pluto@beowulf.ucsd.edu (Mark E. P. Plutowski) (01/06/90)
Fred Gilham writes: >I interpret Searle's argument as follows: > >There is something we (humans) do, called understanding. We usually >know when we do it, and we can often say when others do or do not >understand. We can also give examples of..."not understanding" ... > > [stuff deleted] >[Suppose] someone emulates this system by hand, ... [who] >doesn't understand Chinese, yet [can] follow the rules and produce >the desired results. [The only] >physical apparatus existing is the books, paper, and the person who >doesn't understand Chinese. The question is, what understands >Chinese? Searle claims that there is nothing there to understand >Chinese. > I'm sorry to belabor the point, but I still am not convinced after months of patiently following this argument. What follows is not a counter, but rather is intended to be an honest desire to clarify my 'understanding' of the concept to a level enabling me to not only say I understand, but prove it to some objective logician. We believe Searle-in-the-box when he claims to not-understand. Why? Don't we have an objective definition of "understanding?" Why don't we have an objective definition of understanding? Why do we have to ask Searle whether or not he understands, in order to ourselves decide whether or not he understands? How can a proof be based upon a definition which is subjective to an element of the proof itself? Assume instead Searle-in-the-box says he does understand. Are we to believe him then? Saying it doesn't make it so. Yet, then according to the argument, the Room would understand. If we ask the Chinese Room itself whether it understands, (in Chinese, of course, so Searle-in-the-box will not understand the query) and by some fluke in the rules it somehow answers "Yes" ... Now what? Why not believe the box's reply? I don't think it is decidable whether to believe the Chinese Room if it says it understands, based upon the subjective definitions given so far. Suppose we did not know whether Searle was Searle; suppose it were possible he were indeed a Chinese Room - we know not which - on what basis do we decide whether to believe him when he says he does understand? Because, apparently, we have the "ground rules" laid out such that there is no way the room can understand if Searle-inside does not. So, if Searle says he understands, but then we find out Searle is not Searle, but is instead a Chinese Room with another Searle inside, Searle-2, and Searle-2 "does not understand" - because he says so --- is this not a contradiction?? But wait, what if Searle-2 really has a Searle-3 inside, who DOES understand? Somebody save me. I am not biased against Searle's basic point: (IMHO) that the implementation matters. I just don't see the logic behind the counter to the systems reply, and would like to hear it expressed in objective terms. Prove to me the Chinese Room does not understand, without resorting to asking Searle-inside whether (or not) he does.
gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) (01/06/90)
pluto@beowulf.ucsd.edu (Mark E. P. Plutowski) writes:
------
We believe Searle-in-the-box when he claims to not-understand.
Why? Don't we have an objective definition of "understanding?"
Why don't we have an objective definition of understanding?
Why do we have to ask Searle whether or not he understands, in order
to ourselves decide whether or not he understands?
------
I reply:
Actually we don't have to believe him. We can just write to him in
Chinese and see what happens. In the case where he uses the books and
stuff he will not be able to respond without them. In the case where
he memorizes the rules, he will not be able to translate the Chinese
into, say, English.
-------------
Mark Plutowski continues:
I am not biased against Searle's basic point: (IMHO)
that the implementation matters. I just don't see the logic
behind the counter to the systems reply, and would like to
hear it expressed in objective terms.
Prove to me the Chinese Room does not understand, without
resorting to asking Searle-inside whether (or not) he does.
------------
I reply:
First of all, the argument does not seem to be, strictly, that
``implementation matters''. Rather, the argument is that human minds
are doing something in addition to manipulating symbols.
Now as far as the Chinese Room not understanding, if we take the case
where the rules are in books etc., the question is, ``What physical
entity understands, if not Searle?'' I think we would all agree that
books and ink are not things that can understand. The only actor in
the system is Searle. If he doesn't understand, what does? If Searle
memorizes the rules, then he is the ONLY physical entity left that
could be understanding, so I would think you have to ask him, or test
him.
Even if the system prints (in Chinese), ``I understand Chinese'', it
really doesn't matter. That is because it is easy to produce a set of
rules that will cause a system to print ``I understand Chinese'',
whether it does or not.
If we assume, even so, that there is a ``system'' that understands,
then Penrose, in THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND, has pointed out that this is
equivalent to postulating a ``mind-stuff'' apart from the physical
entities that exist. This is known as dualism and most AI folk seem
to want to avoid such a viewpoint. While the argument as a whole does
not PROVE that the Chinese Room does not understand Chinese, it does
show that no physical entity in the Chinese Room understands Chinese.
-Fred Gilham gilham@csl.sri.commuttiah@cs.purdue.EDU (Ranjan Samuel Muttiah) (01/06/90)
>Prove to me the Chinese Room does not understand, without >resorting to asking Searle-inside whether (or not) he does. --- Thomas Hobbes was undertaking a similar task without computers of course! We moderns have a lot to learn :-). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz wrote a letter to Hobbes in the form of a dialogue. (It is presumed that that A is really Hobbes). It was written in 1677 when Leibniz was just 24 years old! A. If you were given a string and required ti shape it in such such a way that it turned on itslef and enclosed as much space as possible, how would you shape it ? B. Into a circle. For the geometers show that the circle is the shape that has the greatest capacity for a given circumference. And it there were two islands that could be circumnavigated, one circular, the other square, the circular island would contain more territory. A. Do you think that this is true, even if you are not thinking about it ? B. Of course. It was true even before geometers had demonstrated it or before people had observed it. A. So you think that truth and falsity are in things, and NOT IN THOUGHTS ? B. Yes, indeed. A. Then a thing is false ? B. Not a thing, I think, but a thought or propositioni about a thing. A. And so falsity pertains to thoughts, not to things. B. I am forced to admit it! A. Therefore truth as well ? B. So it seems. But I hesitate over whether this consequence holds. A. Now, when a question has been posed, and before you are certain of your opinion, aren't you in doubt about whether something is true of false ? B. Certainly. A. Therefore, you know that the same subject is capable both of truth and falsity, until one of the two is determined by the particular nature of the question. B. I know and I admit that if falsity pertains to thoughts, then truth pertains to thoughts, and not to things. A. But this contradicts what you said earlier, that even something no one might be thinking of can be true. B. You have confused me. --- ok. I will continue if you think this dialogue is of help.
muttiah@cs.purdue.EDU (Ranjan Samuel Muttiah) (01/06/90)
-- In article <9170@medusa.cs.purdue.edu> muttiah@cs.purdue.edu (Ranjan Samuel Muttiah) writes: >Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz wrote a letter to Hobbes in the form >of a dialogue. (It is presumed that that A is really Hobbes). >It was written in 1677 when Leibniz was just 24 years old! ^ X- should be 1670. --- On popular demand the dialogue continues: I am very happy to see that a brand new book is available on some of his essays, including this dialogue. G.W. Leibniz. Philosophical Essays Translated by: Roger Ariew Daniel Garber Hackett Publishing Company (1989) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A. But we should try for a reconciliation. Do you think that all of the thoughts there can be are actually formed ? Or, to speak more clearly, do you think that all propositions are being thought ? B. I don't think so. A. Therefore, you see that truth pertains to propositions or to thoughts, but to propositions or thoughts that are possible, so that, at very least, we can be certain that if anyone were to think in this way or in its opposite, his thought would be true or false. B. You seem nicely to have rescued us from that slippery place. A. But since there must be reason why a given thought is going to be true or false, where, I ask, shall we look for it ? B. In the nature of things, I think. A. What if it arises from your own nature ? B. Certainly not from there alone. For it is neccessary that my nature and the nature of things that I'm thinking about are such that, when I proceed using a legitimate method, I infer a proposition of the sort that is at issue, that is, I find a true proposition. A. You repond nicely, But there are difficulties. B. What are they, I beg of you ? A. Certain learned men think that truth arises from decisions people make, and from name or characters. B. This view is quite paradoxical. A. But they prove it this way: Isn't a definition a starting place for a demonstration ? B. I admit that it is, for some propositions can be demonstrated only from definitions joined to one another. A. Therefore, the truth of such propositions depends on defintions. B. I concede that. A. But defintions depend upon our decision. B. How so ? A. Don't you see that it is a matter of decision among mathematicians to use the word "ellipse" in such a way that it signifies a particular figure ? Or that it is was a matter of decision among the Latins to impose on the word "circulus" the meaning that the definition expresses ? B. But what follows ? There can be thoughts without words. A. But not wihout some other signs. See whether you can do any arithmetic calculation without numerical signs, I ask. B. I am very disturbed, for I didn't think that characters or signs were so necessary for reasoning. A. Therefore, the truths of arithmetic presuppose certain signs or characters ? B. That must be admitted. A. Therefore, they depend upon human decision. B. You seem to have trapped me through trickery, as it were. A. These views are not mine, but belong to quite an ingenious writer. B. Can anyone depart so far from good sense as to convince himself that truth is arbitrary and depends on names, when it is agreed that the Greeks, the Latins, and the Germans all have the same geometry ? ------------ To be continued ...
daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) (01/06/90)
In article <GILHAM.90Jan5125405@cassius.csl.sri.com>, gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) writes: > [...stuff deleted...] > Now as far as the Chinese Room not understanding, if we take the case > where the rules are in books etc., the question is, ``What physical > entity understands, if not Searle?'' I think we would all agree that > books and ink are not things that can understand. The only actor in > the system is Searle. If he doesn't understand, what does? If Searle > memorizes the rules, then he is the ONLY physical entity left that > could be understanding, so I would think you have to ask him, or test > him. > > Even if the system prints (in Chinese), ``I understand Chinese'', it > really doesn't matter. That is because it is easy to produce a set of > rules that will cause a system to print ``I understand Chinese'', > whether it does or not. > > If we assume, even so, that there is a ``system'' that understands, > then Penrose, in THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND, has pointed out that this is > equivalent to postulating a ``mind-stuff'' apart from the physical > entities that exist. This is known as dualism and most AI folk seem > to want to avoid such a viewpoint. While the argument as a whole does > not PROVE that the Chinese Room does not understand Chinese, it does > show that no physical entity in the Chinese Room understands Chinese. > > -Fred Gilham gilham@csl.sri.com Hooray! Finally there is a statement about what the Chinese Room proves that makes sense. I will agree that no physical entity in the Chinese Room understands, but I think it is because *physical entities* do not understand, *systems* do. Roger Penrose is simply wrong to say that is equivalent to postulating "mind-stuff". The systems reply takes it that a mind is a *pattern* produced by physical entities, and is not the entities themselves. This is no more dualism than is believing that sound is a vibration in physical matter, but is not itself matter, or that heat is a property of substances but is not itself a substance. When you say something like "I understand English", what is the "I" that understands? You (and Searle) seem to think it is a physical entity, a particular human body. I don't think that is right, at all. After all, as the old chestnut goes, you replace all the atoms in your body every seven years or so. Any mind that can remember back to your childhood cannot be completely associated with any particular physical entity. Daryl McCullough AKA Mr. Know-it-all
muttiah@cs.purdue.EDU (Ranjan Samuel Muttiah) (01/06/90)
In article <9172@medusa.cs.purdue.edu> muttiah@cs.purdue.edu (Ranjan Samuel Muttiah) writes: > >A. These views are not mine, but belong to quite an ingenious writer. > >B. Can anyone depart so far from good sense as to convince himself > that truth is arbitrary and depends on names, when it is agreed > that the Greeks, the Latins, and the Germans all have the same > geometry ? > >------------ > >To be continued ... -- A. What you say is right. Nevertheless, there is difficulty that must be resolved/ B. one thing troubles me, the fact that notice that I never know, discover, or prove any truth without using words or other signs in my mind. A. Indeed, if characters were lacking, we would never distinctly know or reason about anything. B. But when we examine figures in geometry, we often bring truths to light through careful contemplation of them. A. Indeed so. But we must also realize that these figures must be regarded as characters, for a circle drawn on a paper is not a circle, nor is it necessary that it be, but it is sufficient that it be taken by us for a circle. B. But it does have a certain similarity with a circle, and that certainly isn't arbitrary. A. I admit that, and as a consequence, figures are the most of characters. But what similarity do you think there is between ten and the character '10' ? B. There is some relation or order among the characters which is also found among things, especially if the characters are well designed. A. Indeed, but what similarity do the primary elemetns themselves have with things, for example, '0' with nothing, or 'a' with a line ? You are forced to admit, at very least, that no similarity is necessary in these elements. This for example, is the case with respect to the words 'light' and 'bearing' even though the composite word 'lightbearer' is related to the words 'light' and 'bearing', in a way that corresponds to the relation between the thing signified by 'lightbearer' and the things signified by 'light' and 'bearing'. B. But the Greek word phosphoros has the same relation to phos and phero. A. The Greeks could have used another word instead. B. True. But yet I notice that if characters can be applied to reasoning, there must be some copmlex arrangement, some order which agrees with things, an order, if not in individual words (though that would be better), then at least in their conjecture and inflection. And a corresponding variegated order is found in all languages in one way or another. [My comment: very true of chinese]. This gives me the hope that we can avoid the difficulty. For though the characters are arbitrary, their use and connection have something that is not arbitrary, namely, a certain correspondence between characters and things, and certain relations among different characters expressing the same things. And this correspondence or this relation is the ground of truth. For it brings it about that whether we use these characters or others, the same thing always results, or at least something equivalent, that is, something corresponding in proportion always results. This is true even if, as it happens, it is always necessary to use some characters. for thinking. A. Well done! You have completely untangled yourself in an execllent way. And the analytic or arithmatic calculus confirms this. For, with numbers, things will always come out the same way, whether one uses the decimal system or, as some have done, the duodecimal system. And if, after that, you use seeds or other countable things to show what you explained in a different way using the calculi, it will always come out the same. This is also true in analysis, even though using different characters, different properties of things appear more easily. But the basis of TRUTH IS ALWAYS IN THE VERY ARRANGEMENT OF CHARACTERS. For example, if you call 'a ** 2' the square of 'a', then by taking 'b + c' for 'a', you will have as the square '+ b ** 2 + c ** 2 +2bc.' Or, by taking 'd - e' for 'a', you will have the square '+ d ** 2 + e ** 2 - 2de.' In the prior case we express the relation of the whole 'a' to it's parts 'b' and 'c', and in the latter case we express the relation of the part 'a' to the whole 'd' and to 'e', that which is in 'd' over and above 'a'. However, by substituting, it is obvious that it always comes to the same thing. You see that, by whatever decision the characters are chosen, as long as a certain order and measure is observed in their use, everything will always agree. Therefore, although truths necessarily presuppose some characters, indeed, sometimes they deal with characters themselves, truths don't consist in what is arbitrary in the characters, but in what is invariant in them, namely, in the realtion they have to things. And it is always true, independent of any decision of ours, that if, given such and such characters, such and such reasoning will succeed, then it will likewise succeed given others whose relation to former ones is known; however, the reasoning preserves a relation to the former ones that results from the relation among the characters. This is something obvious from substituting and comparing. -- End. -- Will gladly discuss via email.
gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) (01/07/90)
daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) writes:
==========
Roger Penrose is simply wrong to say that is equivalent to postulating
"mind-stuff". The systems reply takes it that a mind is a *pattern*
produced by physical entities, and is not the entities themselves.
This is no more dualism than is believing that sound is a vibration in
physical matter, but is not itself matter, or that heat is a property
of substances but is not itself a substance.
When you say something like "I understand English", what is the "I"
that understands? You (and Searle) seem to think it is a physical
entity, a particular human body. I don't think that is right, at all.
After all, as the old chestnut goes, you replace all the atoms in your
body every seven years or so. Any mind that can remember back to your
childhood cannot be completely associated with any particular physical
entity.
==========
I reply:
What is the difference between a ``pattern'' produced by physical
entities that is not the entities themselves, and a non-physical
mind-stuff? Certainly a pattern of organization does not produce new
physical entities that did not previously exist, so the pattern must
be non-physical. So ``pattern'' (in the sense you are using it) and
``mind-stuff'' in Penrose's sense seem to me to be two names for the
same thing.
Besides this, I am a little unclear about what a pattern is apart from
the mind of the observer, and how one decides which patterns qualify
as being intelligent. I remember seeing some joke about patterns --
what is the next number in the sequence 2 4 8 16 ... I think the
answer was 31, because there is some quartic polynomial that generates
it and polynomials are less complex than exponentials! The point is
that patterns are things we project onto the world to make sense of
it.
I personally don't want to restrict the phenomenon of consciousness to
a purely physical basis. However, the point is that many proponents
of strong AI argue this way: "Can machines think? Sure, we are
machines and we think!", meaning that we are the sum total of the
physical processes going on inside of us. Searle's argument indicates
that either the Turing test is not an adequate indicator of
understanding (because there is no physical entity doing the
understanding), or that there is some non-physical entity that is
actually doing the understanding.
-Fred Gilham gilham@csl.sri.comutility@quiche.cs.mcgill.ca (Ronald BODKIN) (01/09/90)
In article <GILHAM.90Jan6103615@cassius.csl.sri.com> gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) writes: >What is the difference between a ``pattern'' produced by physical >entities that is not the entities themselves, and a non-physical >mind-stuff? Certainly a pattern of organization does not produce new >physical entities that did not previously exist, so the pattern must >be non-physical. So ``pattern'' (in the sense you are using it) and >``mind-stuff'' in Penrose's sense seem to me to be two names for the >same thing. This, of course, gets into a very old philosophical argument about the nature of universals. When Aristotle s id form is embedded in matter, did he become a dualist? In many people's view, he refuted the dualism of Plato by this concept. One can assert that pattern is either: 1) a tool used to simplify the immense complexity of the universe (e.g. it is really incorrect to say a car stopped when you pushed the break, the thing which made the car stop was no more and no less than the quantum (and sub-quantum) level interactions of everything in the universe within the distance of the speed of light over the given period of the event, and the initial probability distributions in the universe, but this needs simplification). 2) somehow more real yet not a stuff As best I recall, the most extreme view (there isn't pattern at all, and when you say the word the meaning ends at "pattern") is called nominalism, while there are a number of intermediate views before postulating an ontological status for pattern (as mind-stuff). I would say that pattern has an epistemological status, in that it is perceived by minds, and if there is a potential for any mind or anything which can "think" to discover it, it exists, but that pattern is not ontological (i.e. essentially part of the nature of being) -- so that in the universe after energy death there is no pattern. So this is why one can speak of pattern and yet not be peaking of a mind-stuff, since that DOES postulate a somewhat more "concrete" reality for that stuff. Ron
dhw@itivax.iti.org (David H. West) (01/09/90)
In article <1933@quiche.cs.mcgill.ca> utility@quiche.cs.mcgill.ca (Ronald BODKIN) writes: |One can assert that pattern is either: |1) a tool used to simplify the immense complexity of the universe Yes. |(e.g. it is really incorrect to say a car stopped when you pushed the |break, the thing which made the car stop was no more and no less than |the quantum (and sub-quantum) level interactions of everything in the |universe within the distance of the speed of light over the given |period of the event, and the initial probability distributions |in the universe, but this needs simplification). A more thoroughgoing application of this approach of course also unreifies the car, quantum mechanics and everything else, including language, communication and entities such as ourselves. Once we realise this, we can also resume the discussion if we choose! -David West dhw@iti.org
jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (01/10/90)
In article <7661@sdcsvax.UCSD.Edu> pluto@beowulf.UCSD.EDU (Mark E. P. Plutowski) writes: >I'm sorry to belabor the point, but I still am not convinced after >months of patiently following this argument. What follows is not >a counter, but rather is intended to be an honest desire to clarify >my 'understanding' of the concept to a level enabling me to not >only say I understand, but prove it to some objective logician. I think you're asking for too much. There are few, if any, things outside mathematics that could be proved to an objective logician. >We believe Searle-in-the-box when he claims to not-understand. We don't have to believe him. But I think you know what it would normally mean to say you understand Chinese. (I know that I don't understand Chinese, for example, and I don't need to be able to articulate a definition of "understand" to know this. I suspect you are in a similar position.) Now suppose you start doing the things one does in the Chinese Room. You might well think that the room (ie, the system) understood Chinese, and that you had some part in it. But would you really be in doubt about whether your prior claim not to understand Chinese was still correct? I'm pretty sure that running the Chinese Room wouldn't cause _me_ to understand Chinese, at least not right away. The whole point of the C.R., I think, is to take advantage of our admittedly informal and imprecise notion of "understand Chinese". That way, the whole question of what "understanding" in general really means doesn't have to come up right away. The system reply (ie, "the system understands") aims to make the question of whether the person in the room understands Chinese irrelevant, thus forcing us back to the more general, difficult questions about understanding. Searle tries to get back to whether the person understands by his argument about internalizing the system. In short, Searle is trying throughout to avoid getting tangled up in the definition game and other philosophical problems. Well, I don't know if this was really an aim on his part, but I do think it's a good way to look at it. Dennett calls Searle's C.R. argument an "intuition pump", and I think that's a good term for it. It isn't meant to be a water-tight logical argument. Turing took a similar approach in his famous "test": he wanted to get at the question "can a machine think?" in a way that didn't require answers to all kinds of difficult or controversial issues. >Why? Don't we have an objective definition of "understanding?" Probably not. >Why don't we have an objective definition of understanding? It's too hard. Suppose Searle had given a definition. [I'm supposing he didn't give one, but maybe he did. I haven't looked at his _Intentionality_ or the like for a while.] Think of all the ways it could go wrong. For example, he has to make sure that the definition doesn't beg the question by automatically making one or another answer true. Other people might accuse him of that anyway. After all, no one has to accept _Searle's_ definition. It's always open to argue the "understanding" ought to be defined some other way and that defining it Searle's way makes it too hard for machines. A definition might be useful for getting a better idea of what Searle's talking about, but I don't think a dispute about how "understanding" should be defined (a definition game) will tell us what we want to know about machines. There's a danger that it would end up being a debate about whether we should call what computers do "understanding" rather than about whether computers are interestingly different from humans. >Why do we have to ask Searle whether or not he understands, in order >to ourselves decide whether or not he understands? We don't. Imagine yourself in his place. You don't have to agree with his answer, although (as I argued above) I think you would. Maybe you agree with him that far (ie, that the person in the Room doesn't understand Chinese), but still think he hasn't properly answered the systems reply. Or maybe for you the Chinese Room just doesn't convince at all. >How can a proof be based upon a definition which is subjective to >an element of the proof itself? It doesn't aim to prove but to convince. It isn't a proof. >If we ask the Chinese Room itself whether it understands, >(in Chinese, of course, so Searle-in-the-box will not understand >the query) and by some fluke in the rules it somehow answers "Yes" >... Now what? Why not believe the box's reply? That's "the system understands" again. We don't have to believe the box any more than we have to believe Searle. For example, we might have good reason to decide the box was "faking it". I'm not sure what such a good reason would be, but here's something that might do it. Suppose we start up the box for the very first time and ask "what were you doing yesterday?" and it starts telling us all kinds of things that we know it didn't do at all. >I am not biased against Searle's basic point: (IMHO) >that the implementation matters. I just don't see the logic >behind the counter to the systems reply, and would like to >hear it expressed in objective terms. I don't find Searle's argument that he could internalize the rules, etc., so that the system was inside him, and still not understand all that convincing. He's still looking at the system from the CPU's point of view (so to speak), which doesn't seem like the right place to see any understanding that might be taking place. In any case, what I think Searle's Chinese Room example indicates is not so much that no understanding is taking place as that it might not be taking place. Behavior isn't enough evidence for understanding on its own. Whether executing the right program is all there is to understanding (the "strong ai" position Searle is trying to refute) is, in my view, still an open question. >Prove to me the Chinese Room does not understand, without >resorting to asking Searle-inside whether (or not) he does. Note that Searle does have another argument, namely the one about syntax not being sufficient for semantics. Jeff Dalton, JANET: J.Dalton@uk.ac.ed AI Applications Institute, ARPA: J.Dalton%uk.ac.ed@nsfnet-relay.ac.uk Edinburgh University. UUCP: ...!ukc!ed.ac.uk!J.Dalton
gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) (01/10/90)
Well, it seems as if we've gotten to the point where we agree that something other than just the physical entity (entities) in the Chinese room are doing the understanding. The consensus seems to be that some ``pattern'' is doing the understanding. The question comes down to what a pattern is. To me the problem seems to be that a pattern doesn't exist without some mind to perceive it. This is what I think Ronald Bodkin is saying in this quotation: ``I would say that pattern has an epistemological status, in that it is perceived by minds, and if there is a potential for any mind or anything which can "think" to discover it, it exists, but that pattern is not ontological (i.e. essentially part of the nature of being) -- so that in the universe after energy death there is no pattern.'' He then goes on to say: ``So this is why one can speak of pattern and yet not be speaking of a mind-stuff, since that DOES postulate a somewhat more "concrete" reality for that stuff.'' The alternatives seem to be that either a pattern has some independent existence of its own (concrete reality) or a mind is necessary to perceive it. On the one hand, I say we have dualism; on the other hand, I say we have the ``hermeneutical hall of mirrors'', where we project our own thought processes onto something in the outside world. -Fred Gilham gilham@csl.sri.com
jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (01/10/90)
In article <GILHAM.90Jan5125405@cassius.csl.sri.com> gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) writes: >If we assume, even so, that there is a ``system'' that understands, >then Penrose, in THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND, has pointed out that this is >equivalent to postulating a ``mind-stuff'' apart from the physical >entities that exist. This is known as dualism and most AI folk seem >to want to avoid such a viewpoint. It's more like functionalism. (BTW, I'd be interested in comments on Putnam's fairly recent book. Unfortunately, I've forgotten the title. MIT Press, though.) The system supposition is not that the system is some entity made of "mind stuff" that understands. The idea is, roughly, that a mind corresponds to an executing program. Having more than one around is no more dualistic than having more than one process on a 68k. How does Penrose know that Searle can't be the machine that's executing the program? That certainly seems to be what he's doing after he's internalized the Chinese Room.
utility@quiche.cs.mcgill.ca (Ronald BODKIN) (01/11/90)
In article <GILHAM.90Jan9100839@cassius.csl.sri.com> gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) writes: >The alternatives seem to be that either a pattern has some independent >existence of its own (concrete reality) or a mind is necessary to >perceive it. On the one hand, I say we have dualism; on the other >hand, I say we have the ``hermeneutical hall of mirrors'', where we >project our own thought processes onto something in the outside world. I think that it may be that these positions are not really as you claim. I would submit that the word "independent" is extremely vague. Aristotle's view of form/pattern is about the same as mine, both try to avoid postulating a SEPARATE existence for patternyet claim that there is some kind of non-subjective nature to it. I don't really think its the case that my epistemology projects thought processes onto reality, in that it is ultimately the case that the though the pattern is embedded in particular minds its a universal quantity, which ALL minds (or potential minds) can experience. But there is certainly nothing like a definitively correct epistemology out there, and its a problem that has occupied philosophy from its dawn until this century. And the interesting thing is that computer scientists are forced to demonstrate these claims a bit more explicitly than other philosophers were. Ron
cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) (01/16/90)
In article <GILHAM.90Jan9100839@cassius.csl.sri.com> gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) writes: >The consensus seems to be that some ``pattern'' is doing the understanding. .... >The alternatives seem to be that either a pattern has some independent >existence of its own (concrete reality) or a mind is necessary to >perceive it. On the one hand, I say we have dualism; on the other >hand, I say we have the ``hermeneutical hall of mirrors'', where we >project our own thought processes onto something in the outside world. Ok. So how do you explain mathematics, or even humble numbers, without recourse to dualism or the hermeneutic hall of mirrors? -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.aipna 031 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK
kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) (01/17/90)
In article <1839@aipna.ed.ac.uk> cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes: >In article <GILHAM.90Jan9100839@cassius.csl.sri.com> gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) writes: > >>The consensus seems to be that some ``pattern'' is doing the understanding. This is a very fragile consensus, if it exists at all. >>The alternatives seem to be that either a pattern has some independent >>existence of its own (concrete reality) or a mind is necessary to >>perceive it. On the one hand, I say we have dualism; on the other >>hand, I say we have the ``hermeneutical hall of mirrors'', where we >>project our own thought processes onto something in the outside world. > >Ok. So how do you explain mathematics, or even humble numbers, without >recourse to dualism or the hermeneutic hall of mirrors? The traditional solution to this problem goes all the way back to Aristotle. Patterns are explained as properties, which exist only as attributes of objects. Thus squareness exists only in square objects. If no objects in the world are perfectly square, then perfect squareness does not exist, at least not in this world. The existence of other worlds is up for grabs. Numbers get a similar treatment. Mathematics as a whole is treated as a language for describing patterns. Followups to sci.philosophy.tech, please.