pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) (01/01/70)
All right, you backed me into it. Mr. Gywn claims he never said anything about immunology or the possibility of raising defensive vaccines for me to correct. I submit the following quotations: > re. vaccines, it would seem to me (admittedly not an immunologist) that > even if we didn't know the specific nature of future biological threats, > if we were reasonably certain about the likely classes of future threats > then having knowledge that could lead to quick development of vaccines > could well be worthwhile. > > last I heard via unclassified > channels there were then only a small number of probable CBW threats of > sufficient significance to require development of specific countermeasures. > This means that it is not a "hopeless" problem, and therefore it is quite > proper for people to be working on it. I apparently missinterpreted the the "re. vaccines" to mean that Mr. Gwyn was talking about vaccines. I wish to clear up a few points which I thought were made in the above quotes. Bear in mind that Mr. Gwyn claims to have no knowledge of having made these points, so the following should in no way be construed as attacking his possition. There are NOT only a small number of possible threats. It may well be true that there are only a few toxic gene-products that are popular with the military, but you can put the genes for these ANY WHERE YOU DAMN WELL PLEASE. I make my living doing gene manipulation of a less dangerous sort (and in teaching others how to do it). If the Soviets have as little reguard for the treaty we both signed as the US military does, they could easily put their favorite lethal gene into any virus that infects humans. It is also patently false that knowing even the "class" of the agent that would be used to deliver the toxic gene-product would be of any use. Take for example, lentiviruses such as AIDS. Even having the EXACT DNA sequence of many isolates of the virus is USELESS in developing antibodies to neutralize a new isolate. In no case is a vaccine research useful in defense. I suspect the motives of the military are not as pure as they claim. If that makes me a radical and un-American, so be it. Mr. Gwyn takes exception to my claim that the intelegence agencies would not be able to determine years in advance precisely on what agents the Soviets are working. He points out, correctly, that I have no direct experience in covert operations. However, I do read the papers (more people spreading dangerous ideas). Do you, Mr. Gwyn, really expect us to believe that the same community that gave us the Iran/Contra scandel is capable of knowing years in advance the lethal organisms the Soviets are developing? Get real. I also said "It seems to me that one method to destroy life as we know it is quite sufficient." Mr Gwyn responds: > We had that back in the days of stones and spears. Mr Gwyn, for the benefit of those of us less knowledgable in the area of weapons systems, please explain how "stones and spears" can bring an end to life as we know it. I also mentioned alot of cases where I thought military research was conducted poorly or improperly. Perhaps directly with Mr Gwyn, I will discuss this further; but I see no need to subject other readers to it. I have one more point. Mr Gwyn has called my character into question. He made allusions with no support that I am mis-representing the facts. I point out that I gave references in one of my postings. Unlike Mr. Gwyn, I do not believe that ideas are ever dangerous. It is limitting access to ideas and preventing discussion of all sides that is dangerous. I want all those with whom I dicuss this to have access to the information. That is why I posted the references and urged those interested to read them and decide for themselves. Why have you not read them, Mr. Gwyn? Most of the references I gave were in the official journal of the "American Association for the Advancement of Science." The journal is called "Science" and it and its parent organization are extremely reputably. I have not, as you claim, painted the picture of "complete bunglers trying to develop actual vaccines to unknown viruses." The picture I paint is one of the military trying to convince the gullible that "defensive" research is viable and must be carried out in secret. I believe that their motives are not as pure as they say. I have said that in every posting on this topic. You see, I know something of the type of research the military is trying to fund in the private sector. They offer lots of money to people working on things like Staph. aureus enterro-toxins (for defense?). (details and references available on request) My possition is unchanged. What the military proposes they will do is absurd from a scientific point of view. That they want to do it in secret worries me. A president of the US signed an agreement that we would not do what the military wants to do. I wish to take steps to make sure the US does not reneg on that agreement. -tony Molecular etc. Biology Boulder, Co. 80303-0347
gwyn@brl-smoke.ARPA (Doug Gwyn ) (10/11/87)
In article <2518@sigi.Colorado.EDU> pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) writes: >Intelegence can hardly be good enough that we can reasonably assume that >we will know years in advance on what they are working. On what grounds do you make such a claim? Have you ever been a member of the intelligence community? The logistics of deployment of any sort of weaponry, biological or not, provide many opportunities to learn about it in advance. Although I'm not up on current intelligence relating to this (obviously, or I wouldn't be discussing it), last I heard via unclassified channels there were then only a small number of probable CBW threats of sufficient significance to require development of specific countermeasures. This means that it is not a "hopeless" problem, and therefore it is quite proper for people to be working on it. I didn't think your objection was primarily to the idea that vaccines could reasonably be developed in advance of actualization of a biological threat, and judging by your further comments you're indeed opposed to much more about military research & development than just this one issue. However, re. vaccines, it would seem to me (admittedly not an immunologist) that even if we didn't know the specific nature of future biological threats, if we were reasonably certain about the likely classes of future threats then having knowledge that could lead to quick development of vaccines could well be worthwhile. Contrary to some popular scenarios, I doubt that a real conflict involving such weaponry would be over in a matter of a few minutes or even a few days. Secrecy plays the same role here that it does in other military matters: one doesn't want the enemy to be able to determine easily with certainty one's exact capabilities; the accepted theory is that that would be more likely to lead to conflict whenever a breakthrough occurs, since the risks could be closely approximated. Uncertainty raises the threshhold. (Experience seems to bear out this theory.) >It seems to me that one method to destroy life as we know it is quite >sufficient. We had that back in the days of stones and spears. Yet a proper modern defense could not have been developed by refusing to study properties of guns, etc. War is not primarily about destroying life, by the way, although it usually involves doing some of that. One could lose a war without anyone directly dying, if faced with an overwhelming threat that one couldn't defend against. >Name a university biology research building that is so contaminated that >it can probably never be used. On two separate occasions as a Physics grad student, I was present when there was a scare that this level of contamination from nuclear sources might have occurred. I'm sure that even if nothing worse has happened with radiation, there have been non-neglible injury-causing chemical accidents at universities. >Do you know of any cases of a university >deploying bacteria from aircraft on a major (or minor) US city? Don't be silly; universities don't normally have precisely this scenario to goof up. They have spread ideas across the nation that are even more harmful, however; does that count? >a non-military organization that conducted their first experiment with >nuclear chain-reactions under a crowded football stadium so that the cheering >crowd would drown out any noise the reaction might make? I seem to recall that the first sustained nuclear chain reaction was conducted at a university, under a handball court wasn't it? >spent $300 on a hammer? Nobody, including the military, spends $300 on an ordinary hammer; we have budgetary constraints too, even though you might not believe it. To obtain a properly tested non-sparking hammer for special purposes might well cost you that. Most of the highly reported "golden fleece" contracts of which I've had inside knowledge have turned out to be completely misrepresented by Proxmire and the press. I'm sure that there is SOME actual waste, fraud, and corruption, but I don't think it's confined to the military; I've even seen universities involved in it! >built a tank that cannot withstand the force of firing its own cannon? We're quite familiar with tanks at the BRL, but that's the first I've heard of this. (Not that it's my particular job, but you would think that the vulnerability analysts I work with daily would have mentioned it.) One of the problems with some of the less successful designs is that NOT ENOUGH research & development was done before manufacturing contracts were awarded. These tend to be very political programs, and often the people in a position to make good engineering decisions are not consulted. But I found that to be the case in private industry, too. >spent billions of dollars on a plane that can be brought down by a bird? I know of no airplane that costs billions of dollars! If you mean that the total R&D program cost over a billion, that's a different matter; the R&D cost should be amortized over the entire production run. I assume you're referring to the B-1. Do you really think it's the only airplane that has been crashed by starling in the intake? However, it does point up a problem with really expensive military gear: the very cost may limit the risks to which the gear is subjected. I understand the TFX (F-111) loss rate in Vietnam caused them to quit being used, even though they were technically the best gear for the job. Many Middle Eastern nations have opted to buy relatively cheap fighters because of this sort of trade-off. Pentagon planners are certainly aware of this consideration; whether they're making the right decisions is beyond my competence to say. I suspect one of the reasons for interest (on both sides) in biological weaponry is its comparitively low cost. >You can't be serious. The military is inherently a serious business.
dean@violet.berkeley.edu (Dean Pentcheff) (10/12/87)
Mr. Gwyn, you made several good points in your reply to Mr. Pelletier
regarding the role of research and development in the military. You made
one statement, however, which I must challenge.
Mr. Pelletier writes (citing an example of military negligence):
...deploying bacteria from aircraft on a major (or minor) US city?
You reply:
Don't be silly; universities don't normally have precisely this scenario
to goof up. They have spread ideas across the nation that are even more
harmful, however; does that count?
....
The military is inherently a serious business.
The serious business of the universities _is_ to spread ideas,
dangerous or not, across the nation and the world. It is the business
of the military to protect the nation which values such free thought.
Do not lose sight of the priorities.
-Dean Pentcheff (dean@violet.berkeley.edu)
Department of Zoology University of California at Berkeleypell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) (10/12/87)
Doug Gwyn writes: > >[lots of suff responding to a posting of mine on the proposed >biowarfare research facility at the Dugway proving grounds.] Information he gave regarding immunology and the possibility of developing defensive vaccines was false, and I originally wanted to correct it. Then, in response to my challenge to produce an example of misuse of research in academia that was comparable to that of the army dumping bacteria from an airplane on the Washington DC area, he gave us this gem: >They have spread ideas across the nation that are even more >harmful, however; does that count? Logical argument is wasted on people who think ideas are dangerous. I do not care to waste my time. -tony
gwyn@brl-smoke.ARPA (Doug Gwyn ) (10/12/87)
In article <2532@sigi.Colorado.EDU> pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) writes: >Doug Gwyn writes: >>... >Information he gave regarding immunology and the possibility of developing >defensive vaccines was false, and I originally wanted to correct it. Anyone who wishes to can check that I gave NO information regarding immunology in either of my two previous postings. My response addressed the general issue of military research, which I felt was behind pell's objection to the Dugway project (as strikingly verified by the remarks in his previous message). >>They have spread ideas across the nation that are even more >>harmful, however; does that count? >Logical argument is wasted on people who think ideas are dangerous. I of course did not say that ALL ideas are dangerous, which is what one would gather from pell's response. I do believe that SOME ideas are dangerous, such as the idea that misrepresenting an opponent's position is a valid mode of argumentation. One has to wonder at this point whether pell's representation of the intended purpose of the Dugway facility is equally accurate. He has painted a picture of complete bunglers trying to develop actual vaccines for unknown diseases. I rather suspect that the people involved are not nearly so stupid as they are being made out to be by pell, or by whatever sources he got his information from. If they're the same as those that came up with the examples he mentioned in his previous posting, then they aren't very reliable sources of information. Does anyone know the true story of the Dugway project? I didn't really care about this particular project, but now I'm curious.