gilbert@hci.UUCP (01/15/88)
In article <4215@utai.UUCP> tjhorton@ai.UUCP (Timothy J. Horton) writes: >... perhaps not particularly focussed, with too much potential for floundering > in philosophy.. the next verbal battleground without referees. What follows is a response to this, perhaps secondary, polemic. I'm changing the subject a little to take the opportunity to argue against the scientist's and technical type's tendency to use "philosopy" as a pejorative. My apologies to Timothy if I appear to have jumped on a trivial aside in his posting. A lack of focus is always annoying, but it disturbs me to see a need for 'referees' to put an end to 'floundering in philosophy'. I can't help thinking that many of the so-called scientific community would be better off playing dogma and priests. Far from replacing superstition, the scientific community have a habit of perpetuating it. The danger/sterility of rigorous conceptual analysis is one common superstition of science - empirical experiment is favoured as more revealing. The need for authority in superficially automatable method is another sign of superstitious alienation of truth criteria from Man to Methods. Were it not for the philosophy and sociology of science, much of this would go unsaid. Were it not for the social and cultural marginality of many scientists/techies, less of this would go unbelieved. To take psychology as an example, a conservative assertion of the intrinsic value of experimental ritual is about the only assertion ever thrown back at humanist psychology's revelation of the shakey assumptions underlying many laboratory paradigms. It is always refreshing when workers within an experimental paradigm make any assumptions clear (see many of the contributions in "Interfacing Thought", Ed. J. Carroll, MIT Press, 1987). This authenticity makes it easier to respond positively to their work. People who flounder hopelessly are probably short on their philosophical training. Please don't use 'philosophy' to mean 'incompetent rambling'. Sadly, 'philosophical' is becoming a pejorative as the cookbook uncultured approach of technical education (sorry, training) takes hold of more academics. Computers may be difficult to use, but so is the technology of writing and the art of concept invention and application. Technical disciplines procede on the assumption that neither language nor the concepts underlying it are problematic, indeed technical rednecks can get irritated and even abusive at the first sign of conceptual analysis. Ironically, some scurry off home to eat mounds of uncivilised pseudo-philosophy, sociology and psychology cooked into a filling of science-fiction. What sort of a person is it who can't take these things raw? Now what is it that scientist/technical types know that those with an arts training do not? Critical analysis, which lies at the heart of the liberal arts, is regarded as superfluous, unnecessary and a waste of time. Yet the form and substance of the arguments marshalled against it by scientific and technical types suggest an inferiority complex rather than a rigorously established view of the world. They are value laden ("waste of time", "floundering", "verbal diarrhoea"), unscientific in their lack of falsifiability criteria and naively utopian in the unattainable standards they imply (being able to say EXACTLY what someone should do/think in a given situation - impossible even for crossing the road!, cf. AI, robotics). I suggest you read Russell's "Problems of Philosophy" as an antidote to any feelings that philosophy is bound to flounder. You should find this a well-written introduction to philosophical analysis. The introduction to P. Hirst and R. Peters "Logic of the Curriculum" also makes clear the goals of much applied philosophical analysis. Finally, pass an example of your work on to a philosopher and have it checked out for hidden assumptions (without which much scientific ritual won't work). As for referees, won't your own judgement suffice?
tjhorton@utai.UUCP (Timothy J. Horton) (01/20/88)
In article <149@glenlivet.hci.hw.ac.uk> gilbert@hci.hw.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: >In article <4215@utai.UUCP> tjhorton@ai.UUCP (Timothy J. Horton) writes: >>... perhaps not particularly focussed, with too much potential for floundering >> in philosophy... the next verbal battleground without referees. > >What follows is a response to this, perhaps secondary, polemic. >...People who flounder hopelessly are probably short on their >philosophical training. Not true. See note below on Russell. Realize, also, that there are conceptual chasms between fields. From my experience, in 2 graduate courses in the philosophical issues of cognitive science, these chasms are are both apparent and very pronounced. Discussions can lock onto rather comical issues. Philosophical arguments about computational models of intelligence, for instance, among those without comprehensive conceptual bases in computer science, often seem to reduce to expressions of superstition and ignorance, at least among the vocal. The intuitions aren't there. The discussions do worse than flounder. On the other hand, I have great respect for the philosohical underpinnings of our models of mind. (Kuhn, Burke, Hacking, Descartes, Pylyshyn, Fodor, Smith, Searle, Vygotsky, Chomsky, Polanyi ... these are authors on the bookshelf in front of me, for the very reason that I respect the fundamental questions beneath experiment and math). >Please don't use 'philosophy' to mean 'incompetent rambling'. Sadly, >'philosophical' is becoming a pejorative as the cookbook uncultured approach >of technical education (sorry, training) takes hold of more academics... I agree. >I suggest you read Russell's "Problems of Philosophy" as an antidote to >any feelings that philosophy is bound to flounder... I suggest, in balance, Russell's "The Cult of Common Usage," for instance. It describes his fundamental displeasure with certain kinds of philosophy, specifically those that do not reach beyond a level of linguistic analysis. >As for referees, won't your own judgement suffice? Experience would seem to indicate that a few vocal individuals may press their arguments on the entire network, rather than delivering ambivalent analysis or investigating before disseminating. I see every reason to describe, precis, and analyze works of common interest. But that's not what has happened in many newsgroups bordering on philosophy. Advocacy is too easy to slip into. There are better methods for enlightenment. If we are to create a newsgroup, it might provide the means to filter out non-essential ingredients like advocacy, that seem to drive some of the less valuable newsgroups around. -- Timothy J Horton (416) 979-3109 tjhorton@ai.toronto.edu (CSnet,UUCP,Bitnet) Dept of Computer Science tjhorton@ai.utoronto (other Bitnet) University of Toronto, tjhorton@ai.toronto.cdn (EAN X.400) Toronto, Canada M5S 1A4 {seismo,watmath}!ai.toronto.edu!tjhorton
gilbert@hci.hw.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) (01/29/88)
In article <4222@utai.UUCP> tjhorton@ai.UUCP (Timothy J. Horton) writes: >>...People who flounder hopelessly are probably short on their >>philosophical training. > >Not true. Realize, also, that there are conceptual chasms between fields. > >Philosophical arguments about computational models of intelligence, for >instance, among those without comprehensive conceptual bases in computer >science, often seem to reduce to expressions of superstition and ignorance, >at least among the vocal. On conceptual chasms, what - philosophical analysis apart - can bridge them? On ignorance of computability in 'philosophical' arguments on natural and artificial intelligence, perhaps the Theory of Computation needs to be as much a part of a proper philosophical training as linguistic analysis and formal logic. Some people in AI could do with it as well (i.e. those who don't have it). As for reduction to superstition, isn't this the outcome for an analysis of many 'natural truths'. On the existence of objects, nothing is 'proven', but nevertheless, we find no reason for rejecting the natural truth of their existence. Arguments based on ignorance must be discounted, but are we not left with the case that we still have no reason for rejecting the natural truth that human and machine intelligence are different? Not only is the case for the equivalence of human and machine intelligence not proven, no analysis exists, to my knowledge, which points to a way of establishing the equivalence. This leaves AI as a piece of very expensive speculation based on beliefs which insult our higher views of ourselves. Superstition no doubt, but a dominant and moral superstition which needs to command some respect. Vocal polemic is as much a reaction to the arrogant unreasonableness of some major AI pundits, as it is a reflection of the incompetence of the advocate. The debate has been fair on neither side, and the ability of AI pundits to stand their ground is due to their social marginality as round-the-clock scientists and their cultural marginality as workers outwith a proper discipline (look up Sociology of Deviance). People who live in bunkers don't get hit by stones ;-) The big AI pundits just remind me of Skinner. BTW: NOT(AI pundit = AI worker) - most AI workers know their systems aren't working (yet?) and do leave their bunkers to mingle :-) >I suggest, in balance, Russell's "The Cult of Common Usage," for instance. Great - keep balancing, more competent philosophy for the reading list. >Experience would seem to indicate that a few vocal individuals may press >their arguments on the entire network, rather than delivering ambivalent >analysis or investigating before disseminating. Sounds like a netiquette proposal which I thoroughly endorse. Whilst guilty of advocacy on occasions, I think that everyone should strive for an ambivalent analysis in this sort of public forum, and leave people to make their own minds up. Sounds like good philosophy to me. However, ambivalence cannot be expected in response to imcompetence, however candid. Witness the current debate on economic structure and diachronic syntax. Nor, as with tolerance of the intolerant, I can't be ambivalent about dogmatists. -- Gilbert Cockton, Scottish HCI Centre, Heriot-Watt University, Chambers St., Edinburgh, EH1 1HX. JANET: gilbert@uk.ac.hw.hci ARPA: gilbert%hci.hw.ac.uk@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ..{backbone}!mcvax!ukc!hci!gilbert