dhw@itivax.iti.org (David H. West) (12/21/89)
In article <5610@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu> miken@rice-chex.WISC.EDU (Michael N. Nitabach) writes: >metaphysical tradition, beginning with the British Empiricists, e.g. Locke >and Hume. This is the view that causation is not an aspect of the world >which our mentality can recognize, but rather a schema which our mind imposes ^^^^^^^^^ >on events with appropriate spatiotemporal relations. A conceptually >opposite--Realist--stance would be that causation exists as an actual >attribute of certain pairs of physical events. What, in this view, is "recognition"? Is it fallible? If so, how is it different from imposing (perhaps unconsciously) a schema which may need to be revised to accommodate later sense-data? If it is not fallible, why are we still doing science? [hint: this is a rhetorical question :-) ] -David West dhw@iti.org
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (12/23/89)
In article <4678@itivax.iti.org> dhw@itivax.UUCP (David H. West) writes: >In article <5610@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu> miken@rice-chex.WISC.EDU (Michael N. Nitabach) writes: >>metaphysical tradition, beginning with the British Empiricists, e.g. Locke >>and Hume. This is the view that causation is not an aspect of the world >>which our mentality can recognize, but rather a schema which our mind imposes > ^^^^^^^^^ >>on events with appropriate spatiotemporal relations. A conceptually >>opposite--Realist--stance would be that causation exists as an actual >>attribute of certain pairs of physical events. > >What, in this view, is "recognition"? Is it fallible? If we progress beyond Locke and Hume to Husserl, we discover that fallibility may not be the appropriate question. However we choose to characterize this "recognition," the important point is that it is IDIOSYNCRATIC. That is, each individual mind imposes its own set of schemata on the perceptions it experiences, including relations of causality. The fundamental issue of understanding then becomes one of how agent A, with his personal set of schemata, can communicate with agent B, who may have quite a different set of schemata. This brings to mind the old joke about Wittgenstein asking how a sunrise looked different to a man who believed that the sun was in orbit about the earth. Disclaimer: These remarks are based on my first reading of Husserl's THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY. This is one of those books which deserves, if not demands, multiple readings. If I have misinterpreted Husserl, I hope that I shall do better after my next reading. Meanwhile, any supplementary comments will be greatly appreciated. ========================================================================= USPS: Stephen Smoliar USC Information Sciences Institute 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 Marina del Rey, California 90292-6695 Internet: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu "For every human problem, there is a neat, plain solution--and it is always wrong."--H. L. Mencken
lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) (12/23/89)
From article <11104@venera.isi.edu>, by smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar): " ... The fundamental issue " of understanding then becomes one of how agent A, with his personal set " of schemata, can communicate with agent B, who may have quite a different " set of schemata. ... It's really quite a riddle if you insist that understanding and communication are all or none affairs, and that schemata must be wholly shared or wholly disparate. Greg, lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (12/27/89)
In article <5795@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) writes: >From article <11104@venera.isi.edu>, by smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen >Smoliar): >" ... The fundamental issue >" of understanding then becomes one of how agent A, with his personal set >" of schemata, can communicate with agent B, who may have quite a different >" set of schemata. ... > >It's really quite a riddle if you insist that understanding >and communication are all or none affairs, and that schemata >must be wholly shared or wholly disparate. Fortunately, there is no reason to be so insistent. Communication, as it is practiced in the real world among human beings, is hardly an all or none affair; and since I tend to follow Minsky's lead and avoid casual use of the word "understanding," you won't find ME trying to pass it off as binary- valued. I realize this will probably draw flames from a variety of corners, but do we want anything more from an artificial intelligence than an ability to get on in the world? This does not entail perfection. It only requires enough sense to get out of mistakes ("misunderstandings," if you prefer) when it becomes apparent that they have been made. (Would we ask any more of our President?) ========================================================================= USPS: Stephen Smoliar USC Information Sciences Institute 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 Marina del Rey, California 90292-6695 Internet: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu "For every human problem, there is a neat, plain solution--and it is always wrong."--H. L. Mencken