[comp.unix.wizards] random passwords

jgreely@cis.ohio-state.edu (J Greely) (11/27/88)

In article <274@aber-cs.UUCP> pcg@cs.aber.ac.uk writes:
>In article <13169@ncoast.UUCP> allbery@ncoast.UUCP writes:
>    A possible enhancement is to use phonemes instead of letters, thus
>    increasing the chances of a pronounceable password.  It could be combined
>    with a phoneme-to-letter table which could randomly (or maybe not so
>    randomly, depends on how much time I want to put in it) choose between
>    alternative representations (f/ph, etc.) of a phoneme.

  The posted version of this (pwgen, in comp.sources.misc, natch)
doesn't quite work.  I sent the minor changes to Brandon.  The
generated words sound nothing like English, but they *are*
pronouncable (mostly).

>As has been discussed at length and conclusively, generating by algorithm
>menmonic passwords is a very bad idea, because:

>[1] It restricts unconscionably the key space (usually to a few thousand
>or at best dozen thousand entries).

Well, after fixing the minor bugs in pwgen, I'm not terribly worried about
the key space:

	% pwgen 9 500000 | sort | uniq | wc -l
	482718

  The percentage of unique passwords seems to drop at a fairly
constant rate as you raise the number generated, but at 500000 it's
still over 96%.  It would require more testing to see just how many
unique strings it's capable of generating, but that's for another day.

>[2] If the algorithm used to generate the passwords get known, it can be
>used to obtain a complete list of all possibly passwords.

Naaah.  The patch I sent to him suggested adding a switch to randomly
upcase letters, as well as replace letters with numbers ('l' -> '1',
'o' -> '0', etc).  If 8-character passwords are chosen, modified by
these transformations, the key space is more than sufficient.
-- 
J Greely (jgreely@cis.ohio-state.edu; osu-cis!jgreely)
Unseen, in the background, Fate was quietly slipping the lead
into the boxing glove.

pcg@aber-cs.UUCP (Piercarlo Grandi) (11/27/88)

In article <28399@tut.cis.ohio-state.edu> jgreely@cis.ohio-state.edu (J Greely) writes:

    >[1] It restricts unconscionably the key space (usually to a few thousand
    >or at best dozen thousand entries).
    
    Well, after fixing the minor bugs in pwgen, I'm not terribly worried about
    the key space:
    
    	% pwgen 9 500000 | sort | uniq | wc -l
    	482718
    
      The percentage of unique passwords seems to drop at a fairly
    constant rate as you raise the number generated, but at 500000 it's
    still over 96%.

I used the word unconscionably, and for good reason :-(.  Assume that a
nice system administrator uses your 500,000 figure. Assume somebody
decides to DES all of them, say one every millisecond. In less than 500
seconds (say 15 minutes, including delays etc...) he has broken ALL the
passwords on your system. Interesting... :-) :-)

Consider also the fact that pwgen must eventually cycle. For all you
know, the cycle is exactly 482718 elements long, and after that
passwords start repeating. Maybe yes, maybe not. Also, there being a
cycle, there must be a point at which the number of duplicates raises
linearly. When you have got 50% duplicates, this just means that you
have just run thru the second cycle.

Note also that duplicates are not the whole story; there may be no
duplicates, but the key space is still highly structured, and in a
known way.

    It would require more testing to see just how many
    unique strings it's capable of generating, but that's for another day.

The point is that security is not a something where you test; you PROVE,
or you make a convincing mathematical analysis using the best tools of
statistics etc...

    >[2] If the algorithm used to generate the passwords get known, it can be
    >used to obtain a complete list of all possibly passwords.
    
    Naaah.  The patch I sent to him suggested adding a switch to randomly
    upcase letters, as well as replace letters with numbers ('l' -> '1',
    'o' -> '0', etc).  If 8-character passwords are chosen, modified by
    these transformations, the key space is more than sufficient.

It has been argued forcefully that even the 2^56 keyspace of fully
random DES is too small; somebody posted that an exhaustive generation
of all possible keys encrypted by login is already a feasible thing to
do.

All algorithms that do generate "random" passwords lop off a LOT of the
56 bits of the key space. So much the worse if the "random" selection
is based on fairly restrictive rules. The resulting key space may be
larger than a few dozen thousand entities, but will most likely be
small enough to be easily attackable, especially as it is known that it
is highly structured, i.e. not random at all. A good codebreaker uses
the regularity of natural language as a powerful tool; an algorithm as
the source of the signal to decode is just too good to be true,
especially if it is highly predictable.

Manual password generation may be weak, but at least it is less
predictable.


My own opinion is that the worse security risk is a false sense of
security and a "random" password generator is one of the best tools to
achieve this.

If a reasonable and articulate and competent person like Mr. Greely
still feels like giving an example with a number like 500,000 for a
reasonably large key space, and may be prepared to trust a site's
security to it, I shudder thinking of what less prepared people might
come up with.
-- 
Piercarlo "Peter" Grandi			INET: pcg@cs.aber.ac.uk
Sw.Eng. Group, Dept. of Computer Science	UUCP: ...!mcvax!ukc!aber-cs!pcg
UCW, Penglais, Aberystwyth, WALES SY23 3BZ (UK)

smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin) (11/29/88)

In article <278@aber-cs.UUCP>, pcg@aber-cs.UUCP (Piercarlo Grandi) writes:
> somebody posted that an exhaustive generation
> of all possible keys encrypted by login is already a feasible thing to
> do.

Let's look at this quantitatively.  There are, more or less, 95
printable characters.  We'll subtract 2 for @ and #, which many UNIX
systems still use for line kill and erase.  If we consider just
8-character passwords, that means there are 93^8 possibilities, or
5,595,818,096,650,401.  Each one can be encrypt 4096 different ways,
given the salt; this leaves us with 22,920,470,923,880,042,496, but if
you're trying to attack one particular password, as opposed to password
fishing that number isn't relevant.  So we'll look at the smaller
number, which I trust you'll let me abbreviate as 5.6e15.  Let's assume
you can do an encryption in 1 microsecond (which is ~4 orders of
magnitude better than any claims I've seen for a VAX 8600).  Let's
further assume that you're doing this on some small cheap machine, so
that you can put 1000 of them to the task.  That means that you can try
10^9 passwords/second, so it should take you 5.6e6 seconds to crack my
password that way, or ~65 days.  More realistically, you're not going
to manage that speed any time soon, especially not on that many machines.
If your encryptions take even 10 microseconds -- still 1000 times the best
speed reported for an 8600 -- my password is safe for 2 years.  I change
it more frequently than that...

Using a more restricted character set helps the cracker a lot.
Under the same wildly-optimistic speed assumptions as before, a password
of only upper- and lower-case letters would take just .6 days to crack,
which is indeed worrisome.  A cracker on a lone 8600, using today's
technology, would need 6 million days.  Clearly, we can't be that optimistic.
Assume, for example, a worm that devoted all the power of the penetrated
machines to attacking one password.  The Internet is estimated to contain
60,000 machines; let's assume that each one could be infected, and each
one could check a password in 100 microseconds.  That means 6e8 trials a
second, for just over a day to check all possibilities.  This number isn't
that insane; we postulate a 5-fold improvement in the algorithm, and
a 20-fold improvement in CPU power, in a widely available form, is almost
here now.  And if the Internet keeps growing, our next wormer may have
something useful to do with all that CPU power!

Note that precalculating all these passwords doesn't work.  First, you'd
need to multiply the number of possibilities by 4K, because of the salt;
second, CPUs can calculate data much too rapidly for even optical disks
to keep up.  Again, 52^8 choices, times 4096 encryptions, times 8 bytes
for the output data maximally packed, yields 1,751,768,384,518,750,208 bytes.
We'll assume that the salt used and the cleartext password are calculable
from the position of the result, which probably isn't true if you organize
the file for rapid searching...

What can we conclude?  First, for 8-character passwords, today's algorithms
are good enough for now.  Second, that they won't be forever; in 10 years,
some of these numbers will start to look worrisome.  Third, using a larger
input character set expands the search space beyond the forseeable trouble
range.

		--Steve Bellovin

jgreely@cis.ohio-state.edu (J Greely) (11/29/88)

In article <278@aber-cs.UUCP> pcg@cs.aber.ac.uk writes:
>In article <28399@tut.cis.ohio-state.edu> jgreely@cis.ohio-state.edu (J Greely) writes:

> [quick test showed at least a half-million possible strings from
>  Brandon's "pronouncable" password generator]

>I used the word unconscionably, and for good reason :-(.  Assume that a
>nice system administrator uses your 500,000 figure.

The half-million was quoted simply because it took only a few minutes
to generate.  The "sort | uniq" was getting a bit unwieldy at that point.
I haven't had time to really study the method used, beyond noting that
it does attempt to generate random strings with lots of vowels (although
"oo" is *far* too popular).  As is, I would not attempt to force every
user here to use it (fat chance they'd listen to me, anyway), but as
soon as I am sufficiently convinced of its efficiency, I have no problem
pointing it out as an option.

  I'd rather have people using a random string from a known algorithm
than something from /usr/dict/words.  It may not be completely safe,
but it has the advantage of not being *online*.  Quick example: the
infamous worm never got here, but I tested our passwd files against
the 432 strings it used.  32 out of 2000 accounts were broken,
including 2 staff accounts.  So, when I'm convinced that this or
some other algorithm generates a reasonably large number of pronouncable,
non-English words (and I convince the rest of the staff :-)), I'll
be happy to add it as an *option*.

  If I could convince them to roll a set of Boggle(TM) dice, I'd
try that, too.

>						 Assume somebody
>decides to DES all of them, say one every millisecond. In less than 500
>seconds (say 15 minutes, including delays etc...) he has broken ALL the
>passwords on your system. Interesting... :-) :-)

Pretty fast crypt.  Remember, password encryption is 25 times slower
than normal DES (unless you know something about multiple encryption
with the same key that I don't).  And for a quick back-of-the-keyboard
calculation, 500000 * 11 * 4096 / 1024^3 is almost 21 *giga*bytes,
just for the ciphertext.  Now that you know you broke it, you still
have to have the original text somewhere to find out what the password
is.  Messy.

For those who don't know where the 4096 came from, Unix password
encryption changes DES in one of 4096 ways before encrypting (the
"salt"), raising the effective key size to 68 bits, at the possible
cost of some of the algorithm's strength.

>Consider also the fact that pwgen must eventually cycle.

  Can't avoid this with any password generation system.  If you use
any one system, you decrease your security drastically, no matter how
secure that one system is.  However, if, in my list of "ways to make a
good password", I include a random string generator (whether it be
pwgen, travesty, or dissociated press), some people will try it, find
something they like, and use it.  Better that than "password", or
their username.

>It has been argued forcefully that even the 2^56 keyspace of fully
>random DES is too small; somebody posted that an exhaustive generation
>of all possible keys encrypted by login is already a feasible thing to
>do.

Feasible?  'scuse me a moment.  2^56 * 4096 * 11 / 1024^3 > 3 * 10^12
gigabytes of storage for the whole thing.  Consider that when you're
generating these, they have to be compared to your target passwords.
If your target list is small enough, you can (encrypt,compare,throw
out), otherwise you'll have to store them somewhere (a few pieces at a
time).  No doubt it can be done, but the effort required is not
cost-effective for cracking most systems.

>Manual password generation may be weak, but at least it is less
>predictable.

Well, sort of.  Human nature is *very* predictable.  When I tested
here for people using either their username or part of their full name
("joes"), I was not surprised to find several.  When I tested the worm
list, I was not surprised to find more (in fact, some of the accounts
broken pointed out a much larger security problem, which shall remain
nameless :-)).

>My own opinion is that the worse security risk is a false sense of
>security and a "random" password generator is one of the best tools to
>achieve this.

  I'm not going to argue this one.

  "Well, Mr. Upperclass Management Person, we've increased our
security by requiring all employees to use randomly generated
passwords, to prevent them from choosing easy-to-remember words.  Now
they must use company-assigned passwords, and guard them with their
worthless lives."

  I'd be the first person to raise hell if something like this was
tried, particularly in a university environment.

>If a reasonable and articulate and competent person like Mr. Greely

(mind if I show this part to my boss?)
-- 
J Greely (jgreely@cis.ohio-state.edu; osu-cis!jgreely)
Unseen, in the background, Fate was quietly slipping the lead
into the boxing glove.

bzs@encore.com (Barry Shein) (11/30/88)

>Let's look at this quantitatively.  There are, more or less, 95
>printable characters.  We'll subtract 2 for @ and #, which many UNIX
>systems still use for line kill and erase.  If we consider just
>8-character passwords, that means there are 93^8 possibilities, or
>5,595,818,096,650,401.  Each one can be encrypt 4096 different ways,
>given the salt; this leaves us with 22,920,470,923,880,042,496...

>...If your encryptions take even 10 microseconds -- still 1000 times the best
>speed reported for an 8600 -- my password is safe for 2 years.

>What can we conclude?  First, for 8-character passwords, today's algorithms
>are good enough for now.  Second, that they won't be forever; in 10 years,
>some of these numbers will start to look worrisome.  Third, using a larger
>input character set expands the search space beyond the forseeable trouble
>range.
>
>		--Steve Bellovin

Round of applause!

I consider this a good argument to support my claim that shadow
password files are basically an idea barking up the wrong tree.

Choosing good passwords is both necessary and sufficient for
reasonable security. If your users choose good passwords then hiding a
passwd file is unnecessary. If your users choose bad ones than you
better pray before you go to sleep every night that no one walked out
with a copy of your passwd file, protected or not.

If people leave their office/home/car keys lying around no one should
be shocked if they walk away and later their property is found
burglarized.

If people resist choosing good passwords then the same can be said.

Just as leaving keys around often endangers everyone (eg.  outside
entrance keys are often present allowing intruders into the building,
stolen cars often end up in accidents on joy rides etc) so can passwds
left "lying around" (eg. easy to crack.)

On a system I managed a while back I would occasionally try to break
the passwords by use of a program and, when I broke one, would send a
mail message to the owner that went something like:

	Your password on this system is trival to break, I broke
	it with a readily available program in (time value.)

	Please choose a more reasonable password (seven or more
	characters, not an english word or name, at least one
	punctuation mark and preferably a mixture of upper/lower
	case and/or digits.)

	If you need help with this don't hesitate to ask one of
	the staff.

	If you choose to continue to use an easy to break password
	please do not bother the staff to restore files or undo other
	damage which might be done to your account. Since it wasn't
	important to you it will not be important to us. Note also
	that an intruder can disrupt and destroy others' work, if
	such an intrusion is traced to your bad choice of password
	the entire user community will be informed of this.

	Please excuse the tone of this letter but it is a serious
	matter.

A program to demand a decent password might be an improvement, I'm
mixed on the issue of individual responsibility vs trying to cram good
behavior down people's throats with software but given the possible
ramifications to the entire community it has its merits, besides, what
consititutes a "good" password might be confusing to some.

	-Barry Shein, ||Encore||

dhesi@bsu-cs.UUCP (Rahul Dhesi) (11/30/88)

In article <10896@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com> smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com
(Steven M. Bellovin) writes:
[some calculations]
>If your encryptions take even 10 microseconds -- still 1000 times the best
>speed reported for an 8600 -- my password is safe for 2 years.  I change
>it more frequently than that...

Not quite.  Your password is safe for two years against a certain
attack, for one year against an attack with a 50% chance of
success...etc.

Consider the claim:  "Give me a week, and there's a 1% chance that I
will break into your account."

If the person keeps trying week after week, he will likely break into
your account after two or three years of trying.

No matter how often you change your password.

No matter how often your change your password!  I don't like the sound
of that.

(I do realize that your calculations were too conservative by a large
factor.)
-- 
Rahul Dhesi         UUCP:  <backbones>!{iuvax,pur-ee}!bsu-cs!dhesi

lm@snafu.Sun.COM (Larry McVoy) (11/30/88)

Steve wrote:
>>Let's look at this quantitatively.  There are, more or less, 95
>>printable characters.  We'll subtract 2 for @ and #, which many UNIX
Barry said:
[wonderful]



Jeez.  This sounds awful.  Try this instead, you'll like it better.

Add a field somewhere (/etc/failures?) that records the number of 
failed attempts.  If it reaches some maximum, disallow logins with 
some message like:

	("Possible security risk: %d failed attempts\n", failed)

If the failed number is greater than MAXFAIL/2, then warn the user that
he ought to reset his password (to anything, including what it was).
Resetting would clear the failed field.  Now that I think about it,
you could print out the number of failed attempts to date at login time.
Users would know right away if someone had been beating on their
account.

Wouldn't this be a much easier and more palatable way to solve the problem?

Larry McVoy      (lm%snafu@sun.com)

james@tcom.stc.co.uk (James Rouse) (12/01/88)

Larry Mcvoy writes:-
>Add a field somewhere (/etc/failures?) that records the number of 
>failed attempts.  If it reaches some maximum, disallow logins with 
>some message like:
>	("Possible security risk: %d failed attempts\n", failed)
>If the failed number is greater than MAXFAIL/2, then warn the user that
>he ought to reset his password (to anything, including what it was).
[stuff deleted]
>
>Wouldn't this be a much easier and more palatable way to solve the problem?

No because (unless you have a shadow password file :-) see below) to try a 
password you simply get the encrypted version from etc/passwd,encrypt your guess
 and compare the two. The number of attempted logins to your name has nothing
 to do with this.
If however etc/passwd was unreadable to the world then this method of attack
would be ruled out. You wouldn't need a shadow passwd file then either.
The one thing that seems to have been assumed in this argument is that
de-encrypting passwords is impossible. It may be very difficult, but if people
are talking about using a mainframe to encrypt the dictionary (!) and grep the
password file why is everyone so sure that a mainframe cannot be used to reverse the encryption routine?

bzs@encore.com (Barry Shein) (12/02/88)

>If the failed number is greater than MAXFAIL/2, then warn the user that
>he ought to reset his password (to anything, including what it was).
>Resetting would clear the failed field.  Now that I think about it,
>you could print out the number of failed attempts to date at login time.
>Users would know right away if someone had been beating on their
>account.
>
>Wouldn't this be a much easier and more palatable way to solve the problem?
>
>Larry McVoy      (lm%snafu@sun.com)

It's not a bad idea and doesn't complicate/change the user interface
but I think the concern was folks taking away your password file and
running attempts on their own machine.

Once, outside the 7-mile limit and many years ago, a friend recoded V7
crypt in tight assembler and broke the root password on the system
"upstairs", fixed a few kernel bugs we'd been bitching about and
rebooted the system. The reactions were mixed, tho folks seemed to
like the improvements to the terminal driver :-)

	-Barry Shein, ||Encore||

jfh@rpp386.Dallas.TX.US (The Beach Bum) (12/05/88)

In article <711@jura.tcom.stc.co.uk> james@htc2.UUCP (James Rouse) writes:
>Larry Mcvoy writes:-
>>Add a field somewhere (/etc/failures?) that records the number of 
>>failed attempts.  If it reaches some maximum, disallow logins with 
>>some message like:
>>	("Possible security risk: %d failed attempts\n", failed)
>>If the failed number is greater than MAXFAIL/2, then warn the user that
>>he ought to reset his password (to anything, including what it was).
>>
>>Wouldn't this be a much easier and more palatable way to solve the problem?

There have been other arcticles explaining why this is such a bad idea.

> No because (unless you have a shadow password file :-) see below) to
> try a password you simply get the encrypted version from etc/passwd,
> encrypt your guess and compare the two. The number of attempted logins
> to your name has nothing to do with this.

No.  This mechanism presumes the Bad Guy doesn't have access to the
encrypted password file.  Breaking a UNIX system involves having a valid
login name.  root is a standard account, along with bin, adm, etc.
Illegal attempts on those accounts are indicative of someone trying to
break into the machine.  This is also why you should never have an
account `who' which gives a `who' without a password.  You will notice
that I don't follow my own advice on this point ...

> If however etc/passwd was unreadable to the world then this method of
> attack would be ruled out. You wouldn't need a shadow passwd file then
> either.

Making /etc/passwd unreadable more likely than not will break /bin/ls.
Not a nice tradeoff.  Having /etc/shadow allows the encrypted password
to be protected someplace else.

It should also alert you to the importance of physical security.  If the
Bad Guy has access to the dump tapes, he can surely add trojans to the
tape, or duplicate the tape with trojan accounts or files included.
You can't just chmod 400 /etc/shadow and expect your system to be secure.

> The one thing that seems to have been assumed in this argument is that
> de-encrypting passwords is impossible. It may be very difficult, but if
> people are talking about using a mainframe to encrypt the dictionary (!)
> and grep the password file why is everyone so sure that a mainframe
> cannot be used to reverse the encryption routine?

The former is much simpler than the later.  I can encrypt a dictionary on
an unused PC running UNIX.  Trying to reverse [ brute-force decrypt is
more like it ] a password on a PC would take significantly more time than
you or I have on this earth.
-- 
John F. Haugh II                        +-Cat of the Week:--------------_   /|-
VoiceNet: (214) 250-3311   Data: -6272  |Aren't you absolutely sick and \'o.O'
InterNet: jfh@rpp386.Dallas.TX.US       |tired of looking at these damn =(___)=
UucpNet : <backbone>!killer!rpp386!jfh  +things in everybody's .sig?-------U---

norstar@tnl.UUCP (Daniel Ray) (12/06/88)

In article <9119@rpp386.Dallas.TX.US>, jfh@rpp386.Dallas.TX.US (The Beach Bum) writes:
> > and grep the password file why is everyone so sure that a mainframe
> > cannot be used to reverse the encryption routine?
> 
> The former is much simpler than the later.  I can encrypt a dictionary on
> an unused PC running UNIX.  Trying to reverse [ brute-force decrypt is
> more like it ] a password on a PC would take significantly more time than
> you or I have on this earth.
> -- 
> John F. Haugh II                        +-Cat of the Week:--------------_   /|-

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I recall reading one of the old UNIX abstracts
(in the back of "UNIX System Security" by Wood & Kochan, Hayden Books) that
states that the crypt() routine IRREVERSIBLY encrypts a password. As a trivial
example: lets say we encrypt the alphabet..A is mapped to B, B to C, C to D,
etc, except that both Y and Z are  mapped to Z. The encrypted text of the
word "ZOO" would be "ZPP". Easy to do. However, by knowing that the ciphered
text is "ZPP", can one reverse it? No, because both "ZOO" and "YOO" encrypt
to that. I thought crypt() was like this in a much more sophisticated way,
and that there exists the remote but theoretical possibility of password
collision (two different passwords encrypting to the same string using the
same salt).

Is this true, or am I all mixed up :@) !!

norstar
The Northern Lights, Burlington Vermont               |     
tnl dialins: 802-865-3614 at 300-2400 bps.          ` | /   
------------------------------------------        --- * --- 
uucp: uunet!uvm-gen!tnl!norstar or                  / | .   
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jc@minya.UUCP (John Chambers) (12/06/88)

> If a reasonable and articulate and competent person like Mr. Greely
> still feels like giving an example with a number like 500,000 for a
> reasonably large key space, and may be prepared to trust a site's
> security to it, I shudder thinking of what less prepared people might
> come up with.

No need to wrack your brain thinking about this; just get an account
at any bank with an ATM.  I've yet to hear of one that uses a password
(i.e., a PIN) that is more than a 4-digit number.  Some banks even
refuse to use PINs that do things like repeat digits, thus decreasing
the search space even further.

(Oh, well, it's just money. :-)

-- 
John Chambers <{adelie,ima,maynard,mit-eddie}!minya!{jc,root}> (617/484-6393)

[Any errors in the above are due to failures in the logic of the keyboard,
not in the fingers that did the typing.]

gwyn@smoke.BRL.MIL (Doug Gwyn ) (12/07/88)

In article <120@tnl.UUCP> norstar@tnl.UUCP (Daniel Ray) writes:
>However, by knowing that the ciphered text is "ZPP", can one reverse it?
>No, because both "ZOO" and "YOO" encrypt to that.

For purposes of obtaining a usable password, either would do.

waters@polya.Stanford.EDU (Jim Waters) (12/11/88)

In article <147@minya.UUCP> jc@minya.UUCP (John Chambers) writes:
>No need to wrack your brain thinking about this; just get an account
>at any bank with an ATM.  I've yet to hear of one that uses a password
>(i.e., a PIN) that is more than a 4-digit number.  Some banks even

>[Any errors in the above are due to failures in the logic of the keyboard,
>not in the fingers that did the typing.]

Actually, I have a 7 digid "secret number," and I believe that 9 is the limit.
We go to the bank to choose them, so no one else ever sees the number.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Jim Waters                internet: waters@umunhum.stanford.edu
USPS: P.O. Box 13735                      waters@argus.stanford.edu
      Stanford, CA 94309        uucp:  ...decwrl!umunhum.stanford.edu!waters
AT+T: (414)326-0229             bitnet:   waters%umunhum.stanford.edu@stanford

What's that?  Don't I have anything really profound to say here . . . Nope.

jik@athena.mit.edu (Jonathan I. Kamens) (12/12/88)

In article <5598@polya.Stanford.EDU> waters@polya.Stanford.EDU (Jim Waters) writes:

>Actually, I have a 7 digid "secret number," and I believe that 9 is the limit.
>We go to the bank to choose them, so no one else ever sees the number.

Ay, there's the rub....

My bank (BayBanks Boston) allowed me to choose a 7-digit security code
as well.  However, if you watch really closely when typing the 7-digit
code into a BayBanks machine, the screen will flash momentarily after
the fourth digit is entered.

Well, boys and girls, can you guess what that means?  Yes, that's
right, the BayBanks machine is only listening to the first four
digits!  In fact, if you press the enter key after only the first four
digits, the machine merrily accepts your PIN.

Moral of the story: are you *sure* that all seven digits of your PIN
matter to the machine?

(This really has nothing to do with unix.  Sigh.)

  Jonathan Kamens
  MIT Project Athena

ok@quintus.uucp (Richard A. O'Keefe) (12/12/88)

In article <147@minya.UUCP> jc@minya.UUCP (John Chambers) writes:
>No need to wrack your brain thinking about this; just get an account
>at any bank with an ATM.  I've yet to hear of one that uses a password
>(i.e., a PIN) that is more than a 4-digit number.

I had a Versatel card (Bank of America) and my PIN was 10 characters.