniel B Hankins) writes: >" >... Once in full swing, such approaches to suppressing >" >behavior unwanted by society would lead to far more effective deterrents to >" >crime. >" >" This brings to mind a few books like A Clockwork Orange, Brave New World, >" and 1984. In all of these books, scientific advances enabled governments >" to control and modify the behavior of its citizens. >" >" That someone could even suggest that this is a good thing to do shocks >" me. ... > >Whether one judges it a good thing depends on what one compares it >to. If I understood the argument in Skinner's _Beyond freedom and >dignity_ (and I'm not sure I did), it was that our behavior *is* >controlled, and will come to be more controlled in the future. >By an LA street gang boss, a General Foods executive, a political >demagogue, Rajneesh -- but the trick is to try to name your poison. > This argument -- that we're controlled anyway, so we should choose our poison -- is an extremely pernicious and evil one. I also believe it is utterly insincere and cynical in that it is not put forth by those who would be controlled, but by those who would impose control on others. In other words, "If I don't control you, someone else will. And they are worse than me. So embrace my control, it is the best thing for you." This is the argument of a would-be facist dictator and nothing else. Look at history; they've all said this very thing. It's morally equivalent to telling a rape victim, "Look, you're going to get raped sooner or later. And I'm gentler than most. So you should be glad this is happening to you." People who seriously advocate this are a real danger to humanity and should probably be summarily imprisoned. By their own argument, they can hardly complain about this -- they're going to be controlled anyway, so why not be in prison. Of course, the real thrust of their argument is not that THEY will be controlled, but that YOU will. The argument is utter nonsense unless we are prepared to accept its premise -- that we are going to be controlled anyway by a street gang boss, a GM exec, or somebody. But this premise flies in the face of history, and to accept it takes us not only "beyond" our freedom and our dignity, but our humanity as well. Skinner's title alone makes it plain what he is advocating -- that we give up our dignity as human beings and volunteer to become lobotomized slaves. Personally, I'll take freedom and dignity over Skinner's soul-less (not to mention utterly fanciful and unobtainable) utopia. -- Matt Meighan matt@nbires.nbi.com (nbires\!matt)
jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (04/28/89)
In article <387@nbires.nbi.com>, matt@nbires.nbi.com (Matthew Meighan) writes: > > This argument -- that we're controlled anyway, so we should choose our > poison -- is an extremely pernicious and evil one. I also believe it is > utterly insincere and cynical in that it is not put forth by those who > would be controlled, but by those who would impose control on others. > ... > This is the argument of a would-be facist dictator and nothing else. > Look at history; they've all said this very thing. It's morally > equivalent to telling a rape victim, "Look, you're going to get raped > sooner or later. And I'm gentler than most. So you should be glad > this is happening to you." > > People who seriously advocate this are a real danger to humanity and > should probably be summarily imprisoned. By their own argument, they > can hardly complain about this -- they're going to be controlled > anyway, so why not be in prison. Of course, the real thrust of their > argument is not that THEY will be controlled, but that YOU will. > > The argument is utter nonsense unless we are prepared to accept its > premise -- that we are going to be controlled anyway by a street gang > boss, a GM exec, or somebody. But this premise flies in the face of > history, and to accept it takes us not only "beyond" our freedom and > our dignity, but our humanity as well. Skinner's title alone makes it > plain what he is advocating -- that we give up our dignity as human > beings and volunteer to become lobotomized slaves. > > Matt Meighan > matt@nbires.nbi.com (nbires\!matt) Unless you are the controlling stockholder at NBI, your behavior is very controlled. You wear acceptable clothing to the office rather than what you wear when you are alone. You are civil to your co-workers even if you think they are a**holes. If you have an original thought, you either suppress it to avoid problems, do it on your own outside work, or present it so that your boss benefits from it (or possibly even thinks it's his idea). As they say, freedom of the press belongs to he who owns the press. Well, free will belongs to he who depends on nobody and needs nobody. You are controlled not by the orders of someone else, but by your own need to earn a living, or by your own greed (as the case may be). The expression of this self control is identical in effect to following somebody else's orders -- your boss' -- unless, of course, you own the business, in which case you're following your customer's orders. Wake up and recognize that the world's just a stage and your just an actor in it following stage directions like everybody else. Except, of course, for those few dangerous individuals who just don't care. Jim Winer ..!lzfme!jwi I believe in absolute freedom of the press. I believe that freedom of the press is the only protection we have from the abuses of power of the church, from the abuses of power of the state, from the abuses of power of the corporate body, and from the abuses of power of the press itself. Those persons who advocate censorship offend my religion.
dan-hankins@cup.portal.com (Daniel B Hankins) (04/29/89)
In article <10333@ihlpb.ATT.COM> arm@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Macalalad) writes: >> [comments about superseding ineffective controls based on free will with >> effective ones based on science] >This brings to mind a few books like A Clockwork Orange, Brave New World, >and 1984. In all of these books, scientific advances enabled governments >to control and modify the behavior of its citizens. > >That someone could even suggest that this is a good thing to do shocks >me. Did I say government? I said society - one's fellow humans. Completely different. In any case, I can see that my major downfall was in failing to note that the control runs in both directions; both from the government to the citizens, and from the citizens to the government. Everyone controls everyone else in what amounts to a dynamic non-linear system. Incidentally, people controlling other people goes on all the time. But the control is quite imperfect, a hit-and-miss affair, and since it is based on the notion of free will, it will remain imperfect. The citizens control the government and other citizens, and the government consists of individuals controlling each other and the citizens. I am controlled, you are controlled, we are all controlled - by our history as reflected in our brain state, and by our current input. You can do anything you want - more specifically, you can only do what you want - that is, you can only do what you want most _at this particular instant_. Any time you try to convince someone of something, you are controlling them. In fact, any time you communicate you are controlling people, because all information gained affects behavior. Now, whether the effects of this control are something you can predict is another issue. When we have a conversation, I control you and you control me. The communication is not the only source of control, of course; but it is _a_ source. I am _not_ advocating totalitarianism - that is one of the least efficient ways for a society to run. Just because science allows more accurate control of others and more knowledge of both the short and long-term effects of that control does not mean that it must be used to decrease everyone's standard of living, sense of freedom, and other things held dear. It seems to me that totalitarianism results from a _lack_ of knowledge of regulating society's behavior; terror is a crude method of control. It is sometimes effective, but often backfires on its users. In any case, it is inefficient. One draws more flies with honey than gall. Odd you didn't mention "Walden Two" in your list of famous books dealing with behavioral control of society. >In controlling another's actions, you replace his will with another. >Who, then, is responsible for his actions? He certainly isn't anymore, >since it isn't his will. Of course, from your point of view, >responsibility is "out the window" and therefore a moot point. Anytime you communicate with another human being you are controlling his actions. You have become part of his input. It is simply that as long as one clings to the notion of free will, there can be no progress in determining whether the control you actually are exerting is anything like the control you think you are exerting. >There is more to responsibility, though, than assigning blame or reward, >and I certainly have never thought of responsibility as a vehicle for >controlling others. But that is _precisely_ what the notion of responsibility is for. It is society's way of controlling the individual for the benefit of the group. Usually society manages to ingraine the notion so deeply that the individual thinks that he has responsibilities to _himself_. It's also often used by individuals to control other individuals. It's just not completely effective. >(Perhaps you are a behaviorist at heart? :-) Perhaps I am. :-|. Just because a notion is not currently fashionable does not make it wrong. There are certainly flaws in Skinner's behaviorism, but I find the metaphysics to be sound. Data 'disproving' behaviorism usually takes the most simplistic possible interpretation of it and then destroys that, something which is not so difficult to do (particularly since behavior shows increasing signs of being non-linear and highly sensitive to initial conditions). This can be done with almost anything. Imagine a theory of fusion which says "You get fusion energy by ramming hydrogen atoms together.". So you take two beakers of water, smash them together, and when no extra heat or nuetrons result, conclude that there was no fusion and the theory is wrong. The problem is that you've disproved the wrong theory. >Responsibility is a concept intimately connected to self-actualization and >self-identity. Taking away responsibility also takes away any concept of >the self. Nah. Free will and the self are orthogonal concepts. And I'd like to see definitions of self-actualization and self-identity that mean something comprehensible. Seems to me that a lot of these terms are use for the connotative (is that a word?) value of the words that comprise them. Dan Hankins
dan-hankins@cup.portal.com (Daniel B Hankins) (04/30/89)
In article <387@nbires.nbi.com> matt@nbires.nbi.com (Matthew Meighan) writes: >This argument -- that we're controlled anyway, so we should choose our >poison -- is an extremely pernicious and evil one. I also believe it is >utterly insincere and cynical in that it is not put forth by those who >would be controlled, but by those who would impose control on others. > >In other words, "If I don't control you, someone else will. And they >are worse than me. So embrace my control, it is the best thing for you." > >This is the argument of a would-be facist dictator and nothing else. >Look at history; they've all said this very thing. It's morally >equivalent to telling a rape victim, "Look, you're going to get raped >sooner or later. And I'm gentler than most. So you should be glad >this is happening to you." Nah. I'm a free-market-pacifist anarchist. The extent to which I wish to control you is simply to change your mind about the oxymoronic idea of free will. But not to the extent of exerting any form of coercion on you. I think that coercion is probably one of the least efficient and effective means of influencing another's behavior. It is certainly not one that is desireable. _This_ method, that is having a conversation, is I believe much more desireable, if not very efficient or effective. I'm certainly not going to try to get the government to try to _force_ you to agree with me. Control runs in all directions. To some extent, I control you, and you control me. To some extent, you control yourself. This is _not_ free will. Controlling yourself simply means that your self-concept and memories have a greater influence on your behavior than external input does, all of which is determined by the laws of nature. Of course our communication with each other is only a part of the input of each; there are all sorts of other inputs. The shape of your computer screen and the color of the sky are also a part of your input. >People who seriously advocate this are a real danger to humanity and >should probably be summarily imprisoned. By their own argument, they can >hardly complain about this -- they're going to be controlled anyway, so >why not be in prison. Of course, the real thrust of their argument is not >that THEY will be controlled, but that YOU will. I will be controlled, and if people like you have their way, I suppose I will be summarily imprisoned. But on the other hand, I will exert control even as it is exerted on me - I will try to stop you from imprisoning me. I think that imprisonment is probably a very inefficient method of control, as is terror and all the other tools of a totalitarian state. Why not be in prison? That's not the kind of control I wish exerted on myself, or on you, for that matter; although I will attempt to change your opinion on this matter, I won't go so far as to recommend your imprisonment. I am strongly in favor of free speech. >The argument is utter nonsense unless we are prepared to accept its >premise -- that we are going to be controlled anyway by a street gang >boss, a GM exec, or somebody. How about being controlled by one's own memories and experience? There is no form of control that is total except for the laws of physics and perhaps brainwashing (which is quite inefficient, and often ineffective, and in any case undesirable). You are controlled anyway. So am I. I prefer to be controlled by my own memories and experience, rather than external constraints created by other people where reality comes out of the end of a gun. Self-control, or self-determination, or whatever you call it, is _not_ the same thing as free will. Instead, it's a nonlinear feedback system. >But this premise flies in the face of history, and to accept it takes us >not only "beyond" our freedom and our dignity, but our humanity as well. >Skinner's title alone makes it plain what he is advocating -- that we give >up our dignity as human beings and volunteer to become lobotomized slaves. It's clear that you've understood little of Skinner, even misinterpreting the title. He is _not_ advocating that we give up our feelings of dignity and lobotomize ourselves to become slaves. To see how ridiculous this is, simply look at the word slavery. It means to do menial and degrading work and live in poor conditions as a result of coercion by others (reality coming out of the end of a gun, again). Neither he nor I wish this on anyone. >Personally, I'll take freedom and dignity over Skinner's soul-less (not to >mention utterly fanciful and unobtainable) utopia. Skinner welcomes you to have your feelings of freedom and dignity. It is the notion that there is an uncaused causal agent in charge of your behavior that he wishes to dispel. It is interesting that you should mention his 'utterly fanciful and unobtainable' utopia. I have read that several communities have been started which follow the model of Walden Two. Although they have had rocky periods, and not all of the ideas in W2 turned out to be workable or effective, the communities survived and remained viable. Dan Hankins
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (04/30/89)
In article <1288@lzfme.att.com> jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) writes: > Wake up and recognize that the world's just a stage and you're just > an actor in it following stage directions like everybody else. With your kind permission, I beg leave to be the author of my script. --Barry Kort
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (05/01/89)
I have been following the discussion on control, with its allusions to free will and coercion. Since I have some interest in Control Theory, perhaps I can offer a fresh insight or two. In classical feedback control theory, there are two fundamental conditions which must be met if a system is to be controllable. First, there must exist an input channel which the controller can manipulate such that she can drive the system to any desired state. The second fundamental condition, which most lay people overlook, is that the output of the system must be observable. To illustrate, let us say you are behind the wheel of your favorite sports car, hands firmly gripping the wheel. If the steering wheel is not connected to the steering mechanism, you have no control of the vehicle. But a mechanically sound car is not enough. You also have to be able to see where you are on the road. Try driving a car blindfolded. If you cannot see the output of the system, you cannot control it. This brings us back to coercion. The classical defense against coercion is to conceal the output from the controller. The controller is left with the illusion of control, but the system being controlled splits into a controlled portion which is visible to the controller, and an uncontrolled portion which is concealed from the controller. A better strategy is to empower a system to become self-regulating. To do this, one abandons the notion of control in favor of the notion of reliable observer. The observer doesn't direct the system, it merely reports actual behavior relative to a goal. While this idea is fairly modern in terms of feedback control theory, it actually goes back some 5000 years to the ancient notion of Witness. In order for the feedback control loop to operate properly, the Observer must bear accurate witness. This is what coaches do in Athletics and Drama. Failure to bear accurate witness is a common cause of failure in feedback loops. To summarize, in order to empower ourselves to achieve high levels of autonomous self-control, we have to pay close attention to each other. Another word for that is Caring. --Barry Kort
jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (05/03/89)
In article <52004@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: > In article <1288@lzfme.att.com> jwi@lzfme.att.com > (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) writes: > > > Wake up and recognize that the world's just a stage and you're just > > an actor in it following stage directions like everybody else. > > With your kind permission, I beg leave to be the author of my script. > > --Barry Kort Permission granted. I write mine, so why shouldn't you write yours. The primary requirement is to recognize the subliminal programming and understand the politics of experience -- then you have a choice instead of being forced into an action by your own psychology. It also helps if you don't give a damn about anybody else's opinion of you. Of course, that makes you very dangerous -- particularly if you own a press and thus have freedom of the press. Jim Winer ..!lzfme!jwi I believe in absolute freedom of the press. I believe that freedom of the press is the only protection we have from the abuses of power of the church, from the abuses of power of the state, from the abuses of power of the corporate body, and from the abuses of power of the press itself. Those persons who advocate censorship offend my religion.
jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (05/04/89)
In article <52019@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: > ... The classical defense against > coercion is to conceal the output from the controller. The > controller is left with the illusion of control, but the system > being controlled splits into a controlled portion which is visible > to the controller, and an uncontrolled portion which is concealed > from the controller. > > A better strategy is to empower a system to become self-regulating. > To do this, one abandons the notion of control in favor of the notion > of reliable observer. The observer doesn't direct the system, it > merely reports actual behavior relative to a goal. While this idea > is fairly modern in terms of feedback control theory, it actually > goes back some 5000 years to the ancient notion of Witness. In order > for the feedback control loop to operate properly, the Observer must > bear accurate witness. This is what coaches do in Athletics and > Drama. Failure to bear accurate witness is a common cause of failure > in feedback loops. > > To summarize, in order to empower ourselves to achieve high levels > of autonomous self-control, we have to pay close attention to each > other. Another word for that is Caring. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Another word for that is not *caring.* The word is *manipulation.* It depends entirely on whether the *victim* of this *observation* perceives the attempted behavior modification as in the victim's own interest or not, and on the victim's personal reaction to manipulation attempts. The problem with your approach is that it assumes a rational victim. There are those who will react negatively to any attempt to manipulate them without their prior permission (or even with it) and who will not just simply hide from the _observer_ or _witness_, but execute revenge against being controlled (even if the control is in their own interest, and even if the revenge is against their own interest). You cannot assume that agreement about the desirability of achieving a goal will be sufficient for acceptance of a witness. The actual presence of the witness may invoke negative reactions that will subvert the achievement. In short, there are some people who cannot be controlled. There are some people who will react violently to attempts to control them regardless of your reasons for doing so. There are some people who will cooperate with you unless you attempt to control them. Remember that feedback control theory is statistically based as far as humans are concern. Statistics include all possibility. Reality can get you killed. Jim Winer ..!lzfme!jwi I believe in absolute freedom of the press. I believe that freedom of the press is the only protection we have from the abuses of power of the church, from the abuses of power of the state, from the abuses of power of the corporate body, and from the abuses of power of the press itself. Those persons who advocate censorship offend my religion.
fransvo@maestro.htsa.aha.nl (Frans van Otten) (05/08/89)
Barry Kort writes: >[controlling a system requires...] that the output of the system >must be observable. ... Try driving a car blindfolded. If you >cannot see the output of the system, you cannot control it. In general, I agree with this. But if you have a very accurate map, and if there is noone else around, you can drive anywhere you want, even if you can't see the world in which you are driving, or feel the motions of the car. You don't need to see or feel anything: you can calculate exactly what will happen when you perform a controlling action, like turning the steering wheel. Or is the driving not called "controlling" in this case ? -- Frans van Otten Algemene Hogeschool Amsterdam Technische en Maritieme Faculteit fransvo@htsa.uucp
brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) (05/12/89)
In article <1309@lzfme.att.com> jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) writes: >In article <52019@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: >> >> A better strategy is to empower a system to become self-regulating. >> To do this, one abandons the notion of control in favor of the notion >> of reliable observer. The observer doesn't direct the system, it >> merely reports actual behavior relative to a goal. While this idea ... >> To summarize, in order to empower ourselves to achieve high levels >> of autonomous self-control, we have to pay close attention to each >> other. Another word for that is Caring. >> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > >Another word for that is not *caring.* The word is *manipulation.* >It depends entirely on whether the *victim* of this *observation* >perceives the attempted behavior modification as in the victim's own >interest or not, and on the victim's personal reaction to >manipulation attempts. One of the classic arguments against Behaviorism is that it is essentially a fascistic philosophy. That is, it is a system for controlling the behavior of the many by an elite few. The problem I have with this description is that it implies that the controllers are not being controlled. The fundamental basis of Behaviorism is that we are material beings. There is no evidence that there are any other causes for our behavior other than genetics, experience (biological and psychological), and current environment. That's it! ... nothing else! Why should our ablility to describe the behavior relationship for things in a human skin be different than anything else? I think there are only two reasons for arguing >The problem with your approach is that it assumes a rational >victim. There are those who will react negatively to any attempt to >manipulate them without their prior permission (or even with it) and >who will not just simply hide from the _observer_ or _witness_, but >execute revenge against being controlled (even if the control is in >their own interest, and even if the revenge is against their own >interest). > >You cannot assume that agreement about the desirability of achieving >a goal will be sufficient for acceptance of a witness. The actual >presence of the witness may invoke negative reactions that will >subvert the achievement. In short, there are some people who cannot >be controlled. There are some people who will react violently >to attempts to control them regardless of your reasons for doing >so. There are some people who will cooperate with you unless you >attempt to control them. The assumption that one can will to react negatively is incorrect. *ALL* people with an **percise** configuration of genectics, previous history and current environment will *always* react negatively. The closer a particular person's configuration matches this the higher the probablitiy for a negative reaction. A simplistic formulation of the radical behaviorist's description of how feedback (although I don't think it really is feedback) control: Behavior followed by a Reinforcer of that Behavior will increase the probablity of that behavior's occurence. There are some modifications to this description depending on if one is interested in a antecedent stimulus or negative reinforcement but, this is essentially it. My question is why would any one think that 1) we are more than materialistic beings ... what valid evidence is there? Valid in the sense of observable, reliable and well constructed measures. 2) is the Behaviorist explanation of behavior accurate... that is, it works so often that we can call it accurate. I question the frequency of the explanation working only conceding that genetic/biological explanations may be more powerful than the Behavioristic ones. 3) if 1 and 2 are true is it immoral to not apply these explanations in ways that can help people? e.g. Teach people lots of info in non- coercive environments, help the mentally ill... help people work better ... airline maintenance, air traffic controllers etc. Also, I would be very interested in corresponding with other behaviorists about topics beyond defending behaviorism... please contact me via any of the methods below: ============================================================================= Brian | UC San Francisco | E-mail: USENET, Internet, BITNET Colfer | Dept. of Lab. Medicine |..!{ucbvax,uunet}!daedalus.ucsf.edu!brianc | S.F. CA, 94143-0134 USA | brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu | PH. 415-476-2325 | BRIANC@UCSFCCA.BITNET =============================================================================
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (05/13/89)
In article <1309@lzfme.att.com> jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) writes: > In article <52019@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org > (Barry W. Kort) writes: > > [Technical stuff deleted.] > > To summarize, in order to empower ourselves to achieve high levels > > of autonomous self-control, we have to pay close attention to each > > other. Another word for that is Caring. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > Another word for that is not *caring.* The word is *manipulation.* > It depends entirely on whether the *victim* of this *observation* > perceives the attempted behavior modification as in the victim's own > interest or not, and on the victim's personal reaction to > manipulation attempts. Oops. Somebody stole my consent. Please be good enough to return my concept of mutual consent. > The problem with your approach is that it assumes a rational > victim. There are those who will react negatively to any attempt to > manipulate them without their prior permission (or even with it) and > who will not just simply hide from the _observer_ or _witness_, but > execute revenge against being controlled (even if the control is in > their own interest, and even if the revenge is against their own > interest). I am not in favor of victimizing people against their will. In the examples I gave (Drama and Athletic Coaching), there is a mutually agreed upon contract between consenting parties. > You cannot assume that agreement about the desirability of achieving > a goal will be sufficient for acceptance of a witness. The actual > presence of the witness may invoke negative reactions that will > subvert the achievement. In short, there are some people who cannot > be controlled. There are some people who will react violently > to attempts to control them regardless of your reasons for doing > so. There are some people who will cooperate with you unless you > attempt to control them. The adoption of a mutually agreed upon goal is a necessary prerequisite, not a sufficient one. The coach also has to be competent. I have plenty of incompetent self-appointed coaches who can tell me that I failed, but who cannot enable and empower me to succeed. > Remember that feedback control theory is statistically based as far > as humans are concerned. Statistics include all possibility. Reality > can get you killed. It sounds like you are talking from experience here, Jim. (I presume it was a near-miss. :-) Anyway, I thank you for Witnessing for me, even if it wasn't by mutual consent. It's nice to know you care. --Barry Kort
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (05/13/89)
In article <881@maestro.htsa.aha.nl> fransvo@htsa.UUCP (Frans van Otten) writes: > Barry Kort writes: > > [controlling a system requires...] that the output of the system > > must be observable. ... Try driving a car blindfolded. If you > > cannot see the output of the system, you cannot control it. > In general, I agree with this. But if you have a very accurate map, > and if there is no one else around, you can drive anywhere you want, > even if you can't see the world in which you are driving, or feel the > motions of the car. You don't need to see or feel anything: you can > calculate exactly what will happen when you perform a controlling > action, like turning the steering wheel. Or is the driving not > called "controlling" in this case ? I claim that after a while, you will no longer have an accurate estimate of your actual location on the terrain. One problem with dead reckoning is the precision of your calculations. You need infinite precision arithmetic. Any errors inexorably accumulate according to a random-walk model. The statistical variance of the error grows linearly with time. Another problem is with the quantum nature of your travels. No theoretical model can predict below the precision of quantum indeterminacy. The only known solution to these limitations is timely observation out the windshield. We once tried to send a rocket to the moon without mid-course corrections. It missed. --Barry Kort
ejs@unix.sri.com (e john sebes) (05/16/89)
In article <1966@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> brianc@daedalus.UUCP (Brian Colfer) writes: >One of the classic arguments against Behaviorism is that it is >essentially a fascistic philosophy. >... >The fundamental basis of Behaviorism is that we are material beings. >There is no evidence that there are any other causes for our behavior >other than genetics, experience (biological and psychological), and >current environment. That's it! ... nothing else! I have a number of corrections to Mr. Colfer's rhetoric. Behaviorism is not a philosophy, it is psychological theory or method. The *philosophical assumptions* of behaviorism are what is generally called materialistic determinism. As an assumption, this is scientifically acceptable; as a philosophical dogma, it is like all such, unacceptable. The *criticism of* (not "arguments against") some behaviorists' rhetoric (not "Behaviorism") is that it is dogmatic. That is, in addition to *assuming* materialistic determinism, some behaviorists assert it, making essentially metaphysical claims that are out of the bounds of science; this reduces the credibility of them as scientists, and hence clouds the value of their work, which is as important (to me, at least) as any theory of human actions. Such observations about behaviorists should not be construed as logical arguments against the psychological theory. This is not to deny that many people are concerned about the totalitarian possiblities of the application of techniques that behaviorists claim are efficient. This concern even predates behaviorism as such! Just check out any of the classic dystopic novels, such as 1984 and Brave New World. I would like to point out, however, that this concern is *amplified* as a result of the apparent dogmatism of some behaviorists. Finally, the point of such concern isn't that the practitioners of such techniques will be immune to them, but that they will have the knowledge of the use of the techniques-- in other words, POWER over others. Mr. Colfer's posting is classic example of a naive form this dogmatism. For his benefit, I will attempt to answer some of his questions in an attempt to illustrate some of my remarks. >Why should our ablility to describe the behavior relationship for >things in a human skin be different than anything else? The fundamental answer is: nobody knows. Still, a lot of people have the belief that this is the case, both from observation and from unverifiable suspicion. The key word is unverifiable-- that the human mind is not completely deterministic is a metapysical claim that can't be scientifically addressed, just like the existence of God. A lot of people (yes, Virginia, even Scientists) think that it might be the case. Such folks (responsible ones at least), recognize that there is nothing to do about it but take an agnostic stance, and get on with work. The key point here is that you can't base respectable scientific work on an assertion *either way* about an unverifiable question; you just assume that since you can't prove it, it is not important, and forget about it, except for bull sessions over <your favorite beverage>. The best we can do, it seems, is do enough observation and develop our predictive powers to such a degree that we can say that we don't care at all metaphysics, that we are plenty satisfied that we can treat humans as deterministic systems, and that *practically* that is all that matters. ... Unfortunately, this is just a tautological answer to the question: when we can "describe the behavior relationship", etc., then we will know that we can. In other words, get on with investigation, and we'll see. The rest of my answers are it bit more brief. >My question is why would any one think that >1) we are more than materialistic beings ... what valid evidence is there? >Valid in the sense of observable, reliable and well constructed measures. No evidence, *either way*. That doesn't stop people from supposing that it might be so, in a way that is beyond our ability to either a) to verify (i.e. theoretically beyond our ability), or b) to collect convincing empirical evidence about, at present, (i.e. beyond our present practical ability) >2) is the Behaviorist explanation of behavior accurate... that is, it works >so often that we can call it accurate. Again, this a question resolved by lots of observation, theorization, testing, etc, the whole load of scientific endeavor. (The current consensus, from where I sit, is that nobody was convinced then of the ultimate wonderful of behaviorism, and few people are pushing it these days as anything but one of several interesting approaches to the study of human actions. However, poeple (like Colfer) who are already of a materialistic bent, are continually rediscovering behaviorism, and getting keen on it-- evidence that the theory does some essential value, at least in the world of ideas.) >3) if 1 and 2 are true is it immoral to not apply these explanations >in ways that can help people? e.g. Teach people lots of info in non- >coercive environments, help the mentally ill... help people work >better ... airline maintenance, air traffic controllers etc. Yes, it might be immoral. Even if you are not "coercive", you can still manipulate people in ways that they are not aware of, or even worse, in ways that they are aware of, cannot control, and which go against their own wishes. That is where the concern over behaviorism arises. To a strict determinist, this is not a problem: the controlling people are behaving deterministically in their deterministic control over others, so the controllers are no different; developing behaviorist control techniques is the whole deterministic system developing new ways of changing. However, there are few real determinists so dyed in the wool that they would like to let other people use such techniques on them without any caution, just because it is all determined. Practically speaking, however, it seems likely to me that the influence of the work and ideas of the behaviorists will (or has) helped in the development of such benign techniques as Mr. Colfer describes, which can easily be applied in ways that raise few moral qualms. I seems equally likely that unbenign, moral-qualm-raising applications (or at least the practical possiblity thereof) will arise as well. E. John Sebes
fransvo@maestro.htsa.aha.nl (Frans van Otten) (05/16/89)
I wrote: >... if you have a very accurate map ... you can calculate exactly >what will happen ... Or is the driving not called "controlling" >in this case ? Barry Kort responded: >... after a while, you will no longer have an accurate estimate >of your actual location on the terrain ... It is a good point, but for short trips the accuracy may be sufficient. So I ask my question again: Is the driving not (limited) controlling in the short-trip case ? -- Frans van Otten | fransvo@maestro.htsa.aha.nl or Algemene Hogeschool Amsterdam | fransvo@htsa.uucp or Technische en Maritieme Faculteit | [[...!]backbone!]htsa!fransvo
kavuri@cb.ecn.purdue.edu (Surya N Kavuri ) (05/16/89)
In WAR AND PEACE, Tolstoy discussed free will and the underlying
rationality of historical evolution:
The presence of the question of the freedom of the will, if not openly
expressed, is felt at every step in history....If the will of every man
were free, that is, if every man could act as he chose, the whole of
history would be a tissue of disconnected accidents....If there is but
one law controlling the actions of men, there can be no free will, since
men's will must be subject to that law. In this contradiction lies the
question of the freedom of the will, which from the most ancient times
has occupied the best intellects of mankind, and has from the most ancient
times been regarded as of immense importance. Looking at man as a subject
of observation from any point of view- theological, hstorical, ethical,
philosophical- we find a general law of necessity to which he is subject
like everything existing. Looking at him from within ourselves, as what
we are conscious of, we feel ourselves free ....
SURYA KAVURI
(FIAT LUX)jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (05/17/89)
In article <1966@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu>, brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) writes: | In article <1309@lzfme.att.com| jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) writes: | |In article <52019@linus.UUCP|, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: | || A better strategy is to empower a system to become self-regulating. | || To do this, one abandons the notion of control in favor of the notion | || of reliable observer. The observer doesn't direct the system, it | || merely reports actual behavior relative to a goal. While this idea | ... | || To summarize, in order to empower ourselves to achieve high levels | || of autonomous self-control, we have to pay close attention to each | || other. Another word for that is Caring. | || ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |Another word for that is not *caring.* The word is *manipulation.* | |It depends entirely on whether the *victim* of this *observation* | |perceives the attempted behavior modification as in the victim's own | |interest or not, and on the victim's personal reaction to | |manipulation attempts. | The fundamental basis of Behaviorism is that we are material beings. | There is no evidence that there are any other causes for our behavior | other than genetics, experience (biological and psychological), and | current environment. That's it! ... nothing else! | | Why should our ablility to describe the behavior relationship for | things in a human skin be different than anything else? Cause we ain't smart enough to describe something that complex. | |The problem with your approach is that it assumes a rational | |victim. There are those who will react negatively to any attempt to | |manipulate them without their prior permission (or even with it) and | |who will not just simply hide from the _observer_ or _witness_, but | |execute revenge against being controlled (even if the control is in | |their own interest, and even if the revenge is against their own | |interest). | |You cannot assume that agreement about the desirability of achieving | |a goal will be sufficient for acceptance of a witness. The actual | |presence of the witness may invoke negative reactions that will | |subvert the achievement. In short, there are some people who cannot | |be controlled. There are some people who will react violently | |to attempts to control them regardless of your reasons for doing | |so. There are some people who will cooperate with you unless you | |attempt to control them. | | The assumption that one can will to react negatively is incorrect. ^^^^ Actually, it depends on whether or not I'm bored today. (If I am, I will react negatively just for the excitement. Never take comp.ai seriously.) | *ALL* people with an **percise** configuration of genectics, previous | history and current environment will *always* react negatively. Unless they're already having a good time. | The closer a particular person's configuration matches this | the higher the probablitiy for a negative reaction. In a quantum universe, you probably can't determine this. | My question is why would any one think that | 1) we are more than materialistic beings ... what valid evidence is there? | Valid in the sense of observable, reliable and well constructed measures. Best evidence that we are only materialistic beings is the front page of the New York Times. Best evidence that we are more than materialistic beings is the front page of the National Enquirer. | 2) is the Behaviorist explanation of behavior accurate... that is, it works | so often that we can call it accurate. Only for people who don't generate random numbers to liven things up. Same goes for those who take the Devil's Advocate position to liven things up. Sorry, there's always somebody who wants to throw a monkey into the works -- probably the same people who react violently to being controlled except when they want to screw up the statistics. | I question the frequency of the explanation working only conceding that | genetic/biological explanations may be more powerful than the | Behavioristic ones. I don't understand the above sentence | 3) if 1 and 2 are true is it immoral to not apply these explanations | in ways that can help people? e.g. Teach people lots of info in non- | coercive environments, help the mentally ill... help people work | better ... airline maintenance, air traffic controllers etc. The best way we can help people is to stop exceeding the carrying capacity of the planet. We have over populated the place to the extent that it must soon collapse. Any application of any principles to helping people needs to result in fewer people. The advantage of the irrational victim is that it usually results in either one less victim, or one less controller, or both. (8-} for those who take this stuff seriously and 8-{ for those who don't.) Jim Winer ..!lzfme!jwi I believe in absolute freedom of the press. Pax Probiscus! Sturgeon's Law (Revised): 98.89% of everything is drek (1.11% is peanut butter). Rarely able to send an email reply sucessfully. The opinions expressed here are not necessarily Those persons who advocate censorship offend my religion.
jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (05/17/89)
In article <53219@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: | In article <1309@lzfme.att.com| jwi@lzfme.att.com | (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) writes: | | | In article <52019@linus.UUCP|, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org | | (Barry W. Kort) writes: | | | | [Technical stuff deleted.] | | | | To summarize, in order to empower ourselves to achieve high levels | | | of autonomous self-control, we have to pay close attention to each | | | other. Another word for that is Caring. | | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | | | Another word for that is not *caring.* The word is *manipulation.* | | It depends entirely on whether the *victim* of this *observation* | | perceives the attempted behavior modification as in the victim's own | | interest or not, and on the victim's personal reaction to | | manipulation attempts. | | Oops. Somebody stole my consent. Please be good enough to return | my concept of mutual consent. Mutual consent may not matter -- you spoke before reading the parenthesized item in the next paragraph. | | The problem with your approach is that it assumes a rational | | victim. There are those who will react negatively to any attempt to | | manipulate them without their prior permission (or even with it) and ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | | who will not just simply hide from the _observer_ or _witness_, but | | execute revenge against being controlled (even if the control is in | | their own interest, and even if the revenge is against their own | | interest). | | I am not in favor of victimizing people against their will. In the | examples I gave (Drama and Athletic Coaching), there is a mutually | agreed upon contract between consenting parties. A mutually agreed upon contract is not sufficient. See paragraph below. | | You cannot assume that agreement about the desirability of achieving | | a goal will be sufficient for acceptance of a witness. The actual | | presence of the witness may invoke negative reactions that will | | subvert the achievement. In short, there are some people who cannot | | be controlled. There are some people who will react violently | | to attempts to control them regardless of your reasons for doing | | so. There are some people who will cooperate with you unless you | | attempt to control them. | | The adoption of a mutually agreed upon goal is a necessary prerequisite, | not a sufficient one. The coach also has to be competent. I have | plenty of incompetent self-appointed coaches who can tell me that I | failed, but who cannot enable and empower me to succeed. Even a mutually agreed upon goal and a competent coach does not solve the problem of the irrational victim. See (my) paragraph above. | | Remember that feedback control theory is statistically based as far | | as humans are concerned. Statistics include all possibility. Reality | | can get you killed. | | It sounds like you are talking from experience here, Jim. (I presume it | was a near-miss. :-) Anyway, I thank you for Witnessing for me, even | if it wasn't by mutual consent. It's nice to know you care. | | --Barry Kort Of course I care. Who would I have to rant at if something happened to you? How would I express my violence if something happened to you? How could we both deal with our mutual need to be controlling if we didn't have each other? (8-} for those who take this stuff seriously and 8-{ for those who don't.) Jim Winer ..!lzfme!jwi I believe in absolute freedom of the press. Pax Probiscus! Sturgeon's Law (Revised): 98.89% of everything is drek (1.11% is peanut butter). Rarely able to send an email reply sucessfully. The opinions expressed here are not necessarily Those persons who advocate censorship offend my religion.
newsuser@LTH.Se (LTH network news server) (05/17/89)
In article ... Frans van Otten writes: >I wrote: >... if you have a very accurate map ... you can calculate exactly >what will happen ... Or is the driving not called "controlling" >in this case ? > >Barry Kort responded: > >... after a while, you will no longer have an accurate estimate >of your actual location on the terrain ... > >It is a good point, but for short trips the accuracy may be >sufficient. So I ask my question again: Is the driving not >(limited) controlling in the short-trip case ? In control theory, there is open-loop and closed-loop control. Sometimes open-loop control is useful, but when disturbances are present, it usually won't work. Closed-loop control is also called feedback control. If the disturbances are known beforehand or can be measured, the controller may compensate for them. This is called feed-forward control, and is sometimes combined with feedback. All of this, and more, is control, i.e., belongs to control theory. -- Jan Eric Larsson JanEric@Control.LTH.Se +46 46 108795 Department of Automatic Control Lund Institute of Technology "We watched the thermocouples dance to the Box 118, S-221 00 LUND, Sweden spirited tunes of a high frequency band."
brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) (05/18/89)
Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Free will and responsibility. Summary: Expires: References: <10333@ihlpb.ATT.COM> <3850@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <52019@linus.UUCP> <1309@lzfme.att.com> <1966@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> <528@orawest.UUCP> Sender: Reply-To: brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu (Brian Colfer) Distribution: Organization: UCSF Dept. of Lab Med Keywords: Behaviorism, materialism, dogma, science In article <528@orawest.UUCP> orawest!ejs@unix.sri.com (e john sebes) writes: >In article <1966@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> brianc@daedalus.UUCP (Brian Colfer) writes: >>One of the classic arguments against Behaviorism is that it is >>essentially a fascistic philosophy. >>... > >I have a number of corrections to Mr. Colfer's rhetoric. > >Behaviorism is not a philosophy, it is psychological theory or method. Most psych text books consider Behaviorism as a school of psychological thought. BF Skinner in *About behaviorism* says that he does not call Radical Behaviorism a theory because it is an investigation of the principles of being, rather than a scientific investigation of the relationship between observations. But anyways that isn't my point... I'm saying that many see RB as a unattractive view of what it means to be human. Mr. Sebes essentially has two criticisms of my rhetoric: I) My statements are inappropriate as philosophical statements because they are dogmatic .... >Mr. Colfer's posting is classic example of a naive form this dogmatism. ... >The *philosophical assumptions* of behaviorism are what is generally > called materialistic determinism. > As an assumption, this is scientifically acceptable; as a > philosophical dogma, it is like all such, unacceptable. >The *criticism of* (not "arguments against") some behaviorists' rhetoric > (not "Behaviorism") is that it is dogmatic. That is, in addition > to *assuming* materialistic determinism, some behaviorists assert it, > making essentially metaphysical claims that are out of the bounds > of science; this reduces the credibility of them as scientists, > and hence clouds the value of their work, which is as important > (to me, at least) as any theory of human actions. The crux of Mr. Sebes critique is that if behaviorists philosophically assert materialistic determinism then they are making dogmatic metaphysical claims. I see this as deriving from two points: 1) No one can absolutely answer the question of whether the human mind is completely determined. 2) Without this convincing evidence reasonable people can reasonably disagree about this... My point is that if we talk about the rest of the universe as being materialistically determined...<except for Pele in Hawaii :-) > then why change our set of assumptions when it comes to the human mind. >Still, a lot of people >have the belief that this is the case, both from observation and >from unverifiable suspicion. The key word is unverifiable-- >that the human mind is not completely deterministic is >a metaphysical claim that can't be scientifically addressed, >just like the existence of God. > .... >The key point here is that you can't base respectable scientific >work on an assertion *either way* about an unverifiable question; >you just assume that since you can't prove it, it is not important, >and forget about it, except for bull sessions over <your favorite beverage>. ... >Such folks (responsible ones at least), recognize that >there is nothing to do about it but take an agnostic stance, and >get on with work. No one can prove that Mt. St. Helen's did not blow her stack because of Her free will. Still, it is not a serious position at least in modern times to ascribe free will to such geologic behaviors. Just because we cannot prove that free will is not taking place is no reason for adopting it or even being agnostic. There is a large body of data and logic describing that our universe is materialistically determined. If we are agnostic about this issue then we are saying that when we are studying an unverifiable question all of our previous scientific assumptions/assertions are inappropriate. Tabala Rasa for every single question? I think the more reasonable position is to stay with my previous assumptions unless I have good reasons not to, based on sound logic or good evidence. These questions on free will have an impact because they frame the type of questions and problems people will address. People are being effected by assumptions of free will, e.g. "for someone to change (learn, rehabilitate, etc.) they need to want change?" More important to AI assumptions on the nature of human intelligence is an issue which can dramatically the course of the technology. >(The current consensus, from where I sit, is that nobody was convinced > then of the ultimate wonderful of behaviorism, and few people are > pushing it these days as anything but one of several interesting > approaches to the study of human actions. However, people (like Colfer) > who are already of a materialistic bent, are continually rediscovering > behaviorism, and getting keen on it-- evidence that the theory does > some essential value, at least in the world of ideas.) Behaviorism is not the ultimate statement on how and why humans behave it is an important component help to describe the interaction between the biology and environment of an organism (in this case a person). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- II) My statements ignore the potential for harm if some people systematically maliciously apply technologies derived from RB. >This is not to deny that many people are concerned about > the totalitarian possibilities of the application of techniques > that behaviorists claim are efficient. >Finally, the point of such concern isn't that the practitioners of > such techniques will be immune to them, but that they will > have the knowledge of the use of the techniques-- > in other words, POWER over others. If we don't use the techniques to empower the people then perhaps the elite will use them to control the people in ways that will bring short term reinforcement but long term punishment. But Johnathan Platt says that this is happening anyways even if we are not being systematic about it. >That is where the concern over behaviorism arises. To a strict >determinist, this is not a problem: the controlling people are >behaving deterministically in their deterministic control over >others, so the controllers are no different; developing >behaviorist control techniques is the whole deterministic system >developing new ways of changing. Yes my point is tat we will be determined with or without a behaviorist technology. If we are not systematic about it then we loose the opportunity to do some wonderful things and we will have no way of counteracting those who will abuse the technology. >However, there are few real determinists so dyed in the wool >that they would like to let other people use such techniques >on them without any caution, just because it is all determined. > We probably are just not smart enough to understand the social ecology well enough to prevent us from making mistakes with behavioral technologies. But just because we should be careful doesn't mean we shouldn't do it ... lets be careful, have full disclosure about whats happening but let's not stop it just because it involves control. How can we use behaviorism to understand AI? ============================================================================= Brian | UC San Francisco | E-mail: USENET, Internet, BITNET Colfer | Dept. of Lab. Medicine |..!{ucbvax,uunet}!daedalus.ucsf.edu!brianc | S.F. CA, 94143-0134 USA | brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu | PH. 415-476-2325 | BRIANC@UCSFCCA.BITNET =============================================================================
miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu (Michael N. Nitabach) (05/18/89)
I have several comments regarding the recent discussion about free will and behaviorism. First, it seems that many of the participants have assumed that a materialist stance somehow requires one to accept the validity of the radical behaviorist agenda. This is a misconstrual of the nature of the basic behaviorist claim, which is that regularities in animal (including human) behavior stem solely from environmental regularities, and *not* from any structure inherent in the mind of the animal (except for the primitive associative capacity). This position neither implies nor is implied by a materialist metaphysics. Radical behaviorism *is* compatible with a mentalist metaphysics; the "environment" in this case is taken to be a milieu of mental events, rather than physical events. The important point for behaviorists is not the ontological status of the events that shape behavior, but rather the idea that it is solely regularities in events which arise *externally* to the agent which determine the structure of its behavior. Furthermore, it is possible to hold a materialist point of view, yet not accept the tenets of behaviorism. This is embodied in the view, e.g., that the structure of behavior stems not only from external environmental regularities, but also from regularities in *physically instantiated*, yet internal, mental processes. Second, it appears to me that the notions of free will being discussed in this group all miss the mark. The decision as to whether an agent has free will does not hinge on whether that agent is bound to obey the laws of physics, deterministic or probabilistic, either in its overt behavior or in the internal physiological processes that "make it go". Nor does this decision depend on whether the determinants of behavior are physical or mental events. Rather, free will, or its absence, derives from the source of the determinants of behavior. If the behavior of an agent can be fully explained by events occuring *external* to the agent, then that agent should be said to lack free will. If, on the other hand, the regularities in this agent's behavior can only be explained by taking into consideration factors *internal* to the agent, such as its beliefs and desires, then the agent must be said to possess free will. Note, that this concept of free will is continuous, in the sense that an agent can possess more or less free will, to the extent that its behavior is internally and externally caused. It also appears that a notion of free will similar to this is regularly applied in social determinations of moral responsibility. Third, I don't understand the undercurrent of fear regarding the potential sinister uses of behaviorist techniques for purposes of social control. This concern is founded on a belief that behaviorist techniques *are*, in fact, successful in drastically altering the social and private behaviors of human beings, including unwilling and unknowing objects of these methods. I submit that there is no evidence to support this supposition, and that this fear is unfounded. I am new to this newsgroup, so I apologize if I am repeating arguments and perspectives which have already appeared here. Michael Nitabach e-mail: miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu Dept. of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology E25-534 Cambridge, MA 02139 (617) 253-0771
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (05/19/89)
In article <1979@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> brianc@daedalus.UUCP (Brian Colfer) writes: > 1) No one can absolutely answer the question of whether > the human mind is completely determined. I disagree. I have a Value System, which I consult when making decisions. But occasionally I am caught on the razor's edge, with no clear preference between competing alternatives. Then, like Dorothy at the fork in road, I choose at random (rolling the dice if necessary). Literature is full of references to arbitrary choices. The short story, "The Lady or the Tiger?" and the parable of Buridan's Ass both speak to the dilemma of choosing between two alternatives with no clear preference. Casting lots is a venerable solution to such undetermined choices. > 2) Without this convincing evidence reasonable people can > reasonably disagree about this... Are you now convinced that at least one living mind is not completely determined? (Feel free to be reasonable, if you so choose.) --Barry Kort
dmark@cs.Buffalo.EDU (David Mark) (05/22/89)
In article <53788@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Barry Kort) writes: > > .... I have a Value System, which I consult when making >decisions. But occasionally ... I choose at random (rolling the >dice if necessary). > >Literature is full of references to arbitrary choices. The short >story, "The Lady or the Tiger?" and the parable of Buridan's Ass >both speak to the dilemma of choosing between two alternatives >with no clear preference. Casting lots is a venerable solution >to such undetermined choices. > >> 2) Without this convincing evidence reasonable people can >> reasonably disagree about this... > >Are you now convinced that at least one living mind is not completely >determined? (Feel free to be reasonable, if you so choose.) > First, I think that Physics 101 would tell you that the behvior of dice or coins in completely deterministic. It's just that most humans do not have the motor skills that would be needed to control that determinism, and throw dice such that they land a certain way. Second, it seems somewhat paradozical that the way you think you can demonstrate that you have free will is to say that you sometimes behave randomly! I think a model that says the brain (and hence the mind) is completely deterministic, but the determining factors are usually quite un-knowable, is most appropriate. David Mark dmark@cs.buffalo.edu
ejs@orawest.ARPA (05/23/89)
In article <2492@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu> miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu (Michael N. Nitabach) writes: >I have several comments regarding the recent discussion about free will >and behaviorism. >First, it seems that many of the participants have assumed that a >materialist stance somehow requires one to accept the validity of the >radical behaviorist agenda. Actually, no-- just pointing out that this assumption of others explains some of the negative reactions to behaviorism. The rest of Mr. Nitabach's comments about are right on target. >Third, I don't understand the undercurrent of fear regarding the >potential sinister uses of behaviorist techniques for purposes of >social control. This concern is founded on a belief that behaviorist >techniques *are*, in fact, successful in drastically altering the >social and private behaviors of human beings, including unwilling and >unknowing objects of these methods. I submit that there is no evidence >to support this supposition, and that this fear is unfounded. Again, I agree wholeheartedly-- and yet observe that this concern also informs some of the negative reactions to behaviorism. >Second, it appears to me that the notions of free will being discussed >in this group all miss the mark. I couldn't agree more. >{more good stuf omitted} If, on the other hand, the regularities in this >agent's behavior can only be explained by taking into consideration factors >*internal* to the agent, such as its beliefs and desires, then the >agent must be said to possess free will. Metaphysically, this is not sufficient, since the internal factors could be completely determined by prior external factors. Also, the distinction between external and internal breaks down if you push it too hard. Pragmatically, however, it is fine, and I agree that this is fact just the stance that most people, including scientists, take in those moments during their daily business such issues become relevant. >I am new to this newsgroup, so I apologize if I am repeating arguments >and perspectives which have already appeared here. Only a bit, and quite succintly. I wish more newcomers to the group caught on as well. >Michael Nitabach e-mail: miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu John Sebes orawest!ejs@unix.sri.com
miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu (Michael N. Nitabach) (05/24/89)
John Sebes states in reply to my recent posting: | >{more good stuf omitted} If, on the other hand, the regularities in this | >agent's behavior can only be explained by taking into consideration factors | >*internal* to the agent, such as its beliefs and desires, then the | >agent must be said to possess free will. |Metaphysically, this is not sufficient, since the internal factors could |be completely determined by prior external factors. Also, the distinction |between external and internal breaks down if you push it too hard. |Pragmatically, however, it is fine, and I agree that this is fact just |the stance that most people, including scientists, take in those moments |during their daily business such issues become relevant. John's statement that free will breaks down when internal factors are completely determined by external factors is absolutely true, *if* one uses a particular metaphysical definition of free will, namely, the one apparently held by John. This is the classical definition of free will which antonymically opposes the concepts of free will and determinism. That is, acts performed with "free will", are just those acts which are not determined--i.e. those acts that "could have been otherwise." What I am proposing is that this definition of free will does not suffice to describe the concept we could possibly be intending when we use the term. First, I would like to show that this definition is not useful. Second, I will propose a definition that I believe more closely approximates what we really must mean when we use the term 'free will,' in both ordinary, scientific, and legal discourse. It is easy to see the non-utility of the classical definition of free will, if we consider a situation in which the definition is satisfied, but we would never intuitively consider that the agent possessed free will. Consider a being who possesses a special neuron which is somehow tuned into a quantum mechanical (and hence inherently random) process in its interior; depending on the outcome of the completely non-determined quantum process, the neuron will either fire or not fire, and thus lead the agent to either perform or not perform some action. In this case, use of the classical definition leads to the conclusion that the agent possessed free will, because the action *even given the identical state of every sub-atomic particle in the universe just prior to the action* "could have been otherwise"; i.e was undetermined. However, it is clear that this agent would *not* be said to possess free will in choosing whether or not to perform the action. It seems to me that the crucial issue is not whether or not a particular action is physically determined or not, but rather whether or not the agent can be said to have "controlled" the action, i.e. whether the cause of the action arose from the beliefs and desires of the actor, or from unavoidable environmental constraints. This is basically the definition that I proposed in my last posting: that an agent possesses free will just to that extent that his actions are determined by his own beliefs and desires, and not by environmental factors. A reasonable response to this proposal is that all I have done is to base a concept which can be rigorously defined (e.g. the classical definition), and redefined it based on common, unprincipled intuitions about what we mean when we use the term "free will." I agree with this characterization of my strategy here. However, consider our choices in the matter. If we choose to hold the classical view then we must accept the fact that no-one really possesses free will, and no-one is responsible for their actions. Therefore, we must either free all the prisoners in jail, or revise our notion of legal responsibility such that it does not correspond with our everyday notion of responsibility (namely, that some act was performed freely). The other choice choice is to revise our notion of free will in a way such that it will in some way account for our legal and social notions of responsibility, yet not be defined circularly as just that property which we possess when we commit acts which we are responsible for. I submit that my proposed definition can fulfill these requirements. Just to summarize: If we hold the classical definition of free will, then we must conclude that no-one has free will, and that we are completely unjustified in attributing blame or praise to anyone for their acts. This shows clearly that the classical definition of free will is not useful in explaining how we *actually do* use the concept, because we regularly do apportion praise and blame to one another. The alternative is to hold a notion of free will that will make the appropriate distinction between acts which an agent is and is not responsible for. One example of such a notion is that free will exists to the extent that an action is caused by the beliefs and desires of the agent, and not by environmental factors. In essence, what I am proposing is that we discard a conceptually clean and elegant, but useless in describing human behavior, definition of free will, and replace it with a more "vulgar" notion, but one which can explain many of the regularities in the ways in which we actually do apportion praise and blame to the other members of our species. I am leaving MIT tomorrow for the summer, and I don't know how often I will be able to get news. Thus, I would appreciate it if any postings regarding this topic of free will could be also sent to me directly by e-mail. I am somewhat new to the net, so if this is an unreasonable request please ignore it. Thanks. Michael Nitabach email: miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu Dept. of Brain & Cognitive Sciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA
rayt@cognos.UUCP (R.) (05/24/89)
In article <2492@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu> Michael N. Nitabach writes: >... I don't understand the undercurrent of fear regarding the >potential sinister uses of behaviorist techniques for purposes of >social control. This concern is founded on a belief that behaviorist >techniques *are*, in fact, successful in drastically altering the >social and private behaviors of human beings, including unwilling and >unknowing objects of these methods. I submit that there is no evidence >to support this supposition, and that this fear is unfounded. I think that this depends upon what degree of control you are seeking verification for. Association, for example, is exploited to considerable effect in advertising (e.g. that's what the blonde lounging on the convertible is for). Equally, fines for undesirable social activity and praise for exemplary behaviour are forms of punishment and reward behaviour modification techniques (as people become generally richer, just make the fines larger - e.g. the tiing of insurance rates to the number of tickets one has recieved, regardless of accidents). Perhaps the most dramatic (peace-time) example of this sort of behaviour manipulation has been the switch, in a span of about 10 years, from a society wherein most were smokers to one wherein those who smoke are forcibly ostracized. While one may argue that the `facts' of its cancer-promoting tendencies are more solid, equal arguments could be given for alcohol (1000(?) brain cells dead/ounce): the biggest change has occurred in what is socially acceptable behaviour. Smoking no longer is - due to a very thorough propaganda campaign (its adherent, of course, use the term `information dissemination'). Clearly, the time was ripe for this particular effect (increasing paranoia over health, etc.), but that too has had (and still has) its strong lobby over the airwaves. Neither of these effects concerns me very much - other than as examples of just how successful propaganda can be. Modern psychologists are becoming increasingly aware of this not-so-latent potential, however, and (according to one psychology of education text I've seen) were advocating using their knowledge for `moral education'. Again, not especially troublesome since this is what educators have been doing for centuries; what I DO find troublesome is that we may even have enough knowledge (and resources) to actually be successful. My apologies for cluttering up comp.ai with this stuff, please direct any responses to talk.philosophy.misc . R. -- Ray Tigg | Cognos Incorporated | P.O. Box 9707 (613) 738-1338 x5013 | 3755 Riverside Dr. UUCP: rayt@cognos.uucp | Ottawa, Ontario CANADA K1G 3Z4
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (05/24/89)
> Barry Kort >> Brian Colfer >> 1) No one can absolutely answer the question of whether >> the human mind is completely determined. >I disagree. I have a Value System, which I consult when making >decisions. But occasionally I am caught on the razor's edge, >with no clear preference between competing alternatives. Then, >like Dorothy at the fork in road, I choose at random (rolling the >dice if necessary). So your actions are determined by a Value System augmented by a tie-breaking random number generator. That's hardly what most hard-core "libertarians" (ie: FreeWillers) are looking for. >..Casting lots is a venerable solution to such undetermined choices. Just how does a tie-breaking random number generator count as making a radically free choice, one that is authentically one's own, not determined by the the whims or constraints of another being? >..Are you now convinced that at least one living mind is not completely >determined? (Feel free to be reasonable, if you so choose.) You did not convince me, and I am a hardcore libertarian. -michael
matt@nbires.nbi.com (Matthew Meighan) (05/25/89)
In article <1966@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> brianc@daedalus.UUCP (Brian Colfer) writes: > >My question is why would any one think that >1) we are more than materialistic beings ... what valid evidence is there? >Valid in the sense of observable, reliable and well constructed measures. > This is an entirely circular position. Once you insist that the only admissable evidence is that which 'valid' by YOUR criteria, which are materialistic, then of course you will find that that evidence supports a materialistic world view. If I ask you "What valid evidence is there that we are spiritual beings -- valid meaning based in our spiritual experience?" then of course whatever evidence I get will fulfill by a priori assumptions. Instead, I'll ask a different question: what observable, reliable and well-constructed evidence is there that the validity of evidence relies on it being observable and reliable? I doubt that you can materially _prove_ this assumption; it is merely one of your a priori ground rules. What's interesting about this is that the insistence on material ("objective") evidence is itself an entirely subjective position, and thus violates its own ground rules. The point is, there is no PROOF of the kind you are asking for, either way. It is just as subjective and 'religious' to assert that we are material beings, which you can't prove objectively, as it is to assert that we are not, which you also can't prove objectively. In the latter case, though, at least the position is logically consistent; in the former, it is not. Matt Meighan matt@nbires.nbi.com -- Matt Meighan matt@nbires.nbi.com (nbires\!matt)
gpmenos@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (G. Philippe Menos) (05/26/89)
In article <32091@sri-unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips2.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: >> Barry Kort >>> Brian Colfer >>decisions. But occasionally I am caught on the razor's edge, >>with no clear preference between competing alternatives. Then, >>like Dorothy at the fork in road, I choose at random (rolling the >>dice if necessary). Nothing is random. The so-called "random number generator" is misnamed; these devices rely on an algorithm that is based in order, though the pattern is only discernable in the "long run," if it's a good generator. All machines, whether human or artificial, assume a foundation in order, wihtout which only breakdown is possible. A truly random number generator would include the possibility of not generating a number at all; it might "randomly" break down and then operate again. But this wouldn't be very good for our experiments, so we settle for an order that is difficult to discern. But why is ther such a bias toward denying the order and law that is the basis of our environment? This bias operates everywhere in contemporary thinking. Take "chaos theory" as an example -- which is showing that there are basic and shared patterns that underly seemingly chaotic behaviours, whether in the weather or in the flow of water and populations. So why the heck is it called "chaos theory?" Why not something more accurate, like "order" or "pattern" theory? -Phil
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (05/26/89)
In article <32091@sri-unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips2.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) reacts to my unconvincing attempt to prove that I am not completely deterministic: > > ... Are you now convinced that at least one living mind is not > > completely determined? (Feel free to be reasonable, if you so choose.) > You did not convince me, and I am a hardcore libertarian. Michael, if you wish me to believe that assertion, you will have to provide some more persuasive evidence to convince me. :-) --Barry Kort
cam@edai.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550) (05/26/89)
In article <2586@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu> miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu (Michael N. Nitabach) writes: >This is the classical definition of free will >which antonymically opposes the concepts of free will and determinism. That >is, acts performed with "free will", are just those acts which are not >determined--i.e. those acts that "could have been otherwise." Nice one. In fact, in everyday living we normally suppose that those whose actions are bizarrely unpredictable are nutcases who have no free will, their actions being determined by the unfathomable pathology of their illness, whereas those whose actions are most predictable are those Good, Sane, and Rational people who ALWAYS choose to do the Right Thing by their well-known publicly-declared value system. In fact, the reason why I sometimes fail to exercise my free choice to do the Right and Proper thing is that I sometimes lose control of myself, and am overcome by the determinism of some animal greed... >It seems to me that the crucial >issue is not whether or not a particular action is physically determined or >not, but rather whether or not the agent can be said to have "controlled" >the action, i.e. whether the cause of the action arose from the beliefs >and desires of the actor, or from unavoidable environmental constraints. But here you are impaled on the dualist's dilemma: IF the mind is a function of the brain (mind-states correspond to brain-states), then since the brain, as a machine, is causally determined (brain-state n+1 can be deduced from brain-state n plus sense-data), it follows that mind-states are causally determined by physical events, and are just another (perhaps more convenient) way of describing them. The only (obvious) way to restore the causal primacy and efficacy of mental events (beliefs, intentions, etc.) is to disconnect mind-states from brain-states, creating the mental/physical dualism. That solves the causal primacy of will, but at the price of raising the new problem of how on earth the non-physical mind affects the brain. But your suggestion is on the right lines: we get into this puzzling position by fleeing thoughtlessly from the idea that free-will and predictability are contradictory, when even a little reflection shows that to be incompatible with our commonplace speech. The hard question is what exactly do we mean by "could have been otherwise"? -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (05/26/89)
In article <8683@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> gpmenos@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (G. Philippe Menos) writes: > Nothing is random. The so-called "random number generator" is misnamed; > these devices rely on an algorithm that is based in order, though the > pattern is only discernable in the "long run," if it's a good generator. > All machines, whether human or artificial, assume a foundation in order, > without which only breakdown is possible. I forgot to tell you how my random-number generator works. I use a scintillator which emits a flash of light when it is hit by a cosmic ray from outer space. I have divided the scintillator into sectors and regions (wedge-shaped, like a pie, and annular rings, like a bulls-eye). I color these regions, and also label them according to their cross-sectional area. When I want a random number, I wait for the next cosmic ray, and note the sector in which it lands. Sometimes I have to wait as long as a few minutes before getting a scintillation. > A truly random number generator would include the possibility of not > generating a number at all; it might "randomly" break down and then > operate again. But this wouldn't be very good for our experiments, so > we settle for an order that is difficult to discern. Well, you are right. My scintillator is not very convenient. It behaves a lot like your ideal random number generator. But then again, it does have the property that that its underlying order is difficult to discern. --Barry Kort
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (05/28/89)
In article <386@edai.ed.ac.uk> cam@edai (Chris Malcolm) writes: > ... in everyday living we normally suppose that those > whose actions are bizarrely unpredictable are nutcases > who have no free will, their actions being determined > by the unfathomable pathology of their illness, whereas > those whose actions are most predictable are those Good, > Sane, and Rational people who ALWAYS choose to do the > Right Thing by their well-known publicly-declared value > system. In fact, the reason why I sometimes fail to > exercise my free choice to do the Right and Proper thing > is that I sometimes lose control of myself, and am overcome > by the determinism of some animal greed... Yeah, that happens to me too. Now and then my cerebral cortex and my limbic system get into a contest and my rational mind yields control to my pre-wired instincts. The R-complex often "gets there first." But with enough cognitive processing, the cerebrum eventually discovers a superior strategy, and reclaims control. The hardest contests to overcome are responses to those stimuli which trigger the deepest fears. --Barry Kort
jlg@odicon.UUCP (John L. Grzesiak) (05/31/89)
In article <54626@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: > > I forgot to tell you how my random-number generator works. I use a > scintillator which emits a flash of light when it is hit by a cosmic > I have to wait as long as a few minutes before getting a scintillation. > Barry: A cobalt-57 source disk about one inch in diameter is available for calibrating Gamma cameras. One of these would reduce your wait. The potentcy one these sources is about 1 microcurie and should last from 100 - 200 days before it's dead. (At least for gamma camera work). +-------------------------+---------------------------------+ + John L Grzesiak | "Genius is the output of + + 47 Spring Street | a mind twisted beyond + + Wallingford Ct 06492 | normal recognition" + + | + + !yale!spock!odicon!jlg | Omega Dynamics - Wallinford Ct + + | + +-------------------------+---------------------------------+
cam@edai.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550) (06/01/89)
In article <54737@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Barry Kort) writes: >In article <386@edai.ed.ac.uk> cam@edai (Chris Malcolm) writes: > > > system. In fact, the reason why I sometimes fail to > > exercise my free choice to do the Right and Proper thing > > is that I sometimes lose control of myself, and am overcome > > by the determinism of some animal greed... > >Yeah, that happens to me too. Now and then my cerebral cortex >and my limbic system get into a contest and my rational mind >yields control to my pre-wired instincts. A notion I recall from school biology was that we have three nested brains: a lizard's brain, which provided the instincts and passions, a mammal's brain, which provided the emotions and moral feelings, and the cerebral thingy, which provided rational thought, pedantry, etc.. Before I get too taken with this notion, would anybody like to slander it? -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK
cam@edai.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550) (06/01/89)
In article <54737@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Barry Kort) writes: >In article <386@edai.ed.ac.uk> cam@edai (Chris Malcolm) writes: > > > In fact, the reason why I sometimes fail to > > exercise my free choice to do the Right and Proper thing > > is that I sometimes lose control of myself, and am overcome > > by the determinism of some animal greed... > >Yeah, that happens to me too. Now and then my cerebral cortex >and my limbic system get into a contest and my rational mind >yields control to my pre-wired instincts. A notion I recall from school biology was that we have three nested brains: a lizard's brain, which provided the instincts and passions; a mammal's brain, which provided the emotions and moral feelings; and the cerebral thingy, which provided rational thought, pedantry, etc.. Before I get too taken with this notion, would anybody like to slander it? -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK
brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) (06/01/89)
In article <32091@sri-unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips2.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > Just how does a tie-breaking random number generator count as making > a radically free choice, one that is authentically one's own, not > determined by the the whims or constraints of another being? > This is at least similar to Sartre's position: either every action is free or every action is determined. His contention is that you are ultimately responsible for every action that you take. Michael, do you think that a libertarian like your self is essentially a radical exsistentialist? >> Barry Kort >>..Are you now convinced that at least one living mind is not completely >>determined? (Feel free to be reasonable, if you so choose.) Michael is unimpressed and so am I for obviously different reasons. When I was an undergraduate many years ago my Prof. Kirk Gable told me that my concerns about free will were fundamentally a waste of time. One of his reasons were that if behaviorism works as an acurate model for how we live our lives and proves useful for helping people in education, mental health and other similar endevours then who cares about free will. Well, in a sense he's right but I always enjoy discussions about the fundamental nature of humanity. ============================================================================= Brian | UC San Francisco | E-mail: USENET, Internet, BITNET Colfer | Dept. of Lab. Medicine |..!{ucbvax,uunet}!daedalus.ucsf.edu!brianc | S.F. CA, 94143-0134 USA | brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu | PH. 415-476-2325 | BRIANC@UCSFCCA.BITNET =============================================================================
brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) (06/01/89)
Mike Ellis in a previous article (May 24, 89 11:50 GMT) mentioned a few criticisms of behaviorsm. My understanding of these criticisms: 1) Behaviorism is only useful as a limited laboratory methodology. >Problems happen when a narrow technical methodology with >worthwhile but limited results starts being dictated by >some kind of a priori truth. [ which I assume is behaviorism, the pinheaded philosophy] > ... has given us nothing but vast rotting academic archives > full of dead theories > Until behaviorism can come up with hard results, > your're just blowing hot air. There are many examples of real world successful applications of behaviorism which have helped many people. One can read about such examples in the Jo. of Applied Behaviorial Analysis. The best example which has worked in every case I have heard about is in the application of behavioral analysis to the problem of phobic responses. Until behaviorism this problem plagued many people but now it can be cured. Other applications include promoting energy and water conservation and in increasing safe behavior at the work place. 2) Evidence for free will is found in internal observation. > ... beliefs, thoughts and desires are causal determinants of > human action .... The evidence is plentifully available in the > form of 1st person experience... This is classic dualist retort. The problem is then just shifted to where do beliefs, thoughts and desires come from. I am affirming a) that beliefs etc. are causes and b) that they are important to the person experiencing them. I also am saying that they are scientifically unimportant since 1) there is nothing we can do about them directy (we can only change the things that control them) and 2) we can only have direct access to our own experience and no one can ever have direct access to our experience. In fact we actually only observe the effects of our brain since there are no significant sensory neuron receptors in the brain. 3) The assumptions of materialistic determinism is fundamentally undermined by quantum-mechanics. BTW this is the argument Douglass Adams uses to allow for all sorts of metaphysical phenomena. (Adams is the author of Resteraunt at the end of the universe etc.) Boy this is a tough one. I don't know enough about QM but I think that it addresses observations at the very macro reaches of our observations and at the extreem micro levels we find it impossible to predict the events. From what I understand QM does not cancel Newton or Einstien but describes our limits to predict the subatomic extremities of our universe. I am talking about the the vast range in between. Materialistic determinism works as the starting assumption when confronted by a new disease and it would be silly to think otherwise. 4) The main threat of behaviorism is that it is systematic control. >It doesn't matter one whit to whether one's actrions are ... >... determined ... >... as long as they're not determined by the *intentional > manipulation* of another *conscious* being. It would seem that any part of society would fall under this, laws, schools, jobs and any where else ones behavior is being directed by others. If you say that *any* of these are ok then you are saying that behavior control has a place in society. If you say that *all* of these are bad then you are merely a radical anarchist and there is no place for society. As a retort to Hilary Putnam's thesis about Functionalism ... it seems that the human brain is more of an open system than is a Turing Machine. ============================================================================= Brian | UC San Francisco | E-mail: USENET, Internet, BITNET Colfer | Dept. of Lab. Medicine |..!{ucbvax,uunet}!daedalus.ucsf.edu!brianc | S.F. CA, 94143-0134 USA | brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu | PH. 415-476-2325 | BRIANC@UCSFCCA.BITNET =============================================================================
brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) (06/01/89)
Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Free will and responsibility. Summary: Radical Free-will = Exsistentialism Expires: References: <10333@ihlpb.ATT.COM> <3850@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <52019@linus.UUCP> <1309@lzfme.att.com> <1966@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> <528@orawest.UUCP> <1979@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> <53788@linus.UUCP> <32091@sri-unix.SRI.COM> Sender: Reply-To: brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu (Brian Colfer) Followup-To: Distribution: Organization: UCSF Dept. of Lab Med Keywords: In article <32091@sri-unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips2.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: >> Barry Kort >> Brian Colfer > >>> 1) No one can absolutely answer the question of whether >>> the human mind is completely determined. > >>I disagree. I have a Value System, which I consult when making >>decisions. But occasionally I am caught on the razor's edge, >>with no clear preference between competing alternatives. Then, >>like Dorothy at the fork in road, I choose at random (rolling the >>dice if necessary). > > So your actions are determined by a Value System augmented by a > tie-breaking random number generator. That's hardly what most > hard-core "libertarians" (ie: FreeWillers) are looking for. > >>..Casting lots is a venerable solution to such undetermined choices. > > Just how does a tie-breaking random number generator count as making > a radically free choice, one that is authentically one's own, not > determined by the the whims or constraints of another being? I see Barry Kort and Mike Ellis' position as being the same as Sartre's. If free will exists it always is there and we are therefor ultimately responsible for every action. Even if we choose to randomize our behavior. The problem I see is that the Value System (or what ever set of private events) is not only a cause but is also an effect. Even in popular culture value systems are not considered to spring from them selves rather they are the product of education and experience. >>..Are you now convinced that at least one living mind is not completely >>determined? (Feel free to be reasonable, if you so choose.) Sartre's position is that you cannot say that you are partially determined because then you can shirk off some of the responsibility for your actions. No one using science proove that an event has occured (free will). Rather, science can only proove that events did not occur that is affirm the Null Hypothesis. If you don't care about scientific methods for reasoning or evidence well then you can make any sort of outrageous claims. In a non-rigorus analysis I think that there are really only two sources of belief: authority, and evidence. If you primarily derive your beliefs from evidence (it is public or private evidence) then why not be systematic. If you primarly derive your beliefs from authorities, Bible, parents, politicians etc. without any demonstration of evidence then you are lost. Free will is a concept born from authority and not evidence. ============================================================================= Brian | UC San Francisco | E-mail: USENET, Internet, BITNET Colfer | Dept. of Lab. Medicine |...!{ucbvax,uunet}!daedalus.ucsf.edu!brianc | S.F. CA, 94143-0134 USA | brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu | PH. (415) 476-2325 | BRIANC@UCSFCCA.BITNET ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- "All things equal, a man with money is freer than a man without..." H. Muller =============================================================================
brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) (06/01/89)
Mike Ellis in a previous article (May 24, 89 11:50 GMT) mentioned a few criticisms of behaviorsm. My understanding of these criticisms: 1) Behaviorism is only useful as a limited laboratory methodology. >Problems happen when a narrow technical methodology with >worthwhile but limited results starts being dictated by >some kind of a priori truth. [ which I assume is behaviorism, the pinheaded philosophy] > ... has given us nothing but vast rotting academic archives > full of dead theories > Until behaviorism can come up with hard results, > your're just blowing hot air. There are many examples of real world successful applications of behaviorism which have helped many people. One can read about such examples in the Jo. of Applied Behaviorial Analysis. The best example which has worked in every case I have heard about is in the application of behavioral analysis to the problem of phobic responses. Until behaviorism this problem plagued many people but now it can be cured. Other applications include promoting energy and water conservation and in increasing safe behavior at the work place. 2) Evidence for free will is found in internal observation. > ... beliefs, thoughts and desires are causal determinants of > human action .... The evidence is plentifully available in the > form of 1st person experience... This is classic dualist retort. The problem is then just shifted to where do beliefs, thoughts and desires come from. I am affirming a) that beliefs etc. are causes and b) that they are important to the person experiencing them. I also am saying that they are scientifically unimportant since 1) there is nothing we can do about them directy (we can only change the things that control them) and 2) we can only have direct access to our own experience and no one can ever have direct access to our experience. In fact we actually only observe the effects of our brain since there are no significant sensory neuron receptors in the brain. 3) The assumptions of materialistic determinism is fundamentally undermined by quantum-mechanics. BTW this is the argument Douglass Adams uses to allow for all sorts of metaphysical phenomena. (Adams is the author of Resteraunt at the end of the universe etc.) Boy this is a tough one. I don't know enough about QM but I think that it addresses observations at the very macro reaches of our observations and at the extreem micro levels we find it impossible to predict the events. From what I understand QM does not cancel Newton or Einstien but describes our limits to predict the subatomic extremities of our universe. I am talking about the the vast range in between. Materialistic determinism works as the starting assumption when confronted by a new disease and it would be silly to think otherwise. 4) The main threat of behaviorism is that it is systematic control. >It doesn't matter one whit to whether one's actrions are ... >... determined ... >... as long as they're not determined by the *intentional > manipulation* of another *conscious* being. It would seem that any part of society would fall under this, laws, schools, jobs and any where else ones behavior is being directed by others. If you say that *any* of these are ok then you are saying that behavior control has a place in society. If you say that *all* of these are bad then you are merely a radical anarchist and there is no place for society. As a retort to Hilary Putnam's thesis about Functionalism ... it seems that the human brain is more of an open system than is a Turing Machine. ============================================================================= Brian | UC San Francisco | E-mail: USENET, Internet, BITNET Colfer | Dept. of Lab. Medicine |...!{ucbvax,uunet}!daedalus.ucsf.edu!brianc | S.F. CA, 94143-0134 USA | brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu | PH. (415) 476-2325 | BRIANC@UCSFCCA.BITNET ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- "All things equal, a man with money is freer than a man without..." H. Muller =============================================================================
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (06/02/89)
In article <2008@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> brianc@daedalus.UUCP (Brian Colfer) picks up a lingering thread on the Free Will/Determinism merry-go-round: >>> Barry Kort >>>..Are you now convinced that at least one living mind is not completely >>>determined? (Feel free to be reasonable, if you so choose.) >Michael is unimpressed and so am I for obviously different reasons. >When I was an undergraduate many years ago my Prof. Kirk Gable told me that >my concerns about free will were fundamentally a waste of time. One of >his reasons were that if behaviorism works as an acurate model for how we >live our lives and proves useful for helping people in education, mental >health and other similar endeavours then who cares about free will. >Well, in a sense he's right but I always enjoy discussions about the >fundamental nature of humanity. It sounds like Professor Gable was wasting his breath (if not his time). :-) I don't think behaviorism is an accurate (or useful) model for mature sentient beings. (It may be OK for naive neural networks.) As to mental health, I think the behaviorists are more likely to induce neurosis than those who care about free will. My own experience has shown that it is wiser to provide people with accurate observational reports than to directly manipulate their behavior with a cleverly devised system of rewards and punishment. (At least, I think it is a more humane way to treat one's fellow human.) --Barry Kort
gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (06/02/89)
In article <2008@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> brianc@daedalus.UUCP (Brian Colfer) writes: >When I was an undergraduate many years ago my Prof. Kirk Gable told me that >my concerns about free will were fundamentally a waste of time. One of >his reasons were that if behaviorism works as an acurate model for how we >live our lives and proves useful for helping people in education, mental >health and other similar endevours then who cares about free will. >Well, in a sense he's right but I always enjoy discussions about the >fundamental nature of humanity. Gable was largely wrong on Education - I doubt he could cite *ANY* evidence for 'behaviourist' techniques improving on existing methods in education (of which rote learning had been well-established since at least the Renaissance grammar school). I accept his point on behavioural modification, but only up to a certain point. I know of no behavioural modification programs where the patient is not briefed on the therapy and does not have to be 'motivated' by means other than the narrow reinforcement repetoire of behaviourism. I would be interested in the names of practicing behavioural therapists who do not require the active involvement of the patient's 'will' in order to get somewhere. Most proponents of behaviourism work with rodents and don't have a clue about action in the real world. Next time a behaviourist guru tries to pull this one on you, get them to demonstrate the techniques to you in an educational or clinical setting. Stuff the rats :-) -- Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science, The University, Glasgow gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs <europe>!ukc!glasgow!gilbert
lib007@muvms1.bitnet (06/06/89)
lasgow.ac.uk> Followup-To: asgow.ac.uk> Organization: Marshall University Lines: 37 In article <3040@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk>, gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: > In article <2008@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> brianc@daedalus.UUCP (Brian Colfer) writes: >>When I was an undergraduate many years ago my Prof. Kirk Gable told me that >>my concerns about free will were fundamentally a waste of time. One of >>his reasons were that if behaviorism works as an acurate model for how we >>live our lives and proves useful for helping people in education, mental >>health and other similar endevours then who cares about free will. > > Gable was largely wrong on Education > I know of no behavioural modification programs where > the patient is not briefed on the therapy and does not have to be > 'motivated' by means other than the narrow reinforcement repetoire of > behaviourism. I would be interested in the names of practicing > behavioural therapists who do not require the active involvement of the > patient's 'will' in order to get somewhere. Here's the name of a practicing behaviorist: Glen Dunlap, currently with the University of South Florida. Glen supervised training of autistic clients at the Autism Training Center here at Marshall, and he did not require the active involvement of the patient's 'will' in order to achieve improved social function. Check out some of his publications in various journals; no work with rodents anywhere. Glen is as ardent a behaviorist as you'll find--I don't go as far as he does philosophically, but I have to agree with his results. Perhaps some disclaimer can be made to defend the non-behaviorists by saying that Glen's work is with profoundly mentally handicapped people, and that those of us with average intellectual capacity function at some higher plane. Maybe, maybe not. Anyway, think about behaviorism, the next time you stop for a traffic light, and consider its role in your life. --- lib007@muvms1.bitnet,Marshall University Fred R. Reenstjerna | All my life's a circle, 400 Hal Greer Blvd | sunup to sundown.... Huntington, WV 25755 | (304)696 - 2335 |
jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (06/07/89)
> Barry W. Kort writes: > I don't think behaviorism is an accurate (or useful) model for mature > sentient beings. (It may be OK for naive neural networks.) As to > mental health, I think the behaviorists are more likely to induce > neurosis than those who care about free will. My own experience > has shown that it is wiser to provide people with accurate observational > reports than to directly manipulate their behavior with a cleverly > devised system of rewards and punishment. (At least, I think it is a > more humane way to treat one's fellow human.) _As to mental health, I think the behaviorists are more_ like *Good Christians* who will provide a crutch that helps a neurotic live with a problem instead of solving it. (Or in the case of mental health, solving the problem for *society* without solving it for the patient.) My own experience has shown that accurate observational reports are useful only if you (as therapist) are trained (and willing), and the subject (patient) is also willing to undergo an abreactive crisis to relive the experience(s) that have caused the shunt into negative behavior patterns. Comming out of the crisis, the patterns can then be realigned with current (rather than past) reality, and then the accurate observational reports can be accepted and used to solve the problem or alter the behavior patterns. Otherwise, the accurate observational reports are simply misinterpreted by the subject with no change in mental health except a stronger, more developed set of defense mechanisms that will resist the accurate observational reports and maintain the previous behavior patterns. It would be interesting to put an artificial intelligence into abreactive crisis. I have no idea how this would be done, or even what it would mean, given the state of the art -- but it would be interesting. Jim Winer ..!lzfme!jwi I believe in absolute freedom of the press. Pax Probiscus! Sturgeon's Law (Revised): 98.89% of everything is drek (1.11% is peanut butter). Rarely able to send an email reply sucessfully. The opinions expressed here are not necessarily Those persons who advocate censorship offend my religion.
rolandi@gollum.UUCP (wgr) (06/07/89)
In response to Gilbert Cockton's: >I know of no behavioural modification programs where >the patient is not briefed on the therapy and does not have to be >'motivated' by means other than the narrow reinforcement repetoire of >behaviourism. I would be interested in the names of practicing >behavioural therapists who do not require the active involvement of the >patient's 'will' in order to get somewhere. What are you saying? If you mean to imply that one's behavior cannot or will not be subject to modification without the awareness of the "patient" (a medical term--not in use among behavioral folks), then you are wrong. The thrust of behaviorism is simply that behavior is caused. One may or may not be able to accurately indicate the environmental causes of one's behavior. Those environmental causes may or may not be by the design of some behavior modifier. Your terms "the narrow reinforcement repertoire of behaviorism" and "active involvement of the patient's 'will'" imply a thoroughly confounded understanding of terminology and issues associated with the experimental analysis of behavior. What are you talking about here? Walter Rolandi rolandi@ncrcae.Columbia.NCR.COM (insert your feed here)!ncrlnk!ncrcae!rolandi NCR Advanced Systems Development Columbia, SC USA
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/07/89)
>>> > Barry Kort >> me >Michael Ellis reacts to my unconvincing attempt to prove that >I am not completely deterministic: I know you are indeterministic. As much could be said for any chunk of the void you might care to pick out. >>> ... Are you now convinced that at least one living mind is not >>> completely determined? (Feel free to be reasonable, if you so choose.) >> You did not convince me, and I am a hardcore libertarian. >Michael, if you wish me to believe that assertion, you will have >to provide some more persuasive evidence to convince me. :-) Really. You absolutely did not convince me. No kidding. Honor bright. I swear, you really didn't convince me. -michael
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/12/89)
> Brian Colfer >When I was an undergraduate many years ago my Prof. Kirk Gable told me that >my concerns about free will were fundamentally a waste of time. One of >his reasons were that if behaviorism works as an acurate model for how we >live our lives and proves useful for helping people in education, mental >health and other similar endevours then who cares about free will. >Well, in a sense he's right but I always enjoy discussions about the >fundamental nature of humanity. There are many good reasons for considering free will to be a waste of time. There are far fewer reasons for saying the same about responsibility. Behaviorism has little or nothing substantive to offer on either of these questions. -michael
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/12/89)
[[ I have forwarded this to a philosophy newsgroup
where it might be more pertinent -- mce ]]
> Brian Colfer >> me
>1) Behaviorism is only useful as a limited laboratory methodology.
>>Problems happen when a narrow technical methodology with
>>worthwhile but limited results starts being dictated as
>>some kind of a priori truth.
>> Until behaviorism can come up with hard results,
>> your're just blowing hot air.
> There are many examples of real world successful applications
> of behaviorism which have helped many people...
> The best example which has worked in every case I have heard about
> is in the application of behavioral analysis to the problem of
> phobic responses. Until behaviorism this problem plagued many
> people but now it can be cured. Other applications include
> promoting energy and water conservation and in increasing
> safe behavior at the work place.
Nobody denies that behaviorism does not provide us with limited but
useful results, and to that extent behaviorism is wonderful. The
point is that its results are *extremely limited*. And there are
fairly strong reasons to suspect that they will always be *extremely
limited*. See Chomsky's review of Skinner's _Verbal_Behavior_ for
starters: Either Behaviorism cannot account for language, or else
it must use mentalistic constructs in disguise. Catch 22.
>2) Evidence for free will is found in internal observation.
>
>> ... beliefs, thoughts and desires are causal determinants of
>> human action .... The evidence is plentifully available in the
>> form of 1st person experience...
> This is classic dualist retort.
One needn't believe in mental substance to believe in mind unless
you are some kind of substance ontologist. The only dualisms I see are
formal (what extensional logics can deal with versus what requires
intensional logic) and epistemological (what is public versus what is
private).
"Physical substance" itself is increasingly becoming an incoherent
idea. The future of reductionism is not very bright.
> The problem is then just shifted
> to where do beliefs, thoughts and desires come from.
That's another question. You have skirted the issue of what beliefs
and desires actually are.
>I am affirming a) that beliefs etc. are causes and b) that
>they are important to the person experiencing them.
You mean to say that the beliefs and desires of your lover aren't
important to you? I say (b) is just baloney if by that you mean
they are important *only* to the person experiencing them. They are
important to anybody who really cares about you. Furthermore, they
are important to anybody who cares about what is indeed true. Even
the "strong AI" dream of building a robot that passed the Turing
test would need to be able to manipulate formal objects that
represented the beliefs and desires of others as well as its own.
Stop confusing epistemology with ontology.
>I also am saying that they are scientifically unimportant since
> 1) there is nothing we can do about them directy (we can only change
> the things that control them) and
That's like saying I can't drive a car since I can't control it
"directly", say, by psychokinesis. Anyway, whenever I will something
I am as close to "directly" doing something as I'd ever care to get.
It is just a fact that my desires almost always control my actions.
Will just is a desire that is controlling my current action. This is
explicandum, not explicans. I want to know how it happens.
To say this is "scientifically unimportant" is most presumptious indeed
coming as it does from a discipline with as low credibility as behaviorism.
There are other competing scientific theories with other claims about
what counts as "scientifically important" besides behaviorism.
> 2) we can only have direct access to our own experience and no one
> can ever have direct access to our experience. In fact we actually
> only observe the effects of our brain since there are no significant
> sensory neuron receptors in the brain.
But that is no reason whatsoever why science cannot correlate 1st
person "subjective" reports with neurophysiological findings. In
fact, I'd go so far as to say that these amount to the some of the
most interesting scientific facts uncovered to date (such as the
Penfield experiments).
It is just this information that promises to be the most valuable
from my perspective: We have this interior mental life. What can
science tell us about it?
Your reply is to say "Nothing at all. Science isn't up to the task"
I say "Baloney!". Any science worthy of the name must investigate the
phenomena or else remain silent about them.
>3) The assumptions of materialistic determinism is fundamentally
> undermined by quantum-mechanics. BTW this is the argument
> Douglass Adams uses to allow for all sorts of metaphysical
> phenomena. (Adams is the author of Resteraunt at the end of the
> universe etc.)
I make no metaphysical claims. I only want an honest account of the
phenomena. Cross me off your list of metaphysical crazies.
> Boy this is a tough one. I don't know enough about QM but I
> think that it addresses observations at the very macro reaches of
> our observations and at the extreem micro levels we find it impossible
> to predict the events. From what I understand QM does not cancel
> Newton or Einstien but describes our limits to predict the subatomic
> extremities of our universe. I am talking about the the vast
> range in between.
QM + chaos theory provides just the rigorous scientific argument needed
to blast away any claims of deterministic mechanism for sufficiently
complex systems, of which the brain easily counts as an example.
Chaos theory predicts global sensitivity to minor fluctuations
*everywhere*. QM provides minor fluctuations *everwhere*.
Determinism loses. The real problem is how we manage so well to
control our actions in spite of all this metaphysical randomness.
> Materialistic determinism works as the starting
> assumption when confronted by a new disease and it would be silly
> to think otherwise.
No doubt deterministic theories are the best working hypothesis for
the technical specialist who, lets face it, knows practically nothing
about what's really going on. After all, we want to find predictive laws.
If and when they have a theory that successfully predicts the way people
do behave better than folk psychology, and when they have shown us how
beliefs and desires really do cash out into neurophysiological terms,
then these methodological claims (these are currently just methodological
heuristics, not even scientific findings themselves, and absolutely not
proven facts, remember?) will be worth taking seriously as a priori claims.
>4) The main threat of behaviorism is that it is systematic control.
>> It doesn't matter one whit to whether one's actrions are ...
>>... determined ... as long as they're not determined by the *intentional
>> manipulation* of another *conscious* being.
> It would seem that any part of society would fall under this,
> laws, schools, jobs and any where else ones behavior is being
> directed by others.
Manipulation isn't just wrong, it's counterproductive. It is not treating
a person honestly. Admittedly, there may be criminally or mentally
deranged people for whom such manipulation might count as the lesser evil
where honest approaches fail. And there may be people who rationally
consent to such treatment when they know they have lost rational control
of their own actions, as in the case of addictions.
You seem to confuse "behavior direction" with "convincing the other to
act". Only one who doesn't believe in beliefs and desires could fail to
see the difference.
> If you say that *any* of these are ok then you are saying that
> behavior control has a place in society.
> If you say that *all* of these are bad then you are merely a
> radical anarchist and there is no place for society.
If laws, schools, and jobs don't treat people as rational agents
is it any wonder so many of us are just bozos?
Maybe there isn't any place for me in a society, if that be one of bozoes.
>As a retort to Hilary Putnam's thesis about Functionalism ... it seems
>that the human brain is more of an open system than is a Turing Machine.
That's precisely one of Hilary Putnam's points if I am not mistaken.
-michaelellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/12/89)
>>> Barry Kort >> Brian Colfer >>> 1) No one can absolutely answer the question of whether >>> the human mind is completely determined. In fact we can: The mind is not "completely determined" if by that you means "completely determined by antecedent causes". Assuming that the mind corresponds somehow to the brain, chaos theory plus QM provide exactly the one-two knockout blow to any causally deterministic account of human action, or the weather, or anything else of a sufficiently complex nature. If anything it is the mind's amazing ability to be somewhat globally predictable (once you know its beliefs and desires) in the face of massive physical indeterminism that demands an accounting, not its unpredictability. >I see Barry Kort and Mike Ellis' position as being the same as Sartre's. If >free will exists it always is there and we are therefor ultimately >responsible for every action. "Responsible will" is different from "free will" (or is rather more like Kant's account of free will). We are responsible for our actions precisely when they are in accord with reason, regardless of the neurophysiological facts of the matter. Even if free will in the strongest sense does not exist, a weaker form is all that is needed to account for responsibility: Do those actions of yours which affect others the rationally result from your beliefs and desires? Do your future beliefs and desires rationally result from your present ones? Are your present beliefs and desires rational? If not, do you have enough self control to restrain your irrational beliefs and desires so that they do not result in actions that are dangerous to others or yourself? If so, you got responsible will, and many are happy to call that free will, although I don't number among those. It is beyond me why you see Barry's position that same as mine (or Sartre's for that matter). .... >If you don't care about scientific methods for reasoning or evidence well >then you can make any sort of outrageous claims. Science has done a pretty good job at proving all sorts of things not deterministic. I do agree, however, that the strongest versions of free will are philosophical, not scientific, claims. >In a non-rigorus analysis I think that there are really only two sources of >belief: authority, and evidence. If you primarily derive your beliefs from >evidence (it is public or private evidence) then why not be systematic. If >you primarly derive your beliefs from authorities, Bible, parents, politicians >etc. without any demonstration of evidence then you are lost. Free will >is a concept born from authority and not evidence. Baloney. Just who's relying on bogus authority here? Belief in free will naturally arises whenever the background belief system declares that all is controlled by some all-pervasive X, whether X be some omnipotent being or some crackpot scientific theory. Either way, something has to give when the current mythology directly contradicts the direct first person evidence every person has access to. Stop telling me my actions are absolutely determined by the {Great Turtle, YHWH, bumps on my head, mechanistic determinism, environment+heredity} and I'll stop saying "baloney". -michael
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/12/89)
> Chris Malcolm >>It seems to me that the crucial >>issue is not whether or not a particular action is physically determined or >>not, but rather whether or not the agent can be said to have "controlled" >>the action, i.e. whether the cause of the action arose from the beliefs >>and desires of the actor, or from unavoidable environmental constraints. >But here you are impaled on the dualist's dilemma: IF the mind is a >function of the brain (mind-states correspond to brain-states), then >since the brain, as a machine, is causally determined (brain-state n+1 >can be deduced from brain-state n plus sense-data), it follows that >mind-states are causally determined by physical events, and are just >another (perhaps more convenient) way of describing them. Lots of "ifs" there. First, and least important, is that the brain isn't causally determined because of QM + Chaos theory (either one in themselves is not sufficient): Brain state n+1 is provably not "determined" by brain state n plus sense data. Also notice you neglected to mention "output" or "control data". >The only >(obvious) way to restore the causal primacy and efficacy of mental >events (beliefs, intentions, etc.) is to disconnect mind-states from >brain-states, creating the mental/physical dualism. That solves the >causal primacy of will, but at the price of raising the new problem of >how on earth the non-physical mind affects the brain. The "(only) obvious way" is hardly the only way. Screw metaphysical dualism. How about anomalous monism and token identity? And wouldn't the failure of reductionism imply autonomous levels of description? There are so many compelling ways out I am bewildered to see the 19th century still haunting our computer science community. My desires have "causal efficacy" provided they really cause my actions. And my mind retains "causal efficacy" provided my present beliefs and desires really do control my future beliefs and desires in the way and to the extent that I want them to. They can be "made out of" blue cheese for all I care. You might as well be saying that the bottom level description falsifies the top level description. Sort of the arguing over whether "People kill people" or "guns kill people" or "atoms kill people". They're all valid accounts, none contradicting the other. I notice that people have no problem believing their perceptions are affected by the world, but then balk at believing their volitions in turn affect the world. Why? >But your suggestion is on the right lines: we get into this puzzling >position by fleeing thoughtlessly from the idea that free-will and >predictability are contradictory, when even a little reflection shows >that to be incompatible with our commonplace speech. The hard question >is what exactly do we mean by "could have been otherwise"? Which takes us into modal and intensional logics and straight back into that ferocious aristotelian mentalistic jungle again. "Could not have been otherwise" as far as it is relevant to free will means approximately "any agent would have been forced to act identically in all salient respects". This is a different form of free will than the others, but is in no way easier to analyze. -michael
philo@pnet51.cts.com (Scott Burke) (06/13/89)
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) writes: > Belief in free will naturally arises whenever the background belief > system declares that all is controlled by some all-pervasive X, whether > X be some omnipotent being or some crackpot scientific theory. Either > way, something has to give when the current mythology directly contradicts > the direct first person evidence every person has access to. > I have heard many claims that determinism contradicts first person experience, but I have yet to hear such a claim which was not really the more mundane "determinism contradicts A BELIEF about first person experience." It is my understanding that the concept of free will itself can be readily traceable to the metaphysics of the european middle ages (free will as it is contemporarily argued -- not "moral responsibility" as presented by hellenistic philosophies), and as such, most free will arguments are not in and of themselves statements about direct experience, but rather "expansions" of the one concept into the full blown metaphysical system which requires it* (ergo, man's ethical nature + personality + humanocentrism +...). Just what does this "first person experience" of free will consist of, without relying on other metaphysical postulates of the system to describe it (if possible) ?? UUCP: {amdahl!bungia, uunet!rosevax, chinet, killer}!orbit!pnet51!philo ARPA: crash!orbit!pnet51!philo@nosc.mil INET: philo@pnet51.cts.com
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (06/14/89)
In article <401@edai.ed.ac.uk> cam@edai (Chris Malcolm) writes: > A notion I recall from school biology was that we have three nested > brains: a lizard's brain, which provided the instincts and passions, a > mammal's brain, which provided the emotions and moral feelings, and the > cerebral thingy, which provided rational thought, pedantry, etc.. Before > I get too taken with this notion, would anybody like to slander it? I recently picked up a copy of _The Dragons of Eden_, which I first read so long ago, I forgot what was in it. Carl Sagan, in his characteristically populist style, describes the R-Complex (Reptilian Brain), the Limbic System, and the Neocortex. Not being a neuroanatomist, I tend to get my information from sources written for the lay audience. Anyway, your understanding seems to correspond with the _Dragons of Eden_ discussion. I suspect the lifelong neuroscientist would be appalled that I would learn about my brain from a planetary scientist, but I can read Sagan without falling asleep. --Barry Kort
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (06/14/89)
In article <1385@lzfme.att.com> jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) writes: > My own experience has shown that accurate observational reports are > useful only if you (as therapist) are trained (and willing), > and the subject (patient) is also willing... I agree. Therapy must be by mutual consent. > It would be interesting to put an artificialintelligence into > abreactive crisis. I have no idea how this would be done, or even > what it would mean, given the state of the art -- but it would be > interesting. I think there was a Star Trek episode in which Kirk gave the machine it's "Goedel Sentence", and the machine, realizing the error of its ways, turned itself off. --Barry Kort
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (06/14/89)
In article <127@unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips2.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) asserts that I failed to convince him that I am not completely deterministic (even though he already believes so by way of his own independent logic). Michael wrote: > > > You did not convince me, and I am a hardcore libertarian. To which I puckishly retorted: > > Michael, if you wish me to believe that assertion, you will have > > to provide some more persuasive evidence to convince me. :-) To which Michael vigorously reasserts: > Really. You absolutely did not convince me. No kidding. > Honor bright. > I swear, you really didn't convince me. I assure you that I am in receipt of your assertion, Michael. But I still await persuasive evidence of its accuracy. (Vigorous assertion does not constitute proof in my system of logic. On the other hand, your remark that you already believed that I was not completely deterministic does provide evidence that my proof failed simply because it came too late to cause you to adopt the belief in question.) --Barry Kort
goedhart@utrcu1.UUCP (Goedhart) (06/15/89)
Hi, For all folks interested in free will and such, there is an interesting book, altough not entirely on this subject. The book I am refering to is called CHAOS and was written by James Gleick. Throughout the book the author reaches the conclusion that almost all dynamic systems with chaotic behaveour can be understood by simple means. It is stated that the human brain is also a chaotic system. And therefore the behaveour of this system can be understood (I didn't say predicted!). Sooo, what is _FREE_ will? I'm sorry, but I can't give you exact details of the book. It is momentarily not in reach, and it is a Dutch translation.... Bye, Peter. (I am momentarily using the account of a friend.) -- Who would believe the word of a man speaking double Dutch?
cam@edai.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550) (06/15/89)
In article <149@unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips2.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: >> Chris Malcolm > >>>It seems to me that the crucial >>>issue is not whether or not a particular action is physically determined or >>>not, but rather whether or not the agent can be said to have "controlled" >>>the action, i.e. whether the cause of the action arose from the beliefs >>>and desires of the actor, or from unavoidable environmental constraints. > >>But here you are impaled on the dualist's dilemma: IF the mind is a >>function of the brain (mind-states correspond to brain-states), then >>since the brain, as a machine, is causally determined (brain-state n+1 >>can be deduced from brain-state n plus sense-data), it follows that >>mind-states are causally determined by physical events, and are just >>another (perhaps more convenient) way of describing them. > > Lots of "ifs" there. First, and least important, is that the brain > isn't causally determined because of QM + Chaos theory (either one > in themselves is not sufficient): Brain state n+1 is provably not > "determined" by brain state n plus sense data. Also notice you > neglected to mention "output" or "control data". > You'll be surprised that I very largely agree with nearly all that you say, not just the above. I was articulating an argument here which I expected my respondent to largely agree with, in order to provoke a particular disagreement (failed again :-); no implication that I agreed with it myself. Socrates was much too smart to try such a such a stunt on an email net! Arguments get much too complicated if you restrict yourself to having to believe everything you say :-) But what's QM? And why is Chaos in itself insufficient to carry your point? -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK
brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) (06/16/89)
In article <421@edai.ed.ac.uk> cam@edai (Chris Malcolm) writes: And here is M. Ellis >> >> Lots of "ifs" there. First, and least important, is that the brain >> isn't causally determined because of QM + Chaos theory (either one >> in themselves is not sufficient): Brain state n+1 is provably not >> "determined" by brain state n plus sense data. Also notice you >> neglected to mention "output" or "control data". Mike get off the QM (quantum mechanics) thing... according to this reasoning we should consider everything to be non-determined rocks, trees, movement of planets. We can say all sorts of nonsense by evoking mystical forces, here QM. And Chaos theory ... come on ... chaos theory **does** still express a causal relationship but just one that is so complex ( too many variables ) that we can not predict state N+1 ( where N is just before things become too complex). I'm saying that according to QM the brain is **just** as determined as everything else. If we deal with everything else (but the brain) as if it was determined why not treat the Brain the same way... Either the brain is *all* physical matter or it isn't ... which do think? If it is then the same "laws" applicable to the rest of the universe apply to it also. If it isn't then you must evoke spirtual metaphysical crap. (Flame throwers on..? Let me get my fire suit) Are thoughts, beliefs, desires etc. behaviors? >But what's QM? And why is Chaos in itself insufficient to carry your >point? They are not separate or together. Science is not a bunch of theories it is a method of investigation. There are two tensions in science: deductive and inductive reasoning. People will extrapolate to the Nth degree but the real meat of science is valid evidence ... For a discussion of validity in Science see Cook & Campbell _Quasi-experimentaion_ 1978, or even Kerlinger _Foundations of behavioral research_ 1973. ============================================================================= Brian | UC San Francisco | E-mail: USENET, Internet, BITNET Colfer | Dept. of Lab. Medicine |...!{ucbvax,uunet}!daedalus.ucsf.edu!brianc | S.F. CA, 94143-0134 USA | brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu | PH. (415) 476-2325 | BRIANC@UCSFCCA.BITNET ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- "All things equal, a man with money is freer than a man without..." H. Muller =============================================================================
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/19/89)
> Brian Colfer >> Chris Malcolm >>> me >>> Lots of "ifs" there. First, and least important, is that the brain >>> isn't causally determined because of QM + Chaos theory (either one >>> in themselves is not sufficient): Brain state n+1 is provably not >>> "determined" by brain state n plus sense data. Also notice you >>> neglected to mention "output" or "control data". >Mike get off the QM (quantum mechanics) thing... according to this reasoning >we should consider everything to be non-determined rocks, trees, movement >of planets. We can say all sorts of nonsense by evoking mystical forces, >here QM. And Chaos theory ... come on ... chaos theory **does** still >express a causal relationship but just one that is so complex ( too many >variables ) that we can not predict state N+1 ( where N is just before >things become too complex). Ultimately, none of that stuff really is determined in the sense that you want. And knock off the "mystical forces" crap. Would you prefer I accuse you of "closet Theism" to support your 19th century determinism? If you are decide to seriously answer this article, please address this point: Chaos theory says that minor fluctuations at points of bifurcation in suitably complex systems have massive global effects. If those minor fluctuations are genuinely random (as in QM, not merely the classical lack of knowledge) then the global behavior also is *genuinely* random. Not just "too many variables": If we knew *all* the variables and had a computer of infinite capacity -- if we were Laplace demons -- we still could not predict. If anyone here is being mystical, it is you who refuse to face up to modern science. I'll get off this QM thing once you get off this 19th century determinism thing. >I'm saying that according to QM the brain is **just** as determined as >everything else. If we deal with everything else (but the brain) as if it >was determined why not treat the Brain the same way... And that's hardly very determined at all. What kind of prediction would we get even supposing we had complete knowledge and a computer of infinite capacity? If chaos theory and QM are correct, we would predict a gigantic number of globally divergent possibilities over even a fairly short interval of prediction, if the brain is even as complex as a dripping faucet or a rising smoke column. (And none of this is to address the truly awful issue of what kinds of functions map neurophysiological predicates to mental predicates!) I *am* treating the brain like anything else. Nothing physical in the universe is completely predictable. This doesn't usually matter for phenomena whose attributes we care about are approximated by linear differential equations, like most ideal objects in engineering books, or, similarly, those artifacts we have consciously designed after their example. It is a great testimony to the cleverness of science that we have designed things that behave so predictably under the press of a button. But the brain, like the weather, isn't one of those things. >Either the brain is *all* physical matter or it isn't ... which do think? >If it is then the same "laws" applicable to the rest of the universe >apply to it also. If it isn't then you must evoke spirtual metaphysical >crap. (Flame throwers on..? Let me get my fire suit) I'm not into the metaphysics of substance. Let's just say I prefer to bracket that question, especially considering how incoherent the notion of "material substance" has become this century *in the scientific community*. Anyway, even if mind/brain identity theories are correct, we are probably in deep trouble where meaningful predictions are concerned. To take an example from Fodor: Consider the function that maps physical objects to money. Some money is in the form of valuable metal. Other is in the form of slips of paper. And then there are electronic blips in computers, and so on. Even if all this physical stuff *were* metaphysically deterministic can we ever reasonably expect physical theories which predict the motions of all those physical objects to tell us anything meaningful about economics? Except for the grossest of predictions ("the gold itself will not suddenly transform into some other metal"), physics can tell us very little about economics. Token theories of mind/brain identity are sort of like that. Just what in the brain would correspond to the belief that your car needs a valve job or the desire that your lover would stop cracking her knuckles? Even simple beliefs and desires like these almost certainly correspond to a disjunction of an enormous number of radically dissimilar brain states (assuming "brain state" even refers to something real). Brain states can get us to gross predictions ("thoughts cease when we run over this brain with a steamroller"), but it isn't clear that brain state talk will ever get us to meaningful predictions about beliefs that are any better than folk psychology. In other words, brain state language deals with natural kinds that "go together"; mind state language deals with yet other natural kinds that "go together". Both languages really talk about the same stuff if that makes you feel better metaphysically. But the two different languages don't "go together" anymore than physics and economics (sort of like a nightmarish version of applying Nelson Goodman's predicate "grue" to emeralds). The realms of discourse are autonomous in that even if economics is theoretically reducible to physics, the reduction is humanly impossible and unknowable. Throw in what QM+Chaos theory and the reduction may well be theoretically impossible as well. >Are thoughts, beliefs, desires etc. behaviors? Not if behavior only counts what is publically observable. There is a crucial part of beliefs and desires that you have to be the subject in order to know. And not if behavior leaves out intentionality: What you are trying to do is an intrinsic part of what you are doing even if B.F. Skinner does not count it as scientifically important. Surely you know what beliefs and desires are. What nobody really knows is what they "are made out of" (if indeed, they are made out of anything) or "what they are caused by" or "how they are realized in our brains". >>But what's QM? And why is Chaos in itself insufficient to carry your >>point? QM is quantum mechanics. Without QM, one could still assert that things are *really* deterministic, however it is not humanly possible to perform the computations or acquire knowledge of all the variables. This is to say, metaphysically we would be deterministic, but there would be overwhelming epistemic problems in making any prediction. With QM, even if you knew *everything*, you could not predict. Quantum randomness is "metaphysical" in most viable interpretations. But the ardent determinist however, might still sleaze out by asserting that quantum randomness operates only at levels so small that it has no macroscopic consequences. Now chaos theory predicts that microscopic fluctuations at points of bifurcation have enormous effects on macroscopic global behavior. This is a *hard* prediction of chaos theory. Those who doubt this are urged to refer to any text on chaos theory. So Chaos theory + Quantum mechanics are both required to assert the metaphysical and epistemic randomness of global behavior for suitably complex systems. -michael If quantum mechanics is right, a lot of philosophers are in deep trouble. -John Searle
donw@zehntel.zehntel.com (Don White) (06/22/89)
In article <1385@lzfme.att.com> jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) writes: >> Barry W. Kort writes: > >> I don't think behaviorism is an accurate (or useful) model for mature >> sentient beings. (It may be OK for naive neural networks.) As to > >It would be interesting to put an artificial intelligence into >abreactive crisis. I have no idea how this would be done, or even >what it would mean, given the state of the art -- but it would be >interesting. > >Jim Winer ..!lzfme!jwi I believe that the human mind is capable of more than purely trained behaviours. (Although, who's to say that linear problem solving isn't a trained behaviour?) i.e. Both training and reasoning direct our behaviour. For a good exploration of possible AI psychosis, look for a work of fiction (Science Fiction pronounced Science Affliction) called I, ROBOT by Isaac Asimov. Aside from providing a warmly human look at future AI creations, this book also reminds us that all robots are undeniably created in our own image. Computers have always been an attempt to mimic (if not improve on) the processes of the human brain. If we reach our highest goal, the computer would react just as we do. I also believe in determinism AND freewill, puppy dogs, peanut butter, static electricity, and the fact that cold fusion will ultimately occur with nothing more than a potato and two different kinds of metals. I sure hope I'm right about puppy dogs. If you have any response, please email it. Our newsfeed is broken. Thanks, Don White zehntel!donw PO Box 271177, Concord CA. 94527-1177
brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) (06/23/89)
In article <234@unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips2.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: >> Brian Colfer > Michael Ellis Michael, - statement is my way of summerizing my understanding of your argument. I. Link between QM & CT - The brain is inherently chaotic due to fluctations caused by QM effects in the molecules of the brain. > If you are decide to seriously answer this article, please address this > point: Chaos theory says that minor fluctuations at points of bifurcation > in suitably complex systems have massive global effects. If those minor > fluctuations are genuinely random (as in QM, not merely the classical lack > of knowledge) then the global behavior also is *genuinely* random. Not just > "too many variables": If we knew *all* the variables and had a computer > of infinite capacity -- if we were Laplace demons -- we still could not > predict. Where is the evidence for a link between QM and any CT effect seen in the behavior of the brain? 1. CT has not been definitively shown to describe the behavior of the brain. Can you refer me to any articles which state that CT has been shown (rather than just preliminary findings) to describe brain behavior. 2. If CT and brain behavior is true why do you say that QM is the source of the small fluctuations. I think it is a pretty big leap to state that QM effects are of sufficient magnitude (I am not refering to their quantity) to generate chaos. 3. Not all physical systems are chaotic (in the CT sense) yet all physcical systems have QM effects. 4. While one cannot exclude QM as a source of flux since it is ubiquitous other sources may be dramatically more important for the system. For example, in describing the system of the brain one can easily imagine that a single uncontrolled (in an experimental sense) stimulus of sufficient strength as a source of flux. II. Determinism - QM+CT insures that there is an inherent non-determinism in the brain. > Ultimately, none of that stuff really is determined in the sense that > you want. And knock off the "mystical forces" crap. Would you prefer I [...] >>I'm saying that according to QM the brain is **just** as determined as >>everything else. If we deal with everything else (but the brain) as if it >>was determined why not treat the Brain the same way... > > And that's hardly very determined at all. ... Note my additions in [] > I *am* treating the brain like anything else. .... [I especially like this statement] .... > Nothing physical in the > universe is completely predictable. This doesn't usually matter for > phenomena whose attributes we care about [which] are approximated by linear > differential equations, like most ideal objects in engineering > books, or, similarly, those artifacts we have consciously designed after > their example. It is a great testimony to the cleverness of science that > we have designed things that behave so predictably under the press of > a button. [...] > With QM, even if you knew *everything*, you could not predict. Quantum > randomness is "metaphysical" in most viable interpretations. But the ardent > determinist however, might still sleaze out by asserting that quantum > randomness operates only at levels so small that it has no macroscopic > consequences. > > Now chaos theory predicts that microscopic fluctuations at points of > bifurcation have enormous effects on macroscopic global behavior. This > is a *hard* prediction of chaos theory. Those who doubt this are urged > to refer to any text on chaos theory. So Chaos theory + Quantum mechanics > are both required to assert the metaphysical and epistemic randomness > of global behavior for suitably complex systems. 1. I am not saying that the universe is completely predictable. 2. I am saying that some set of the brain's behavior is predictable. I think that you will agree with this ... the question that we are likely to disagree about is degree. I am merely speculating but I think you would say that the set of brain behavior which is predictable is either insignificant because of quality and/or quantity. Note: brain behaviors are responses of the brain to its environment. The characteristics of these responses are shaped by the interacting effects of genetic and personal history of the organism. For more on this see the section on beliefs and desires. I see behaviorism as a systematic exploration of this set of behaviors. Whether this set is insignificant is an empirical question. While the scope of behaviorism is narrow its power is unrivaled in psychology, save physiological psych. I think that the role of contemporary behaviorists is to explore the limits of the behavioral model both in theory and practice. I also see that some of the current limits is the ideological repugnance held by some regarding the application of science to humans. This is a political limit not a technical one. III. Levels of analysis - behaviorism is too reductionistic to be relevant for the real problems of people In this part of my discussion I flag speific points that I refer to with [N] where N is the number of my response. >>Either the brain is *all* physical matter or it isn't ... which do think? >>If it is then the same "laws" applicable to the rest of the universe >>apply to it also. If it isn't then you must evoke spirtual metaphysical >>crap. (Flame throwers on..? Let me get my fire suit) > > I'm not into the metaphysics of substance. Let's just say I prefer to > bracket that question, especially considering how incoherent the notion > of "material substance" has become this century *in the scientific > community*. > > Anyway, even if mind/brain identity theories are correct, we are probably > in deep trouble where meaningful predictions are concerned. > > To take an example from Fodor: Consider the function that maps physical > objects to money. Some money is in the form of valuable metal. Other > is in the form of slips of paper. And then there are electronic blips > in computers, and so on. Even if all this physical stuff *were* [1] > metaphysically deterministic can we ever reasonably expect physical > theories which predict the motions of all those physical objects to > tell us anything meaningful about economics? Except for the grossest of > predictions ("the gold itself will not suddenly transform into some > other metal"), physics can tell us very little about economics. > > Token theories of mind/brain identity are sort of like that. Just [2]-> what in the brain would correspond to the belief that your car needs > a valve job or the desire that your lover would stop cracking her > knuckles? Even simple beliefs and desires like these almost certainly [3]-> correspond to a disjunction of an enormous number of radically dissimilar -> brain states (assuming "brain state" even refers to something real). Brain -> states can get us to gross predictions ("thoughts cease when we run > over this brain with a steamroller"), but it isn't clear that brain state [4]-> talk will ever get us to meaningful predictions about beliefs that are [5]-> any better than folk psychology. > >In other words, brain state language deals with natural kinds that "go >together"; mind state language deals with yet other natural kinds that >"go together". Both languages really talk about the same stuff if that >makes you feel better metaphysically. But the two different languages >don't "go together" anymore than physics and economics (sort of like >a nightmarish version of applying Nelson Goodman's predicate "grue" to >emeralds). The realms of discourse are autonomous in that even if economics >is theoretically reducible to physics, the reduction is humanly impossible >and unknowable. Throw in what QM+Chaos theory and the reduction may well >be theoretically impossible as well. I see that there is a difference in the relevance of different levels of analysis. Subatomic physics tells us very little about the working of the brain. This is the same sort of argument that Skinner made when he described why he didn't think that phsyio-psych made behavioral analysis irrelavent. He said that who knows, some day someone may be able to link up all the chemical/synaptic connections and explain the micro mediation of behavior. What behaviorism essentially describes is a set of relationships between behaviors and their consequences. He is looking at the organism as a whole; the analysis [reduction and catagorization] is of the behaviors not the organism. Specific points: (from above) [1] Don't need to... physics is like physiology and behaviorism is like economics. The important thing is that at any level of inquiry we are using systematic, rigorus methodologies for analysis. Although, behaviorism has been much more empirical than economics. In this sense it might be at midpoint between these two levels of inquiry. [2] Probably some sort of complex synaptic response but we don't need to know this to predict and control this behavior. [3] Discussions about brain states (CA, MA and maybe NM) is probably silly. This type of discussion should be on synaptic nexuses ... see the current issue of Scientific America... but this is not my point anyways... one does not need to know the micro-medaition of behavior to describe contingencies of reinforcement. [4] Probably a trivial point but, what do you consider a meaningful prediction? [5] What meaningful predictions does folk psychology make? IV. What are behaviors - ? I don't understand your position. You do not state that beliefs, etc. are behaviors nor do state that they are not. You say that's its obvious. >>Are thoughts, beliefs, desires etc. behaviors? > > Not if behavior only counts what is publically observable. There is > a crucial part of beliefs and desires that you have to be the subject in > order to know. Skinner says that there are covert as well as overt behaviors and I agree with this. Private experiences are only avialable to the person experiencing them. These experiences are inherently excludable from any verifiable analysis since they can only be indirectly examined by self report. > And not if behavior leaves out intentionality: Why cannot intentionality be a behavior? albiet an unexplorable behavior. > What you are trying to do > is an intrinsic part of what you are doing even if B.F. Skinner does > not count it as scientifically important. Intentions are things we can not directly control or measure. While they exsist and are important and are intrinsic to the organism they cannot be a part of science. Science explores public experience it is a process of communicating inductions and deductions in a verifiable way. Scientific claims without possiblilty of verification for validity are nonsense. Speculations (e.g. thought experiments) are very different than claims (e.g. specification of the relationship between matter and energy or behavior and reinforcement). We can speculate about others' intentions but we can never really know about them. > Surely you know what beliefs and desires are. What nobody really knows > is what they "are made out of" (if indeed, they are made out of anything) > or "what they are caused by" or "how they are realized in our brains". If they are behaviors then why not treat them as being caused by the same type of things that cause other behaviors ... that is, environmental and genetic events. V. application of Behaviorism to AI ---------------------------------------------------------- Two assertions: 1. I think that a neural-net simulating the change in the future probability of behavior due to the consequences of the behavior is what AI research need to approach AI. 2. Skinner's views on verbal behavior can significantly improve the strategies for AI. ---------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================================= Brian | UC San Francisco | E-mail: USENET, Internet, BITNET Colfer | Dept. of Lab. Medicine |...!{ucbvax,uunet}!daedalus.ucsf.edu!brianc | S.F. CA, 94143-0134 USA | brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu | PH. (415) 476-2325 | BRIANC@UCSFCCA.BITNET ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- "We are here because you are there." --- The Tubes, 1981 =============================================================================
cam@edai.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550) (06/24/89)
In article <234@unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips2.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > QM is quantum mechanics. > > Without QM, one could still assert that things are *really* deterministic, > however it is not humanly possible to perform the computations or acquire > knowledge of all the variables. This is to say, metaphysically we would be > deterministic, but there would be overwhelming epistemic problems in making > any prediction. Ah. A subtle point. "Hey Bert! D'you think the cognitive police are onto us?" "Metaphysically speaking we are liable to arrest and imprisonment, but the cognitive police suffer from such overwhelming epistemic problems that we needn't worry." But all this came up in the context of (ahem) free will, the suggestion being that since free will is incompatible with determinism, then only if human behaviour can be shown to be undetermined can free will, responsibility, rational choice, civilisation as we know it, etc., be saved. I know that to lots of people free will is so _obviously_ incompatible with determinism that it need not even be argued. My problem is that I don't see any incompatibility, and I've never seen a good argument for it. I see no problem in having free will even without QM, chaos, or any other indeterministic insect in the clockwork of a completely (metaphysically) predictable Universe. I see even less problem in having free will in a Universe which simply _seems_ to be completely determined. I honestly don't know what all the fuss is about. I find the suggestion that my freedom of will depends upon some kind of random die in my head rather insultingly trivialising of the freedom of will. Don't we lock up unpredictable people in prisons and nuthouses? -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK
mbb@cbnewsh.ATT.COM (martin.b.brilliant) (06/25/89)
From an EXTREMELY LONG article <2134@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu>, by brianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer): > Where is the evidence for a link between QM and any CT effect seen in > the behavior of the brain? > > 1. CT has not been definitively shown to describe the behavior of > the brain. Can you refer me to any articles which state that > CT has been shown (rather than just preliminary findings) to > describe brain behavior. I can't even try to respond to the whole article, but this strikes me as perhaps overly skeptical. In the first place, there is no hope at this time of definitively describing the behavior of the brain at the level that we are talking about, namely free will and responsibility. The best we can do is try for plausible models, and use them as working hypotheses. Under the circumstances, we could do well to try alternative hypotheses, with chaos theory, but either with or without QM. In the second place, we know that without QM we have only virtual unpredictability, but not unpredictability in principle. Do we know that virtual unpredictability ("pseudo-unpredictability," to go along with the terminology of "pseudo-random" processes) does not fit the observations? It seems to me that we have no objective evidence of free will, but only a subjective feeling of free will. Given that, I would suppose that virtual unpredictability, based on a deterministic chaos model, is good enough. In the third place, we know that quantum mechanics is really with us, and invoking a deterministic model does not make it go away. The question is not whether quantum mechanics affects the behavior of the brain, but how much it does so. M. B. Brilliant Marty AT&T-BL HO 3D-520 (201) 949-1858 Holmdel, NJ 07733 att!hounx!marty1 or marty1@hounx.ATT.COM Disclaimer: Opinions stated herein are mine unless and until my employer explicitly claims them; then I lose all rights to them.
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/28/89)
> Chris Malcolm >> Michael Ellis >> QM is quantum mechanics. >> >> Without QM, one could still assert that things are *really* deterministic, >> however it is not humanly possible to perform the computations or acquire >> knowledge of all the variables. This is to say, metaphysically we would be >> deterministic, but there would be overwhelming epistemic problems in making >> any prediction. >Ah. A subtle point. >"Hey Bert! D'you think the cognitive police are onto us?" >"Metaphysically speaking we are liable to arrest and imprisonment, but >the cognitive police suffer from such overwhelming epistemic problems >that we needn't worry." I notice your failure to offer equally cynical remarks to those metaphysicists against whom my argument was directed, namely the "scientific" metaphysicists who argue "the complexity of human behavior only appears random, but it's *really* determined, even if we could never carry out the prediction in practice." That's as metaphysical as you can get! >But all this came up in the context of (ahem) free will, the suggestion >being that since free will is incompatible with determinism, then only >if human behaviour can be shown to be undetermined can free will, >responsibility, rational choice, civilisation as we know it, etc., be >saved. I know that to lots of people free will is so _obviously_ >incompatible with determinism that it need not even be argued. There are those who have metaphysical worldviews, that is, those who see things made out of mental and/or physical substances that operate according to strictly deterministic causal laws. This includes a whole lot of people in the scientific community. See for yourself how many hardcore determinists you will find among computer science types. >My problem is that I don't see any incompatibility, and I've never seen a >good argument for it. I see no problem in having free will even without >QM, chaos, or any other indeterministic insect in the clockwork of a >completely (metaphysically) predictable Universe. I see even less >problem in having free will in a Universe which simply _seems_ to be >completely determined. I honestly don't know what all the fuss is about. Ever since Newton, philosophers have turned out a fair number of elegant arguments that free will and determinism are *not* contradictory. For some people, a nondeterministic universe takes all the fun out of free will. And I happen to enjoy shredding up classical deterministic arguments, which reopens the possibility of alternative "swerving of the atoms" accounts of free will. Otherwise, I think we agree. For the most part, I think metaphysical determinism is irrelevant to any meaningful notion of free will. >I find the suggestion that my freedom of will depends upon some kind of >random die in my head... Now you're being a reductionist. What makes you think the higher levels depend on the lower levels? Why not vice versa? Or some other possibility? Why can't the "randomness" that appears at one given level be due to the autonomy of other levels? >... rather insultingly trivialising of the freedom of will. Why would you be insulted if you found out freedom of the will depended on something random rather than something deterministic? Even if your choice does "depend on" randomness, it doesn't "depend on" it in any meaningful way. Why should you care? >Don't we lock up unpredictable people in prisons and nuthouses? Sometimes it is the predictable ones who are more dangerous. -michael
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/28/89)
> Scott Burke >> Michael Ellis >> Belief in free will naturally arises whenever the background belief >> system declares that all is controlled by some all-pervasive X, whether >> X be some omnipotent being or some crackpot scientific theory. Either >> way, something has to give when the current mythology directly contradicts >> the direct first person evidence every person has access to. > I have heard many claims that determinism contradicts first person >experience, but I have yet to hear such a claim which was not really the more >mundane "determinism contradicts A BELIEF about first person experience." There are lots of kinds of free will. Leaving out the spiritual or mystical versions, I assume we are talking about the thesis that mentalisms like beliefs and desires and volitions are real, that we actually do will our actions, that we can and ought to actually use our own reason to bear on these actions, and that we are thus accountable in various ways for what we do depending on whether it was on purpose, accidental, and so on. Now it is true that I believe something like the above, just as I believe that I am typing these very characters. But the belief is not a matter of faith, rather, it is a matter of experience, plain old observation. I experience myself typing these characters, I experience my efforts bringing my intentions into action, I experience my typing being caused by my desire to express myself. These are not just a beliefs about first person experience, these are first person experiences, just as my perception of these words is not just a belief that these words are in front of me. >It is my understanding that the concept of free will itself can be readily >traceable to the metaphysics of the european middle ages (free will as it is >contemporarily argued -- not "moral responsibility" as presented by >hellenistic philosophies), and as such, most free will arguments are not in >and of themselves statements about direct experience, but rather "expansions" >of the one concept into the full blown metaphysical system which requires it* >(ergo, man's ethical nature + personality + humanocentrism +...). I suspect that most concepts can be "readily traceable to the metaphysics of the european middle ages" and much further back than that, and I might add that determinism itself is as fully blown a metaphysical system as they get, one which requires the absolute omnipotence of cosmic law (ergo, man's nilpotence + irreality of the mind + nomocentrism +...) Let's do it again as Erasmus vs Luther. >Just what does this "first person experience" of free will consist of, >without relying on other metaphysical postulates of the system to describe it >(if possible) ?? I hope I've covered that. -michael
jwi@lzfme.att.com (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (06/28/89)
Chris Malcolm > >Don't we lock up unpredictable people in prisons and nuthouses? Michael Ellis > Sometimes it is the predictable ones who are more dangerous. Jim Winer It is always the *predictable* ones who are locked up. The antisocial who understand what they are doing are locked up in jails. Usually what they are doing is looking for a secure place to live and a sturctured environment where they don't have to take personal responsibility for themselves. The antisocial who don't understand what they are doing are locked up in nuthouses. They are usually quite predictable, but we don't like the way they behave. The social (who fall into neither of the above categories) are locked up in the social fabric where they regularly bore each other to death. We have never found a good way of dealing with the unpredictable ones. They are the dangerous ones because they occasionally do something absolutely disasterous to the social fabric -- like think. Jim Winer ..!lzfme!jwi Those persons who advocate censorship offend my religion. Pax Probiscus! Rarely able to reply to email sucessfully. The opinions expressed here are not necessarily
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (06/29/89)
In article <443@edai.ed.ac.uk> cam@edai (Chris Malcolm) writes: > I find the suggestion that my freedom of will depends upon some kind of > random die in my head rather insultingly trivialising of the freedom of > will. Don't we lock up unpredictable people in prisons and nuthouses? I define Free Will as the ability to make choices consistent with ones Knowledge, Beliefs, and Values. But when Dorothy meets the Scarecrow at the Fork in the Road, a Random Choice is the only solution to Selecting The Way. Otherwise one gets Stuck Forever. --Barry