[news.sysadmin] SLOG. A possible solution to the "open" passwd problem

venta@i2ack.UUCP (Paolo Ventafridda) (01/07/89)

I read about all those statistics on pw hacking due to "open" passwd
on unix. The whole point is: with new software and hardware technologies
- like optimized DES routines, faster machines etc. - one could get 
passwd and work it out on a local workstation.
It is possible that soon some CRAY ( or whatever ) gips computer will offer
good possibilities for such a thing in "reasonable" times.
So, the other point is that it is not so easy to make passwd not readable
by world, since too many commands use it (also "ls" does..), and anyway
this kind of work (changing the way most of utilities work inside Unix)
should be done by unix manufacturers themselves, otherwise, with all these
"patches" i guess many other holes would appear in the Big Swiss Cheese which
is Unix.
So, i don't know is someone already thought about this, but maybe there IS
a solution. At least, this is what i found out..i called it "SLOG".

Suppose that passwd looks like this:

	root:NOHACK:0:0:system Owner:/etc.etc.
	foo:NOHACK:150:600:foo bar:/usr/foo etc.
	logon::0:0:Secure logon procedure:/usr/logon:/usr/logon/slog

And suppose there's a daemon called "logdaemon" running from system boot,
which interacts with "slog".
When a user wants to get in, he has to enter as "logon", which will say
something like:

        Please enter your account id:  4519sH8
	Please enter your account pw:  mypw

	Access granted for user: foo  password: Hg75so
	Complete your logon within 120 seconds.

	login: foo
	Password: Hg75so
	
	Welcome to ...

Basically, SLOG tells to logdaemon to change foo password to a new
random-generated one. Logdaemon will then change it back to "NOHACK" after
120 seconds or whatever decided for that user by the system manager.

Once every "x" days or/and "y" accesses, SLOG will tell to user foo,
immediatly after the "access granted" message something like:

	Your new account id is: TG6sa32

And also once every "z" days or/and "k" accesses:

	Please change you account password.
	New password:  etc.

This means that:
1) there is no way of hacking /etc/passwd since there are no real passwords
   inside.
2) there is no way of knowing which is the account id for a user, since this
   account id is random-generated too, and automatically changed once a while.
3) at this point, also the really stupid secretary won't be a security problem
   because of its simple passwords, like "pencil" (think of WarGame..); 
   one should always get her account id, which could be asked SLOG to be 
   changed also everytime she logs in, if needed.
   I guess she would always being asking root for the forgotten id/pw :-)

OF COURSE all files related to SLOG are well closed inside a private directory!	
From the software point of view, i think this is really easy to do.
        
Just an idea. If someone thinks it could do, i would write it down.
I just *love writing daemons...:-)

         Greetings from Milano, Italy
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    Paolo Ventafridda 
-- 
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Makey@LOGICON.ARPA (Jeff Makey) (01/08/89)

In article <83@i2ack.UUCP> venta@i2ack.UUCP (Paolo Ventafridda) writes:
 [description of SLOG password system deleted]
>OF COURSE all files related to SLOG are well closed inside a private directory!	

As was brought up in the discussion of shadow passwod files, the
effectiveness of this sort of protection is questionable, at best.
SLOG seems to be an overly complicated authentication scheme that has
no compelling advantages over the use of a simple /etc/shadow file.

                           :: Jeff Makey

Department of Tautological Pleonasms and Superfluous Redundancies Department
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