siping@cerc.wvu.wvnet.edu (Siping Liu) (09/22/89)
I remember there was a discussion on the net about a "Chinese room" problem half a year ago. I never know the exact problem definition. Can someone tell me what it is? Thanks in advance. Siping Liu.
bill@wayback.unm.edu (william horne) (09/22/89)
In article <235@cerc.wvu.wvnet.edu.edu> siping@cerc.wvu.wvnet.edu (Siping Liu) writes: >I remember there was a discussion on the net about a >"Chinese room" problem half a year ago. I never know >the exact problem definition. Can someone tell me >what it is? I think you might be talking about the problem Searle poses in his paper, "Minds, Brains, and Programs", Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1980). He poses the following: Suppose there is a black box which accepts Chinese as input and performs a translation into English as output. Does this imply that the black box "understands" Chinese? He claims not by the following argument: Suppose in the box is a man who neither understands Chinese or English. When presented with a Chinese string of words, he simply matches the words and sentance structure according to a set of rules which dictates how to manipulate the input. However, he is at no time aware of the meaning of the input he is manipulating. And thus he does not "understand" Chinese. This example is relavant to AI, because it questions the validity of the Turing Test as a test of "understanding", as well as questioning the legitimacy of rule based systems as models of intelligence. Is this really any different than what we do in our heads anyhow? What is so bad about a complex system of rules being applied. Maybe the understanding is in the rules, not in the man manipulating them. In this sense Searle is imposing a homunculus on the system. Maybe there is just rules, no man.
rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) (09/24/89)
In article <567@ariel.unm.edu> bill@wayback.unm.edu (william horne) writes: >This example is relavant to AI, because it questions the validity of the >Turing Test as a test of "understanding", as well as questioning the >legitimacy of rule based systems as models of intelligence. One serious flaw in the Chinese Room Problem is that it relies on the so-called 'conduit metaphor' (originally described by Michael Reddy in A. Ortony's _Metaphor_and_Thought_ Cambridge U. Press 1979). That metaphor assumes that meaning is essentially contained in the linguistic expression. A logical consequence of this belief is that one can devise a set of principles for translating from one language into another without losing any of the semantic 'stuff' that a linguistic expression conveys. The conduit metaphor is very powerful and useful as a means of illuminating the behavior of language, but, like all analogies, it breaks down. Those who deal with real language to language translation know that there is no one-to-one match between expressions in one language and those in another. An alternative view of linguistic communication is to assume that linguistic expressions merely help to shape the flow of mental pictures (alas, another metaphor :-) that constitute the end product of communication. Therefore, there is no necessary one-to-one correspondence between linguistic expressions in one language and those in another. The trick to translation is to construct expressions in the target language that evoke the same thoughts as those in the source language. And this may even be impossible without modification of the target language (i.e. the creation of new words to fit new experiences). So I claim that the Chinese room problem rests on incorrect assumptions about the nature of language and understanding. -- Rick Wojcik csnet: rwojcik@atc.boeing.com uucp: uw-beaver!bcsaic!rwojcik
sp299-ad@violet.berkeley.edu (Celso Alvarez) (09/26/89)
In article <15157@bcsaic.UUCP> rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) writes: >. . . The trick to translation is to construct expressions in the >target language that evoke the same thoughts as those in the source language. Much more than thoughts are evoked by language. How do you translate the signalling of identity, roles, and social relationships? >And this may even be impossible without modification of the target language >(i.e. the creation of new words to fit new experiences). So I claim that the >Chinese room problem rests on incorrect assumptions about the nature of >language and understanding. I'm not familiar with the Chinese room problem, but where do you/Searle leave the question of interpretation? There is more to language than understanding. Celso Alvarez sp299-ad@violet.berkeley.edu
ray@bcsaic.UUCP (Ray Allis) (09/29/89)
In article <15157@bcsaic.UUCP> rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) writes: >One serious flaw in the Chinese Room Problem is that it relies on the >so-called 'conduit metaphor' (originally described by Michael Reddy in A. >Ortony's _Metaphor_and_Thought_ Cambridge U. Press 1979). That metaphor >assumes that meaning is essentially contained in the linguistic expression. A >logical consequence of this belief is that one can devise a set of principles >for translating from one language into another without losing any of the >semantic 'stuff' that a linguistic expression conveys. The conduit metaphor >is very powerful and useful as a means of illuminating the behavior of >language, but, like all analogies, it breaks down. Those who deal with real >language to language translation know that there is no one-to-one match >between expressions in one language and those in another. An alternative view >of linguistic communication is to assume that linguistic expressions merely >help to shape the flow of mental pictures (alas, another metaphor :-) that >constitute the end product of communication. Therefore, there is no necessary >one-to-one correspondence between linguistic expressions in one language and >those in another. The trick to translation is to construct expressions in the >target language that evoke the same thoughts as those in the source language. >And this may even be impossible without modification of the target language >(i.e. the creation of new words to fit new experiences). So I claim that the >Chinese room problem rests on incorrect assumptions about the nature of >language and understanding. It seems to me your position is in fact very close to Searle's. The problem I have with his little parable is that he pretends that the output from the Chinese room is satisfactory (or rather lets us assume so). I believe that if the room does not "understand" Chinese, and he argues that it does not, the output will not be satisfactory. BTW, in his original illustration there is no inter-language translation, it's Chinese in and Chinese out, with the transformation rules in English. "But the point of the [Chinese room] argument, I think has been lost in a lot of the subsequent literature developed around this, so I want to emphasize the point of it. The point of the argument is not that somehow or other we have an "intuition" that I don't understand Chinese, that I find myself *inclined to say* that I don't understand Chinese but, who knows, perhaps I really do. That is not the point. The point of the story is to remind us of a conceptual truth that we knew all along; namely, that there is a distinction between manipulating the syntactical elements of languages and actually understanding the language at a semantic level. What is lost in the AI *simulation of* cognitive behavior is the distinction between syntax and semantics. Now the point of the story can be stated more generally. A computer program, by definition, has to be defined purely syntactically. It is defined in terms of certain formal operations performed by the machine. That is what makes the digital computer such a powerful instrument. One and the same hardware system can instantiate an indefinite number of different computer programs, and one and the same program can be run on different hardwares, because the program has to be defined purely formally. But for that reason the formal simulation of language understanding will never by itself be the same as duplication. Why? Because in the case of actually understanding a language, we have something more than a formal or syntactical level. We have a semantics. We do not just shuffle uninterpreted symbols, we actually know what they mean." John Searle, "Minds and Brains Without Programs", Mindwaves, Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield, eds., 1987. Your comments that "there is no necessary one-to-one correspondence between linguistic expressions in one language and those in another." and "The trick to translation is to construct expressions in the target language that evoke the same thoughts as those in the source language." are really what prompted this posting. I have several times stated my belief that AI's "natural language understanding" and "machine translation", in their present form as symbol manipulation, are futile efforts. The phrase 'computational linguistics' betrays a deep misunderstanding of what language *is*, i.e. a means to communicate *experience*. "Understanding" is the subjective experience evoked in a receiving mind by language, whether spoken, written or gestured. Translation *requires* understanding, missing (so far) in computers because symbol systems, which are by design form without content, lack experiences to evoke.
rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) (09/29/89)
Celso Alvarez (CA) writes: me>. . . The trick to translation is to construct expressions in the me>target language that evoke the same thoughts as those in the source me>language. CA> Much more than thoughts are evoked by language. How do you translate CA> the signalling of identity, roles, and social relationships? I think that such concepts have to be represented as thought structures, since they have an impact on language structure. But your question may be filed under my general question: Just what do 'Chinese Room' debaters think a translation is? What criteria do you use to judge that a translation from one language to another is successful? My position is that there is no such thing as translation in an absolute sense. A seemingly trivial example is the translation of expressions that refer to language-specific grammatical structure. Thus, there is no way to translate French 'tutoyer' directly into English. You must rely on circumlocution. It means roughly 'use the intimate 2nd person singular form of the verb'. But practical translators might take an equivalent French expression to 'Don't tutoyer me' into English as 'Don't use that tone of voice with me', or some such thing. But it is difficult to say what makes one such translation better than another. People can get into heated arguments over such questions. N. Boubaki (NB) writes: >...Those who deal with real >language to language translation know that there is no one-to-one match >between expressions in one language and those in another. NB> But this difficulty would affect the native Chinese speaker and the NB> Chinese Room Demon equally. That is one premise of Searle's NB> argument - the "mechanical" system is presumed to be just as competent NB> (not necesarily perfect) at translation as the "understanding" system. I know, but I think that Searle, like most of us, has implicitly adopted the conduit metaphor in his conceptualization of the problem. He really believes that there is some absolute sense whereby an expression in one language corresponds to one in another. This seems clear from his insistence that the translation itself be 'mechanical'--in other words, symbol manipulation. Those involved in translation understand that the translation process requires editing and revision. Who determines that the "mechanical" system is "just as competent" if there is no mechanical basis for judging competence? But that is just what you need to do in order to bring about translation. You need mechanize the ability to judge and revise. That would be tantamount to mechanizing the understanding process, since it is only by understanding expressions in two different languages that you can judge their equivalence. I want to be careful to distinguish modern Machine Translation efforts, which do not attempt to automate the revision process (rather they attempt to facilitate it), from an ideal MT system, which would require mechanized understanding to do its job properly. So I agree with you that Searle ultimately begs the question. The question is whether or not 'understanding' is a mechanizable process. He either assumes that it is not, or he doesn't have a proper conception of the nature of translation. Ray Allis (RA) writes: RA>It seems to me your position is in fact very close to Searle's. The problem RA>I have with his little parable is that he pretends that the output from RA>the Chinese room is satisfactory (or rather lets us assume so). I believe RA>that if the room does not "understand" Chinese, and he argues that it does RA>not, the output will not be satisfactory... From my above remarks, you should see that I am closer to your viewpoint than Searle's. In fact, I find myself largely in agreement with most of what you said. I would only quibble on the issue of whether or not modern NLP efforts, including MT, are futile. The pragmatic purpose of such work is to increase human efficiency in language-intensive work on computers. There are many good things you can do without addressing the need for full language understanding. MT (really Machine-Assisted Translation) can improve the output of a human translator, even though the MAT system may produce some pretty bad translations. Our grammar-checking system is proving useful in the writing of aircraft maintenance manuals. But this takes us away from the philosophical question of whether or not you can mechanize language understanding. -- Rick Wojcik csnet: rwojcik@atc.boeing.com uucp: uw-beaver!bcsaic!rwojcik
rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) (09/29/89)
In article <822kimj@yvax.byu.edu> kimj@yvax.byu.edu writes: >Could you elaborate what you mean by "the semantic stuff"? Say I translate >"kick the bucket" into "die" in Chinese. Does the translation lose what >you call "the semantic stuff"? I want to recommend to you Ronald Langacker's tour de force Foundations_of_ Cognitive_Grammar. v.1. Stanford U. Press, 1987. I particularly call your attention to the discussion on and around p. 93, where he lays out a clear distinction between literal and figurative senses. He argues quite convincingly that you can take neither a purely compositional, nor a purely conventional, approach to meaning. I do not know how his work, and that of other 'cognitive grammarians' will end up affecting the world of computational linguistics, but it does help to point up many areas for future research. I do not think that there is any precise way to translate 'kick the bucket' into Chinese, and I don't think that the opening scene of the movie 'It's a Mad, Mad World' can be properly understood by Chinese speakers, even in its dubbed version. (That scene has a great sight gag involving the 'kick the bucket' idiom.) Semantic stuff is very often lost when idioms get translated. But it is the compositionally-derived stuff that gets lost, not the conventional stuff. -- Rick Wojcik csnet: rwojcik@atc.boeing.com uucp: uw-beaver!bcsaic!rwojcik
dmocsny@uceng.UC.EDU (daniel mocsny) (10/01/89)
In article <15336@bcsaic.UUCP>, rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) writes: > What criteria do you use to judge that a translation from one > language to another is successful? How about: the same criteria (note: plural) we use to judge whether native language speakers can communicate with each other successfully. > My position is that there is no such thing > as translation in an absolute sense. Two languages aren't even necessary. Two people who speak the "same" language can misunderstand each other. Two translation steps are already going on there---from the speaker's thoughts into a serial symbol string, and then from the string to the hearer's thoughts. If the hearer's thoughts differ substantially from the speaker's, then the translation has failed. However, I think absolute translation *must* be possible in principle, unless we believe that the human mind has an infinite information content. That is, if we view communication as a thought-transfer between two thinkers, then some finite serial data stream must represent the thoughts of the speaker in sufficient detail to allow the hearer to reconstruct them with arbitrary accuracy. We may not know how to move thoughts from one person to another as one would copy files between computers, but the materialist assumption says it must be possible. (If the brain turns out to be not a very convenient medium to "write" on, then one might have to resort to physically reconstructing features of the sender's brain in the recipient. "Let me give you a piece of my mind..." This won't be an easy trick, but it can't be impossible.) > A seemingly trivial example is the > translation of expressions that refer to language-specific grammatical > structure. Thus, there is no way to translate French 'tutoyer' directly into > English. You must rely on circumlocution. It means roughly 'use the intimate > 2nd person singular form of the verb'. But practical translators might take > an equivalent French expression to 'Don't tutoyer me' into English as 'Don't > use that tone of voice with me', or some such thing. But it is difficult to > say what makes one such translation better than another. People can get into > heated arguments over such questions. I'm not sure what you mean by "directly." Perhaps you should use "concisely." After all, we are English/American speakers here, and Lo! we can certainly grasp some idea of the action "tutoyer" refers to from your brief description. Since we start off without the necessary concepts, you simply have to hand us the underlying knowledge heirachy for us to understand. That doesn't make your translation "bad." It simply means you can't lop off the top floor of a skyscraper, ship it across town, and expect it to float the same distance above bare ground. You can speak concisely when you share a large base of common knowledge/experience with your hearer. If you don't, then you must recursively expand your high-level expressions until you reach the level of your listener's available knowledge. Consider how differently you might describe what you did at work today to your boss, to a coworker, to a casual friend, and to your mother. Thus translating a static word-string from one language into another should be, in general, about as hard as inferring a person's hair color by observing the mud they have tracked onto a carpet. A person's language is essentially a set of high-level pointers into the large knowledge network they cart around in their head. Without an accurate model of that network, translating those pointers into another language (with all its different cultural baggage) will be tough. In any case, the "goodness" of the translation must always depend on the recipient. Dan Mocsny dmocsny@uceng.uc.edu
rim@csadfa.oz (Bob McKay) (10/04/89)
From article <2281@uceng.UC.EDU>, by dmocsny@uceng.UC.EDU (daniel mocsny): > Two languages aren't even necessary. Two people who speak the "same" > language can misunderstand each other. Two translation steps are already > going on there---from the speaker's thoughts into a serial symbol > string, and then from the string to the hearer's thoughts...... The conception here of speaking and listening as translation is a little worrying: it has somewhat of the flavour of the homunculus theories of sensation, with the same dangers of an infinite regress. > ......If the hearer's > thoughts differ substantially from the speaker's, then the translation > has failed. It's almost never true that we would even wish the hearer's thoughts to be substantially the same as the utterer's: I grant you that we usually do wish there to be a correspondence of some sort between their thoughts, but the problem lies in defining that correspondence. I doubt if it can be defined without some prior understanding of the relationship between syntax and semantics, which is where this discussion started off. > > However, I think absolute translation *must* be possible in principle, > unless we believe that the human mind has an infinite information > content. Is it clear that the human mind has any information content (in Shannon's sense) at all? We don't yet understand how the human brain holds knowledge, or even if there is any level at which it is discretised: if not, it's not at all clear that information theoretic measures apply, Cheers Bob McKay -- Bob McKay Phone: +61 62 68 8169 fax: +61 62 68 8581 Dept. Computer Science ACSNET,CSNET: rim@csadfa.cs.adfa.oz Aust. Defence Force Academy UUCP: ...!uunet!munnari!csadfa.cs.adfa.oz!rim Canberra ACT 2600 AUSTRALIA ARPA: rim%csadfa.cs.adfa.oz@uunet.uu.net
sp299-ad@violet.berkeley.edu (Celso Alvarez) (10/05/89)
In article <15336@bcsaic.UUCP> rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) writes:
CA> Much more than thoughts are evoked by language. How do you translate
CA> the signalling of identity, roles, and social relationships?
RW>I think that such concepts have to be represented as thought structures,
RW>since they have an impact on language structure.
If you're talking about (mental) typifications of social relationships,
that's one thing. Typifications generate expectations which underly the
production and interpretation of talk. But the signalling of identity
etc. is a situated process, and by this I imply that there may be no
matching between typifications and actual behavior. Additionally,
certain linguistic markers of social dimensions are inherently ambiguous
(this ambiguity may be of a different kind than lexical ambiguity).
I don't know how you can translate social markers unless you establish
certain universals (or, at least, certain generalizable transcultural
principles) of socio-interactional meanings. I don't think you can do
this without incorporating context as a variable in those universals.
And I'm not sure that even then you can give account of the dynamic
reconstitution of those general principles (thought structures?)
in and through context, during the course of an interaction.
Celso Alvarez
sp299-ad@violet.berkeley.edu
lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) (10/05/89)
From article <2245@csadfa.oz>, by rim@csadfa.oz (Bob McKay): " From article <2281@uceng.UC.EDU>, by dmocsny@uceng.UC.EDU (daniel mocsny): " > ... Two translation steps are already " > going on there---from the speaker's thoughts into a serial symbol " > string, and then from the string to the hearer's thoughts...... " " The conception here of speaking and listening as translation is a little " worrying: it has somewhat of the flavour of the homunculus theories of " sensation, with the same dangers of an infinite regress. On the contrary. Translating (and, within a single language, paraphrasing) are concrete everyday activities. Conceiving of speaking and listening in these terms makes it possible to avoid appealing to a mysterious internal stream of thoughts or concepts or cognitive structures or whatever, and so to avoid any regress at all. Yours, A. Behaviorist
dmocsny@uceng.UC.EDU (daniel mocsny) (10/05/89)
In article <2245@csadfa.oz>, rim@csadfa.oz (Bob McKay) writes: > From article <2281@uceng.UC.EDU>, by dmocsny@uceng.UC.EDU (daniel mocsny): > > However, I think absolute translation *must* be possible in principle, > > unless we believe that the human mind has an infinite information > > content. > > Is it clear that the human mind has any information content (in Shannon's > sense) at all? We don't yet understand how the human brain holds knowledge, > or even if there is any level at which it is discretised: if not, it's not > at all clear that information theoretic measures apply, If we hold to the materialist assumption, then the function of the brain (i.e., intelligent behavior) must follow directly from its physical structure. We can describe this physical structure to any arbitrary precision with some finite string of characters, right? I mean, you've only got so much material in your head, and only a finite number of structures, interconnections, cells, etc. So, if we can in principle describe a brain in sufficient detail to permit a sufficiently capable constructor to reconstruct an arbitrarily exact copy, then all the information content of the brain must be tagging along for the ride. To say otherwise is, I think, to believe in Dualism (not that can prove that's wrong...). So even if we don't know the mechanism whereby the brain stores its information, we must be able to conceptualize its information content indirectly through the complexity of its physical structure. Note that this is not likely to be a very efficient basis for communication. It may be rather like reconstructing all of IBM to copy a floppy disk. Obviously, you would like to save yourself some trouble by piecing together the code whereby IBM puts information on a disk. But even if you don't know how to do that, you can see that some upper bound must exist on how hard that job would be. I do not know if the information content of the brain can be greater than the information content of the shortest description of the physical structure of the brain. However, I doubt that it can be INFINITELY greater. Dan Mocsny dmocsny@uceng.uc.edu
rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) (10/07/89)
In article <1989Oct5.080214.7683@agate.berkeley.edu> sp299-ad@violet.berkeley.edu (Celso Alvarez) writes: >CA> Much more than thoughts are evoked by language. How do you translate >CA> the signalling of identity, roles, and social relationships? >RW>I think that such concepts have to be represented as thought structures, >RW>since they have an impact on language structure. >If you're talking about (mental) typifications of social relationships, >that's one thing. Typifications generate expectations which underly the All I meant was that anything which influences linguistic structure ipso facto has to be represented as some kind of thought structure. However you want to represent those thought structures is open to debate. I agreed with your implicit point that they are not represented well in modern linguistic theory. But I don't think that my statement should have generated any controversy. -- Rick Wojcik csnet: rwojcik@atc.boeing.com uucp: uw-beaver!bcsaic!rwojcik
rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) (10/07/89)
In article <5026@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) writes: >" The conception here of speaking and listening as translation is a little >" worrying: it has somewhat of the flavour of the homunculus theories of >" sensation, with the same dangers of an infinite regress. >On the contrary. Translating (and, within a single language, >paraphrasing) are concrete everyday activities. Conceiving of >speaking and listening in these terms makes it possible to >avoid appealing to a mysterious internal stream of thoughts >or concepts or cognitive structures or whatever, and so to >avoid any regress at all. > Yours, > A. Behaviorist Dear A. Behaviorist, Conceiving of speaking and listening without appealing to an internal stream of thoughts or concepts or cognitive structures or whatever is what is mysterious. What do you think? (Oops! I meant "What do you say?" Sorry. :-) Your fellow mystic, R. U. Kidding -- Rick Wojcik csnet: rwojcik@atc.boeing.com uucp: uw-beaver!bcsaic!rwojcik
sp299-ad@violet.berkeley.edu (Celso Alvarez) (10/09/89)
In article <15578@bcsaic.UUCP> rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) writes: >>RW>I think that such concepts [as social identity, etc.] have to be >>RW>represented as thought structures, >>RW>since they have an impact on language structure. CA>If you're talking about (mental) typifications of social relationships, CA>that's one thing. Typifications generate expectations which underly the RW>All I meant was that anything which influences linguistic structure ipso RW>facto has to be represented as some kind of thought structure. However RW>you want to represent those thought structures is open to debate. That's why I opened the debate. Am I sure that I do want to represent those categories/typifications as thought structures? Is it analytically or heuristically productive to work with a notion such as `thought structure' to help explain linguistic behavior? (because we're talking about this, aren't we?). Between linguistic action and cognition there's still a missing link, both in Searle and beyond Searle, in discourse analysis or ethnomethodology. RW>I agreed with your implicit point that they are not represented RW>well in modern linguistic theory. But I don't think that my statement RW>should have generated any controversy. And I agree with your view on translation, however different our approaches may be. But I'm not that interested in contributing to fill the holes in modern linguistic theory. In other, socio-interactionally oriented linguistic disciplines, yes. It's not my intention to create unnecessary controversy. I'm just trying to translate your language (`thought structures', social relationships as `notions' and not actions) into mine. Celso Alvarez sp299-ad@violet.berkeley.edu
andrew@dtg.nsc.com (Lord Snooty @ The Giant Poisoned Electric Head ) (10/10/89)
A family aunt once summed up this problem by exclaiming "My! This room really has PERSONALITY!!" couldn't resist. -- ........................................................................... Andrew Palfreyman and the 'q' is silent, andrew@dtg.nsc.com as in banana time sucks
lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) (10/10/89)
From article <15594@bcsaic.UUCP>, by rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik): " " Dear A. Behaviorist, " Conceiving of speaking and listening without appealing to an internal " stream of thoughts or concepts or cognitive structures or whatever is what is " mysterious. What do you think? (Oops! I meant "What do you say?" Sorry. " :-) As scientists we ought to be concerned with devising theories that explain facts. There is no theory which appeals to a stream of thoughts which explains any fact of speaking or listening, so far as I know. Whether Rick can manage to conceive of speaking and listening without such appeal is not a matter of any great scientific interest. So, B. A. Behaviorist
eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) (10/11/89)
In article <5062@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) writes:
;As scientists we ought to be concerned with devising theories that
;explain facts.
As scientists we ought to be concerned with devising ways of investigating the
world that help us ascertain what the facts are in the first place.