zarnuk@caen.engin.umich.edu (Paul Steven Mccarthy) (03/14/90)
>>>>(Paul Steven Mccarthy) writes: [Everything is a consequence >>>> of the laws of physics...] >>>(Chris Malcolm) asks: [...How is {some property of chess} the >>> consequence of the laws of physics?...] >>(Paul Steven Mccarthy) answered: [...reductionism...] >> The given property is a consequence of the rules of the game. >> The rules of the game are the consequence of human perceptions >> of pleasure. [pleasure <-- nuero-chemistry <-- chemistry >> <-- physics] >> . . . >> [reference to role of history... basic reductionism... >> probablistic determinism...] >(Ken Presting) objects: [...] >It may be easy to write off chess as defined only for human pleasure, >but but such a move is not so easy for the rules of arithmetic, the >rules of logic, or the rules of a Turing machine. [...] >The question of handling abstract rules in a physical system is very >important for AI. [...] >What is the relationship between processes, perceptions, and rules? I make no claims to be a philosopher. I will try to lay out the logic behind my beliefs, but I am sure you could find more persuasive arguments in "philosophy somewhere...". Anyway, here goes: At the end of my article I made quick reference to the historical aspects of the game, and an appeal to "probablistic determinism". It occurred to me afterwards that the real crux of my beliefs stems from probablistic determinism. You set up the dominoes 'just right' at the beginning, introduce a convenient cosmic big bang, wait a few eons, ... and voila! Here we are, with this particular world, and all of its interesting properties. As for the development of "logic", "arithmetic" and "Turing machines", there was a non-zero probability at the beginning that the human organism would evolve, that this organism would be curious about its environment, that it would develop reasoning tools to help it contemplate that environment and ultimately that those reasoning tools would manifest themselves in the form that they have. It is basically a long chain of (yes :-) logic where I have tried to look at the "big picture" and not been particularly concerned with the details of intervening steps. It seems to me that reductionism naturally leads to probablistic determinism. It is a belief in "cause and effect", where the underlying "causal force" is the laws of physics -- just "the way the universe works". I _believe_ that I am correct. I _believe_ that the body of reasoning tools developed by humans are valid for describing the properties of the universe. I also believe that this belief is a consequence of "the way that the universe works" (nice and recursive, isn't it?! :-). I may be completely wrong, but I don't let myself worry about that too much. I am a computer scientist, not a philosopher. Now, Ken, don't you agree that this kind of discussion really belongs in "philosophy somewhere..."? I appreciate your opinions. I have devotedly read the articles that you have posted to this newsgroup, but I will not pretend that I have understood even 10% of their content. There is certainly value in these kinds of discussions, but I think the value is mis-placed here. I must say that I even _enjoy_ these philosophical digressions; I just think they are more "philosophy" than they are "artificial intelligence". Your awe-struck, but uncomprehending fan, ---Paul...
aarons@syma.sussex.ac.uk (Aaron Sloman) (03/16/90)
zarnuk@caen.engin.umich.edu (Paul Steven Mccarthy) writes: > >>>>(Paul Steven Mccarthy) writes: [Everything is a consequence > >>>> of the laws of physics...] > ..... > >>>(Chris Malcolm) asks: [...How is {some property of chess} the > >>> consequence of the laws of physics?...] > ...... > >>(Paul Steven Mccarthy) answered: [...reductionism...] > >> The given property is a consequence of the rules of the game. > ..... > >(Ken Presting) objects: [...] ..... Just to stir things up a little: Chess would have existed even if the whole physical universe hadn't, just like all those infinitely many other games that nobody ever has or ever will invent, and just like all those infinitely many languages that nobody ever has learnt or ever will learn, and all those infinitely many valid proofs in axiom systems that nobody will ever formulate, and all those infinitely many thoughts that nobody will ever think.... Aaron
kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) (03/17/90)
In article <49331604.1285f@maize.engin.umich.edu> zarnuk@caen.UUCP (Paul Steven Mccarthy) writes: > >>>>(Chris Malcolm) asks: [...How is {some property of chess} the >>>> consequence of the laws of physics?...] > >>>(Paul Steven Mccarthy) answered: [...reductionism...] >>> The given property is a consequence of the rules of the game. >>> The rules of the game are the consequence of human perceptions >>> of pleasure. [pleasure <-- nuero-chemistry <-- chemistry >>> <-- physics] > >>(Ken Presting) objects: [...] >>It may be easy to write off chess as defined only for human pleasure, >>but but such a move is not so easy for the rules of arithmetic, the >>rules of logic, or the rules of a Turing machine. [...] > >It occurred to me afterwards that the real crux of my beliefs stems >from probablistic determinism. You set up the dominoes 'just right' >at the beginning, introduce a convenient cosmic big bang, wait a >few eons, ... and voila! Here we are, with this particular world, >and all of its interesting properties.. . . >It is a belief in "cause and effect", where the underlying "causal force" >is the laws of physics -- just "the way the universe works". What you have here is not so much an argument for reductionism, but rather an argument against *emergence*. By assuming that the starting state has certain potential for making certain things happen later on, you are saying that the ultimate effects were there, in some sense, right from the start. By bringing in the probabilistic type of causality, you can say that chess was still a consequence of the initial state, even though it was not certain to appear. But this is not a reduction of the rules of chess to the laws of physics. I just happen to have another concept in my little catalog, which does a much better job than "reductionism". I call it "implementationism". To give an example, let's switch from chess to algorithms: When a computer calculates a function, its operation is entirely controlled by the laws of physics. But an algorithm cannot be reduced to the operations of any one computer, or any one kind of computer, or to computers at all. Any physical operations which have the "right" structure could be an instance of computing a function by the algorithm. The "right" structure is not definable in terms of the laws of physics, but *is* definable in terms of the logical structure of the algorithm. There is a large class of physical objects which *could* be used as automatic computers, and they all have such physical properties as allow a homomorphism from the logical description of the algorithm's operation to the causal description of the machine's operation. (This is a case of the "homomorphism of logical structure" I mentioned earlier this week). This idea of implementing an abstraction in a physical device with a "matching" logical structure is easily extended to sciences. Chemistry includes a very complex bunch of abstractions and general laws, which most people think of as reducible to physics. But - this is big - if the physicists decide that say, Rutherford atoms are out, and Bohr atoms are in, the chemists do NOT have to re-write the Periodic Table. They may perhaps change some of their plans and expectations for new research. The concepts of chemistry do not disappear into physics, and I would even say that the concepts of chemistry do not change *meaning* when physics changes. Chemists' beliefs about the *reference* of their terms changes, but that's about it. That's because the relation between chemical and physical theory is a like an implementation of a program. If the implementation changes, most of the "high-level" functions are unaffected. Chess, mathematics, and logic now fit into the scheme with a lot less mangling. We know how to implement machines that can behave according to any rules anyone would care to state. And we ourselves know how to follow rules. What we don't know is how to implement a machine that can learn all the rules human beings can learn, or even how much of human behavior is based on rules and how much is based on causes. But the general thesis of implementationism is: Everything is implemented in Physics. If implementationism is true, then we have a shot at re- implementing intelligence in silicon. We don't need Reductionism. (Jerry Fodor has a great discussion of reduction in the first chapter of _The_Language_of_Thought_. He makes a very good case against reducing psychology to physics, but I think Implementationism is much more elegant than his "Token Physicalism". I could use a better name, though. :-) > . . . I _believe_ that the body of reasoning >tools developed by humans are valid for describing the properties >of the universe. I also believe that this belief is a consequence of >"the way that the universe works" (nice and recursive, isn't it?! :-). Statements such as this bring up an important point. One part of being an intelligent person is to recognize that one's beliefs come about in a variety of ways. Sometimes our beliefs seem to be "built in", and sometimes our beliefs are deliberately adopted. It is certainly foolish to insist that all beliefs must have a justification, but on the other hand, it would be disingenuous to hold any particular belief exempt from all challenges. Even the laws of arithmetic and logic can be held up for scrutiny. The intuitionists and constructivists may well be wrong about doubting the law of excluded middle, but they are not stupid or foolish to do so. I would say that an AI which could not participate in a discussion of the foundation of its beliefs was lacking in an important area of human behavior. I might go so far as to say that if a machine did not make little jokes when it reveals the circularity of its reasoning, it would lack another important human trait! (:-) (Circularity in the foundations of reasoning is *very* difficult to avoid. Even Kant could not avoid it. He did not make many jokes, however...) >Now, Ken, don't you agree that this kind of discussion really belongs >in "philosophy somewhere..."? I don't know. I guess that "net protocol" requires extended discussions to be conducted in talk.* groups. I figure that as long as my articles receive thoughtful replies here, I might as well continue to post here. The value I derive from the ideas of the rest of the group is tremendous. My impression is that the success of AI will probably entail the answers to a bunch of philosophical questions. I *love* answers, so I'm very interested in the success of AI. I have cross-posted and suggested followups to sci.philosophy.tech. >Your awe-struck, but uncomprehending fan, >---Paul... Oops. I'll try to be more comprehensible and less awful. (:-) Ken Presting
kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) (03/22/90)
In article <351@ntpdvp1.UUCP> sandyz@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Sandy Zinn) writes: >> Ken Presting writes: >> What we don't know is how to implement a machine that >> can learn all the rules human beings can learn, or even how much of >> human behavior is based on rules and how much is based on causes. > >Rules vs. Causes?? I'm curious; please elaborate. When you play a game of chess, if someone asks you why you move the knight in that funny way, or why the pawn doesn't capture the piece ahead of it, the rational explanation is based on the rules of the game. No such explanation would be available if someone asked you why you jerk your foot when the tendon of your kneecap is tapped (even if you know a whole lot more about neurophysiology than I do, you couldn't give an account of why jerking your foot was *rational*) One thing that makes rules interesting is that they seem to be closely related to conscious thought, abstract thinking and learning, and overt behavior, all at the same time. A *very* controversial issue revolves around the rules of grammar. A large number of bright people are prepared to argue to the death that knowledge of grammar is knowledge of certain rules, and that this knowledge is innate in every infant. A similar number of equally bright people think this position is absurd. Confusion over this and related issues (such as explicit representation of symbolic data vs. "implementation" of symbolic process in hardware) seems to me to infect much of the debate over the foundations of AI. Implementationism and normative properties are my attempt to sort things out. Whether a certain process (natural or artificial) follows a certain rule is a normative question - the rule states a "norm", and some interpretation of our observations of the process may be required before we can understand the relation between the process and the rule. I know this is rather vague, but it may be enough for a start. Ken Presting
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (03/23/90)
In article <8eQP02EX94Fn01@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com> kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) writes: > >When you play a game of chess, if someone asks you why you move the knight >in that funny way, or why the pawn doesn't capture the piece ahead of it, >the rational explanation is based on the rules of the game. No such >explanation would be available if someone asked you why you jerk your >foot when the tendon of your kneecap is tapped (even if you know a whole >lot more about neurophysiology than I do, you couldn't give an account >of why jerking your foot was *rational*) > We have discussed the problems involved in playing fast and loose with words like "understand" and "intelligent." Now I find myself ready to approach "rational" with a similar degree of caution. Unless I'm mistaken, however, this is a situation in which epistemology has also tried to take the bull by the horns. What I have read certainly indicates that a lot of thought has gone into the issue, but I'm not convinced that it has been resolved satisfactorily. Let me try to pick on both of Ken's premises for the usual sake of argument. Let's take the patella reflex first. Why can't I give a RATIONAL account? At one level, I can sketch out a trace of activations of nerve and muscle cells; and I have every reason to believe that a nerophysiologist could essentially do the same much more thoroughly. On the other hand, I can provide ethological evidence as to why selection has favored phenotypes which have this reflex (having to do with the way it breaks one's fall). Thus, I can account for it at both the level of the behavior of the organism in the world and at the level of the internal functions of that organism. Is the argument that the reflex is not RATIONAL a consequence of the fact that it is a REFLEX, rather than a conscious act? If so, do we really want such a close coupling between rationality and consciousness? Now let's go back to chess. Here, I admit, I may be a bit more OUTRE; so let me attribute my reaction to reading Gabriel Garcia Marquez. To refresh the memories of our readers, there is a scene in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDE in which a new priest tries to teach chess to Jose Arcadio Buendia (who is tied to a tree in the public square). Buendia responds that he cannot see the point of playing a game in which both sides have agreed to the rules in advance. Why should we assume either that it is rational for a game to have rules or for the players to follow them? When all is said and done, I see more rationality in the patella reflex, since I can observe that individuals who have it survive better than those who don't, whereas I cannot make any similar statements about chess. ========================================================================= USPS: Stephen Smoliar USC Information Sciences Institute 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 Marina del Rey, California 90292-6695 Internet: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu "Only a schoolteacher innocent of how literature is made could have written such a line."--Gore Vidal
sandyz@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Sandy Zinn) (04/06/90)
> Let me emphasize again that my view is opposed to the computationalist. > Logic and computation, for me, are *methods*, not *models*. (I think > I have demonstrated that logic is not the only method (:-) but logic does > have the advantage of sharpening objections). Fantasy and ritual are > the appropriate models for thought - that is my view. With a position > like this, I hope it is obvious why I concentrate on formal methods! > > Ken Presting ("Descartes never woke up") This is my third hit on this posting. (besides, our news feed is down.) Ken, this fantasy-as-model idea just keeps getting more interesting to me, as a springboard for further exploration of the divergences & convergences in this discussion, if nothing else. I agree with Stephen that it's a method as well; to my old "identity of incomparable categories", I'd add: > rules = representation = processes = perception = methods = models The Dotland Identity. [ which has something to say but leaves a lot unsaid ] Instead of fantasy-as-model, let me leap from dream-as-model. I'm going to use Bateson's discussion of the Freudian notion of primary process. Dreams, in the classical Freudian sense, translated material into metaphors to avoid the Superego watchdog. Bateson argues, and I agree with him, that dream metaphors are not *result* but *source*. Insofar as Mind is representa- tion, it is a metaphor for whatever is being represented. The Primary Process is metaphorical, and involves the representation of *relationships*. Bateson says: ...the subject matter of primary-process discourse is different from the subject matter of language and consciousness. Consciousness talks about things or persons, and attaches predicates to the specific things which have been mentioned. In primary process the things or persons are usually not identified, and the focus of the discourse is upon the *relationships* which are asserted to obtain betweeen them. I suggest that this primary process is Dotland, is Implementationism. A metaphor retains unchanged the relationship which it "illustrates" while substituting other things or persons for the relata. Gee, this sounds like a Normative Property! (or do I seriously mistake you?) Primary process is characterized (e.g., by Fenichel) as lacking negatives, lacking tense, lacking in any identification of linguistic mood (i.e., no identification of indicative, sub- junctive, optative, etc.) and metaphoric. Dreams. Fantasy. Ritual. The relationships just ARE, period. These relationships are primarily iconic, or analogic: it is a *pattern* which is represented, a style of relationship, if you will. The digitalization of information comes only at the level of language. Logic, a set of digital relationships, is imposed on dreams. The question becomes, can Edelman's neural-processor code for this kind of primary process? My guess is yes. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sandra Zinn | "The squirming facts (yep these are my ideas | exceed the squamous mind" they only own my kybd) | -- Wallace Stevens
kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) (04/10/90)
In article <365@ntpdvp1.UUCP> sandyz@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Sandy Zinn) writes: >(Ken Presting) writes: >> It is very important to pick out the "right" frame of reference, ... >> Every person establishes a frame of reference; > ^^^^^^^ >Be careful of this singular terminology here; we don't want to "entitize" >that which is fluid, multi-dimensional, evolutionary and "self-contradictory" >(how do you contradict a "self" which is constantly in flux?). Very good point, but the flux in any personality is limited, at least in some ways. I would agree that parts of a personality can change practically without limit, especially in the case of beliefs and intellectual behavior (ie making assertions and arguments). I think there is a useful comparison between the Society of Mind and the Scentific Community. At most times in the history of a science (Kuhn's "normal science") there is one dominant abstraction which organizes the interpretation of data, the design and evaluation of research programs, and the results of (most) previous experiments. Paradigm shifts don't seem to be the result of any single experiment, but rather are a response to unchecked growth in the complexity of data interpretation (eg, epicycles). As experimental results accumulate which strain the interpretive framework provided by theory, it is increasingly likely that an alternative theory will have a chance of showing itself to have a real advantage. Data interpretation, and its counterpart, the analysis of natural systems, are more like *skills* than *algorithms*. Physics students learn a lot of specific cases of natural phenomena, and the mathematical techniques that have been applied to those systems. No attempt is made to prove to anybody that the math is justified a priori - you try it, and if it works, go for it! If it fits into some grand formalism, that's great, but as Dan Mocsny observed, a table in a handbook is where most numbers come from, not from theoretical derivations. I think the mind is very similar. Skills are prior to abstractions, and logic is applied to rationalize ("explain" is the polite term) the effectiveness of the skills. The entity is the collection of skills or techniques or conditioned responses, the frame of reference (descriptive abstraction) is a fantasy. > >> the problem for Cog. Sci. is to understand that self-constructed frame. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >One of my professors convinced me how impoverished a representation we have >for this process. Most of our building materials are pre-fab, by our >families, our culture, etc., . . . Mathematics, and abstraction in general, is the solution to this problem. To the extent that we commit ourselves to scientific method, we are commited to abstraction in solutions whenever it is feasible (at least). Strong AI is doubly committed to abstraction - as a method, and as a model. The literate/illiterate distinction might help to understand the situation, although I am not prepared to give a clear account of the psychology of literacy (print vs. speech is too simplistic). An illiterate has only the culturally developed tools, but with symbols you can build any logical structure at all. >> > In the case of the knee-jerk reflex, the premise ... >> >> I would analyze the situation just a little differently, >> ... If the leverage system (and all the other physiology) is called a >> "context", I would take the tap of the hammer to be a "premise". > > . . . your identification of the hammer as premise shifts >the focus of the system -- we do this all the time, and necessarily -- >but I must note that such a re-punctuation will necessitate a different >interpretation of the conclusion than the one I intended. Neither of us >is wrong, but we've lost the isomorphism of our metaphors.... This shows the interplay between analysis, interpretation, and representation (eg expression in words). To understand the relation between perception and cognition, we have to understand all three processes. Sensation by itself does not require so much effort, I would say. Any attempt to build too much logical structure into the concept of sensation can only be confusing. I offer this remark mostly as a suggestion for terminology - we need *some* level of description at which there is nothing more than superposition of squirms, and we might as well call that sensation. Sensation seems to me to be precisely analogous to analysis, which I would define as "redescription in a selected vocabulary". I've begun working out a homomorphism of logical structure between analysis and sensory processes. The basic idea is to compare transduction between phase spaces (ie physical parameters) to syntactical transformations. Ken Presting ("The system will be ready next Sunday" - SK)
kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) (04/10/90)
In article <366@ntpdvp1.UUCP> sandyz@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Sandy Zinn) writes: >> (Ken Presting) responds: >> > Fantasy and ritual are the appropriate models for thought . . . > >Why are rituals more appropriate? Because they are phenomenological, >as opposed to being logical? This is what I think you are saying. I got such a hard time for so long from Stephen about excessive formalism that I decided if I'm going to get pounded for having a silly and simplistic opinion, I might as well take a pounding for the silly opinion that I actually do hold! (The truth will out ...) The attribute of rituals that gets my attention is their *concreteness*, combined with their *futility*. (Ahh, that explains everything! :-) Not that all rituals are always futile - this is precisely why ritual is fascinating. Why would grown organisms with important things to do like gathering nuts and berries, and dragging off the females (:-) engage in behavior with *no discernable practical consequences*? This has got to be, without question, the strangest phenomenon in the animal kingdom. (I include posting netnews within this phenomenon - no joke) To anticipate Sandy's later remark, I see no alternative to the hypothesis that symbol manipulation originated historically in ritual behavior, and that what we today describe as symbol manipulation remains an enactment of a ritual. I should admit that I am overstating a point for effect when I say "NO practical consequences". If there were no selective advantage to having a tendency to ritual, then the tendency would probably disappear. But selection for a tendency does NOT entail that all consequences of having the tendency are advantageous. The gene which confers resistance to malaria in West African populations also confers susceptibility to sickle-cell disease. It is an elementary fallacy to suppose that every trait in a *phenotype* confers a selective advantage, and there are many subtler fallacies lurking for selectionist explanations. Having said this, I have finally made good on a promise I gave back during the last big Chinese Room debate - I've finally defined "symbol manipulation". My definition does have the virtue of blasting Searle out of the water, but I will understand if some readers continue to reserve judgement! (Posted or e-mailed objections requested, natch) (Sandy makes her first mistake:) > . . . You are a superlative logician; . . . In Sandy's defense, I should note that she must have composed this article before I claimed that logic and calculation are also rituals. (:-) I did once take a course from Leon Henkin, but was utterly defeated by ultrafilters. (Don't ask me what they are) >... a propositional mode, which elevates the concepts of separateness, >levels, abstractions, distinctions of types, etc. This brings up some interesting points. I would say that *arguments* *must* be conducted in terms of propositions, their relations, etc. This has very important implications for the symbolist vs. connectionist issue. I would still deny that any non-ritual thought is propositional, that is, any thought that is not related to argumentation. But if the practical criteria for *evidence* of thought is to be communication, then the capacity to apply recursive rules (which may be difficult for NN's) is essential. With regard to levels: In order to be able to discuss the truth of propositions, and other semantic issues, it is indispensable to use seperate languages (ie abstractions), and let one of them refer to the other. If this is not done, then the discussion is conducted in a semantically closed language, and argument is pointless. (Other than this object language/metalanguage distinction between levels, I would de-emphasize any hierarchy of abstractions.) This is not a pedantic triviality. The Greeks had a terrible time with arguments that depended on paradoxes to trip up opponents. Some of these were (more or less) well intended, as in the case of Zeno. But to conduct an argument that reached an interesting conclusion (ie, anything other than "change remains the same and changes" et. al.) required dedicated collaboration between disputants. Schools of thought tended to be more like religions than intellectual investigations. Aristotle finally cleared up the mess with the logic of syllogisms, which are adequate for most of geometry and some number theory, but not for as much mathematics as we do in Fregean logics. The point is that some set of rules is indispensable to control communication in disagreement, or disagreement will become inescapable. IMO, this is the beginnings of a justification of the survival value of the logic ritual, part of an explanation of why we continue to perform it, part of the motivation for learning the ritual, and most importantly, for *internalizing* it. Thought *is posterior* to negotiation. (Simplified diagram:) X X .........X......X...... . X X . . X X . . X X . ......X......X.......... X X >Those X-bars are your darned normative properties, which I, living in >dotland, believe are really just more dots, >just like the dot-planes (levels of abstraction), Each normative property is part of an abstraction all of its own. Truth is a good example - it is part of the whole abstraction of Logic. A normative property is always exemplified by the dots, but can never be defined in terms of dots. Again, truth is the perfect example - truth is not definable in terms of syntactic properties (Tarksi's Theorem). >just like the dot-planes (levels of abstraction), which as you see I can >move between, with or without your normative properties (though I will >concede that all my bridges may well be labeled as such). The dot-bridges correspond to *implementations*. The relation between normative properties and implementations is very close. Both depend on homomorphisms of logical structure. But normative properties are more "fluid" than implemented properties, because a normative property is most important when it is *imperfectly* exemplified. For example, people's assertions are never the whole truth and nothing but. Normatives depend on *interpretations* which are always tentative. > >In dotland, all the patterns I see seem to pulse in this rhythm: > propagation, selection propagation, selection > >The resulting patterns are very different, but the essential processing >is the same. Between levels, within levels, outside the levels: patterns >begetting patterns. Natural selection is an excellent analogy for the process of interpretation, because the propagation is always tentative. I think it is undeniable that a process with similar logical structure is responsible for scientific progress, though the degree of similarity is open to question. Also, I am personally convinced that some similar processes occur in the brain during (at least) early cognitive development, as well as during creative thought, throughout life. I think there is a very suggestive analogy between the operation of non-deterministic automata and, say, the proliferation of antibodies. How far this analogy can be pressed is a good question. > Maybe I like the idea of emergence because a syncretic >reality sees levels as a coalescence phenomenon, whereas a propositional >reality has built-in levels, and thus sees "emergence" as silly. You're confusing me with a logician again! Bertrand Russell suggested that reality was composed of "facts". I think reality is composed of us and the rest of the stuff. Whatever it is, I don't care, as long as there's only one kind of stuff, and we are made of it. I call this view "indifferent monism". I see emergence as unnecessary. Normative properties can be clearly defined, argued about, calculated, and are lots of fun to be with. Emergence is vaguely slimy, or slimily vague, and I just don't trust it. >You wrote that the relation between description and perception is fantasy. >Literally. -- Let me propose that dotland is fantasyland. Homomorphs, >isomorphs, allomorphs -- they're all here, wildly procreative but lawfully >selective. I'm confused about this, I guess. Where is Reality? Ken Presting ("I can't these squirms out of my mind")
edm002@muvms3.bitnet (04/10/90)
In article <16ai029B9byy01@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com>, kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) writes: > In article <366@ntpdvp1.UUCP> sandyz@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Sandy Zinn) writes: >>> (Ken Presting) responds: >>> > Fantasy and ritual are the appropriate models for thought . . . >> >>Why are rituals more appropriate? Because they are phenomenological, >>as opposed to being logical? This is what I think you are saying. > > The attribute of rituals that gets my attention is their *concreteness*, > combined with their *futility*. (Ahh, that explains everything! :-) > > Not that all rituals are always futile - this is precisely why ritual > is fascinating. Why would grown organisms with important things to..... Isn't this what Skinner called "adventitious conditioning"? Skinner's hypothesis was that ritual behavior arose when an operant made a false stimulus-response correlation. We do it all the time, with behaviors like wearing our "lucky hat" when fishing or such like. I've wondered if we couldn't extend the concept of adventitious conditioning to a behavioral explanation of religion in human culture. Religious ritual is nothing more than a stimulus-response correlation that does not correlate with the actual s-r sequence [cf. Monty Python's "Life of Brian" as an example]. Statistics is one more belief system, as the original message pointed out. A statistician *believes* that his/her results *probably* are 95% not due to mere chance [p<.05], but the statistician cannot *know* if the results are random or not. There are alternative ways of knowing [or thinking we know], and statistical inference is one such way--it is not the *only* such way. -- edm002@muvms3.bitnet,Marshall University Fred R. Reenstjerna | Life is like a 'B' movie. You 400 Hal Greer Blvd | don't want to leave in the middle, Huntington, WV 25755 | but you don't want to see it again. (304)696 - 2905 | ---Ted Turner, 1990
kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) (04/12/90)
In article <15855@muvms3.bitnet> edm002@muvms3.bitnet writes: >In article <16ai029B9byy01@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com>, kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) writes: >> The attribute of rituals that gets my attention is their *concreteness*, >> combined with their *futility*. (Ahh, that explains everything! :-) >> >> Not that all rituals are always futile - this is precisely why ritual >> is fascinating. Why would grown organisms with important things to... > > Isn't this what Skinner called "adventitious conditioning"? Skinner's >hypothesis was that ritual behavior arose when an operant made a false >stimulus-response correlation. . . . The biggest problem I have with this suggestion is the the application of "false" to "correlation". Inverse or negative correlations I can understand, and I can understand low correlation coefficients. I can even understand temporary, accidental, and non-repeatable correlations. But to apply the term "false" at all, to any correlation, no matter how pathological, is an example of the basic problem of behaviorism - there are concepts that scientists apply to each other's work which are completely useless in explanations of animal behavior. Falsehood is one of these concepts, and for Behaviorism to be consistent, it must eliminate that term entirely from its vocabulary. Now, I have no problem at all with using a system of describing animal (including human) behavior which does not include any semantic, intentional, or normative concepts. On the contrary, I think that no explanation of animal bahavior can be satisfying unless all *observations* can be accounted for in non-intentional terms. However, it is *clearly false* that all *concepts* can be reduced to behavioristic terms. Truth and falsehood cannot be reduced to syntactic terms (by Tarski's theorem), and syntax cannot be reduced to typographic terms (think of cyphers and Pig-Latin). But a very significant (I would say the most interesting) part of human behavior consists of applying semantic, intentional, and normative terms to people, places and processes. The conjunction of these two positions makes theorizing about behavior very difficult. I would say that any attempt to simplify the issue is at best a deferral, and at worst an evasion, of real questions. I see no alternative to the hypothesis of unconscious (ie non-intentional) psychological processes, and a difficult and confusing project of explaining subjective experience in terms of them. > I've wondered if we couldn't extend the concept of adventitious >conditioning to a behavioral explanation of religion in human culture. >Religious ritual is nothing more than a stimulus-response correlation that does >not correlate with the actual s-r sequence Oh? How would you propose to distinguish religious ritual from mathematical calculation? Or any other rule-governed activity with a problematic epistemological foundation? I would not attempt to defend (most) religious doctrines, but any attentive philosophy undergraduate would be prepared to debunk most contemporary justifications of mathematical theory and practice. The plain fact is that very many mathematicians believe wholeheartedly in a Platonic Heaven. This is an example of what I am calling a *fantasy*, and when such a belief is used to explain one's own behavior, that behavior is what I call a *ritual*. I don't see much hope for finding an "actual s-r sequence" that correlates with the method of indirect proof, or mathematical induction. Fred, I apologize for the harsh tone of this reply. I actually have a great deal of sympathy for any method that professes to have strict scruples, and does not shy away from applying those scruples to the "sacred cows". But, please, not as a blunt instrument! Ken Presting ("A scruple is a two-edged blunt instrument")
sandyz@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Sandy Zinn) (04/14/90)
(Ken Presting) writes: > > What I had in mind [is something that] I > (eventually) want to call "Intentional" behavior, or more precisely, > behavior _qua_ intentional. This distinction is based on what abstraction > is used to describe the behavior. Physical, chemical, biological, or > medical abstractions are non-intentional, while descriptions which > refer to "propositional attitudes" such as belief and desire are > intentional. > > Whereas non-intentional descriptions are justified (or criticised) by > citing observations *within* the vocabulary of a single abstraction, > intentional descriptions are conditional on INTERPRETATIONS of cited > observations in the vocabulary of *another* abstraction. So intentional > predicates are very much like normative predicates. The only difference > is in connotation - normative predicates involve value judgements, while > intentional predicates do not. Wait a minute, Ken. There are some mixed referents here: if intentional descrs. are dependent on Interpretations, then it's clear that they MUST involve value judgments. Value is precisely the interpretation of an observation's (a behavior's or a property's) location in a scheme which is held to be relevant. The choice of a relevant scheme is a value judgment, as is the activity of locating the observation in that scheme: interpreta- tion. VALUE is linked in the Socratic sense to *sense*. I would even say that *value* is a measure of order, of information (which means that money- grubbers, since currency currently carries so little information, are indeed grasping at straws -- just what I'd want to have operating in MY paradigm.) What _particular_ frame of reference (or value) are you NOT wanting to apply to intentional predicates which you think IS applied to normative predicates, and why do you feel it is not *sensible* to do so? I'll guess that you are talking about a sociocultural frame, in which case the question becomes, why isn't it sensible to relate intentionality to these values? If you want to suspend the individual's *beliefs and desires* from reference within a larger social context, I'm going to jump all over you, so you'd better have a high-information-quotient reason. (On second thought, maybe you're going to suspend *logic*, which you might be able to get away with.) (Ken Presting): > >> Even a Universal Turing machine can apply only one interpretation to > >> the data on its tape. > > (Steven Daryl McCullough) writes: > >... Are you saying that Searle's argument *does* prove that a Turing > >machine can't think? . . . > > Yes. ...observe that a > compiler will take any garbage input file, try to parse it, and barf if > it hits a syntax error. That's what I mean by a program "applying an > interpretation". The compiler acts as if every file it gets its hands on > is a source program, and if the file doesn't fit the compiler's > "conceptual scheme" (ie parsing algorithm) then the compiler just dies. > An AI program needs to manipulate its own "concepts" along with its input. A very clear explication, which I agree with. This means not only recur- sive transformation, but also *excursive* transformation -- ie, the string of symbols itself needs a second pass. One of the things that bugs me about the TM model is its reduction of interaction to a serial stream going merrily past. TOO SIMPLE. And therefore tasteless. (IMO, natch.) > [ about the Symbol Grounding Problem. ] > Hilary Putnam [ with reference to problems of unique interpretation ] > mentions on the very last page. He thinks it entails Behaviorism. On > Functionalist assumptions, it may, but on Implementationist assumptions, > this is not so. I have a friend who's trying to convince me that Skinner advocated a very different view of grounding and interpretation than is commonly assumed; more along the lines of contextual frame orientation and analogic reference than the usual serial S => R model. When I have a little better grip on it, I might bring it up here in a grounding/ interpretation context, to see what flies. (or what flies it attracts!) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sandra Zinn | "The squirming facts (yep these are my ideas | exceed the squamous mind" they only own my kybd) | -- Wallace Stevens