mcovingt@athena.cs.uga.edu (Michael A. Covington) (01/12/91)
The issue of unexamined metaphors was debated (in print) by C. S. Lewis and Owen Barfield about 30 years ago. See "Bluspels and Flalansferes" in Lewis's SELECTED LITERARY ESSAYS (Cambridge University Press).
bougie@pine.circa.ufl.edu (BRO) (01/14/91)
In article <shahar.663768754@shum> (sender only) Mark Volovic <mav@lizardo.huji.ac.il > writes: > I submit that the usage of metaphors is essential for any PUBLIC >speech about the possibly upcoming war. > However, I doubt very much that language itself will influence the >advancement of the events. The language may be a reflection of the advancement, >but not its wheels. Lakoff's point is that we DO reason about things & events by making use of the inferences that arise with the metaphors we choose. Reddy was perhaps the first to make this clear in his paper called "The Conduit Metaphor: a case of frame conflict in our language about language" Reddy, M.J. (1979) in A.Ortony _Metaphor & Thought_ (pp284-324) CUP. where he demonstrates that we have a great deal of difficulty detaching ourselves from a metaphor of communication in which the transmitted BITS are metaphorically mapped onto the MEANING. (see the "Bandwidth of the Brain" subject chain!). Lakoff is pointing out that while metaphor is a very useful means of simplifying reasoning (analogy) it is also capable of misleading us into oversimplifications. I'm not going to claim that Bush, Baker, Azziz & co. do not and cannot see the schematicity of their metaphors (nor that they do and can!) but public opinion to a large extent seems to be content with the "truth" that war=a game, Saddam=Irag (state=person), or Sadam=dragon & US=white knight & Kuwait=damsel in distress. It just *ain't that simple*!! CNN reported that while 51% of Americans (when asked point-blank) are in favor of going to war with Iraq, that figure drops to something like 30% when they're asked if getting Iraq out of Kuwait is worth 1000 American lives. That %age drops to around 15% if you postulate 20,000 dead. Deaths just don't seem to be part of the war=game metaphor and it's too easy to forget! The game metaphor also makes it too easy to forget about the "post- game" situation. It is NOT all over once the fat lady sings! In sum, I don't think it is a good idea to underestimate the role of metaphor in reasoning. It can play a causal role. Lakoff's analysis cannot be brushed off so easily. (Lakoff's paper is available on a listserver who's address I'll find & post later.. It is also somewhere in recent archives of comp.ai) =================================================================== John Bro bougie@pine.circa.ufl.edu Univ of Florida bougie@ufpine (Bitnet) Gainesville
bougie@pine.circa.ufl.edu (BRO) (01/14/91)
In article <26303@uflorida.cis.ufl.EDU>, bougie@pine.circa.ufl.edu (BRO) writes... > (Lakoff's paper is available on a listserver who's address I'll > find & post later.. It is also somewhere in recent archives of > comp.ai) Lakoff's paper is available by sending an e-mail message with only one line: HELP LAKOFF to: LISTSERV@UNIWA.UWA.OZ.AU (My newsreader won't let me look at directories of postings marked read.. could somebody help find his paper in comp.ai?) =================================================================== John Bro bougie@pine.circa.ufl.edu Univ of Florida bougie@ufpine (Bitnet) Gainesville
mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) (01/15/91)
Let me begin by saying that I agree completely with George Lakoff's political conclusions in his recent postings. We are rushing headlong into a bloody war that is unlikely to gain us much, basically to avoid a humiliation that George Bush's unnecessary rhetoric has made inevitable. We should all be screaming at our leaders to stop this madness. Having said that, I would like to argue that Lakoff's argument from his "theory of metaphor" is just silly. Simplified, it comes down to this: (a) All human thought is mediated by metaphor (b) The metaphors of people who disagree with Lakoff are bad. I am inclined to agree with (a), without necessarily acknowledging its cosmic significance. However, if all thought is indeed mediated by metaphor, that leaves us in the position of having to use metaphor as we carry on with our arguments about war and peace. Arguing that our opponents' thought processes are warped by metaphor is pseudoscientific twaddle. It may be wrong to bomb Iraqis, and part of the problem may be our lumping all Iraqis together, but the fault would lie in nationalism and racism, not in the metaphor of "nations as persons." The latter is simply one of the ways we think about the former. If we didn't use this metaphor, we'd use another one. -- Drew McDermott
daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) (01/15/91)
In article <28045@cs.yale.edu>, mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) writes: > Let me begin by saying that I agree completely with George Lakoff's > political conclusions in his recent postings. > ... > Having said that, I would like to argue that Lakoff's argument from > his "theory of metaphor" is just silly. Hear, hear! Too often in political debates, people are willing to swallow any cockamamie theory if it leads to politically correct conclusions. It is nice to see an illustration that it is possible to agree with someone and still think that their reasoning is wrong-headed. And (the eternal question) does any of this have anything to do with AI? Daryl McCullough
daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) (01/15/91)
In article <26303@uflorida.cis.ufl.EDU>, bougie@pine.circa.ufl.edu (BRO) writes: > Lakoff is pointing out that while metaphor is a very useful means > of simplifying reasoning (analogy) it is also capable of misleading us into > oversimplifications. I'm not going to claim that Bush, Baker, Azziz & co. > do not and cannot see the schematicity of their metaphors (nor that they do > and can!) but public opinion to a large extent seems to be content with > the "truth" that war=a game, Saddam=Iraq (state=person), or Sadam=dragon & > US=white knight & Kuwait=damsel in distress. It just *ain't that simple*!! Lakoff's analysis seems to me to be trite, superficial, and insulting. It assumes great stupidity on the part of nearly everyone except himself: of course ordinary people can't handle subtlety. Do you (or Lakoff) really have evidence that people are unaware of the complexities of the Persian Gulf situation? If Lakoff is taking the oversimplification of slogans such as "We can't reward aggression" and "Saddam Hussein is the equivalent of Hitler" as evidence for superficiality of thought, I believe he is making an error. It is in the nature of slogans to be simplistic; on the other side of the fence on this issue is the equally simplistic slogan "No Blood for Oil!" In my opinion, the kind of "psychologizing" that Lakoff is engaging in is the absolute *worst* thing one can do for meaningful political debate. Rather than discussing issues of what we want to accomplish and how best to accomplish it, we are reduced to discussing psychological quirks and personalities. I think a Freudian analysis is just as bad, for the same reason. ("Margaret Thatcher sent the military to Falklands out of penis envy." or "Men like missiles because they are phallic symbols.") A few points about the particular metaphors that Lakoff brings up: (1) War = a game There are certainly are senses in which this is an apt metaphor. Both involve strategy, have teams, have an objective, etc. These analogies are *not* coincidental, since many games, such as football, chess, soccer, boxing, etc. were invented as metaphors for war. There are certainly ways in which war is not like any game, namely the fact that many people get killed, and a team may not be punished for breaking the rules. Rather than saying simply that "War= a game" is a bad metaphor, Lakoff could contribute something real to the debate if he pointed out some particular mistakes people were making based on a faulty use of this metaphor. A possible mistake is to assume that "Those people on my team are people I can trust", which is certainly wrong in the case of certain allies such as Syria. (2) Saddam = Iraq This is a pretty lame example for Lakoff. People only believe this metaphor to the extent that it is appropriate. Saddam Hussein *is* Iraq to the extent that his will determines whether Iraq invades or withdraws from Kuwait, etc. To get Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, it is Saddam Hussein who must be convinced, not the average Iraqi citizen. In what sense has this metaphor misled anyone? (3) Saddam=dragon, US = white knight, Kuwait= damsel in distress. Another lame example. I don't think anyone believes this analogy except in the most obvious sense. Once again, if you claim "It just *ain't that simple*!!" tell us how people are being misled by the analogy. > CNN reported that while 51% of Americans (when asked point-blank) > are in favor of going to war with Iraq, that figure drops to something like > 30% when they're asked if getting Iraq out of Kuwait is worth 1000 American > lives. That %age drops to around 15% if you postulate 20,000 dead. Deaths > just don't seem to be part of the war=game metaphor and it's too easy to > forget! The game metaphor also makes it too easy to forget about the "post- > game" situation. It is NOT all over once the fat lady sings! Your evidence doesn't back up your claims. The poll quite obviously indicates that people are willing to risk lives to get Iraq out of Kuwait, but aren't willing to lose a large number. How does this show that people are being misled by the "game" metaphor? If anything, it shows that people are overconfident of US military prowess to think that a war can be won with a small number of American casualties. It *is* a serious problem if people have an unrealistic expectation of the costs of war, but there is no evidence that metaphorical thinking caused this state of affairs. > In sum, I don't think it is a good idea to underestimate the role > of metaphor in reasoning. It can play a causal role. Lakoff's analysis > cannot be brushed off so easily. Yes, it can. Quite easily. Daryl McCullough
gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) (01/15/91)
In article <28045@cs.yale.edu> Drew McDermott writes:
]Let me begin by saying that I agree completely with George Lakoff's
]political conclusions in his recent postings. We are rushing headlong
]into a bloody war that is unlikely to gain us much, basically to avoid
]a humiliation that George Bush's unnecessary rhetoric has made
]inevitable. We should all be screaming at our leaders to stop this
]madness.
You have just farted in public, to use a metaphor. One of the reasons
for the seperation of newsgroups is so that people who don't want to
see arguments about touchy political situations don't have to. They
just avoid the newsgroups where such arguments are permissable. Now
people who disagree with you have the choice of either (1) letting you
get away with a propaganda coup, or (2) also farting in public to
correct your ignorance. I hope those who disagree with McDermott
will be satisfied with this reply and not carry on a debate on the
topic.
--
David Gudeman
gudeman@cs.arizona.edu
noao!arizona!gudeman
powers@uklirb.informatik.uni-kl.de (David Powers ) (01/15/91)
daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) writes: >In article <28045@cs.yale.edu>, mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) writes: >> Let me begin by saying that I agree completely with George Lakoff's >> political conclusions in his recent postings. >> ... >> Having said that, I would like to argue that Lakoff's argument from >> his "theory of metaphor" is just silly. >Hear, hear! Too often in political debates, people are willing to >swallow any cockamamie theory if it leads to politically correct >conclusions. It is nice to see an illustration that it is possible to >agree with someone and still think that their reasoning is >wrong-headed. >And (the eternal question) does any of this have anything to do with AI? Whilst I cannot say I am in complete agreement with everything Lakoff says OR concludes, he has helped ME (prompted ME) to look past the metaphor filled rhetoric. It is necessary at times to strip away the clutter of mutually inconsistent frames. In summary, 1. Metaphor is an essential aspect of language and learning; 2. Multiple metaphorical frames can be applied to the same facts; 3. Different metaphorical frames are somewhere mutually inconsistent; cf. For every proverb there is one with the opposite force. Our everyday language contradicts our scientific beliefs. The parable is not intended to elucidate every detail. 4. It is hard work to understand complex situations without metaphors; 5. Our whole past experience is a metaphor for our future expectations. cf. Life goes on as usual. A good theory just hasn't been invalidated yet. As far as relevance to AI is concerned, 1. Our understanding and recognition of the ubiquitousness of metaphor has been considerably enhanced by our attempts to formalize language and learning into computational models; 2. Our understanding of our understanding can be enhanced by understanding and stripping away metaphor (cf ontology); 3. AI systems are probably already part of the "war machine" (met. & lit.) being employed in this "crisis" (cf etymology); 4. The language of tomorrow is moulded by the metaphors of today. David Powers
kazic@valanor.mcs.anl.gov (Toni Kazic) (01/16/91)
I suggest one metaphor is that of dealing with an extended family (of adults, of differing abilities but all intellectually sound). We do sometimes seek to "punish" family members, particularly in cases of abuse, but usually these desires stem from our own insecurities and interfere with conflict resolution. Incidentally, shifting and confused metaphors in wartime, both printed but especially visual, is nothing new. There is another area I feel should be of professional interest to the AI community: the decision-making process for policy (or the lack of it) in this country. Here are some questions I would love to see the net discuss. I realize this may not be the best place, but I believe there may be some technical and technological knowledge out there which can shed some light on these. One thought which prompts me to pose these is that while we are familiar with these problems on a very small scale (e.g. inside our own heads), we have little experience with them on a larger scale or when we ourselves are not directly involved in the formulation of policy. It is not clear to me that the issues or the solutions scale. What effect does concentrating decision-making into a small group have on the quality of decisions? Will changing the individuals making the decisions be sufficient to produce a desired change, or are institutional revisions required? Should the public be more involved in the policy process from the beginning? If so, how? How can the number of policy alternatives presented to or conceived of by the decision-making group be broadened? How are new areas, not previously identified as problems, best recognized? Since most policies are profoundly intertwined, how can the decision-making group arrive at an internally coherent set of decisions with are not self-contradicting in their effects? Is there something useful decision theory can tell us, or are these rather political and philosophical problems? Thanks, Toni Kazic
sena@infinet.UUCP (Fred Sena) (01/16/91)
In article <1991Jan15.202949.28173@mcs.anl.gov> kazic@valanor.mcs.anl.gov > (Toni Kazic) writes: >I suggest one metaphor is that of dealing with an extended family (of adults, >of differing abilities but all intellectually sound). We do sometimes seek to >"punish" family members, particularly in cases of abuse, but usually these >desires stem from our own insecurities and interfere with conflict resolution. I strongly agree with this. On the metaphorical level, we react to each person that we encounter based on our internal representation of them, or how we perceive them, based on various criteria of our experience and our fears (...of the unknown, non-experience). When we "attack" someone, we are metaphorically or symbollically (which?) attacking that part of ourselves. I suppose that you could say that the internal conflict is being expressed through the conflict. Like when we dream "about someone", we may actually be seeing the part of ourselves that the person represents, and not really be dreaming about that person at all as far as how they are in "real" life. > > What effect does concentrating decision-making into a small group have >on the quality of decisions? I once took a course on human development or psychology which talked about this. It seemed to me that the conclusion was that when decisions are left up to a group instead of an individual, they tend to be lower quality. (I suppose it depends on the group though, and how well they interact with one another.) The reason a group may not make as "good" a decision is that in a group there is less of a sense of responsiblity by each member for the outcome of a decision. In other words, finger pointing can be used for self justification. Also, I think that groups tend to get into a sort of "mob mentality", where people may go along against their intuitive feelings that a decision may not be good as far as they are concerned. Has anyone else been on a project using the "design by committee" method? It is probably good for an individual making a decision to consult with a group before making the decision, but then proceed to take complete responsibility for the decision. --fred -- -------------------------------------------------- Frederick J. Sena sena@infinet.UUCP Memotec Datacom, Inc. N. Andover, MA
smoliar@isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (01/18/91)
Now that the bombs are falling, it is unclear how much virtue there is in discussing relevance to artificial intelligence. However, I think it is important to remember that a major danger in interacting with individuals is that everyone tends to use himself as a model. In other words, if A is trying to communicate with B, he is likely to assume that he can use his own mental state as a model for B's. If A and B belong to a common culture, this may be a reasonable assumption; but the cultures of the United States and Iraq have relatively little in common. Those of us who have tried to deal with machine intelligence at least may have a leg up in recognizing that there can be intelligent agents whose mental states bear little resemblance to our own. This is not to say that members of the artificial intelligence community should be taking over the negotiating process or planning military strategy. I just wish that more of our key decision-makers were more sensitive to the possibilities for truly different mentalities. (Of course, as we seem to be demonstrating even as I write this, if you have military might, you really do not have to worry very much about communicating.)
smoliar@isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (01/18/91)
In article <2761@infinet.UUCP> sena@infinet.UUCP (Fred Sena) writes: >In article <1991Jan15.202949.28173@mcs.anl.gov> kazic@valanor.mcs.anl.gov >> (Toni Kazic) writes: >> >> What effect does concentrating decision-making into a small group have >>on the quality of decisions? > >I once took a course on human development or psychology which talked about >this. It seemed to me that the conclusion was that when decisions are left up >to a group instead of an individual, they tend to be lower quality. (I >suppose it depends on the group though, and how well they interact with one >another.) The reason a group may not make as "good" a decision is that in a >group there is less of a sense of responsiblity by each member for the >outcome of a decision. In other words, finger pointing can be used for self >justification. Also, I think that groups tend to get into a sort of "mob >mentality", where people may go along against their intuitive feelings that a >decision may not be good as far as they are concerned. Has anyone else been >on a project using the "design by committee" method? It is probably good >for an individual making a decision to consult with a group before making the >decision, but then proceed to take complete responsibility for the decision. > Theodore Sorensen gave a brief analysis of Kennedy's decision making on Tuesday night's FRONTLINE. He basically used the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis as two case studies. The Bay of Pigs was the product of a very small group--Kennedy and a few "inner circle" advisors who basically tended to support anything he said. For the Cuban Missile Crisis, he deliberately assembled as larger and more diverse group, explicitly to hear out those who disagreed with the position he took into the meeting. The result was that that position changed as a product of the meeting. Bush has apparently planned his Iraq strategy with the small "inner circle" approach; but he seems to be doing better than Kennedy did with the Bay of Pigs. -- USPS: Stephen Smoliar 5000 Centinela Avenue #129 Los Angeles, California 90066 Internet: smoliar@venera.isi.edu