[comp.sources.d] There are two separate chroot

brnstnd@stealth.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) (10/29/89)

Any user who can execute a chroot() (and who can write a directory on the
same filesystem as /bin/su) can become root. That's the point the original
poster was trying to make; that's why only root is allowed to chroot().

The previous discussion here was on a different issue: *once* a process
(in particular, the unshar process) is stuck inside a chroot(), can it
affect anything outside its sub-filesystem? The answer is obviously no.
(Modulo IPC and network facilities, but that's no problem if you reserve
a userid for the unsharing and if you hide your network libraries. It
wouldn't be funny if processes started dying...)

Yes, chroot() would be a security hole if normal users could use it.
Yes, it's safe to stick an unshar into a chroot() sub-filesystem.

---Dan