[sci.electronics] Electronic sweeping and debugging equiptments

yj1@CUNIXA.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU (y) (08/26/89)

The massive arrests (tens of thousands) after the massacre in Beijing,
China have shocked the Chinese students in the US.  They have realized
that the Chinese government has been extensively monitered telephone
conversations, especially international calls and dissidents groups
are spied.  My friend in Beijing was arrested from the clue of a telephone
conversation.  The Chinese students need to learn anti-spy and anti-
surveillance techniques.

Do you know any equiptment that can check whether the phone lines are
monitored or the rooms are bugged?  Do you know any anti-spy techniques
in general?

They need your help.  Thanks,

Yuan

dl@ibiza.cs.miami.edu (David Lesher) (08/26/89)

> Article <CMM.0.88.620075522.yj1@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu> From: yj1@CUNIXA.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU (y)

# 
# Do you know any equiptment that can check whether the phone lines are
# monitored or the rooms are bugged?  

There is no way, repeat NO WAY, to tell if a line is tapped. 

Rule one: Don't say anything on the phone you are not prepared
to see on the front page of tomorrow's Washington Post.

The only means to conduct a secure conversation is on a secure
(encrypted) telephone. The STU-III is the current standard 
for federal agencies and their cleared contractors. Millions
of your tax dollars went into this {gem, dog}.

Of course the same is true of fax machines.
Flash! Murphy gets look and feel copyright on sendmail.cf
  {gatech!} wb8foz@mthvax.cs.miami.edu (305) 255-RTFM

vaso@mips.COM (Vaso Bovan) (08/26/89)

In article <CMM.0.88.620075522.yj1@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu> yj1@CUNIXA.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU (y) writes:
>The massive arrests (tens of thousands) after the massacre in Beijing,
>China have shocked the Chinese students in the US.  

The students brought this crackdown upon themselves. They now bear
responsibility for having set back democratization perhaps a decade, and for
almost starting a civil war. How long did they think they could tweak the
tail of the tiger without retaliation ?

henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (08/26/89)

In article <721@umigw.MIAMI.EDU> wb8foz@Mthvax.Miami.Edu (David Lesher) writes:
># Do you know any equiptment that can check whether the phone lines are
># monitored or the rooms are bugged?  
>
>There is no way, repeat NO WAY, to tell if a line is tapped. 

Well, more precisely, this is true if it's been done competently.  A sloppy
job can leave traces.  A good one won't.
-- 
V7 /bin/mail source: 554 lines.|     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
1989 X.400 specs: 2200+ pages. | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu

henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (08/26/89)

In article <CMM.0.88.620075522.yj1@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu> yj1@CUNIXA.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU (y) writes:
>Do you know any equiptment that can check whether the phone lines are
>monitored or the rooms are bugged?  Do you know any anti-spy techniques
>in general?

Determining whether a room is bugged, if the bad guys are reasonably
competent, is an inordinately tedious process that in itself is going
to rouse the suspicions of listeners.  It's basically impractical.

The number one rule is to assume that in indoor environments with
known inhabitants, someone is *always* listening.  Go somewhere
outdoors to talk, or conduct your conversation in writing
rather than out loud (burn the paper and stir the ashes afterward!),
or put your heads together under a blanket and talk very quietly.
The more background noise, the better.
-- 
V7 /bin/mail source: 554 lines.|     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
1989 X.400 specs: 2200+ pages. | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu

john@stiatl.UUCP (John DeArmond) (08/27/89)

In article <CMM.0.88.620075522.yj1@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu> yj1@CUNIXA.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU (y) writes:
>
>Do you know any equiptment that can check whether the phone lines are
>monitored or the rooms are bugged?  Do you know any anti-spy techniques
>in general?
>

This CANNOT be done with sufficient reliability to bet your life on.
Especially when the adversary is the government that has control of the
switching equipment.  Some equipment will detect direct-connect bugs.
Most will not detect inductive or capacitive coupled taps.  And none
will detect taps initiated at the CO.  Even scrambling won't work in
that environment.  The existance of a scrambled signal would be more
than enough excuse for arrest.  

Your friends wll have to learn the same lessons learned by dissitants 
elsewhere.  There IS NO secure electronic communications available in 
an environmnet where the govenment is not bound to what we consder
legal behavior.

John

-- 
John De Armond, WD4OQC                     | Manual? ... What manual ?!? 
Sales Technologies, Inc.    Atlanta, GA    | This is Unix, My son, You 
...!gatech!stiatl!john    **I am the NRA** | just GOTTA Know!!! 

honig@ics.uci.edu (David A. Honig) (08/28/89)

In article <6660@stiatl.UUCP> john@stiatl.UUCP (John DeArmond) writes:
>In article <CMM.0.88.620075522.yj1@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu> yj1@CUNIXA.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU (y) writes:
>>
>>Do you know any equiptment that can check whether the phone lines are
>>monitored or the rooms are bugged?  Do you know any anti-spy techniques
>>in general?
>
>This CANNOT be done with sufficient reliability to bet your life on.
>Especially when the adversary is the government that has control of the
>switching equipment.  Some equipment will detect direct-connect bugs.
>Most will not detect inductive or capacitive coupled taps.  And none
>will detect taps initiated at the CO.  Even scrambling won't work in
>that environment.  The existance of a scrambled signal would be more
>than enough excuse for arrest.  

This won't work for speech but for letters and radio (and is amenable
to machine translation),

If you use a method of coding your messages where:
 You use ordinary phrases to mean other things,  
 And you use a shared, trusted codebook ( translation lookup-table),
Then you could use unsecure channels to communicate securely.

However, make sure you change codebooks frequently enough so that if
someone knew approximately what you meant, for some period of time,
and recorded your ciphertext, they could not understand your coding.

If done right, this will not attract the attention that a scrambled or
otherwise coded signal would.

>Your friends wll have to learn the same lessons learned by dissitants 
>elsewhere.  
>
>John

David
--
David A Honig

ee5391aa@hydra.unm.edu (Duke McMullan n5gax) (08/28/89)

>In article <CMM.0.88.620075522.yj1@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu> yj1@CUNIXA.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU (y) writes:
>Do you know any equiptment that can check whether the phone lines are
>monitored or the rooms are bugged?  Do you know any anti-spy techniques
>in general?

With limitations, yes. Let's examine a few of these.

Phone line taps: If THE ENEMY is using a cheap system to tap your line, you
MIGHT be able to detect the thing using something like The Neutralizer from Ted
Gunderson & Associates. However, at $1,989 (1982 price) it's probably bad eco-
nomy. A _good_, _properly_installed_ phone tap can't be reasonably detected, as
its high impedance in parallel with the ~600 ohms of the phone line can't be
detected by "black box" measuring techniques; neither can "voltage spike" me-
thods be used to destroy it. A _good_ (read: expensive) scrambler telephone
(and you'll need at least two) will thwart a line tap to a great extent.
Still, THE ENEMY will know when you're calling and, on outgoing calls,
what number you're calling.

If the room is miked too, scrambler phones are a waste of time. Physical search
may turn up a microphone, if you're lucky, but is it the ONLY microphone? A pro
might plant dummies to lead you into the proverbial false sense of security.

If THE ENEMY is using a cheap FM wireless microphone to bug you (Radio Schlock,
~$25 if memory serves), you can put on some music, and tune an FM radio across
the band. If you hear your music on the radio, you're bugged. If THE ENEMY has
slightly greater financial and/or technical resources, (s)he won't use such a
common band, and you'd have to use a scanner or better yet:

Go look up all the copies of Popular Electronics and Radio/Electronics for the
past 6 months. One of them has a very nice how-to article on detection of bugs
which employ radio transmitters on site. The author shows how to use a spectrum
analyzer and a Doppler Systems direction finder to detect and locate the trans-
mitter(s).

Suppose THE ENEMY doesn't use a radio transmitter. Infrared works very well,
too. Even a large magnetic induction loop wouldn't show up on any conventional
detection systems (and it's pretty unlikely -- too hard to install and hide).

There have been some recent articles (including a how-to-build-it thing by
Forrest Mims) on laser bugs. Do it with an infrared laser (yes, complete units
are available, so I'm told, from some of the grey-market companies that spec-
ialize in this sort of equipment -- bo-coo bucks, to be sure) and you won't be
able to locate it reliably without infrared or starlight viewing gear.

In a quiet environment, an amazing amount of information can be plucked from
the air with just a parabolic or shotgun microphone. With appropriate signal
processing techniques applied to the (recorded) signal, quite a bit of noise
can be peeled off the signal.

Are your window curtains open? Does THE ENEMY have access to a decent tele-
scope or binoculars? Has (s)he any skill at reading lips? Think about it...re-
member HAL. Lip reading is much "noiser" than actual listening, but it's no
myth.

Yeah, most of this stuff can be detected if you're willing to go to the trouble
to acquire/purchase the technology and expertise and then invest the time.
Even then, it's SOP to take precautions that would seem right at home on the
old GET SMART television spy-comedy show. Even then, it's only UNLIKELY that
you're not bugged -- you can't demonstrate negatives with real surety.

You always have to ask how much it's worth to you to protect a given bit of
information, and from whom? If it's miscellaneous privacy you're after, it's
not worth your time. Make some assumptions: The phone, house and car are always
compromised in some way. All "uninterested" parties are ENEMIES. If you don't
have to tell somebody about it, don't. Don't show off. Maintain a mimimal pro-
file. Don't cheat on your income taxes. Avoid gay bars. Plant agressive (sharp
spines and/or poison) plants around your house. Install outdoor lighting. Get
a good alarm system. Install an auxilary power system. Install an auxilary gas
supply. Stay out of straight bars. Don't be seen firing your gun. Buy all fire-
arms out of town, out of state if practical. Never leave your house. Grow all
your own food. Etc. Ect. Cet. Tce. Cte. Tec. Etc.

Sound paranoid? You got it, Charlie. And even then, you're never SURE....

If you just have a little bit of legally possessable stuff to physically
protect, a lockbox at your bank is a fine investment.

If you really want to protect yourself, there's only one practical way: you
have to become your own expert. This interests enough people that there's a
substantial market in "literature" in this area. Try some of these places:

Delta Press
PO Box 1625
El Dorado, AZ 71730
(catalog $2)

Butokukai
PO Box 430
Cornville, AZ 86325
(catalog $1)

Paladin Press
PO Box 1307
Boulder, CO 80306
(catalog $1)

CEP, Incorporated
PO Box 865
Boulder, CO 80306
(?? catalog charge ??)

Loompanics Unlimited
PO Box 1197
Port Townsend, WA 98368
(catalog $2[?])

I've said this on the net before, and I'll repeat it again: If your personal
politics lean heavily to the left, these catalogs will most assuredly offend
you, and may scare the bloody crap out of you. You'll find that it's perfectly
legal to write instruction manuals on almost any illegal/unlawful/incomprehen-
sible/contemptable/stupid/etc. activity. Personally, I like it that way.

					Hope it helps,
						d


         "Son, I got my good judgement from experience --
            and I got my experience from my poor judgement." - Anon.
    Duke McMullan n5gax nss13429r phon505-255-4642 ee5391aa@hydra.unm.edu

dueck@dvinci.USask.CA (Harvey C. Dueck) (08/29/89)

In article <1989Aug26.042754.9128@utzoo.uucp> henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer)
writes:
>In article <CMM.0.88.620075522.yj1@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu> yj1@CUNIXA.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU (y) writes:
>>Do you know any equiptment that can check whether the phone lines are
>>monitored or the rooms are bugged?  Do you know any anti-spy techniques
>>in general?
...stuff about conversing in a (possibly) bugged room deleted
>The more background noise, the better.

If the listeners are reasonably sophisticated and can obtain a separate
recording of the 'background noise', then it is often a relatively
straightforward signal processing task for them to filter it out.
This means that recorded music, television and radio broadcasts are
effectively useless as background noise unless turned up loud enough to
saturate the recording equipment used by the listeners.

			- harv

-- 

     dueck@dvinci.usask.ca  or  ...!uunet!dvinci.usask.ca!dueck

wiz@xroads.UUCP (Mike Carter) (08/29/89)

RE: Vaso Bovan's article on Chinese democracy.
 
I wonder how the U.S. gained it's freedom from the British empire?
China suffers from more than just a red "tiger"..it suffers from
ignorance and apathy in general.
So few Chinese nationals have access to free media or media in general that
a large section of the population goes around with it's collective heads
in the rice paddy.
To assert the students are setting back democratic reform is to imply
Paul Revere was a commie. It's a sad note to visualize what happened..
but if we are to blame the essence of the Chinese democratic movemnet..
we should aslo blame ourselves . We had as much power to change the
political spectrum as did the students. We sat in the room of
laurel resting watching the events take place over an electron tube..
they lived it. It's the height of supreme ignorance to point the
finger at the Chinese students and proclaim stupidity.
It's also the epitome of a sycophant's blathering if we consider
the democratic movement has been set-back in any degree in China.
 
	-Sci.ELectronics? How about Middle.East.Politics?
-- 
=============================================================================
= Mike Carter  N7GYX, Phoenix AZ| Q: Why did the Chicken cross the road  ?  =
= hplabs!hp-sdd!crash!xroads!wiz| A: To ESCape the Main Menu .              =
=============================================================================

vaso@mips.COM (Vaso Bovan) (08/30/89)

In article <818@xroads.UUCP> wiz@xroads.UUCP (Mike Carter) writes:
>
>RE: Vaso Bovan's article on Chinese democracy.
> 
>but if we are to blame the essence of the Chinese democratic movemnet..
>we should aslo blame ourselves . We had as much power to change the
>political spectrum as did the students. We sat in the room of
>laurel resting watching the events take place over an electron tube..
>they lived it. It's the height of supreme ignorance to point the
>finger at the Chinese students and proclaim stupidity.
>It's also the epitome of a sycophant's blathering if we consider
>the democratic movement has been set-back in any degree in China.
> 

There's been a great deal of posturing in the West on this problem, which hasn't
helped the situation in China at all. The above is yet another example.

I got a dozen or so replies to my original posting, most of them of the
outraged breast-beating kind. The best, most thoughtful responses came from
(apparently) Chinese students, who did a good job of commenting on opportunities
gained and lost in China as a result of this fiasco.

Concerning the posting of "political" memos on sci.electronics: they clearly
are inappropriate. What strikes me, though is the hypocrisy. What many people
mean when they say they don't want "politics" in sci.electronics, is that they
merely object to political statements with which they disagree. In the first
instance, the request for comments on bug-tracing techniques need not have been
prefaced by a call to "help our struggling fellow student-democrats in China."

yj1@CUNIXA.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU (Yuan Jiang) (08/30/89)

In article <26476@quacky.mips.COM> you write:
>
>I got a dozen or so replies to my original posting, most of them of the
>outraged breast-beating kind. The best, most thoughtful responses came from
>(apparently) Chinese students, who did a good job of commenting on opportunities
>gained and lost in China as a result of this fiasco.

I've advice my friend not arguing with you because you are worth while to
argue with.  You are entittled to have your opinion.  You are not the first
person I know who share your culture background and hold similar point of
view.

>
>Concerning the posting of "political" memos on sci.electronics: they clearly
>are inappropriate. What strikes me, though is the hypocrisy. What many people
>mean when they say they don't want "politics" in sci.electronics, is that they
>merely object to political statements with which they disagree. In the first
>instance, the request for comments on bug-tracing techniques need not have been
>prefaced by a call to "help

I prefaced my request for TECHNICAL help with my cause so that more people
would offer their help.  It worked.  I'm not sure it will work for
your cause.

I'd like to thank all of you who have contributed their knowledge and their
help.

Thanks again for all of you,

Yuan

aj-mberg@dasys1.UUCP (Micha Berger) (09/05/89)

John DeArmond (john@stiatl.UUCP) writes in article <6660@stiatl.UUCP>:
>This CANNOT be done with sufficient reliability to bet your life on.
>Especially when the adversary is the government that has control of the
>switching equipment.

Actually, this isn't strictly true. The phone company controls the switching
equipment. How many criminals went free because the phone company claimed
that it took a certain amount of time to trace a call? For decades they tried
to hide the secret of their billing system that way. (Read this in an old
Popular Electronics.)
-- 
					Micha Berger

"Always should [the child of] Adam have awe of G-d in secret and in public,
admit the truth, and speak truth in his heart." 

henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (09/06/89)

In article <10630@dasys1.UUCP> aj-mberg@dasys1.UUCP (Micha Berger) writes:
>>Especially when the adversary is the government that has control of the
>>switching equipment.
>
>Actually, this isn't strictly true. The phone company controls the switching
>equipment...

Except in a handful of Western countries -- I think the US, parts of Canada,
and the UK are the entire list -- the two are one and the same.  Most places,
the Post Office runs the phone system and there is no distinct "phone company".
-- 
V7 /bin/mail source: 554 lines.|     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
1989 X.400 specs: 2200+ pages. | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu

raoul@eplunix.UUCP (Otero) (09/06/89)

John DeArmond (john@stiatl.UUCP) writes in article <6660@stiatl.UUCP>:
>This CANNOT be done with sufficient reliability to bet your life on.
>Especially when the adversary is the government that has control of the
>switching equipment.

True, but didn't the original poster ask for ways to protect Chinese
students in the States? Do you really think Ma Bell's siblings are 
controlled by the Chinese government? ;-) The strike at New England
Telephone would have ended much more quickly if this were so....

-- 
			Nico Garcia
			Designs by Geniuses for use by Idiots
			eplunix!cirl!raoul@eddie.mit.edu