bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/14/89)
In article <2418@munnari.oz.au> ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > In article <73510@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: > > Einstein observed that Man is part of Nature, too. > From the rather banal observation that human beings exist, > no conclusions can be drawn about whether the scheme of > things can make mistakes UNTIL we have first established > that "is able to form intentions" (or some such property) > is one of the few properties which does transfer like that. > This has not been done. Are you telling me that you disbelieve that human beings are capable of intentional behavior? > In fact there is a rather bigger presumption in this woodshed. The > assumption is that ``Nature'' refers to something. But what is the > genus of ``Nature'' and what are its differentia? I have a strong > suspicion that ``Nature'' as a ``thing'' may be about as sensible as > a set of all sets. I don't know. Ask a taxonomist. > > Joseph Campbell suggests that we are Nature's Consciousness. > Well, it's a lovely sentiment, but what does it _mean_? It > certainly can't be using "consciousness" in the way that it > is used when referring to people and animals. Consciousness > generally includes the idea of awareness of one's surroundings, > and what are the surroundings of ``Nature''? [It's a very > anthropocentric claim too, but that's another story.] He also suggests that humans are not the only beings who possess consciousness. I happen to agree with him. > > So at least a part of Nature is personifiable and capable > > of intentional behavior. > Yes, but that demonstrates nothing about ``Nature'', any more than > the presence of metal fillings in my teeth proves _me_ to be made > of metal. I don't follow your logic. > > I sometimes make mistakes on behalf of Nature. > How do you know this? How does the goddess Natura tell you > what she wants you to do on her behalf? Does she appear to you > in a dream? Sometimes. And sometimes she appears to me in a posting on USENET or on the face of a child who wanders into the Science Museum. As near as I can tell, the Children of Nature wish to survive and thrive. The evidence for that is overwhelming. --Barry Kort
ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) (10/15/89)
In article <74029@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: > In article <2418@munnari.oz.au> ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > > From the rather banal observation that human beings exist, > > no conclusions can be drawn about whether the scheme of > > things can make mistakes UNTIL we have first established > > that "is able to form intentions" (or some such property) > > is one of the few properties which does transfer like that. > > This has not been done. > Are you telling me that you disbelieve that human beings are > capable of intentional behavior? Oh my, that is the direct opposite of what I was saying. Let me try to say it very simply. Kort's argument had the basic form human beings are capable of forming intentions (NOT DISPUTED) human beings are part of ``nature'' (NOT DISPUTED) -------------------------------------------------- ``nature'' is capable of forming intentions. In schematic form, the argument looks like X has property P X is part of Y ---------------- Y has property P Now there are some valid arguments of this form: A battleship's bridge is too big to fit in a Volkswagen A battleship's bridge is part of a battleship -------------------------------------------------- A battleship is too big to fit in a Volkswagen So when P = "is too big to fit in a Volkswagen" the argument is usually valid. But there are some invalid arguments of the same form: An elephant's foot is small enough to fit in a Volkswagen An elephant's foot is part of an elephant --------------------------------------------------------- ** An elephant is small enough to fit in a Volkswagen. My point is that we cannot simply assume that Y has property P just because Y has a part X which has property P. Surely this is an elementary logical observation? Let's try an example which is closer to home. Human beings usually act rationally Mobs are composed of human beings ----------------------------------- ** Mobs usually act rationally Hm. That didn't work, did it? Let's try another one. Joseph Mengele was evil. Joseph Mengele was part of ``nature''. ------------------------------------- ** Nature was evil. That didn't work either. I concede it as a logical possibility that ``nature'' may be capable of forming intentions, making mistakes, &c (though I can't pretend to find it credible). That was not the point that I was trying to make. My point was that the form of the argument is one whose validity cannot be assumed. > > > Joseph Campbell suggests that we are Nature's Consciousness. > He also suggests that humans are not the only beings who possess > consciousness. I happen to agree with him. So? Every known human civilisation has taken this as axiomatic until recent times (gods and ghosts are not human, but are thought to be conscious). The last animal trials in France took place in the 18th century, and it doesn't make sense to try something unless it knew what it was doing. If the argument "X is conscious, X is part of nature, therefore nature is conscious" is valid, then it is valid if there is even one such X. If it is invalid, it remains invalid even if there are 10**15 such X. Every virus in the world could be conscious, and that would not validate the argument. Only Barry Kort might be conscious, and that would not invalidate the argument. > > > So at least a part of Nature is personifiable and capable > > > of intentional behavior. > > Yes, but that demonstrates nothing about ``Nature'', any more than > > the presence of metal fillings in my teeth proves _me_ to be made > > of metal. > I don't follow your logic. That is regrettably clear. This is yet another invalid example of the "X is P, X is part of Y, therefore Y is P" scheme (P is "made of metal"), to drive home the point that the form of the argument is not one which guarantees validity. > As near as I can tell, the Children of Nature wish to survive > and thrive. The evidence for that is overwhelming. Now we have another personification, the Children of Nature. AIDS viruses are children of nature. Pasturella pestis cells are children of nature. Trypanosomes are children of nature. The Europeans who brought smallpox, scarlet fever, measles, mumps, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, plague, and later cholera and yellow fever to the native population of America, reducing said population from the low hundreds of millions to the low tens of millions in a century or so were also Children of Nature, and so were the diseases which helped them in this accomplishment. I would be glad to hear of any evidence that the Children of Nature *in general* had any interest in the survival and thriving of any other children of nature that they didn't happen to be using as a food source. Oh yes, here we have another instance of the scheme which doesn't work: Human beings want human beings to be healthy Human beings are part of nature -------------------------------------------- Nature wants human beings to be healthy I am basically an optimistic person, with benevolent intentions to all (something to do with never having been hungry and never having had any enemies). But I can find no justification for these attitudes in my biology textbooks (and yes I have read Maynard-Smith).
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/16/89)
In article <2433@munnari.oz.au> ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > I am basically an optimistic person, with benevolent intentions to all > (something to do with never having been hungry and never having had any > enemies). But I can find no justification for these attitudes in my > biology textbooks (and yes I have read Maynard-Smith). I think you would be more likely to find them in books on Theology or Ethics than in books on Biology. See, for instance, _The Tao is Silent_, by Philosopher/Logician Raymond Smullyan. --Barry Kort
jwi@cbnewsj.ATT.COM (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (10/16/89)
| | | Barry W. Kort writes: | | | | Einstein observed that Man is part of Nature, too. | | | Richard O'Keefe writes: | | | | From the rather banal observation that human beings exist, | | no conclusions can be drawn about whether the scheme of | | things can make mistakes UNTIL we have first established | | that "is able to form intentions" (or some such property) | | is one of the few properties which does transfer like that. | | This has not been done. | | Barry W. Kort writes: | | Are you telling me that you disbelieve that human beings are | capable of intentional behavior? No, he's telling you that if we can't establish "intention" on the part of Nature, we can't determine if a "mistake" has been made (i.e., it might have been intentional). Therefore, we have to assume "stupidity" on the part of humanity. It's the only way to account for the observed facts. Jim Winer -- The opinions expressed here are not necessarily and do not represent nor in any way imply of any other sane person and especially not employer. "I'd like to see this petty bickering ended so we could get to some more important bickering." -- David Bedno
roland@cochise (10/16/89)
ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: >Let me try to say it very simply. Kort's argument had the basic form > human beings are capable of forming intentions (NOT DISPUTED) > human beings are part of ``nature'' (NOT DISPUTED) > -------------------------------------------------- > ``nature'' is capable of forming intentions. >In schematic form, the argument looks like > X has property P > X is part of Y > ---------------- > Y has property P As You surely realize, this is not a valid syllogism, THEREFOR it is probably NOT a formalization of the intent of Kort's argument. Try instead: X has property P X is an element of the set Y -------------------------------- some element of Y has property P Now this is a valid (set-theoretic) syllogism, and IMHO a more correct formalization
daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) (10/16/89)
In article <2433@munnari.oz.au>, ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > [stuff deleted] > Let me try to say it very simply. Kort's argument had the basic form > > human beings are capable of forming intentions (NOT DISPUTED) > human beings are part of ``nature'' (NOT DISPUTED) > -------------------------------------------------- > ``nature'' is capable of forming intentions. > > In schematic form, the argument looks like > > X has property P > X is part of Y > ---------------- > Y has property P Let me call this principle "Kort's rule". So, far, this is a nice analysis of Barry Kort's argument. Your point, which is well taken, is that this is not a valid rule of inference, in general. Then you go on to give a million and one examples, enough to make it obvious to someone of the meanest of intelligence that it is not a valid rule of inference. Was this necessary? Obviously Barry believes that "having intentions" is a property such that Kort's rule applies. He is not claiming that it always applies. I think that "ability to form intentions" is a property such that, if a part of an object has it, then the whole object has it. Common usage is consistent with this: people often say "this committee intends to ...", or "Congress intends to ...". It is not necessarily the case that *every* intention held by the part is held by the whole, but it is surely possible that *some* intentions are held by the whole are inherited from the parts. More generally, it is often the case with abilities that, if the part has a certain ability then the whole has. For example, I conclude that "Richard O'Keefe can think" from the fact that "Richard O'Keefe's brain can think". Or I conclude "Elton John can play the piano" from the fact that "Elton John's brain and fingers, working together, can play the piano". It is a perfectly legitimate question to ask "what does it *mean* for nature to form intentions". I think that the question is just as relevent (and its answer is no clearer) to human beings as to nature. Usually people are satisfied with something like "Entity E has intentions if it shows signs of behaving in a goal-directed manner". This definition is ultimately unsatisfactory, of course, since "goal-directed" is as nebulous a concept as "intention". However, something like this is the reason we ascribe intentions to human beings. Given any definition you like of "goal-directed", it seems that nature acting in a "goal-directed fashion" follows from human beings acting in such a fashion. Nature accomplishes something using a part of itself, namely human beings, as tools, in the same way a human being might use parts of himself: his brain, his hands, his tongue. I won't argue that this point of view is correct, or even that I believe it, but I will argue that it isn't stupid. Daryl McCullough (I have a Master's Degree...in Science!)
ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) (10/17/89)
In article <1087@oravax.UUCP>, daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) writes: > In article <2433@munnari.oz.au>, ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > > X has property P > > X is part of Y > > ---------------- > > Y has property P > > Let me call this principle "Kort's rule". > > So, far, this is a nice analysis of Barry Kort's argument. Your point, which > is well taken, is that this is not a valid rule of inference, in general. > Then you go on to give a million and one examples, enough to make it obvious > to someone of the meanest of intelligence that it is not a valid rule of > inference. Was this necessary? Yes it was, for the simple reason that Kort stated explitly that he didn't follow my reasoning. > Obviously Barry believes that "having > intentions" is a property such that Kort's rule applies. He is not claiming > that it always applies. His argument was not valid unless it was _assumed_ that Kort's rule applies in _this_ case. He presented no argument to show that it _does_ apply in this case. Many of my examples were directled at showing that the rule fails in cases which are obviously similar. > I think that "ability to form intentions" is a property such that, if a > part of an object has it, then the whole object has it. You may believe as you wish. If you want _me_ to believe the same thing (and I concede that it _may_ be true) you must present good reasons. > Common usage is > consistent with this: people often say "this committee intends to ...", > or "Congress intends to ...". It is not necessarily the case that *every* > intention held by the part is held by the whole, but it is surely possible > that *some* intentions are held by the whole are inherited from the parts. I'm afraid we can't appeal to common usage. Common usage "the sun rose" is pre-Copernican with respect to physics. A survey referred to in Discover found that 37% of the people interviewed believed that milk contanimated with radio-active material could be made safe by boiling it; no doubt their language would reflect this. Another point is that the usage is not common: in English (as opposed to American) one says "this committee INTEND to ..." or "Parliament INTEND to ...": the noun being taken as plural, just as one says "the University ARE going to cut funding for the Percy Grainger Museum by 20%". This is not a ``my language is better than your language'' point. The point is that common usage is an uncertain guide because usage _varies_. Since a committee collectively form a language-using spatio-temporally bounded individual, it would not challenge my position even if I accepted this example at face value. > More generally, it is often the case with abilities that, if the part has > a certain ability then the whole has. For example, I conclude that > "Richard O'Keefe can think" from the fact that "Richard O'Keefe's brain > can think". I do believe that I can think, but I do not believe that my brain can think. I don't believe that my brain CAN'T think, but saying that a brain can think sounds a lot like saying that a finger can feel. A simpler example: "being able to cook" is not a property of an element, but a property of the whole stove. It is necessary that the element be held level, that it be connected to electrical power by cables, &c &c. Thinking requires more than a brain; it requires a history. > Or I conclude "Elton John can play the piano" from the fact > that "Elton John's brain and fingers, working together, can play the piano". Elton John's brain and fingers can't play one note without his arms, shoulders, back muscles, spinal cord, skin, ears, ... (and I'm just listing parts which are directly involved in the act of playing). Piano-playing is not a property of individual parts. We can tell whether Elton John can play the piano by sitting him down in front of it and asking nicely. How do we test his brain-and-fingers on their own? Does it make sense to imagine his fingers waving in the air without any other part of Elton John around, playing a piano? No? Then sit his brain on the piano stool, underneath those waving fingers; can that ensemble play the piano? Does it really make sense to say that "Elton John's brain and fingers can play the piano"? No, it takes a more-or-less intact human being (prosthesis being included in "more or less intact"). In terms of what really happens, it is simply FALSE that anyone has yet concluded "that <X> can think" from the fact that "<X>'s brain can think" or "that <X> can play the piano" from the fact that "<X>'s brain and fingers can play the piano". In both cases, the inference goes the other way. We see people behaving in a way that we interpret as thinking, and believing that thinking takes place in the brain, infer that their brains are thinking. We see people playing the piano, and infer that their brains know how to play the piano. (Are you sure that none of the learning required for piano playing involves the spinal cord?) Basically, the ``Nature''-can-form-intentions-because-we-can viewpoint is just reductionism run backwards. > It is a perfectly legitimate question to ask "what does it *mean* for > nature to form intentions". Yes, and I wish someone would try to answer it. > I think that the question is just as relevent > (and its answer is no clearer) to human beings as to nature. Of course the question is relevant to human beings. But I'm not asking for any mysterious essence of things; I'm asking for a crude rule of thumb which will help me detect actual instances of human beings intending something and nature intending something. In the case of humans, we have a pretty good guide: if someone says they have an intention or a desire, that will usually do. I'm not asking for the Ultimate Truth about this, just something which works as well as that. > Usually > people are satisfied with something like "Entity E has intentions if it > shows signs of behaving in a goal-directed manner". That would give a thermostat intentions. It would elevate every equilibrium principle in physics and chemistry to the status of "proof of intentions". > However, something like this is the reason we ascribe intentions to > human beings. Back to front again. We ascribe intentions to human beings because we ARE human beings and have a particular kind of experience and project that experience onto other human beings in the belief that they are similar to us. People often worry about precisely the intentions of other people which the others have given no evidence of yet. > Given any definition you like of "goal-directed", it seems that nature > acting in a "goal-directed fashion" follows from human beings acting in > such a fashion. Nature accomplishes something using a part of itself, > namely human beings, as tools, in the same way a human being might use > parts of himself: his brain, his hands, his tongue. With any definition of "goal-directed" that does not take into account the notions of the agent having a model of an actual state of affairs, a model of a hypothetical state of affairs, some way of distinguishing between the agent's ATTITUDES and the agent's ACTIONS (so that we can talk about intentions an agent forms but does not carry out and actions an agent performs without having intended them), with any such limited definition of "goal-directed" we can talk about stones intending to fall down. But to say that 'nature acting in a "goal-directed fashion" follows from human beings act in such a fashion' is merely to reASSERT Kort's rule. If human beings act in a goal-directed fashion, then all that follows is that some PARTS of ``Nature'' act in a goal-directed fashion. We cannot conclude that ``Nature'' herself acts in a goal-directed fashion unless P="acts in a goal-directed fashion" obeys Kort's rule. Merely asserting that it does gets us not one step further. I have no difficulty with the idea that things happen in such a way that some measure is reduced (i.e. that ``Nature'' may be said in some sufficiently irrelevant way to ``act'' in a ``goal-directed'' way). But that doesn't get us one step further towards ``Nature'' having INTENTIONS. It is not enough that ``Nature'' should be heading towards the Heat Death of The Universe, just because that's happening doesn't mean ``Nature'' WANTS (intends) it to happen. One more example: Algol 68. That was a production of the Algol 68 committee. So if we are willing to accept committees as systems possessing intentions, the Algol 68 committee intended the language to be the way it was. But several of the members of the committee were so dissatisfied with it that they issued a Minority Report. Here we are a clear actual case where some of the parts (the members who signed the Minority Report) had an intention (that the language be other than it was) which the whole did NOT have. This is a proof by existence that even if a whole and its parts both have intentions, the intentions that the whole has may not be the same as the intentions of its parts. This tells us, for example, that simply because biological individuals behave as if they wished to live and wished their own species to continue in existence, it does not follow that ``Nature'' wishes either of these things. > I won't argue that this point of view is correct, or even that I believe > it, but I will argue that it isn't stupid. I am not arguing that it is stupid, but that it needs to be supported by argument, not by assertion. > Daryl McCullough > (I have a Master's Degree...in Science!) So have I. There's a lot of it about.
ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) (10/17/89)
In article <74401@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: : In article <2433@munnari.oz.au> ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: : > But I can find no justification for these attitudes in my : > biology textbooks (and yes I have read Maynard-Smith). : I think you would be more likely to find them in books on Theology : or Ethics than in books on Biology. See, for instance, _The Tao : is Silent_, by Philosopher/Logician Raymond Smullyan. I was responding to ``Nature's children want to live and thrive, there is evidence for that'' which seemed to be drawing some sort of ``nature is a source of moral inspiration'' conclusion. Sending me to books on the supernatural (Theology) and on philosphy (Ethics) -- good advice -- reinforces my point that we must look for moral inspiration elsewhere. If ``Nature'' can form intentions, it has a lot to answer for.
giovanne@topaz.rutgers.edu (Steve Giovannetti) (10/17/89)
> Barry W. Kort writes: > > Einstein observed that Man is part of Nature, too. Gentlemen, I believe that Darwin had more to do with making man a part of nature than Einstein.
daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) (10/17/89)
In article <2450@munnari.oz.au>, ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > > Then you go on to give a million and one examples, enough to make it obvious > > to someone of the meanest of intelligence that it is not a valid rule of > > inference. Was this necessary? > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > Yes it was, for the simple reason that Kort stated explitly that > he didn't follow my reasoning. That shows that it was neither necessary, nor sufficient 8^) A little familiarity with the way people behave would tell you that if one clear example doesn't convince, then a million won't---you have to try a different tack. > > Common usage is > > consistent with this: people often say "this committee intends to ...", > > or "Congress intends to ...". It is not necessarily the case that *every* > > intention held by the part is held by the whole, but it is surely possible > > that *some* intentions are held by the whole are inherited from the parts. > > I'm afraid we can't appeal to common usage. Common usage "the sun rose" > is pre-Copernican with respect to physics... It seems to me that this disagreement springs from the fact that we haven't said what we *mean* by the word "intention". Of course we cannot appeal to common usage to decide whether it is a *fact* that nature (or anything else) has intention, but we can appeal to common usage to discover what is *meant* by intention. > > > More generally, it is often the case with abilities that, if the part has > > a certain ability then the whole has. For example, I conclude that > > "Richard O'Keefe can think" from the fact that "Richard O'Keefe's brain > > can think". > > I do believe that I can think, but I do not believe that my brain can think. ^ At this point I hope I am not being a smart-aleck to ask : What is the "I" in that sentence? Is it your entire body, including your hair, your teeth, and your fingers? If so, can you still think if you lose some of those members? This is getting remotely closer to the topic of this newsgroup, AI. The premise of at least part of AI is that a "brain", be it flesh or electronic, *can* think, without all the other accessories that come with a human body. Perhaps this premise is wrong, but once again, it depends on what you mean by "thinking". > In terms of what really happens, it is simply FALSE that anyone has yet > concluded > "that <X> can think" from the fact that "<X>'s brain can think" > or > "that <X> can play the piano" from the fact that "<X>'s brain and > fingers can play the piano". > In both cases, the inference goes the other way. Again, I have to ask, when someone says that <X> can think, what do they mean by <X>? I think a good case can be made that it is the brain and (as you suggest) the spinal nerves that do the thinking. However this is not common usage: usually one invokes the concept of the "whole person" which does the thinking. In my opinion, the "whole person" is an abstraction which does not have an objective definition. You are considered the "same person" even if you lose a leg, or have a heart transplant. > Basically, the ``Nature''-can-form-intentions-because-we-can viewpoint > is just reductionism run backwards. I find this to be an extremely insightful statement! (Even if you meant it as a put-down.) The usual course of reductionism runs as follows: The human body and brain are described by mechanical laws. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Man is a machine, so consciousness, intention, and free will are illusions. A more upbeat way of looking at the same facts is: (1) Man is a machine. (2) Man has consciousness, etc. ------------------------------------------------------------- A machine (or nature itself) may have consciousness, etc. I agree with you that these are flip sides of the same coin: in either case, one basically admits that reductionism (or more generally, materialism) has won. The difference is in where one goes from there. Several new ideas, such as the Gaia hypothesis, bear a resemblence to "new age" anti-rational beliefs, but are actually quite opposed to them, since there starting point is an acceptance of current science as essentially correct. I believe that Barry Kort's belief that nature can form intentions is essentially a slight strengthening of the Gaia hypothesis. (Am I right, Barry?) > > It is a perfectly legitimate question to ask "what does it *mean* for > > nature to form intentions". > > Yes, and I wish someone would try to answer it. I *did* try to answer it. You don't like my answer because, as you point out, it allows even thermostats (or rocks) to have intentions. Sheesh! Some people are so picky! 8^) > With any definition of "goal-directed" that does not take into account > the notions of the agent having a model of an actual state of affairs, > a model of a hypothetical state of affairs, some way of distinguishing > between the agent's ATTITUDES and the agent's ACTIONS (so that we can > talk about intentions an agent forms but does not carry out and actions > an agent performs without having intended them), with any such limited > definition of "goal-directed" we can talk about stones intending to > fall down. Many people claim the same difficulty in understanding what it means for a *human* *being* to have intentions. How *do* we separate attitudes from actions? What does it mean to say "Joe Blow intended to lose weight, but he didn't have the willpower?". Behaviorists might say that it doesn't mean anything at all. I disagree, but I think the true meaning has more to do with *our* model of Joe Blow than it does with Joe's model of the world. Barry Kort suggests a model of nature in which human beings serve the role of brains with which nature thinks about the future and makes plans, etc. > But to say that 'nature acting in a "goal-directed fashion" follows > from human beings act in such a fashion' is merely to reASSERT Kort's > rule. If human beings act in a goal-directed fashion, then all that > follows is that some PARTS of ``Nature'' act in a goal-directed fashion. > We cannot conclude that ``Nature'' herself acts in a goal-directed > fashion unless P="acts in a goal-directed fashion" obeys Kort's rule. > Merely asserting that it does gets us not one step further. I don't find your "part of nature" versus "nature herself" distinction to be very illuminating in the case of intentionality. For some properties, such as "being made of ivory" it is possible to identify what part of an object has the property. For instance, it is definitely the tusks of an elephant which are made of ivory, and not its tail. However, I don't understand the principle you are using to say which part of an entity is the part which has intentions. Give me a criterion which would allow me to determine that it is the man, and not the brain which forms intentions, and *simultaneously* allow me to determine that it is the man and not nature which forms intentions. Unlike the case of "being made of ivory", I believe that drawing the boundaries to determine "what part has intentions" will be quite arbitrary. > One more example: Algol 68. [stuff deleted] Yes, committees can be in disagreement. What does that prove? A single human being can disagree with himself. I do it often. 8^) > > > Daryl McCullough > > (I have a Master's Degree...in Science!) > So have I. There's a lot of it about. It's a joke, son! Have you ever heard the radio show "Ask Dr. Science"? Dr. Daryl (Remember! He's not a *real* doctor!)
lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) (10/18/89)
From article <2450@munnari.oz.au>, by ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe):
" In article <1087@oravax.UUCP>, daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) writes:
" > Common usage is
" > consistent with this: people often say "this committee intends to ...",
" ...
" I'm afraid we can't appeal to common usage. ...
Uncommon usage, then? I don't understand what else could possibly
be involved here except usage. When do we or should we
say: "___ intends ..."?
Greg, lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edubwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/18/89)
I seem to have triggered a lively discussion on inferential reasoning. In response to a commentary from Richard O'Keefe, I asked: > > Are you telling me that you disbelieve that human beings are > > capable of intentional behavior? To which Jim Winer responds: > No, he's telling you that if we can't establish "intention" on the > part of Nature, we can't determine if a "mistake" has been made > (i.e., it might have been intentional). Therefore, we have to > assume "stupidity" on the part of humanity. It's the only way to > account for the observed facts. I don't deny that humans are known to act unwisely from time to time, but it is not clear that we do so intentionally. Perhaps it is in our character. --Barry Kort
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/18/89)
In article <2450@munnari.oz.au> ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > In article <1087@oravax.UUCP>, daryl@oravax.UUCP > (Steven Daryl McCullough) writes: > > I think that "ability to form intentions" is a property such that, > > if a part of an object has it, then the whole object has it. > You may believe as you wish. If you want _me_ to believe the same thing > (and I concede that it _may_ be true) you must present good reasons. Independent of any flaws in my line of reasoning supporting the thesis that Nature is capable of intentional behavior, I would be gratified if you would independently discover its truth-value and identify any necessary restrictions for the thesis to hold. ... > Basically, the ``Nature''-can-form-intentions-because-we-can > viewpoint is just reductionism run backwards. > > It is a perfectly legitimate question to ask "what does it *mean* > > for nature to form intentions". > Yes, and I wish someone would try to answer it. > > I think that the question is just as relevent > > (and its answer is no clearer) to human beings as to nature. > > Usually people are satisfied with something like "Entity E has > > intentions if it shows signs of behaving in a goal-directed manner". > That would give a thermostat intentions. It would elevate every > equilibrium principle in physics and chemistry to the status of > "proof of intentions". In Cybernetics (the System Theoretic approach to Goal-Oriented Feedback Control Systems), the Thermostat is the classic example of an elementary Purposive System. > With any definition of "goal-directed" that does not take into account > the notions of the agent having a model of an actual state of affairs, > a model of a hypothetical state of affairs, some way of distinguishing > between the agent's ATTITUDES and the agent's ACTIONS (so that we can > talk about intentions an agent forms but does not carry out and actions > an agent performs without having intended them), with any such limited > definition of "goal-directed" we can talk about stones intending to > fall down. The thermostat is a Purposive System because it has a model of the current state-of-affairs (the temperature), a representation of the goal state (the thermostat's set-point or desired temperature), a calculation of the difference between the current state and the goal state, and a successful strategy (course of action) for changing the state-of-affairs (turning the furnace off or on). > I have no difficulty with the idea that things happen in such a way > that some measure is reduced (i.e. that ``Nature'' may be said in some > sufficiently irrelevant way to ``act'' in a ``goal-directed'' way). > But that doesn't get us one step further towards ``Nature'' having > INTENTIONS. It is not enough that ``Nature'' should be heading towards > the Heat Death of The Universe, just because that's happening doesn't > mean ``Nature'' WANTS (intends) it to happen. Now you're getting into an interesting distinction between the objective behavior of a purposive system, and the subjective process by which the goal state is established. Is the goal state a happenstantial equilibrium point of a feedback control loop, or is the goal state selected through premeditation by a complex information processing system (like the human mind). > This tells us, for example, that simply because biological > individuals behave as if they wished to live and wished their > own species to continue in existence, it does not follow that > ``Nature'' wishes either of these things. I would like to go on record as stipulating that I wish to survive, and that I wish to ensure the survival of other members of the Biosphere. > > I won't argue that this point of view is correct, or even that > > I believe it, but I will argue that it isn't stupid. > I am not arguing that it is stupid, but that it needs to be > supported by argument, not by assertion. Are you rejecting my assertion that I wish to facilitate our mutual survival? Have I not offered proof that there exists at least one part of Nature who wants to survive? --Barry Kort
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/18/89)
In article <Oct.17.08.21.43.1989.29298@topaz.rutgers.edu> giovanne@topaz.rutgers.edu (Steve Giovannetti) writes: > Gentlemen, I believe that Darwin had more to do with making man > a part of nature than Einstein. Teilhard de Chardin (_The Phenomenon of Man_) made a nice contribution, too. --Barry Kort
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/18/89)
In article <2452@munnari.oz.au> ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > If ``Nature'' can form intentions, it has a lot to answer for. I agree. In fact, if Nature is adopting some of it's goals through subjective meditation, then perhaps it is time to review the Value System through which the candidate goals are filtered. --Barry Kort
ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) (10/18/89)
It's time I got some useful work done, and it has become evident that
trying to play Socrates in this group isn't getting me anywhere. Can
we leave it at this:
some people use language in such a way that when they say
"Nature can form intentions" they _mean_ "some parts of Nature
can form intentions", and for them the truth of the former
necessarily follows from the truth of the latter.
other people do not use language in that way.
"Truth cannot be tolerant" -- Freud.bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/18/89)
In article <1090@oravax.UUCP> daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) writes: > I believe that Barry Kort's belief that nature can form intentions is > essentially a slight strengthening of the Gaia hypothesis. (Am I right, > Barry?) I believe my thesis is concordant with the Gaia Hypothesis. Whether it constitutes a "strengthening" is a technical matter which I am not prepared to say. > Many people claim the same difficulty in understanding what it > means for a *human* *being* to have intentions. How *do* we > separate attitudes from actions? ... Barry Kort suggests a > model of nature in which human beings serve the role of brains > with which nature thinks about the future and makes plans, etc. I define a Goal as a feasible, desirable, and reachable future state of affairs toward which one has committed resources of time, energy, and materiel. In order to reach the goal state, one needs Ideas (an Idea is a possibility for changing the state-of-affairs) and Strategies (a Strategy is a collection of interconnected ideas for reaching a goal from a known starting point). This entire process is called Planning (Planning is the art of choosing goals and corresponding courses of action to reach selected goals). The challenge in selecting goals is in defining the word "Desirable". For the selection of desirable goals, one needs a Value System. (A Value System is a collection of preferences that transforms knowledge into wisdom. Leadership begins with values.) The next step beyond Artificial Intelligence is Artificial Wisdom. It is not enough to imbue our computers with knowledge. We must also imbue them with values. This is where Ethics meets AI. --Barry Kort
jwi@cbnewsj.ATT.COM (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (10/19/89)
> Barry W. Kort writes: > > I seem to have triggered a lively discussion on inferential > reasoning. In response to a commentary from Richard O'Keefe, > I asked: > > > > Are you telling me that you disbelieve that human beings are > > > capable of intentional behavior? > > To which Jim Winer responds: > > > No, he's telling you that if we can't establish "intention" on the > > part of Nature, we can't determine if a "mistake" has been made > > (i.e., it might have been intentional). Therefore, we have to > > assume "stupidity" on the part of humanity. It's the only way to > > account for the observed facts. > > I don't deny that humans are known to act unwisely from time to > time, but it is not clear that we do so intentionally. Perhaps > it is in our character. Perhaps, but more clearly, it's in our character to be greedy. Based on common usage (and the New York Times), corporate managers are out for "short term gain" at the expense of the long term. Similarly, from the vidiot box, the advertising industry encourages us to consume, comsume, comsume. A similar situation now exists in western Europe and Japan. Based upon history books, it is also reasonable to infer that the human race has been greedy throughout its history. It is likely that this greed is necessary to the survival of the individual and is highly related to teritorial behavior in other species -- i.e., we might not exist if we weren't greedy. From this we might infer that Nature intended us to be greedy to insure our survival. The problem is that on a mass scale, this greed threatens our survival as a species. From this we might infer that Nature intends to terminate the human experiment or we might infer that Nature has made a mistake. Unfortunately, we can't ask (don't know how to ask) Nature what was intended. We have two sets of facts: 1. Our greed helps insure our survival as individuals. 2. Our greed helps insure our termination as a species. Rather than conclude that Nature intends us to survive or that Nature intends us to terminate, I feel that either: 1. Nature is incapable (or uninterested) in intending anything on our behalf, or 2. Nature intends for us to make a choice, either of which leads us me to the same conclusion: We do not behave intelligently. It is in our character to behave stupidly (suicidally). To put this in words closer to your own: Humans are known to act unwisely most of the time, and it is clear that we do so intentionally. Perhaps it is in our character. Jim Winer -- The opinions expressed here are not necessarily and do not represent nor in any way imply of any other sane person and especially not employer. "I'd like to see this petty bickering ended so we could get to some more important bickering." -- David Bedno
jdk@ficc.uu.net (jeff klumpp) (10/20/89)
In article <2461@munnari.oz.au>, ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > It's time I got some useful work done, and it has become evident that > trying to play Socrates in this group isn't getting me anywhere. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Aha! Have we possibly found the definitive meaning of "having an intention"? Does it always imply failure? *8^} -- "Was Enrico Fermi half-baked? * Jeff Klumpp, SCADA Development Ionically don't think so." * Ferranti International Controls Corp. "IC, therefore I/O, I think." * jdk@ficc.uu.net, +1 713 274 5405 My Opinions do not represent the policies of FICC, nor should they be perceived as a reflection of the general standards of intelligence of the company or employees at large.
MNOJEIM@AUVM.BITNET (10/20/89)
i dont know where i am, dont know how to get back to where i was. help me...
aarons@syma.sussex.ac.uk (Aaron Sloman) (10/21/89)
ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > Date: 18 Oct 89 05:51:58 GMT > > It's time I got some useful work done, and it has become evident that > trying to play Socrates in this group isn't getting me anywhere. Can > we leave it at this: > > some people use language in such a way that when they say > "Nature can form intentions" they _mean_ "some parts of Nature > can form intentions", and for them the truth of the former > necessarily follows from the truth of the latter. > > other people do not use language in that way. Philosophical discussions frequently degenerate into a succession of non-terminating repeitions of "X means so and so" "No it doesn't". I find most such disputes about as silly as arguing about whether a circle really is an ellipse or not. Clearly there is the precisely defined mathematical sense of "ellipse" and and older, less well defined sense and clearly a circle is an ellipse in the first sense and (probably) not in the second (though it's clearly a limiting case). The philosophical situation changes if you can provide a theoretical framework within which to locate a new, precisely defined, technical concept, say "quasi-X", AND THEN ask whether a so and so is an instance of it. You can then make progress investigating whether a so and so satisfies the conditions for being a quasi-X (though that may turn up further concepts requiring rational reconstruction). So anyone who wants to argue about whether nature (or anything else) has intentions, should provide a theory about the architecture and functions of systems capable of having quasi-intentions and other quasi-mental states, and then investigate whether Nature has the appropriate kind of architecture, etc. (One day I shall try to publish my version of such a theory - it requires the system to be divisible into a number of co-existing, independently variable, causally interacting sub-states, whose causal interactions correspond to the causal roles that seem to be characteristic of beliefs, desires, etc. We then find there are many different architectures with more or less different functional differentiation, for which we have to define different concepts of quasi-intention, quasi-belief, etc. I.e. the concepts are mechanism(or architecture)-relative. No one architecture is the RIGHT one. Cats and dogs and very young humans have quasi-intentions, but their functional architectures are different from a typical adult western human, so you can't assume their quasi-intentional states to have all the properties that your own do. Similarly for beliefs, desires, feelings, etc.). If we can find an appropriate functional architecture in Nature (the biosphere?), I think it will be very different from that of individual humans, so if it has quasi-intentions (beliefs, hopes, fears, etc.) those states will have very different properties from ours. (Just as some ellipses have properties circles don't and vice versa.) Some philosophers will argue against this that there is an "essence" to the concept of "intention" that we somehow learn without knowing any theory about functional architectures of intentional systems. My reply is that such pre-theoretical conceptual essences are often riddled with deep ambiguity and internal incoherence, despite strong convictions people have that they know what they mean. "Consciousnesss" is an extreme case. (The pre-einsteinian concept of a persisting location, independent of any framework of reference, is another example: after all you can POINT at a position, so it MUST have an identity.... similarly you can, you think, point at your own consciosness.....) Aaron
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/21/89)
In article <6596@ficc.uu.net> jdk@ficc.uu.net (Jeff Klumpp) writes: > In article <2461@munnari.oz.au>, ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > > It's time I got some useful work done, and it has become evident that > > trying to play Socrates in this group isn't getting me anywhere. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The goal of playing Socrates doesn't advance the emotional well-being of the Socratic party. One plays Socrates in order to empower the others in the dialogue to discover how to think. I often use the Socratic Method when I teach science to children. It seems to work better than the lecture method. > Does it always imply failure? *8^} By design, the Socratic Method is intended to leave the student with the feeling that he or she discovered the truth without having it programmed in by an all-knowing authority figure. --Barry Kort
yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu (Brian Yamauchi) (10/23/89)
In article <74553@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Barry Kort) writes: > >The challenge in selecting goals is in defining the word "Desirable". >For the selection of desirable goals, one needs a Value System. >(A Value System is a collection of preferences that transforms >knowledge into wisdom. Leadership begins with values.) > >The next step beyond Artificial Intelligence is Artificial Wisdom. >It is not enough to imbue our computers with knowledge. We must >also imbue them with values. We clearly will give intelligent systems "values" in the sense of methods of determining which high-level goals they wish to attempt to acheive. On the other hand, "wisdom" is an even fuzzier term than intelligence and one that seems impossible to define in a non-circular way -- a way that does not refer back to values. >This is where Ethics meets AI. And since, we haven't been able to agree on a system of Ethics despite the millenia of philsophers' efforts..... It seems to me that the values of an AI will reflect the values of the AI's creator, and the degree to which that represents "wisdom" depends on the degree to which you share his values. _______________________________________________________________________________ Brian Yamauchi University of Rochester yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu Computer Science Department _______________________________________________________________________________
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/23/89)
In article <1989Oct22.175912.22181@cs.rochester.edu> yamauchi@nectarine.cs.rochester.edu (Brian Yamauchi) writes: > We clearly will give intelligent systems "values" in the sense of > methods of determining which high-level goals they wish to attempt to > acheive. On the other hand, "wisdom" is an even fuzzier term than > intelligence and one that seems impossible to define in a non-circular > way -- a way that does not refer back to values. I define "Wisdom" as the structured integration of knowledge and values. If knowledge is a two-edged sword, wisdom enables us to choose which edge to use. > And since, we haven't been able to agree on a system of Ethics despite > the millenia of philsophers' efforts..... Perhaps not, but there is evidence that most people haven't given much thought to the construction of value systems. On the other hand, the deep thinkers who have investigated questions of values, people like Hillel, and Lao-Tse, and Moses, and Siddhartha, and Maimonides, and Gandhi, all seem to come to the same conclusion. The Symmetry Principle and the Principle of Maximum Mutual Benefit are recurring themes in Ethics and Values. > It seems to me that the values of an AI will reflect the values of the > AI's creator, and the degree to which that represents "wisdom" depends > on the degree to which you share his values. I predict that an AI system which favors itself over others, or favors a selected party over others will not long survive. I predict that an AI system which strives for balanced positive benefits for all will likely achieve immortality. --Barry Kort
dsueme@chinet.chi.il.us (dave sueme) (10/25/89)
this hypothesis is generally called "teleology", the "view that developments
are due to the purpose or design that wil be fulfilled by them" (Pocket
Oxford Dictionary)
I'm not sure I like that definition - an alternative is simply that
nature tends toward some pre-defined end. Karl Marx's progression
toward Communism is an example of philosophical teleology.
Teleology is highly contrary to orthodox Darwinism, which considers
roaches and men equal as evolutionaly experiments in the quest for
survival. I'm sceptical about that also - I believe I see an observable
trend toward COMPLEXITY or a higher (greater) degree of "integration" -
the more complex being embodies a more complete solution to the problem
of adapting to the environment.
maybe.
================================================================================
...chinet.chi.il.us!penl0p!dsueme David M. Sueme
Attorney at Law
911 Washington, 2N
Evanston, IL 60202
(312) 869-1824 (voice)
Philosophers are violent and aggressive persons who, having no army at their
disposal, bring the world into subjection to themselves by means of locking
it up in a system. (Robert Musil)bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/29/89)
In article <1989Oct25.023703.13346@chinet.chi.il.us> dsueme@chinet.chi.il.us (Dave Sueme) writes: > ...nature tends toward some pre-defined end. Nature, being a System in which "the Outputs are shorted to the Inputs," tends toward a Fixed Point (which we may call Omega). The Omega point is the limit point of a succession of semi-stable points. This view is consonant with the Post-Darwinian notion of Punctuated Equilibrium. The final state (if we ever reach it) will be indefinitely stable. Most likely the Omega Point will be the heat death of the Universe. Life may find a way to postpone that fate as long as possible. Or not. --Barry Kort
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (10/29/89)
In article <89292.214352MNOJEIM@AUVM.BITNET> MNOJEIM@AUVM.BITNET writes: > I don't know where I am, don`t know how to get back to where I was. > Help me... For starters, you are a Homo sapiens on the planet earth, in an epoch approximately 4 1/2 billion years since the formation of the Solar System. You are a carbon-based life-form with extraordinary information processing capacity, including the ability to think and solve problems. Now, please look around you and describe the world in which you find yourself embedded. How does it differ from the the world in which you started? Do you know what path you have been following which brought you to where you are today? --Barry Kort
jj@hume.cis.ohio-state.edu (John Josephson) (10/30/89)
> I believe I see an observable trend toward COMPLEXITY ...
Stephen J. Gould suggests in a recent article in Natural History that
the trend is towards increasing DIVERSITY of life forms; what you see
as increasing complexity is just the maximal complexity leading edge.
Most organisms are simple. .. jjjwi@cbnewsj.ATT.COM (Jim Winer @ AT&T, Middletown, NJ) (10/31/89)
In article <89292.214352MNOJEIM@AUVM.BITNET>, MNOJEIM@AUVM.BITNET writes: > i dont know where i am, dont know how to get back to where i was. > > help me... Help you do what? There's nothing wrong with not knowing where you are. In fact, it's a very common situation. There's also nothing wrong with not knowing how to get back to where you were. In most cases, you can't ever get back to where you were because it has changed in the meanwhile, or you have changed in the meanwhile. Besides, you haven't asked to get back to where you were, or to know where you are, so I can't determine your intentions. Sort of like the problem we're having with Nature. Jim Winer -- The opinions expressed here are not necessarily and do not represent nor in any way imply of any other sane person and especially not employer. "My reply is that such pre-theoretical conceptual essences are often riddled with deep ambiguity and internal incoherence, despite strong convictions people have that they know what they mean." -- Aaron Sloman
ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) (10/31/89)
In article <76548@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: > Nature, being a System in which "the Outputs are shorted to the Inputs," > tends toward a Fixed Point (which we may call Omega). The Omega point > is the limit point of a succession of semi-stable points. > > This view is consonant with the Post-Darwinian notion of > Punctuated Equilibrium. Given that Genetic Algorithms are respectable these days, this may possibly have some tenuous connection with AI. However... "The theory of _punctuated equilibria_ (Eldredge and Gould, 1972) sees species as reproductive communities with beginnings, histories, and terminations. Stasis within species facilitates recognition and argues against the model that species can be divided into chronologically successive lineage segments. Eldredge and Gould (1972) moreover take the causal argument a step further, maintaining that _adaptive change in general only occurs in conjunction with speciation_, _i.e. the development of reproductive discontinuities._ In light of the distinction between economic and reproductive attributes as outlined in this book, this is to say that _economic change is unlikely to accrue to any significant degree without reproductive change_. " Niles Eldredge, "Macro-Evolutionary Dynamics", p207. _That_ is what punctuated equilibrium is all about, according to one of the people who thought of it. What it has to do with Omega points or grandiose spiels about Nature escapes me; certainly Eldredge and Gould do not claim to see any "limit point" in it.