[comp.sys.mac] Macintosh LC

dubman@ocf.berkeley.edu (Jonathan Dubman) (02/13/90)

I've read all your responses on the Low-Cost Mac, some of 
which I've incorporated in this article.  Here is my own 
urgent argument, which I invite you to critique.
(The subject line is creative visualization.)

Apple, hear this!

* * *

I.  Apple's current pricing strategy

The Mac pricing strategy is optimized for short-term profit.  
The scheme starts well:  Introduce a new and improved 
machine, saturate the cutting-edge market, drop the price, 
saturate the high-end market, etc.  Unfortunately, this 
scheme is not carried to its logical conclusion.  Apple 
price reductions peter out; the prices level off at about 
twice what the masses are willing to pay, and probably over 
five times manufacturing cost.  In trying to make as much 
money as possible on each type of machine, Apple management 
overcompartmentalizes profit and does not acknowledge the 
complimentary nature of the sales of the numerous members of 
the Mac product line.

Apple's profit margins are the highest in the business.  In 
overpricing its entry-level machines, Apple is excluding 
vast numbers of customers at its own peril.

Apple is trying to preserve its high-quality image by 
artificially inflating prices rather than actually improving 
quality or performance on the low end.  Their reputation is 
correspondingly shifting from premium-quality to high-price.

A lot of low-end customers tend to look just at the bottom 
line.  Snob-appeal does not apply to the low end.  Look how 
many people bought Yugos.

II.  The Magic Number

Apple, to lower expectations, has changed its tune from 
"low-cost Mac" to "low-end Mac."  How much should they 
charge, and what should it buy?

It is common wisdom in the computer industry that there are 
several magic numbers below which many customers sitting on 
the fence will rush to buy a product.  $1000 is commonly 
considered to be such a price point, for numerous 
psyschological and economic reasons.  While this is an 
overgeneralization - the price/demand curve isn't a step 
function - and you couldn't give away some computers - this 
is basically true.

Exactly what this $1000 should buy you is not agreed upon.  
A $495 PC clone system includes monochrome monitor, disk 
drive, and a standard memory configuration, sans printer.  
$1000 is still twice as much; even this proposal is arguably 
too conservative.  We need a list price at or below $995, 
with a bargain basement price of maybe $750-$800 and an 
educational price about $700.  Someone recently posted that 
an SE costs under $200 to make.  I am aware of Apple's large 
research and development costs (they are competing with 
IBM), so I will not suggest a ridiculously low price.  With 
design-for-manufacturing techniques, the SE is cheaper to 
produce than the Plus.  I am sure Apple could comfortably 
sell the machine under $1000.

I'm aware of sticky issues like dealer relations, mail-order 
pros and cons, international pricing, and legalizing clone
manufacturing, and these must be considered, but the bottom
line is, Apple needs to drop the price.

III.  Benefits of the low-cost Mac.

There was a rare window of opportunity from 1986-1988, when 
Macs began to be accepted at corporations, for Apple to gain 
significant market share.  Instead of really dropping the 
price, Apple depended on a stroke of good fortune (the 
emergence of the desktop publishing market, a lucky break 
that Apple has been trying to duplicate ever since) to 
retain its 15% market share in the face of rapidly dropping 
PC prices by overseas clone manufacturers.

The benefits of stuffing Macs through the channels in high 
volume are so many that it's _almost_ worth it to sell below 
cost.  Not only will market share increase, but the market 
will widen, because truly user-friendly machines will be 
available to the masses.  We'll sell potentially twice as 
many Macs to volume buyers like corporations and schools who 
allocate only so much money to computer purchases.  Lots of 
customers who buy one machine will buy one for home and one 
for the office.  We'll see an increase in the variety of 
third-party software and peripherals.  And we'll increase 
the potential market for upgrades - on which Apple makes a 
very healthy profit.

IV.  Happy Dealers

Whenever a computer manufacturer lowers prices, it 
frustrates and, in a sense punishes those who just purchased 
the machine at the higher price.  If the manufactuer warns 
of a price increase in advance, sales plummet.  The best 
scheme is to pleasantly surprise the user community and 
retroactively drop the price for those who purchased in, 
say, the last three months.  This will be a pleasant 
surprise for recent purchasers, and only a few will be 
disgruntled because they bought their machine three months 
before a price decrease.  Since the price should have been 
dropped three years ago, Apple should be able to afford the 
retroactive price decrease.  Dealers agreements often 
include price protection, so if everything is done properly 
there should be no backlash.

There are not one, but two critical figures: The wholesale 
and retail price.  When a price decrease takes effect, one 
would expect the dealer margin to decrease proportionally, 
though this isn't a necessity.  Dealers will be pleased 
about the increased volume the lower prices will bring but 
may be angered by lower margins.  This is a political issue, 
and I don't know the nature of the current arrangements, so 
I won't suggest any specific numbers.

The lower prices should undercut the current second-hand 
market and drive used Mac prices way down.  I would expect 
Mac Plus prices to drop down to the under $800 range.

IV.  Send in the Clones

The chance of this is about zero, so it's merely an academic 
issue.

In the early to mid '80s, IBM permitted clone manufacturers 
to produce equivalent, if not better machines at lower cost.  
At first, clones were met with compatability problems and a 
degree of public mistrust, but they were eventually 
accepted.  I don't know the most current figures, but PC-
compatible computers, including IBM's own, have roughly an 
85% market share, with over 35 million computers in the U.S.  
(What's my operational definition of market share?  Is it 
current sales or existing inventory?  I think both are on 
the order of 85%.)

Is this a phenomenal coup for IBM?  They quickly and firmly 
established themselves as King of the Mountain, the standard 
of standards.  However, they steadily lost market share and 
have fallen below Apple in sales.  (What's my operational 
definition of sales?  Number of units or total revenue?  I 
believe the figures I saw related to number of units.)

We keep hearing rumors about Brazilian and Taiwanese Mac 
clone manufacturers.  It is certainly technically feasible.  
We would all like competition to bring the price of a Mac 
Plus down to $495, but I'm not convinced that it wouldn't be 
a mistake for Apple to permit clones.  It's a risky move, 
and I'm not sure what it would accomplish.  It might 
increase market share of Mac-compatibles, but I am not sure 
even in the long run how much revenue this would generate 
for Apple, however indirectly.  It might have been a good 
idea earlier on in the Mac's career, to encourage 
developers.

There already is a Mac compatible - an Atari ST or Amiga 
running the appropriate software and hopefully legally-
obtained Mac ROMS. These have their niches (those who know 
about this are in the niche) but many potential customers 
are more concerned with compatibility headaches than with 
the increased flexibility of these other computers.  (Both 
have excellent games; ST sales have dropped off but the 
Amiga is going strong with over a million units sold 
worldwide.  Many of those could have been Macs...)

Since a standard box is supposedly (supposedly) one of the 
Mac's strengths, a stampede of near-Macs with various 
incompatibilities might hurt the Mac's image.

V.  Low-cost means low-cost

Low-cost Mac IIcx:  Problem is, it can't be under $1000.  It 
can't even be $1500.  Drop the price, maybe, but this is not 
the low-end machine.  (Does it even run Dark Castle?)

Little box sans monitor:  Problem is, most end users want a 
cheap monochrome monitor anyway.  Apple can't compete with 
Amiga and Atari in games, so color is of limited use.  A
A monitor costs about $20 raw, which means $50 on the
sticker.

Mac Jr: What can you remove?  A Plus with 1 meg and 800K 
drive is barely acceptable, and I think it's wiser to 
standardize on 2 meg and FDHD.  You need a keyboard, keypad, 
mouse, etc.  Basically, you can't get rid of anything to 
lower the cost.  And it should have an SE slot and provide 
an upgrade path to the SE/30.

I read all your arguments, and this is the one I find the 
most convincing:

Just lower the price on the SE and deep-six the Plus.  It's 
already made, it's cheap to produce, it's already got a 
public image, it's already on the shelves.  Just ship it 
with two meg standard so everyone can run system 7, like 
Chris Espinoza would like us all to do.

* * *

But what do I know about the low-end?  I just bought a NeXT 
machine... (Apple II Plus, Apple IIc, Amiga, Mac Plus, NeXT, 
...)

-----

"We're not going to play that low-end game"
	Jean-Louis Gassee, about 1987
	
Jonathan Dubman
UC Berkeley

sobiloff@agnes.acc.stolaf.edu (Chrome Cboy) (02/18/90)

[Many good arguments]
[Make a price reduction retroactive]
Retroactive price decrease is a bad idea because it does not eliminate what
you had hoped it would-namely, the anger over having bought something only
to see its price drop shortly thereafter.  The people who bought the
computer four months ago will be upset because the aren't being given a
break like their neighbor who bought three months ago.  Just have a price
reduction without the retroactive clause.

[Send in the clones...]
I strongly believe that Apple is in a position where clones should become an
essential part of Macintosh.  Just as Apple currently relies very heavily on
its connections with the third-party hardware and software manufacturers,
Apple should begin to rely on clone manufacturers to take care of the
low-end of the market.

Everyone agrees that Apple desperately needs to beef-up its installed base. 
Apple *could* make a no/low-profit Mac, but that's not Apple.  This isn't a
fault, it's just Apple Corporate Culture--"Macintosh is the Mercedes of the
computer market."  I believe that Apple should continue to focus on the
segment of the market that ranges from the middle-of-the-road to the
high-end in power/price demands.  This will keep Apple's profits high enough
to further Macintosh technology.  *BUT*, most importantly, Apple needs to
realize that this strategy, by itself, will not work--it must be done in
conjunction with a proper focus on the low-end.

Apple should/will not spend its resources on the low-end (as defined as the
$1000 market).  Thus Apple should work in conjunction with a few, select
manufacturers who can prove to Apple that they understand Macintosh and are
willing to put out high-quality hardware.  If such a manufacturer is
impossible to find, Apple could spin-off such a company, such as they are
doing with Claris.  Apple should then sell the 256K ROMs and System Software
to the manufacturer(s) as a package.  This low-end manufacturer (LEM) would
be constrained by agreement to only produce at the low-end (currently
68000-based performance (and Apple // class, which could be integrated into
a hybrid low-end machine)), thus not threatening Apple's domain.  The ideal
initial product for these LEMs would be a cheap version of the SE.  Since
these companies are relatively unconstrained by the need for large amounts
of R&D money, they could price the SE much lower than Apple could.  Apple
would then drop the Plus (which they should have done a while back, IMHO)
the SE, and the // series, and replace them with a new baseline Apple
Macintosh computer.

Based on a 68020, this new Mac (the IIe, "e" for entry-level) would be
"headless," but come with expandable, built-in 4-bit color capability (able
to drive an Apple Color Monitor as is), a Processor-Direct Slot, a NuBus
slot, 2 megs of RAM, 512K ROM, a SCSI port able to handle data transmission
at a 1:1 interleave, AppleTalk*, ADB, 2 internal FDHDs, 2 serial ports, and
1 parallel port.  This is the System Seven baseline of technology, but is
easily expandable to handle virtual memory (with a 68881), increased storage
(with external hard drives), increased performance (with a cache card), or
larger/more colorful (16-bit max) displays (with the addition of more video
RAM), and full use of the NuBus slot.  Such expansions would be standard in
a IIei, announced sixth months later.  *AppleTalk would be on a removable
card so that it could be upgraded to EtherTalk.

Six to twelve months later, announce a revamped lineup of Macintosh
computers, composed of the old II series.  The IIcx/ci would form a
medium-expandability computer line based on the 68030, with the cx being
similar to the IIe: expandable 4-bit color*, PDS, 2 regular NuBus slots, 1
high-speed NuBus slot (NuBus II?), 2 megs RAM, 512K ROM, SCSI @ 1:1,
AppleTalk, ADB, 1 FDHD, 1 internal SCSI II HD without DMA chip (can be
installed later), 2 serial ports, 1 parallel port.  The ci would have
built-in EtherTalk, 4 megs of RAM, 16-bit color*, and DMA for the SCSI II
port.  *The key changes here are: 1) Expandable to 24-bit color, and 2) the
ability to add an AMD29000 chip dedicated to driving the display (as is
rumored for the "real" IIxi).

The IIx would cease to be 68030-based; instead, it would be 68040-based, and
split into two models, just like the other two lines.  The IIx would have:
expandable 24-bit color, PDS, 3 NuBus II/3 NuBus III slots, 4 megs RAM, 512K
(1 meg?) ROM, DMA SCSI II, ADB with independent processor, 1 FDHD, 1
internal HD, 2 serial ports, 1 parallel port.  The IIxi would add 32-bit
color, 6 NuBus III slots, 16 megs RAM.

This would create a balanced, powerful lineup of computers that would expand
the power of Macintosh and be profitable enough to provide the R&D money
that Apple needs.  As the 68050 gets underway (or if Apple decides that the
88000 is the way to go), the bottom-line would be transferred to the LEM. 
Thus, when the 68050 is used in the IIx/xi lineup, the 68040 would be used
in the IIc/ci lineup, the 68030 would be used in the IIe/ei lineup, and the
68020 would be given to the LEM to play with.

Comments (besides "It'll never happen... " :-( ?
						-CCb

sobiloff@stolaf.edu