G.Joly@ucl-cs.UUCP (10/26/90)
From: G.Joly@uk.ac.ucl.cs > From: vanadis@cs.dal.ca (Jose Castejon-Amenedo) > But then again, perhaps AI and natural intelligence are just > hierarchies of brute force techniques, Penrose permitting. Yeh to the former, nay to the latter!
G.Joly@ucl-cs.UUCP (10/26/90)
From: G.Joly@uk.ac.ucl.cs > From: vanadis@cs.dal.ca (Jose Castejon-Amenedo) > But then again, perhaps AI and natural intelligence are just > hierarchies of brute force techniques, Penrose permitting. Yeh to the former, nay to the latter! As for Roger Penrose, he really has very little to offer the former. Gordon Joly +44 71 387 7050 ext 3716 InterNet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ...!uunet.uu.net!ucl-cs!G.Joly Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT
vanadis@cs.dal.ca (Jose Castejon-Amenedo) (10/29/90)
Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: What Has Traditional AI Accomplished References: <1232@ucl-cs.UUCP> Organization: Math, Stats & CS, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada Keywords: Penrose In article 6314 G.Joly@uk.ac.ucl.cs says: >> From: vanadis@cs.dal.ca (Jose Castejon-Amenedo) >> But then again, perhaps AI and natural intelligence are just >> hierarchies of brute force techniques, Penrose permitting. > Yeh to the former, nay to the latter! As for Roger Penrose, he really > has very little to offer the former. My greetings to you, fellah. While I tend to agree with you, I do not think that Penrose's arguments can be dismissed just like that. It seems to be certain that the region where QM and Classical Mechanics should overlap is not well understood, and some people even say that a new theory must be developed to account for it. There might exist some non-local phenomena in this regime (phenomena that are outside the scope of present theories, for obvious reasons) essential for explaining self-consciousness, for example. The idea that a gravity theory that works at Planck scales might be a fundamental ingredient to explain intelligence seems to be more far-fetched, but then again, who knows? Jose Castejon-Amenedo vanadis@cs.dal.ca
G.Joly@uk.ac.ucl.cs (Gordon Joly) (11/04/90)
I still stick to my original thesis. Penrose has much to say about the
mind, including the fact that you cannot make a mind in a box.
Therefore, he can say little about AI, since he believe the goals to be
impossible (if consciosness/mind/awareness if the true goal of AI.
Gordon Joly +44 71 387 7050 ext 3716
InterNet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ...!{uunet.uu.net,ukc}!ucl-cs!G.Joly
Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT, UKloren@tristan.llnl.gov (Loren Petrich) (11/06/90)
In article <1251@ucl-cs.uucp> G.Joly@uk.ac.ucl.cs (Gordon Joly) writes: > >I still stick to my original thesis. Penrose has much to say about the >mind, including the fact that you cannot make a mind in a box. >Therefore, he can say little about AI, since he believe the goals to be >impossible (if consciosness/mind/awareness if the true goal of AI. I guess this discussion belongs in comp.ai.philosophy. What "fact" is this? And why does he come to this conclusion? And what makes him so sure that other people have minds? $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ Loren Petrich, the Master Blaster: loren@sunlight.llnl.gov Since this nodename is not widely known, you may have to try: loren%sunlight.llnl.gov@star.stanford.edu