pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) (10/07/87)
I wish to clarify a possition of mine that was apparently mis-understood
in my last posting. Neither the Committee for Responsible Genetics or myself
have any affiliation with Jeremy Rifkin or the Council on Economic Trends.
My personal opinion of Jeremy is that he is an extremist and potentially
dangerous to my carreer. That opinion not-withstanding, he must be credited
when citing the law suit that got the injunction against the biowarfare
facility at Dugway.
One of the reasons I am involved in the fight against Dugway is that it
troubles me that objection to the use of biotechnology in warfare did
not come strongly enough from the mainstream research community.
It behooves those of us who depend on modern biotechnology in our research
to make sure we are perceived as a responsible community capable of
self-regulation. At a recent international meeting of prokariotic molecular
geneticists, the Dugway facility was discussed. One of the points I stressed
is that we must maitain control of our own research--I do not wish to lose
control to the military OR to fanatics such as Rifkin.
If we allow Rifkin to build his credibility by winning battles such as
this while we are silent, we give him ammunition to then direct against us.
Allowing the military to use modern biotechnology for top-secret warfare
research is dangerous. Given their history of bungling, what they do by
accident is more worrysome than that which they do intentionally (consider
the "anthrax tower"--a building at fort Dietrick that cannot ever be used
because of an accident with anthrax--and the death of some six thousand
livestock around Dugway due to an accidental release of nerve gas. A complete
list is too long to include here).
Giving the military control over research funds in biotechnology is potentially
dangerous. Consider the double-bind in which our colleagues in physics now
find themselves.
The assertion I make is that research in molecular biology should be in the
hands of private-sector and civilian agencies, where it is openly discussed,
subject to peer review and criticism.
If we do not object to the military gaining control, we will lose one of
two ways: Either the military will get control; or fanatics such as Jeremy
will succeed in their fight against the military use of biotechnology and,
armed with public support and greater credibility, attempt to stifle
research in accademia.
I urge you to read about the proposal and decide for yourself if you wish to
allow the military to use biotechnology in warfare-related work. And yes, we
can stop it if we choose to do so.
A few references:
"Science" volume 226 pp1176-1178 (1984)
"Science" volume 228 pp 827-828 (1985)
"Genewatch" May-August 1985
More recent references are fewer and farther between. This is part of the
problem. But this will give most of the picture.
Anyone interested in more information can contact me or the Committee for
responsible Genetics. We can get copies of the DOD's report when it is
published.
Thanks,
-tonygwyn@brl-smoke.ARPA (Doug Gwyn ) (10/08/87)
In article <2476@sigi.Colorado.EDU> pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) writes: >It behooves those of us who depend on modern biotechnology in our research >to make sure we are perceived as a responsible community capable of >self-regulation. That's certainly laudable, and you should do that in any case. >Allowing the military to use modern biotechnology for top-secret warfare >research is dangerous. Omitting "top-secret" (since security classifications are based solely on probably damage to the national interests if information is disclosed), your contention seems to be that there are certain areas that the military should be prohibited from considering. Unfortunately, this is very naive. Like it or not, nuclear, chemical, and biological issues are extremely important for the battlefield of today. As a minimum, a responsible military organization MUST determine viable defenses for such agents, which WILL BE (and to a limited degree HAVE BEEN) used in actual battles. Even to investigate defensive measures, some research has to be done to determine possible offensive threats. That is NOT to say that such research should lead to the stockpiling of large quantities of such offensive munitions, as has been stupidly done in the past. >Given their history of bungling... The military researchers I know of have no more tendency to "bungle" than civilians. True, politicians (both within the military and outside it) can make some incredibly stupid decisions that eventually cause major problems; however, civilian research has similar bureaucracies, especially when it is dependent on Federal funding. >I urge you to read about the proposal and decide for yourself if you wish to >allow the military to use biotechnology in warfare-related work. And yes, we >can stop it if we choose to do so. I doubt that very much, based on past experience. You can't even keep the administration from supplying military aid to the Contras when Congress has specifically prohibited it! I think your best bet would be to agitate for a civilian review board as an overseer of military bio research, rather than trying to "outlaw" such research. P.S. Although I work (as a civilian) for a military research lab, the above opinions are mine alone and should not be assumed to have any relation to official government policy.
diaz@aecom.YU.EDU (Dizzy Dan Diaz) (10/10/87)
In article <6535@brl-smoke.ARPA>, gwyn@brl-smoke.ARPA (Doug Gwyn ) writes: > Like it or not, nuclear, chemical, and biological issues are extremely > important for the battlefield of today. As a minimum, a responsible > military organization MUST determine viable defenses for such agents, > which WILL BE (and to a limited degree HAVE BEEN) used in actual battles. > Even to investigate defensive measures, some research has to be done to > determine possible offensive threats. That is NOT to say that such > research should lead to the stockpiling of large quantities of such > offensive munitions, as has been stupidly done in the past. Despite the existence of treaties forbidding the development and use of biological weapons in combat, the facist forces in the Reagan regime insist on their development for "purely defensive" reasons. As Doug Gwyn has aptly stated in his posting, the stockpiling of munitions as a result of such research should not be permitted. The problem with the way military research has usually worked is that what begins as defensive research usually turns offensive. Facist Reagan's "Star Wars" is a prime example of a "defensive" system with the potential to become offensive at the flip of a switch. This is why the Soviets are fearful of its development, and why we should fight it as well. Although I think him a bit extreme, I consider Jeremy Rifkin a "voice in the wilderness" appropriately asking us to look at where we're headed and decide if that's where we really want to go. Molecular biology is no exception. If we are serious about our opposition to the development of biological weapons, then the research community might consider taking steps to hinder this work in the spirit of opposition to South Africa's repressive Apartheid system. It may be that we will want to reconsider consulting with or giving advice to those engaged in such research. As Tony has pointed out, many of our friends in the physics and computer science communities have sold out to DOD and are now engaged in the development of new weapons for world annihilation. The biological community may well be next. -- ....* dn/dx = Dan Diaz (diaz@aecom.yu.edu) 212 430 9476 ~..|.> Department of Wasting Taxpayers' Money on Useless Research *\../ Albert Einstein College of Medicine and Bar & Grill
binkley@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Jon Binkley) (10/10/87)
In a previous article, pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) writes: >Allowing the military to use modern biotechnology for top-secret warfare >research is dangerous. Given their history of bungling, what they do by >accident is more worrysome than that which they do intentionally (consider >the "anthrax tower"--a building at fort Dietrick that cannot ever be used >because of an accident with anthrax--and the death of some six thousand >livestock around Dugway due to an accidental release of nerve gas. A complete >list is too long to include here). > >Giving the military control over research funds in biotechnology is potentially >dangerous. Consider the double-bind in which our colleagues in physics now >find themselves. > Poor, dear Tony, you ARE so naive... Of course we must research and develop biological warfare-- the Soviets are!!! The risk of accidently or intentionally wiping out vast populations is one we'll just have to take! (Not to say there aren't just as many risks in non-military research-- just think of the ramifications if some well-meaning academician accidently released insulin producing HB101 into the streets!) Surely you can't be so naive as to think we shouldn't assassinate foreign leaders not to our liking when the Soviets have done so many times. Nor can you possibly be opposed to us sponsoring our fascist allies in their campaigns of torture and genocide, while the Russians commit torture and genocide both on their own and through their communist allies. My point is that biological warfare research is just as necessary as political torture and assassination, and those involved in this research are EVERY BIT as noble and admirable as those involved in genocide. So you see, dear, misguided Tony, we MUST continue to do all of these things. How else can we keep the planet safe for democracy and maintain our many shining examples of how much BETTER we are than the Soviets? Yours ever so sincerely, Jonathan P. Binkley Dept. of Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology University of Colorado Box 347 Boulder, Colorado 80309 binkley@boulder.Colorado.EDU (These views are probably not shared by this pinko-commie university, or this department.)
pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) (10/11/87)
in response to an article of mine, Doug Gwyn writes: > (I write) >>Allowing the military to use modern biotechnology for top-secret warfare >>research is dangerous. > >Omitting "top-secret" (since security classifications are based solely >on probably damage to the national interests if information is disclosed), >your contention seems to be that there are certain areas that the military >should be prohibited from considering. Unfortunately, this is very naive. >Like it or not, nuclear, chemical, and biological issues are extremely >important for the battlefield of today. As a minimum, a responsible >military organization MUST determine viable defenses for such agents, >which WILL BE (and to a limited degree HAVE BEEN) used in actual battles. > Let's start by adding back the "top-secret" label, since that is what the army IS requesting (read it for yourself), and is the crux of the problem. I believe you will find that one of the points I made is that there is no need for legitimate defensive research to be top-secret. I have no trouble with the army funding research on vaccines. I think you should start by re-reading the original posting, since it seems clear from your response that you did not read it carefully, if at all. But I will re-iterate some of the main points. 1) There is no practical way to do "defensive vaccines." One can assume that the Soviets are not going to call the army and let them know on what new leathal organisms they are working. Intelegence can hardly be good enough that we can reasonably assume that we will know years in advance on what they are working. So against what, exactly, are we going to vaccinate? Vaccinating fighting forces is only reasonable if you know well in advance what new pathogens are going to be released. The only reasonable assumption is that the army plans to know what is going to be released because they are the ones that will release it. Furthermore, (2) there is no need to use deadly pathogens to test protective clothing and sterilization proceedures. There are plenty of non-toxic bacteria and viruses that can "stand in" for the toxic ones. Why does the military insist on developing deadly pathogens to test Clorox? You say that the army must be involved in research on this because it could be a weapon. Why? I am not trying to be unreasonable. It is not apparent to me why the army must have its hand in every potential weapon. It seems to me that one method to destroy life as we know it is quite sufficient. What difference does it make if the Soviets can destroy the world two different ways while we can do it only one way? You call me naive. Really? Do you really think that any leader of either "super-power" will surrender his/her country? Don't you think that, before giving up the freedom of Americans on American soil, the Commander-in-chief of the military will simply blow the enemy off the planet and risk the same happening to us. The USSR has signed an agreement that they will never use a nuclear weapon first in a war. I am not sure I believe them. But the US has repeatedly refused to sign the agreement and defended its perrogative to use nuclear weapons first if they have no other alternative other than surrender. I think it is clear where the government stands on this. So what reasonable use will anti-biological defenses have (even assuming they are possible). Long before the battlefield moves to America, the war will go nuclear. So this is not about defending Americans and American soil. This is likely to be about defending financial interests of US corporations in South-east Asia, or about fighting against guerrillas in El Salvador or as guerrillas in Nicaragua. As I pointed out, the only practical use of biological weapons at all would be in a small guerrilla effort where the "good guys" could be vaccinated in advance of use (did you read the original posting at all?). IN NO CASE IS A VACCINE USEFUL AS A DEFENSE. You have to know against what you are vaccinating. If you are going to suggest that "one never knows what will be developed--perhaps some universal vaccine," please first familiarize yourself with some immunology. Then, if you still want to argue that, tell me why it must be done in secrecy by the army, instead of in the open by the civilian research facilities. Doug writes: >The military researchers I know of have no more tendency to "bungle" >than civilians. Really? When was the last time a civilian research group killed 6000 sheep? Name a university biology research building that is so contaminated that it can probably never be used. Do you know of any cases of a university deploying bacteria from aircraft on a major (or minor) US city?; of a non-military organization that conducted their first experiment with nuclear chain-reactions under a crowded football stadium so that the cheering crowd would drown out any noise the reaction might make?; -spent $300 on a hammer?; built a tank that cannot withstand the force of firing its own cannon?; spent billions of dollars on a plane that can be brought down by a bird? You can't be serious. > Doug writes: >I think your best bet would be to agitate for a civilian review board >as an overseer of military bio research, rather than trying to "outlaw" >such research. I never said I wanted to "outlaw" (who are you quoting?) research of any kind. I don't have to outlaw the development and use of biological weapons...that was done in 1972 by R.M. Nixon when he signed an international agreement. I want to make sure that the army is not allowed to develop, in a secret, covert operation, illegal weapons. I maintain that whatever research needs to be done in defense can be done in the open where it is regulated and subject to peer review. To lay it on the line: I don't trust the army. I don't believe their motives are what they say; and if their motives are as they say, they don't need the facility they are proposing. Sorry for the redundancy. Some things apparently need to be said more than once to be understood. -tony MCDB Boulder, Co.
robert@uop.UUCP (Robert McCaul--The Equalizer) (10/13/87)
hmmm, in warfare... "illegal weapons" somehow does not make a whole lot of sense, seeing as we can blow up, mutilate, burn, gas, cause to vomit, abort nerve responses, hack, slash, maim, radiate, incinerate... oh well, i guess making sawtooth bayonets "illegal" was a good idea, you can pull non saw tooth bayonets out faster anyway...
pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) (10/15/87)
In article <609@uop.UUCP> robert@uop.UUCP (Robert McCaul--The Equalizer) writes: > >hmmm, in warfare... "illegal weapons" > >somehow does not make a whole lot of sense, seeing as we can >blow up, mutilate, burn, gas, cause to vomit, abort nerve responses, >hack, slash, maim, radiate, incinerate... [etc.] New oxymoron? my favorite was always "immoral weapon" which I consider to be a redundancy. But, call me naive, I think there is some hope for treaties between nations. It seems like a good idea in the current situation to work towards agreements on arms control. Perhaps "illegal" is a poor choice, since all is fair... tony