jfjr@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Jerome Freedman) (12/10/87)
I am not sure if this is the appropriate place to discuss this but
if I err I apologize.
I just saw the move "12 O'Clock High" on TV and I began to wonder
Just how effective was the daylight precision bombing of Germany
in WWII. Was it worth it?
Jerry Freedman,Jr
jfjr@mitre-bedford.arpa
Jerry Freedman, Jr "Thank you, folks,
jfjr@mitre-bedford.arpa for those kind applause"
(617)271-4563 mcgrew@topaz.rutgers.edu (Charles) (12/13/87)
Cc: mcgrew >Just how effective was the daylight precision bombing of Germany >in WWII. Was it worth it? Tricky question. The easy answer is no, since the original intentions of the bombing (to completely cripple the German production and transport systems) were not acheived. A more thorough answer is maybe. 8th and 15th AF attacks on the German aircraft and other production industries were not particularly successful, but attacks on its oil industry were quite effective in limiting the mobility of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, particularly from 1944 on. (The strategic bombing survey (undertaken by the US after the war) showed that attacks on the aircraft industry were ineffective, but oil was a prime and useful target. An interesting statistic is that 83% of all bomb tonnage dropped on Germany were dropped in 1944 and 1945.) Also, a significant amount of German production was spent on home (i.e. air) defence that could have gone to the front without the allied air offensive. The Luftwaffe, having to split its strength between tactical roles at the front and strategic air defence, wasn't able to do either effectively. On the other hand, heavy bombers and fighter escorts are very expensive to make, and required the most intelligent personel of the US and British armed forces to fly and maintain them, people who might have been of more use in tactical air and ground roles. In directly winning the European war, the tactical air forces on the Western allies were of equal, if not more value. They limited the tactical mobility of the Germans during the early weeks of the Normandy invasion and allowed the Allies to build up overwhelming strength. Throughout the campaign in France and Germany, no German plan could afford not take allied fighter-bombers into account. The problem is there are a lot of if's involved. If the daylight strategic offensive against Germany hadn't been undertaken (the British night bombing had negligible effect on the German war effort, since a 'good strike' was when the bombs fell within 5 miles of their target), the Germans would have had more of everything to hand. The war in France might have turned out differently, so might the war in Russia. Certainly the Germans would have eventually lost (if only by losing the a-bomb sweepstakes to the Japanese). Hope this helps, Charles
tedrick@ernie.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (12/14/87)
->>Just how effective was the daylight precision bombing of Germany ->>in WWII. Was it worth it? A good reference to the air war over Germany is "The First and The Last" by Adolf Galland (commander of German fighter forces), published by Bantam Books (first published in 1954). Generally the sources I have read tend towards the view that more resources should have been devoted to tactical air support of ground units, and less to strategic bombing. ->... but attacks on its oil industry were quite effective ... Yes, fuel seemed to be the vital point where strategic bombing had its greatest effect. -> ... (The strategic bombing survey (undertaken by the US after the ->war) showed that attacks on the aircraft industry were ineffective, ->but oil was a prime and useful target ... -> On the other hand, heavy bombers and fighter escorts are very ->expensive to make, and required the most intelligent personel of the ->US and British armed forces to fly and maintain them, people who might ->have been of more use in tactical air and ground roles. Yes ... -> In directly winning the European war, the tactical air forces on ->the Western allies were of equal, if not more value. They limited the ->tactical mobility of the Germans during the early weeks of the ->Normandy invasion and allowed the Allies to build up overwhelming ->strength. Throughout the campaign in France and Germany, no German ->plan could afford not take allied fighter-bombers into account. Yes ... ->Certainly the Germans would have eventually lost (if only by ->losing the a-bomb sweepstakes to the Japanese). I wonder what would have happened if the Luftwaffe would have had its jet fighters operational a year earlier (or even sooner, as would have been possible had Hitler not been such an idiot). Anyway, here are some quotes from Galland's book: page 226: "The raids of the Allied air fleets on the German petrol supply installations was the most important of the combined factors which brought about the collapse of Germany. The enemy was surprised at the results. With only 5166 tons of bombs they had scored a bull's-eye against Germany's material strength of resistance. Seven times this weight had been dropped on V-weapon firing platforms and 14 times that weight on railway installations. Only after the start of the invasion did the Allies realize the true strategical importance of the German synthetic oil plants. They were now given top priority on the list of targets." page 232: [on the Normandy invasion] "Under the protection of the consolidated Allied air forces, 25 landing divisions were built up by June 15: 427,000 men, 62,238 vehicles, and 105,175 tons of material were already on the mainland. The German counterattacks, particularly fierce around Caen, collapsed under the hail of bombs from the Allies ... " " ... Because of the enemy's air supremacy the army got into similar difficulties during its move, as did the Luftwaffe. It took a whole week to transfer a combat unit of the 265th Infantry Division from Quimper in Brittany to the front in Normandy. The 2nd SS Armored Divison left its station at Limoges on June 11 with marching orders for the front. It reached the Loire between June 14 and 16. Only parts of it reached Le Mans with great difficulties because of destroyed railway bridges. From here progress was possible only on foot. Its first units only went into action at the end of the month, much weakened by low-level attacks ... The 9th and 10th Armored Divisions received their marching orders to the west on the day the invasion started. After a few days they arrived at Metz. Because of the hopeless transport conditions only the armored units were transported to Paris ... the last 200 miles to the front were almost impossible by rail--the only way of transporting heavy armor. In moves up and down the country, lasting for weeks, 1400 miles instead of 300 were covered. These urgently needed armored units were only able to go into action at the end of July." "The English and American tactical air forces successfully extended their attempts to interrupt the bringing up of German reserves deep into France. They had made any move by daylight almost impossible. In June alone they destroyed 551 locomotives. A report by the commander of the 2nd Panzer Division says: 'The Allies have total air supremacy. They bomb and shoot anything that moves, even single vehicles and persons. Our territory is under constant observation ... The feeling of being powerless against the enemy's aircraft ... has a paralyzing effect ... '" " ... on the invasion front the Allied strategic bombers were only sent into action at particularly important points. Thus on July 18, 1600 heavy and 350 medium English and American bombers intervened in the particularly bitter fighting at Saint-Lo. Within a few minutes 7700 tons of bombs came down on the battlefield. So far in the war this was the heaviest bombing of in the war of this type. A few days later von Kluge reported to Hitler the result of a conference of commanders. In face of such complete air supremacy nothing else could be done but to give up territory. The report ended with the words: 'The psychological effect on the fighting troops, especially on the infantry, caused by the cascades of the falling bombs, of the elements, is a factor which gives cause for serious consideration.' ... A week later, on July 25, the attack was repeated on the same target area, but in much greater strength: 1507 heavy, 380 medium, and 559 fighter-bombers attacked the position. According to a statement from the commander of the Panzer Training Division, 70 per cent of his troops were either 'dead, wounded, or had a nervous breakdown,' and von Rundstedt called the bombing 'the most effective and most impressive use of the air force I ever witnessed.'" " ... Eisenhower could state with truth in his book, 'Crusade in Europe', that without the air force taking part the invasion would have turned into the greatest disaster in the history of war." " ... the mass bombing on July 25 was the overture to the collapse of the German defense and to the breakthrough of the Allied invasion army into the unprotected hinterland ... The battle of Normandy had been decided; the invasion was a success." [And let's not forget, it was the air force which put Rommel, the German commander, out of action with severe head injuries, on July 17.] page 263: "Following the special heavy raids on our fuel production before and during the Anglo-American invasion, the petrol shortage made it necessary to dissolve a whole series of flying units whose further existence could no longer be justified ..." ----------------------- The rest is about jets: page 267: "The first fighter plane of the world to exceed 600 mph had rocket propulsion. It was built by Messerschmidt in Augsburg before the outbreak of WW2, in April 1939 ... Several prototypes had been already built by the beginning of the war and bore the mark ME-163 ... Professor Walter in Kiel developed the rocket- propulsion engine. The same designer also introduced revolutionary innovations in the field of U-boat construction and the propulsion of torpedos as well as power units for different rocket projectiles and other flying missiles, which were later employed as V-weapons ..." [but why weren't jets put into production as soon as possible?] " ... experiments, development, and designs in the realm of revolutionary, novel ideas, and ... the entire development of aviation, were decisively retarded by the order of the Fuhrer ... demanding that all technical experiments and development jobs not likely to be ready for 18 months be postponed indefinitely. The order was based on the expectation of a speedy termination of the war ... " ... more than three years passed before Wolfgang Spate could form the first ME-163 test group in Brandid near Leipzig ... " " ... After long delays [the ME-163] went into action during the second half of 1944 ... much valuable time was lost ... the Allied offensive paralyzed the production of the ME-163, of which 100 aircraft per month were being turned out ... thus one of the epoch-making, revolutionary technical developments in Germany during the last war passed without having any practical effect. It would have been ideal to prove my contention that superior technical achievements --used correctly both strategically and tactically--can beat any quantity numerically many times stronger yet technically inferior." "Most of the ME-163's fell into the hands of the Soviets during the collapse ... Dr. Lippisch, the designer of the ME-163, has been working since 1945 for the Northrup works in the United States; and fundamental principles of his construction ideas can be seen in many of the fastest supersonic trial planes of the USAF ..." " ... At the beginning of [jet] development Germany was indeed clearly ahead of the Western allies by 18 months, but no strategical benefit matured from it ..." " ... I shall never forget May 22, 1943, the day I flew a jet for the first time in my life ... the flying speed of 520 mph in horizontal flight, which was fantastic at that time, meant an advance of at least 120 mph over the fastest propeller-driven aircraft. Inferior diesel-like oil could be used as fuel instead of octane, which was more and more difficult to get ... On landing I was more impressed and enthusiastic than I had ever been before ... this was not a step forward, it was a leap! ... Today I still believe it was not exaggerated optimism to expect from a mass action of ME-262 fighters a fundamental change in German air defense even at that late hour ... with it [the ME-262] we could beat any other fighter plane ..."" " ... [Hitler] overrode even Messerschmidt and the other responsible men who a few days before had worked out with me the plan [for mass production], expressly forbidding any kind of preparation for mass production ... thereby the production of the ME-262 received a further delay of six months after it had already suffered a delay of about 2 years, due to the previous order given in autumn, 1940, to postpone all research developments ..." [later Hitler delayed things even further due to trying to convert it from a fighter to a fighter-bomber, and other idiotic ideas of his.] " [later after things finally get rolling] ... the Allies also knew what it was all about. The first single encounters with the new German rocket fighter ME-163 had already alarmed the enemy. The Americans had not yet made the acquaintance of the ME-262. But information from the Allied intelligence ... made General Doolittle arrive at the conclusion that if German jet fighters appeared in sufficient numbers they would make daylight raids impossible ..." "At last, in October 1944, I received orders .. to form a jet-fighter unit ... Their successes were to convince Hitler that the ME-262 was a really excellent fighter plane ... " ... The last air battle over Germany in which the Americans suffered impressive losses was delivered by the German fighter arm on March 18, 1945, over Berlin. The capital of the Reich was attacked by 1200 bombers that had an escort of 14 fighter squadrons of P-51s. ... The enemy suffered much greater losses at the hands of the jet fighters ... From American flight reports one can see that the ME-262 broke through again and again with ease through the American fighter screen and shot down one bomber after another from the tightly closed formations despite an inferiority of 100 to 1 ... Doolittle and Tedder now demanded decisive measures to prevent the operation of German jet fighters ..." " During [the] last weeks of the war we were able to fit out some [jets] with additional weapons, which gave a greater firing power to the ME-262: R4M rockets of 3-cm. caliber, and 500-g. explosives. A single hit from these was enough to bring down a multiengined bomber ... our impression of the efficiency of this new weapon was indescribable. The rockets could be fired outside the effective range of the defensive fire of the bombers. A well-aimed salvo would probably hit several bombers simultaneously ... But this was the end of April 1945! In the middle of our breakup, our collapse! It does not bear thinking about what we could have done had we had these jet fighters, 3-cm. quick-firing cannons, and 5-cm. rockets years ago--before our war potential had been smashed ..."
adrian@cs.hw.ac.uk (Adrian Hurt) (12/17/87)
In article <22162@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>, tedrick@ernie.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) writes: > > page 267: "The first fighter plane of the world to exceed 600 mph > had rocket propulsion. It was built by Messerschmidt in Augsburg > before the outbreak of WW2, in April 1939 ... Several prototypes > had been already built by the beginning of the war and bore the > mark ME-163 ... > The trouble with the Me163B, otherwise known as the Komet (the Me163A had no motor at all, it was a glider) was that it was as dangerous to its pilot as to anything it attacked. The fuel was VERY unstable, and all the plane had for landing gear was a single ski. If ANY fuel was left in the tank when it landed, the plane was likely to explode. Also, it had very short endurance - about 10 minutes flying time, extended a bit if the motor was turned on and off. The Komet was stationed close to important factories. When any bombers that had survived more conventional defences got close enough, the Komets took off, made one or two passes at the bombers till their fuel ran out, then glided back to base. If they were lucky, they didn't get chased by escort fighters on the way down, and didn't explode on landing. The Germans were also developing another rocket fighter, but it never saw combat. Called the Natter, or Viper, its armament was a salvo of small rockets in the nose. It would take off vertically, attack its targets, then the pilot would eject and come down by parachute. The plane would come down the same way. Incidentally, how good is radar against non-metallic targets? How good are infra-red missiles against piston-engined planes? If the answer to either of these is "not very", then I suggest the new stealth bomber be a copy of the WW2 British Mosquito. These were made largely of balsa wood, to save weight, and they were fast - they could match most fighters, and with their bombs gone they could dogfight too if they had guns (which some variants did). -- "Keyboard? Tis quaint!" - M. Scott Adrian Hurt | JANET: adrian@uk.ac.hw.cs UUCP: ..!ukc!cs.hw.ac.uk!adrian | ARPA: adrian@cs.hw.ac.uk
jnp@calmasd.GE.COM (John Pantone) (12/23/87)
Adrian Hurt: >Incidentally, how good is radar against non-metallic targets? How good are >infra-red missiles against piston-engined planes? If the answer to either of >these is "not very", then I suggest the new stealth bomber be a copy of the >WW2 British Mosquito. These were made largely of balsa wood, to save weight, >and they were fast - they could match most fighters, and with their bombs >gone they could dogfight too if they had guns (which some variants did). Radar (at least the radar used by police to detect speeders) can detect non-metallic objects quite well. I have had the opportunity to test them against a number of substances, and know the results to be true. The best reflectors were (non-metallic): Fiberglass, plywood (especially marine), doped canvas (like airplanes) and solid hardwoods (oak and maple). Soft wood was less reflective (like balsa) but was not at all invisible. Interestingly enough, people were relatively good reflectors - especially if you cought them going straight towards or away from you (chests and backs); I speculate that meat has enough water/density to reflect well. -- These opinions are solely mine and in no way reflect those of my employer. John M. Pantone @ GE/Calma R&D, 9805 Scranton Rd., San Diego, CA 92121 ...{ucbvax|decvax}!sdcsvax!calmasd!jnp jnp@calmasd.GE.COM GEnie: J.PANTONE
g-rh@cca.CCA.COM (Richard Harter) (12/24/87)
Adrian Hurt: Incidentally, how good is radar against non-metallic targets? Johmn Pantone: > >Radar (at least the radar used by police to detect speeders) can detect >non-metallic objects quite well. I have had the opportunity to test them >against a number of substances, and know the results to be true. The best >reflectors were (non-metallic): >Fiberglass, plywood (especially marine), doped canvas (like airplanes) and >solid hardwoods (oak and maple). Soft wood was less reflective (like balsa) >but was not at all invisible. Interestingly enough, people were relatively >good reflectors - especially if you cought them going straight towards or >away from you (chests and backs); I speculate that meat has enough >water/density to reflect well. Back (many years ago) when I was working on the Atlantic missile range as a radar technician we used to routinely track seagulls. I don't remember the maximum range at which we could track them -- I know it was more than 20 miles but I don't remember if it was as much as a 100. Trees are reasonably good reflectors, particularly for side scanning radars. A tree will have a radar cross section as large as a truck. When you are talking about visibility to radar geometry is very important. Most of the return from an object is from corners. I.e. the beam hits a surface, bounces off the surface to a second surface at right angles to the first, and comes back to the origin. If you look at the detailed reflection pattern from a vehicle you will see that most of the return comes hot spots created by the local geometry. An example of hard to detect geometry is a sphere -- the only visible point is the spot directly closest to you. One of the important tricks in the stealth game is to make sure that the plane has a good geometry. -- In the fields of Hell where the grass grows high Are the graves of dreams allowed to die. Richard Harter, SMDS Inc.
rwa@auvax.UUCP (Ross Alexander) (01/03/88)
In article <1594@brahma.cs.hw.ac.uk>, adrian@cs.hw.ac.uk (Adrian Hurt) writes: > ... I suggest the new stealth bomber be a copy of the WW2 > British Mosquito. These were made largely of balsa wood, to save weight, and > they were fast - they could match most fighters, and with their bombs gone they > could dogfight too if they had guns (which some variants did). All of the above is true _except_ the bit about balsa... they were made from Douglas Fir plywood, and they were d*mned good airplanes. As a matter of fact, about the guns & dogfighting: they were a popular night-fighter platform too, in that there was room for all the rather bulky & primitive radar equipment of the day and yet they were fast and manouverable enough to give the ME's and Fokker's a rough time of it (the endurance was good too). -- Ross Alexander @ Athabasca University, alberta!auvax!rwa
acij@cwi.nl (Bert IJsselstein) (01/08/88)
In article <481@auvax.UUCP> rwa@auvax.UUCP (Ross Alexander) writes: >> ... British Mosquito ... >were fast and manouverable enough to give the ME's and Fokker's a >rough time of it (the endurance was good too). > The Luftwaffe of the German Reich ordered its war planes from several firms. Notably Dornier (Do), Focke-Wulf (FW), Heinkel (He), Junker (Ju), and Messerschmitt (Me) were well-known sup- pliers. They were also German. The Dutch firm Fokker however, wasn't a supplier. Maybe the names Focke and Fokker got mixed up? -- Bert IJsselstein, CWI, Amsterdam (mcvax!acij / acij@cwi.nl)