[sci.misc] The nature of reality.

sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/15/88)

>In article <2885@sfsup.UUCP>, glg@sfsup.UUCP (G.Gleason) writes:
> 
> So, I ask you, what is reality, and who defines it?

Reality is the totality of what exists.

For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him.  Thus
different people have different realities, though realities may intersect
to form consensual or interpersonal realities.

Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of
individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/16/88)

In article <343@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>>In article <2885@sfsup.UUCP>, glg@sfsup.UUCP (G.Gleason) writes:
>> 
>> So, I ask you, what is reality, and who defines it?
>
>Reality is the totality of what exists.

>For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him.  Thus
>different people have different realities, though realities may intersect
>to form consensual or interpersonal realities.

Does this mean that someone who thinks he's Napoleon has as 'valid' a reality
as I (or you?) or are we assuming some sort of "majority rules" principal?
Then again, I'd hate to think that my reality achieves ligitimacy by the
same process that selected Reagan for president.  But what I think you're
really saying is that the validity of everyone else's reality depends on whether
it corresponds to yours; i.e the answer to G. Gleason's question is that *you*
define reality (though you might qualify that as *your* reality).  Or maybe
you're saying whatever a person believes is what she believes, which is a
tautology which makes it both unfalsifyable and contentless.  And, therefore,
as you put it below, should be ignored.

But the interesting question is why do these realities, which *may* intersect,
seem to have so much in common?  Or is this merely a feature of *my* reality?

>Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of
>individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored.

This is the same kind of "unprovable" as the heavily debated question of what
is conciousness as distinguished from its behavioral manifestations.  Turing's
point was that the question of machine intelegence is only a meaningful question
on the behavioral level.

>-- 
>"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
>
>Sarge Gerbode
-- 
	Absloute knowledge means never having to change your .signature

				jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)

gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) (03/17/88)

For some of us, reality is paraphrasing Wittgenstein.

"Reality -- what a concept!"  -- Mork.

sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/20/88)

In article <732@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:

>In article <343@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:

>>Reality is the totality of what exists.

>>For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him. Thus
>>different people have different realities, though realities may intersect
>>to form consensual or interpersonal realities.

>Does this mean that someone who thinks he's Napoleon has as 'valid' a reality
>as I (or you?) or are we assuming some sort of "majority rules" principal?

I wasn't talking about "validity".  I was only pointing out that reality is
what exists for a person.  I think what we normally think of as "validity" is
really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to
agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard.  A
person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting
agreement from others than one with a less credible reality.  A major aspect
of credibility is conformity to what others already believe.  Another is
logical consistency.  Another is aesthetics.  But I think it is relatively
meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality.

>But what I think you're
>really saying is that the validity of everyone else's reality depends on whether
>it corresponds to yours; i.e the answer to G. Gleason's question is that *you*
>define reality (though you might qualify that as *your* reality).

I think people naturally tend to apply, as a first shot, the criterion of
whether a presented reality corresponds to theirs, and they tend to reject
those that don't.  But the saving grace is that if a credible reality is well
presented, people can change their minds and have a different reality.  But the
viewpoint that *my* reality is in some sense an *absolute* reality is a form of
ideological imperialism.  I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is
being such an imperialist.  It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting
it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others.

>Or maybe you're saying whatever a person believes is what she believes, which
>is a tautology which makes it both unfalsifyable and contentless.

Definitions are always unfalsifiable and contentless (I think).  I was just
giving a definition of the term, "reality".  Naturally, by making the
appropriate substitution, you can turn any definition into a tautology.

>But the interesting question is why do these realities, which *may* intersect,
>seem to have so much in common?  Or is this merely a feature of *my* reality?

I think it is because *people* have so much in common.  There are certain rules
that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical
consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease
of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a
computer program.  So they will tend to agree of things that promote these
characteristics in their worlds.  Nelson Goodman goes into this notion in his
excellent book, "Ways of World-Making".

>>Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of
>>individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored.

>This is the same kind of "unprovable" as the heavily debated question of what
>is conciousness as distinguished from its behavioral manifestations.

Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced*
and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all.
Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly
experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by
behavioral means.

>Turing's point was that the question of machine intelligence is only a
>meaningful question on the behavioral level.

Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful*
without being *provable*.  I can get an idea of what it would mean for a
machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

crown@dukempd.UUCP (Rick Crownover) (03/20/88)

	"Reality is what doesn't go away when you stop believing in it."
                                      -- Philip K. Dick --

-- 
	Rick Crownover				1-919-684-8279 
	Duke University Dept. of Physics	crown@dukempd.uucp
	Durham, N.C.      27706			mcnc!duke!dukempd!crown

jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/21/88)

In article <356@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
]In article <732@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:
]
]>In article <343@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
]
]>>Reality is the totality of what exists.
]
]>>For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him. Thus
]>>different people have different realities, though realities may intersect
]>>to form consensual or interpersonal realities.
]
]>Does this mean that someone who thinks he's Napoleon has as 'valid' a reality
]>as I (or you?) or are we assuming some sort of "majority rules" principal?
]
]I wasn't talking about "validity".  I was only pointing out that reality is
]what exists for a person.  I think what we normally think of as "validity" is
]really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to
]agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard.  A
]person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting
]agreement from others than one with a less credible reality.  A major aspect
]of credibility is conformity to what others already believe.  Another is
]logical consistency.  Another is aesthetics.  But I think it is relatively
]meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality.

At the risk of sounding like the 'ordinary language' folks, I have to say that
this is not the way we use the word "reality".  We can talk about someone being
out of touch with reality.  We don't mean merely that we don't agree with her
reality.  I can even entertain the idea that I am out of touch with reality.
This does not mean that I believe that the "totality of what exists for me"
doesn't exist for me.  Regardless of what I may like to philosophise about, I
believe in my ordinary life (and I suspect so do you) that reality is "out 
there" and that my senses give me a workable picture of it, sufficient, at 
least, to cross the street without getting run over.  I further believe that
others have access to that same "out there" reality.  In other words, reality
is (at least partially) independant of what "exists for me" and if (ignoring
life after death issues) I were to cease to exist, there would still be a "you"
(gentle reader) out there in reality.  (Not very 'New Age' of me, I know)
]
]I think people naturally tend to apply, as a first shot, the criterion of
]whether a presented reality corresponds to theirs, and they tend to reject
]those that don't.  But the saving grace is that if a credible reality is well
]presented, people can change their minds and have a different reality.  But the
]viewpoint that *my* reality is in some sense an *absolute* reality is a form of
]ideological imperialism.  I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is
]being such an imperialist.  It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting
]it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others.

Are you asserting this view as "absolutely" true?  Does that make you a 
meta-imperialist?
]
]>Or maybe you're saying whatever a person believes is what she believes, which
]>is a tautology which makes it both unfalsifyable and contentless.
]
]Definitions are always unfalsifiable and contentless (I think).  I was just
]giving a definition of the term, "reality".  Naturally, by making the
]appropriate substitution, you can turn any definition into a tautology.

But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used.

]>But the interesting question is why do these realities, which *may* intersect,
]>seem to have so much in common?  Or is this merely a feature of *my* reality?
]
]I think it is because *people* have so much in common.  There are certain rules
]that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical
]consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease
]of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a
]computer program.  So they will tend to agree of things that promote these
]characteristics in their worlds.  Nelson Goodman goes into this notion in his
]excellent book, "Ways of World-Making".

This begs the question.  Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing
their world?  Do they accidently choose the same rules?  Or are these "rules"
part of a "reality" they have in common?

]
]>>Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of
]>>individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored.
]
]>This is the same kind of "unprovable" as the heavily debated question of what
]>is conciousness as distinguished from its behavioral manifestations.
]
]Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced*
]and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all.
]Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly
]experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by
]behavioral means.

How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious?

]
]>Turing's point was that the question of machine intelligence is only a
]>meaningful question on the behavioral level.
]
]Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful*
]without being *provable*.  I can get an idea of what it would mean for a
]machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it.

Is this 'idea' verbalizable?  Is it a judgement made on the basis of observable
evidence?  Or is it a feeling, such as we have watching the image of an actor on
the screen that this image is concious?

]-- 
]"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
]
]Sarge Gerbode
]Institute for Research in Metapsychology
]950 Guinda St.
]Palo Alto, CA 94301
]UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

	"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your .signature"

-- 
			The check is in the e-mail

				jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)

bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (03/21/88)

Psychologists like to speak of "psychic reality".  If the brain/mind/psyche
(choose one) constructs an internal model, map, or representation of the
external environment, then we must be clear on the distinction between
the map and the territory.

My internal map or model of the world is undergoing continual evolvement
and refinement.  I know that at every instant, my mental model of the
world is incomplete and innacurate.  It is like a mosaic, which has a
granularity which limits the precision to which I can resolve detail.
It also has a frontier beyond which I have as yet few pieces of the picture.

My map is real.  But my map is not the territory.  I believe my map, to
the extent that I rely on it to navigate through the world.  But I also
disbelieve my map, to the extent that I expect to find errors and
inaccuracies that cause me to walk into walls now and then.

I find that I am attracted to people who seem to have more accurate maps
than me.  I also find that I am attracted to people who have less
accurate maps than me, provided they wish to benefit from consultation
with my map.  I find that I am repelled by people who wish to overwrite
my map with their own, without my consent.

Of course, one of the most interesting (to me) corners of my map, is the
little piece that contains a model of the mapmaker himself.  I like to
watch the mapmaker at work, making a map of the mapmaker at work....

--Barry Kort

sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/22/88)

In article <27440@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Kort) writes:

>My map is real.  But my map is not the territory.  I believe my map, to
>the extent that I rely on it to navigate through the world.  But I also
>disbelieve my map, to the extent that I expect to find errors and
>inaccuracies that cause me to walk into walls now and then.

Very enjoyable article.  A lot of people forget that the map is just as real as
the territory.

In my view, the map may be *more* real than the territory, in that the
territory (new territory) is constantly being *inferred* from the existing
map, thus adding to the existing map and resulting in a revised map.  Many
people have pointed out that the only time when we are acutely aware that the
map is not the territory is when existing maps break down and need to be
replaced.  To paraphrase Nelson Goodman: worlds are made out of existing
worlds.  So the existing map is epistemologically *prior* to any future
territory that will be experienced by inference from an existing map.

It also seems possible that there is no territory -- only a gradually evolving
map.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) (03/23/88)

Once upon a time there were five blind men who encountered
an elephant and Sarge Gerbode.

The first grasped the elephant's trunk.  "Aha!" he said, "the
elephant is like a snake!"

The second grasped the elephant's leg.  "No!" he said, "the
elephant is like a tree!"

The third felt the elephant's side.  "Not at all," he said,
"the elephant is like a wall!"

The fourth felt the elephant's tail.  "You're all wrong," he
said, "the elephant is like a rope!"

The fifth blind man said, "I think, if we perform further
experiments, and reason about the results, we can construct
a fairly good idea about what an elephant is.  It may be
that we can even put this elephant to good use."

"No," said Sarge Gerbode.  "There is no objective reality.
And there is no elephant."  And he got on the elephant and
rode away into the sunset.
-- 
G Fitch	        				{uunet}!mstan\
The Big Electric Cat     {ihnp4,harvard,philabs}!cmcl2!cucard!dasys1!gf
New York City, NY, USA  (212) 879-9031          {sun}!hoptoad/

govett@avsd.UUCP (David Govett) (03/23/88)

> 
> My internal map or model of the world is undergoing continual evolvement
> and refinement.  I know that at every instant, my mental model of the
> world is incomplete and innacurate.  It is like a mosaic, which has a
> granularity which limits the precision to which I can resolve detail.
> It also has a frontier beyond which I have as yet few pieces of the picture.
> 
> I find that I am attracted to people who seem to have more accurate maps
> than me.  I also find that I am attracted to people who have less
> accurate maps than me, provided they wish to benefit from consultation
> with my map.  I find that I am repelled by people who wish to overwrite
> my map with their own, without my consent.
> 

How can you determine the accuracy of another's "map" if your "map" is
inaccurate?

vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/23/88)

In article <363@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>In article <27440@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Kort) writes:
>
>>My map is real.  But my map is not the territory.  I believe my map, to
>>the extent that I rely on it to navigate through the world.  But I also
>>disbelieve my map, to the extent that I expect to find errors and
>>inaccuracies that cause me to walk into walls now and then.
>
>In my view, the map may be *more* real than the territory, in that the
>territory (new territory) is constantly being *inferred* from the existing
>map, thus adding to the existing map and resulting in a revised map.  

I agree with something Sarge said in an earlier posting: that
fundamental questions on the existence of objective reality are non
testable.  Thus, on an absolutist view we must admit that skepticism is
possibly true (infinitesimally likely?).  I haven't read much in this
area per se, but neither have I come accross a really knock-out argument
against skepticism.

So reality of the territory is undecidable.  What about reality of the
map? Sarge, I think you'd claim that an individual's truth claims about
their mental phenomena are incorrigible.  When I was reading in
Cognitive Science I did come accross some pretty heavy arguments against
this view.

So, what if reality of the map is *also* undecidable?  Well, then, uh, I
guess. . .gosh, I'd better be pretty careful going to work today. .
.never know when I met run into a reality pit and spit out a white hole.

O---------------------------------------------------------------------->
| Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician 
| Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions
| vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .

jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/23/88)

In article <363@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
)In article <27440@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Kort) writes:
)
)>My map is real.  But my map is not the territory.  I believe my map, to
)>the extent that I rely on it to navigate through the world.  But I also
)>disbelieve my map, to the extent that I expect to find errors and
)>inaccuracies that cause me to walk into walls now and then.
)
)Very enjoyable article.  A lot of people forget that the map is just as real as
)the territory.

I agree that the article was enjoyable.  But the map is only real as 'map 
territory', mapable as meta-map.  Will some Zen master please hit Sarge with
a stick?

)
)In my view, the map may be *more* real than the territory, in that the
)territory (new territory) is constantly being *inferred* from the existing
)map, thus adding to the existing map and resulting in a revised map.  Many
)people have pointed out that the only time when we are acutely aware that the
)map is not the territory is when existing maps break down and need to be
)replaced.  To paraphrase Nelson Goodman: worlds are made out of existing
)worlds.  So the existing map is epistemologically *prior* to any future
)territory that will be experienced by inference from an existing map.
)
)It also seems possible that there is no territory -- only a gradually evolving
)map.

New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the existance
of New Jersey is implicit in the existance of Staten Island.  You can debug a
program for syntax errors but without specifications for what the program is
suppose to do, you cannot debug it logically.  1 man's bug is another man's
feature.  Of course, a map is also territory in its own right just as programs
can be data for other programs.  The fact that we are often unaware that the
map is not the territory until it breaks down is because we spend a great deal
of time in our heads.  And for most practical purposes it is more convenient to
deal with an abstraction then the thing abstracted but, in my view, (and while
were at it, please preface all of my sentences with the phrase "in my view")
it is to the extent that we deal with maps that we cannot be destinguished from
a suitibly programmed Turing machine (in principal since AI is not that far
advanced yet) and conversely in so far as we do not use maps to mediate with
reality (uh oh, it's "reality" again) we cannot be simulated electronically.
Since, short of hitting with a stick, one cannot communicate without resorting
to maps (The Tao that can be named is not the Tao-- you know the routine) I
doubt I am making this sufficiently clear except to those who know what I'm
saying already.  

There was a TV show on tonight about the mathematician Ramanujan in which he was
quoted as saying that he got his formula from a Hindu goddess (whose name I 
don't remember but it would really class up this posting).  Clearly this is not
the kind of map most of us have for where our ideas come from, but for me it has
a lot to recommend it:  First of all, it says ideas come from something alive.
That we prefer to think of the mind as something dead (i.e. mechanical) is (in 
my view) limiting and ultimately, if I may get Freudean for a moment, a defense.
Secondly, it recognizes a non-rational source to creativity; that it is not the
result of some fancy search tree pruning algorithm tied to a random number
generator.  (This also has bearing on the paradox of how free will can arise
from determinism.  For some other posting...)  

I also think one has a tendancy to try to understand (i.e. map) too quickly
(just as one easily forgets ones dreams on awakening) until one believes the
map existed before the mapped.

)-- 
)"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
)
)Sarge Gerbode

"Absolute knowledge means you have nothing to learn"

-- 
			The check is in the e-mail

				jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)

sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/23/88)

In article <984@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
(Cliff Joslyn) writes:

>So reality of the territory is undecidable.  What about reality of the
>map? Sarge, I think you'd claim that an individual's truth claims about
>their mental phenomena are incorrigible.  When I was reading in
>Cognitive Science I did come accross some pretty heavy arguments against
>this view.

>So, what if reality of the map is *also* undecidable?  Well, then, uh, I
>guess. . .gosh, I'd better be pretty careful going to work today. .
>.never know when I met run into a reality pit and spit out a white hole.

If reality of the map is undecidable, then, as you imply, we are really
f**ked.  We can't go on living with that assumption, so, in practice, it's
unmakable.  And I don't think anyone would really agree that they couldn't have
a *representation* of reality, at least.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/23/88)

In article <52@avsd.UUCP> govett@avsd.UUCP (David Govett) writes:
>
>How can you determine the accuracy of another's "map" if your "map" is
>inaccurate?

You can't, in any absolute sense.  But elements of another's map can "fill in
the gaps" in yours, thus completing the picture.  With actual
(non-metaophorical) maps, I think that one would judge the accuracy of
another's map by whether the parts that corresponded with yours matched well
-- by whether his had rivers where yours had rivers, and so forth.  If so, and
if his map also included what was formerly terra incognita for you, or if
parts of your map were fuzzy and his corresponding parts were clear, you could
use another's map to expand yours.  In fact, we do this all the time.  It's
called "communication" and "education".  A good teacher always starts from
what is known to the student (the points of overlap of their maps) and then
adds to the student's map in a way the student can follow.  The student also
adds to his own map by observation.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/24/88)

In article <741@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:
>In article <356@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:

>]I was only pointing out that reality is
>]what exists for a person.  I think what we normally think of as "validity" is
>]really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to
>]agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard.  A
>]person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting
>]agreement from others than one with a less credible reality.  A major aspect
>]of credibility is conformity to what others already believe.  Another is
>]logical consistency.  Another is aesthetics.  But I think it is relatively
>]meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality.

>At the risk of sounding like the 'ordinary language' folks, I have to say that
>this is not the way we use the word "reality".  We can talk about someone being
>out of touch with reality.  We don't mean merely that we don't agree with her
>reality.

Whether we *mean* that or not depends on what our definition of "reality" is.
But, empirically, I would say when we say that someone else is out of touch
with reality, we do in fact disagree with that other person.  And if we were to
say that we were ourselves out of touch with reality, that would betoken a loss
of confidence in what we believe and an inner conflict.  Can you think of
a counter-example?

>I believe in my ordinary life (and I suspect so do you) that reality is "out 
>there" and that my senses give me a workable picture of it, sufficient, at 
>least, to cross the street without getting run over.

Sure: *anyone's* reality is perceived as being "out there", in that it is
perceived, conceived, and known to be outside the person.

>I further believe that
>others have access to that same "out there" reality.  In other words, reality
>is (at least partially) independant of what "exists for me" and if (ignoring
>life after death issues) I were to cease to exist, there would still be a "you"
>(gentle reader) out there in reality.  (Not very 'New Age' of me, I know)

Well, this isn't talk.religion.newage, so you're safe!  Well, I certainly
prefer your view to the solipsistic one I sometimes run across.  My
translation of the above is to say that there is considerable *agreement*
amongst people and that that agreement will exist even when I am no longer
around.

>]I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is being [an ideological]
>]imperialist.  It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting
>]it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others.

>Are you asserting this view as "absolutely" true?  Does that make you a 
>meta-imperialist?

Interesting point.  Is there no escape from imperialism?  Well, I prefer to
think that I am *offering* this reality to others as a useful one with a great
deal of credibility, one that will enhance their world-view if accepted.  So
it's more of a sales job than an enforcement.  It's not the *presentation* of a
reality that I object to.  It's the enforcement of one reality and the
invalidation of others that I object to.  It's like the difference between
conquest and acculturation.

>But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used.

True, but I am offering a different conceptualization that will fit most of the
instances where the word "reality" is used, one that I think has some useful
consequences.

>]I think [realities seem to have so much in common] because *people* have so
>]much in common.  There are certain rules
>]that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical
>]consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease
>]of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a
>]computer program.  So they will tend to agree on things that promote these
>]characteristics in their worlds.

>This begs the question.  Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing
>their world?  Do they accidently choose the same rules?  Or are these "rules"
>part of a "reality" they have in common?

Interesting question.  I don't know.  All I know is that we seem to follow those
rules.  The rules don't, of course, mandate the *particular* realities people
experience, only various characteristics of those realities.  Completely
different systems, for instance, may be logically consistent internally but
quite different from each other.

My point is really a skeptical one:  there *might* be some external reality
that we share, but all each of us really knows is the reality *he* has and, to
some extent, how it has been derived from prior realities.  Maybe the
commonalities we experience are due to the presence of some external reality
that is not knowable directly, or maybe the commonalities have to do with some
higher unity of consciousness.  Maybe, as Sagan speculated in "Contact", God is
trying to communicate to us through what we perceive as the physical universe
and the discovery of truth concerning the physical universe amounts to a
correct interpretation of what God meant.  All these are fun as speculations.
But it is best to start from what we are certain of:  the existence of our own
worlds and the principles by which they are ordered.

>]Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced*
>]and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all.
>]Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly
>]experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by
>]behavioral means.

>How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious?

I don't think it can be proved with certainty.  I think we can only infer from
similarities (either of form or behavior) the probable presence of other
consciousnesses.  There has been a big controversy raging about Turing
machines in talk.philosophy.misc on this point.

>]Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful*
>]without being *provable*.  I can get an idea of what it would mean for a
>]machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it.

>Is this 'idea' verbalizable?  Is it a judgement made on the basis of observable
>evidence? Or is it a feeling, such as we have watching the image of an actor on
>the screen that this image is concious?

Maybe it's verbalizable, though it's difficult.  It has something to do with
having a viewpoint and having intention.  If a machine had a viewpoint and had
intention, the same way I have a viewpoint and have intention, I would say it's
intelligent (or, rather, conscious).  I don't happen to think a machine *could*
have these qualities, but if it did, it would be conscious.

I wouldn't say an idea is a feeling, though ideas are commonly *accompanied* by
feelings.  A feeling is a phenomenon, an internal or external perception.

Also, an idea is not a judgment.  An idea is something that can be *judged*, as
to its truth or falsity.  In itself, it is not an assertion, so it can't be
"proven".  It simply exists, as a possibility.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/24/88)

In article <3503@dasys1.UUCP> gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) writes:
>Once upon a time there were five blind men who encountered
>an elephant and Sarge Gerbode.
>
>The first grasped the elephant's trunk.  "Aha!" he said, "the
>elephant is like a snake!"
>
>The second grasped the elephant's leg.  "No!" he said, "the
>elephant is like a tree!"
>
>The third felt the elephant's side.  "Not at all," he said,
>"the elephant is like a wall!"
>
>The fourth felt the elephant's tail.  "You're all wrong," he
>said, "the elephant is like a rope!"
>
>The fifth blind man said, "I think, if we perform further
>experiments, and reason about the results, we can construct
>a fairly good idea about what an elephant is.  It may be
>that we can even put this elephant to good use."
>
>"No," said Sarge Gerbode.  "There is no objective reality.
>And there is no elephant."  And he got on the elephant and
>rode away into the sunset.

Wonderful!

I'm going to be hard-pressed to find a quality comeback to this one!

Actually, what I would say is:

"Perhaps if we pooled our experiences and ironed out our differences, and if
we applied the rules of logic and other rules by which we all organize our
respective worlds, we could come to an agreement about what the nature of an
elephant is."

And we all got on the elephant that we had agreed on and rode off into the
sunset.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/25/88)

In article <746@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:

>[T]he map is only real as 'map territory', mapable as meta-map.  Will some
>Zen master please hit Sarge with a stick?

Please don't!  I hate violence, even from a Zen master.  Besides, I *agree* that
the map is only real as map territory.  I can't conceive its being real as
anything else.  So you don't have to hit me.  Pleeeze!

>New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the
>existence of New Jersey is implicit in the existence of Staten Island.

I don't really understand this point.  We make models of the universe all the
time and predict hitherto unobserved phenomena from them by extrapolation.
That is a principal means of discovery.

And can we ever know the territory directly?  I think not.  As has been
pointed out ad nauseum, all our sensory data comes to us pre-filtered and
per-interpreted.  So all we have, each of us, is his own map.  Certainly, as
you imply, we have different levels of maps -- maps of maps.  And for each
higher-level map, the territory is a lower-level map.  But do we ever reach a
level so low that we have reached a territory that is not a map?  I don't
think so.
-- 
"The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) (03/25/88)

In article <363@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
}
}It also seems possible that there is no territory -- only a gradually evolving
}map.
}-- 
But a map is a map -- which means it's a map of something, if only
a bigger map.  (It could be a map of itself, but that would be too
boring, except to Douglas Hofstadter.)
-- 
G Fitch	        				{uunet}!mstan\
The Big Electric Cat     {ihnp4,harvard,philabs}!cmcl2!cucard!dasys1!gf
New York City, NY, USA  (212) 879-9031          {sun}!hoptoad/

jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/26/88)

In article <368@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
)
)But, empirically, I would say when we say that someone else is out of touch
)with reality, we do in fact disagree with that other person.  And if we were to
)say that we were ourselves out of touch with reality, that would betoken a loss
)of confidence in what we believe and an inner conflict.  Can you think of
)a counter-example?

Yes. I disagree with your "mapping" of reality but I don't think you are out of
touch with reality.

)Sure: *anyone's* reality is perceived as being "out there", in that it is
)perceived, conceived, and known to be outside the person.

It looks like you are making a stronger statement here than the one you wish to
avoid.  You say that the question of whether there is an external reality is
"meaningless" regardless of how we perceive it to be, yet you don't hesitate to
speculate on what goes on in the perceptions of others which we cannot directly
perceive.

me:
)>But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used.
)
)True, but I am offering a different conceptualization that will fit most of the
)instances where the word "reality" is used, one that I think has some useful
)consequences.

And what meta-map can tell me how to choose between the ordinary and new map of
reality?  As for myself, I kinda like the old "out-there" reality since it is
more intuitive.  What's more, I'm willing to bet that you act in the world as if
there were an objective reality despite your claim of meaninglessness.

me:
)>This begs the question.  Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing
)>their world?  Do they accidently choose the same rules?  Or are these "rules"
)>part of a "reality" they have in common?
)
)Interesting question.  I don't know.  All I know is that we seem to follow those
)rules.  The rules don't, of course, mandate the *particular* realities people
)experience, only various characteristics of those realities.  Completely
)different systems, for instance, may be logically consistent internally but
)quite different from each other.
)
)My point is really a skeptical one:  there *might* be some external reality

But you seem to be very selectively skeptical.  You end up assuming things
more improbable.  Take the following for example:

me:
)>How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious?
)
)I don't think it can be proved with certainty.  I think we can only infer from
)similarities (either of form or behavior) the probable presence of other
)consciousnesses.  There has been a big controversy raging about Turing
)machines in talk.philosophy.misc on this point.

)                                            ...  It has something to do with
)having a viewpoint and having intention.  If a machine had a viewpoint and had
)intention, the same way I have a viewpoint and have intention, I would say it's
)intelligent (or, rather, conscious).  I don't happen to think a machine *could*
)have these qualities, but if it did, it would be conscious.

Does a chess playing program have the intention of winning?  Somehow I think 
your "requisites" for conciousness are harder to pin down than conciousness 
itself.

)"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

You could always change your mind just for the fun of it...

)Sarge Gerbode

-- 
	Being an AI program means never having to say you're sorry.

				jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)

sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/26/88)

In article <3558@dasys1.UUCP> gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) writes:

>[A] map is a map -- which means it's a map of something, if only
>a bigger map.  (It could be a map of itself, but that would be too
>boring, except to Douglas Hofstadter.)

Maybe it's an infinite series of maps of maps, or maybe at the bottom level, it
not a map but something one has created.  After all, we can also create things
that are not maps, like mental pictures, then map them.
-- 
"The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

dan@lclark.UUCP (Dan Revel) (03/26/88)

In article <746@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:
>I ... think one has a tendancy to try to understand (i.e. map) too quickly
>(just as one easily forgets ones dreams on awakening) until one believes the
>map existed before the mapped.

I agree:

The trick is to appropriate the map, as a map.  Many maps are inherited,
learned and followed by rote without the understanding that they are
1) provisional and 2) tools ( not rules, I know it rhymes, but I mean it ).

In retrospect maps that other people have used and left behind provide
an interesting view into the world in which they lived.  In the same
way our maps reflect our daily concerns, whether we are aware of those
concerns or not.  (A road map not only lets one find one's way around
but it also implies some interest in doing so, the location of a freeway
means somewhat less if you don't have a car.)

>"Absolute knowledge means you have nothing to learn"

"Absolute knowledge means dasein ;^)"

edk@gryphon.CTS.COM (Ed Kaulakis) (03/27/88)

In article <356@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
> Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly
> experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by
> behavioral means.

	This is true of skeptical discourse. What does it say about reality?

vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/27/88)

In article <373@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>...maybe at the bottom level, it
>not a map but something one has created.  

At the bottom level, our maps, our minds, our selves, everything that is
and allows us to even talk about maps, is our bodies.  It is
*impossible* for me to visually perceive the world in a way inconsistent
with my retina, optic nerves, optical ganglia, and visual cortex.  I
*cannot* *perceive* the world of X-rays, or of ultra-sonics, or of
micro-scopics, or of quantum tunneling, or a myriad of other modes of
existence of the world (i.e.  "reality"). 

So what, these things don't exist?

There *are* more things in heaven and earth. . .

O---------------------------------------------------------------------->
| Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician 
| Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions
| vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .

jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/27/88)

In article <371@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
)In article <746@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:
)
)>[T]he map is only real as 'map territory', mapable as meta-map.  Will some
)>Zen master please hit Sarge with a stick?
)
)Please don't!  I hate violence, even from a Zen master.  Besides, I *agree* that
)the map is only real as map territory.  I can't conceive its being real as
)anything else.  So you don't have to hit me.  Pleeeze!

Well, I hope I don't have to.  But map this: If I did you would experience
something directly.  (if not I'd do it again till you did :-)  Now you may
argue that it isn't *really* directly since there's all this intervening
nervous system and the like but I would reply that you had it all backwards.
Perception, as an interpretation of how we relate to the world, is just an
after the fact mapping; an organization of our direct experience (which in
this case paradoxically defines it as indirect).  You say that maps are all
we've got.  But to paraphrase Buckaroo Bonzai, what ever we've got..., thats
what we've got.  Arguments that there is more than *that* are just mis-mappings.
You can't argue with tautologies!

)>New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the
)>existence of New Jersey is implicit in the existence of Staten Island.
)
)I don't really understand this point.  We make models of the universe all the
)time and predict hitherto unobserved phenomena from them by extrapolation.
)That is a principal means of discovery.

Yes, but the prediction doesn't make it true.  It just tells you where to look.

)And can we ever know the territory directly?  I think not.  As has been
)pointed out ad nauseum, all our sensory data comes to us pre-filtered and
)per-interpreted.  So all we have, each of us, is his own map.  Certainly, as
)you imply, we have different levels of maps -- maps of maps.  And for each
)higher-level map, the territory is a lower-level map.  But do we ever reach a
)level so low that we have reached a territory that is not a map?  I don't
)think so.

Where's my stick?  

And by the way, that obnoxious fellow in "newage" who responded to you has a
point.  Don't dismiss him out of hand.
)-- 
)"The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got."
)
)Sarge Gerbode
-- 
286,000 miles per second.  It's not just a good idea, it's the law!

				jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)

glg@sfsup.UUCP (G.Gleason) (03/27/88)

In article <371@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>In article <746@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:

>>[T]he map is only real as 'map territory', mapable as meta-map.  Will some
>>Zen master please hit Sarge with a stick?

Is this possible over the net?

>Please don't!  I hate violence, even from a Zen master.  Besides, I *agree* that
>the map is only real as map territory.  I can't conceive its being real as
>anything else.  So you don't have to hit me.  Pleeeze!

Yes, but perhaps the reward is enlightenment, would that make it worth-
while?

Try not to turn everything into concepts, it makes it difficult to taste
and feel the world.

>>New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the
>>existence of New Jersey is implicit in the existence of Staten Island.

>I don't really understand this point.  We make models of the universe all the
>time and predict hitherto unobserved phenomena from them by extrapolation.
>That is a principal means of discovery.

I would spend some more time looking at what he said, and why your
posting prompted him to say it.

Sure, we try to predict what will happen, or what we will discover
sometimes, but are rarely very successful.  The more succussful way of
being-in-the-world is not predicting, but spontaneous.  With a clear
mind we confront new situations ready to flow with events.  Learning
shows up in our ability to interpret events, and synthesize actions
in respnse.  When learning is complete, action is spontaneous, and
we are not even conscious of what is happening.  No contemplation,
no prediction, just action.

Gerry Gleason

vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/28/88)

In article <2960@sfsup.UUCP> glg@/guest4/glgUUCP (xt1112-G.Gleason) writes:
>In article <371@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>>>New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the
>>>existence of New Jersey is implicit in the existence of Staten Island.
>
>>I don't really understand this point.  We make models of the universe all the
>>time and predict hitherto unobserved phenomena from them by extrapolation.
>>That is a principal means of discovery.
>
>Sure, we try to predict what will happen, or what we will discover
>sometimes, but are rarely very successful.  

Um, I really have to agree w/Sarge here.  To my mind, the primary
(only?) use of information (i.e.  knowledge, "maps") is in terms of
prediction.  This is true at a vast number of levels.  When the dog
learns to salivate at the bell, it is acquiring information (augmenting
its map) with which it predicts the future: when it hears a bell, it
predicts food.  When I have a good theory, it is informative in that I
can use it to make predictions about experiments in the future.  The
cell is full of information (genetic "maps") about the state of the
world, etc.  When certain conditions happen, it produces an enzyme,
"predicting" that that enzyme will be useful.  At a common sense level,
when I walk into a dark room that I know very well, I use my knowledge
(literally a visual image, map) to predict the location of furniture and
avoid obstacles. 

On the contrary to Gerry, these kinds of predictions are overwhelmingly
common and succesful.  It's just the exceptions that stand out that make
it appear otherwise.

>The more succussful way of
>being-in-the-world is not predicting, but spontaneous.  With a clear
>mind we confront new situations ready to flow with events.  Learning
>shows up in our ability to interpret events, and synthesize actions
>in respnse.  When learning is complete, action is spontaneous, and
>we are not even conscious of what is happening.  

I agree to the extent that you limit information and prediction to
conscious events.  My examples above show otherwise.  There is a complex
interaction between the conscious and the unconsciuos, and sometimes
conscious knowledge and decision making are necessary.  To advocate not
using conscious prediction and decision, but rather a kind of
non-thinking going-with-the-flow, can be a prescription for disaster. 
That is in fact the world situation now: not predicting global warming,
not predicting global debt, not predicting population growth.  

Skill is nothing without wisdom, and vice versa. 

>Gerry Gleason

O---------------------------------------------------------------------->
| Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician 
| Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York
| vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .

laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) (03/29/88)

In article <369@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>I'm going to be hard-pressed to find a quality comeback to this one!
>
>Actually, what I would say is:
>
>"Perhaps if we pooled our experiences and ironed out our differences, and if
>we applied the rules of logic and other rules by which we all organize our
>respective worlds, we could come to an agreement about what the nature of an
>elephant is."
>
>And we all got on the elephant that we had agreed on and rode off into the
>sunset.

I don't think so.  That ``ironing out the differences'' stuff is
going to be difficult.  Methink that the elephant will die of old age.
Will that be an objectively dead elephant?  or only a subjectively
dead one?

Laura
-- 
The universe is expanding, but I still can't find a parking space.

Laura Creighton	
uunet!hoptoad!laura  utzoo!hoptoad!laura  sun!hoptoad!laura toad@toad.com

bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (03/29/88)

In article <4268@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) 
(Hi Laura!) writes:

>The universe is expanding, but I still can't find a parking space.

Gee, couldn't we just let Sarge & Company ride the elephant
around the block?

--Barry Kort