utility@quiche.cs.mcgill.ca (Ronald BODKIN) (03/18/90)
[Ken Presting wrote about his idea of implementationism.] I heartily agree that there is a concept of structure which can be seen to be exhibited by systems in reality (which obey the laws of physics). However, I am still troubled by the "ontological status" of these universals; i.e. concepts are somehow implemented in a system (quite right), but just what exactly are these concepts. I find it hard to exactly describe what is annoying me about this. Platonism can be modified to assert that these structures are somehow "real", while Aristotleanism can be modified to assert that they are real but only exist in implementations/embeddings. In some sense, the question can be placed as, concepts are some kind of well-founded abstraction, but what exactly is the nature of such abstraction? As for AI treating philosophical questions, it is in my mind a totally correct assertion. AI is often taken as the study of intelligence in general, which is what epistemology is. If one thinks of AI as the implementation of intelligence, then it must still have recourse to a theoretical area (just as any applicative science requires a theoretical one) which would still be epistemology. Ron p.s. I first followed up to talk.philosophy.misc, but I guess no one in comp.ai reads that.